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ABSTRACT 
 
TAKAFUL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES IN SAUDI ARABIA: AN EXPLORATION INTO 
POLICYHOLDER’S PERCEPTIONS AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
Hashem Abdullah AlNemer 
 
Takaful is the Islamic counterpart of conventional insurance, where it relies on a combination of 
tabarru (donation) and agency or profit-sharing. The takaful fund is considered a musharaka (partnership) 
among participants (policyholders). The relationship between the takaful operator and participants’ fund 
is based on either wakala contracts to manage the underwriting activities, and/or a mudaraba contracts to 
manage the underwriting or investment activities. Participants (Policyholders) in the takaful scheme are 
the main stakeholders; their equity consists of ownership of the underwriting activities and the investment 
funds. Participants’ relationship with Takaful Operators (TOs) depends on the percentage of the 
contributions premium they pay. They have a claim on assets of these funds in case of liquidation and 
they are entitled to have their claim paid if there is enough underwriting funds to finance payout; they are 
also entitled to share in the distribution of any investment and underwriting surplus. However, the only 
right that participants can exert on the takaful scheme is to disconnect their contractual relationship with 
the company in case of dissatisfactions. Participants’ undeserved rights might be due to management 
prioritizing interest towards shareholders as they are the main stewards of the takaful company. In other 
words, one of the main challenges faced in the takaful industry is shareholders and management 
discretions, power and activities due to the unclear structure of the takaful operational scheme. The 
Takaful operational scheme should follow the two-tier hybrid structure (mutual and proprietorship) as it 
has been identified by the prominent regulatory bodies such as AAOIFI and IFSB. However, almost all 
regulators, of which the Saud Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) is one, treat the TOs as a 
proprietorship, as it can be easily regulated and supervised which requires an identified share capital and 
shareholders.  
 
The main aim of this study, hence, is to recommend proper protection channels for participants, 
by conducting two parallel ways research, (i) exploring participants’ perceptions, knowledge, preferences 
and satisfactions levels about the service and products presented by the TOs in Saudi Arabia (ii) 
reviewing and comparing the current directives and laws imposed by the Saudi insurance regulatory 
authorities with the standards and polices imposed by the international insurance and takaful bodies. 
 
In fulfilling the aim of the study, primary data collection research was adopted through a survey 
questionnaire technique. The questionnaire was structured with 4 main dimensions (Disclosure, 
Knowledge, Preference and Satisfaction) with a total of 26 variables to cover the research objectives and 
themes. The survey questionnaire was distributed to 9 TOs in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. A total of 300 out of 
500 returned questionnaires were complete and found fit for analysis purposes. The data were analysed 
using various statistical analysis techniques ranging from simple frequency distribution analysis to the 
more advanced analyses such as non-parametric statistical analysis, Spearman’s correlation and 
multinomial logistic regression. In general, the results of the study show that participants’ overall 
perceptions and knowledge on TOs services and products is low, while participants reported high overall 
preferences which implies that participants are demanding more services from the TOs as they have more 
wants and needs. In term of satisfaction levels, participants reported a weak to moderate satisfaction 
levels, as a result of participants’ low perception, weak knowledge and high preferences which was 
obvious from the significant relationship between participants perceptions, knowledge and preferences as 
independent variables with participants’ satisfaction levels as dependant variables. In other words, in 
order for the TOs to satisfy their participants, they need to disclose more detailed information about 
different sorts of financial returns (investment return and underwriting surplus), as participants are 
iv 
 
financially motivated and there is no effect at all for religious motivation. The results of reviewing and 
comparing SAMA with the international insurance and takaful bodies, indicated that SAMA did not 
implement directive laws that address the takaful business nor any directive that address Shari’ah issues. 
Accordingly, it is highly recommended that SAMA adopts the well-established Corporate Governance 
and Market Conduct & Disclosure standards and polices that have been set by the international bodies 
such as AAOIFI and IFSB for better protection for the takaful participants in Saudi Arabia.        
 
The results of the research have established effective instrumental tools to measure the desired 
environment that should be available for the perspective policyholders and participants for their ultimate 
protection. These tools are based on participants’ perceptions, knowledge, preferences and satisfaction 
levels and based on the country’s regulatory assessments to support and protect participants’ and 
policyholders’ rights in the takaful fund.   
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GLOSSARY 
 
The Glossary for terminology used in this thesis is taken from the Encyclopedia of Islamic 
Finance authored by Shanmugam, Alam and Zahari (2008) and Dusuki (2005). The 
terminologies were also taken from IFSB (2010). 
 
Transliteration      Translation 
 
Al-Quran: The Holy Book of the Muslims consisting of the evelations made by Allah 
to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The Quran lays down the 
fundamentals of the Islamic faith including beliefs and all aspects of the 
Muslim way of life. 
 
Al-Hadith:  The tradition or collection of traditions attributed to the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) that includes his saying, acts, and approval or 
disapproval of things. Hadith is valued by Muslims as a major source of 
religious law and moral guidance. 
 
Fiqh / usul alfiqh:   Islamic Jurispudence / The Principles of Islamic Jurispudence. It covers all 
aspects of life – religious, political, social or economics etc. 
 
Gharar: Certain types of prohibited (haram) uncertainty in a contract. It is an 
exchange in which one or more parties stand to be deceived through 
ignorance of an essential element of the exchange. 
 
Kafalah: A contract of guarantee, security or collateral. It is also defined as the 
responsibility of the entrepreneur or manager of a business, that is, one of 
two basic relationships towards property, which entails bearing the risk of 
its loss. 
 
Mudārabah: An agreement made between two parties: one which provides 100 percent 
of the capital for the project and another party known as a mudarrib, who 
manages the project using his entrepreneurial skills. Profits are distributed 
according to a predetermined ratio. Any losses accruing are borne by the 
provider of capital. The provider of capital has no control over the 
management of the project. 
 
Mudarib :   Refers to the partner who provides entrepreneurship and management 
services in a mudarabah agreement. 
 
Mushārakah: A partnership contract between two parties who both contribute capital 
towards the financing of a project. Both parties share profits on a pre-
agreed ratio, but losses are shared on the basis of equity participation. 
Either parties or just one of them may carry out management of the 
project. This is a very flexible partnership arrangement where the sharing 
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of the profits and management can be negotiated and pre-agreed by all 
parties. 
 
Qard-al Hasan: An interest-free loan given mainly for welfare purposes. The borrower is 
only requires to pay back the amount borrowed. In some cases, a 
minimum administrative fee may also be charged to the borrower. 
 
Rab-al-Mal: The owner of capital in a mudarabah contract. The owner agrees with the 
working party to give him an amount of money to be invested such that 
the profit is distributed among them with known predetermined 
percentages that are not based on the capital but on the amount of the 
realized profit itself. As for the loss (if any), is to be borne by the owner of 
capital alone and the working party suffers the loss of his effort and his 
time without any compensation. 
 
Riba’: Literally means an increase or addition. Technically it denotes any 
increase or advantage obtained and accrued by the lender in a loan 
transaction without giving an equivalent counter-value or recompense in 
return to the borrower. In a commodity exchange it denotes any disparity 
in the quantity or time of delivery. 
 
Sharī’ah: In legal terminology, Shari’ah means the law as extracted by the 
Mujtahids from the sources of law. The term Shari’ah can also mean 
divine guidance as given by the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) and embodies all aspects of the Islamic faith, 
including beliefs and practice. 
 
Sunnah: It refers essentially to the Prophet’s examples as indicated by his practice 
of the faith. Literally means custom; the habits and religious practices of 
the Prophet Muhammad, which were recorded for posterity by his 
companions and family and are regarded as the ideal Islamic norm. 
 
Surplus or deficit: An agency contract where the Takaful participants (as principal) appoint 
the Takaful operator (as agent) to carry out the underwriting and 
investment activities of the PRF on their behalf. 
 
 
Takaful: Literally it means guaranteeing each other. It is a system of Islamic 
insurance based on the principle of tawun (mutual assistance) and tabbaru 
(voluntarily) where risk is shared collectively by the group voluntarily. 
 
Takaful operator: Any establishment or entity that manages a Takaful business. 
(TO) 
 
Takaful participant: A party that participates in the Takaful product with the TO and has the 
right to benefit under a Takaful contract (similar to a “policyholder” in 
conventional insurance). 
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Tabarru’: A takaful donation or a contract where a participant agrees to donate a pre-
determined percentage of his contribution (to a takaful fund) to provide 
assistance to fellow participants. 
 
Underwriting: The process of evaluating new applications, carried out by a TO on behalf 
of the Takaful participants based on an established set of guidelines to 
determine the risk associated with an applicant. The TO could accept the 
application or assign the appropriate rating class or decline the application 
for a Takaful contract. 
 
Wakala: Delegation of a duty to another party or agency for specific purposes and 
under specific conditions. Under this concept, the bank acts as the 
customers’ agent in completing a particular financial transaction. As an 
agent, the bank will be paid a certain amount of fee for the services it 
provides. 
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Abbreviations Meaning 
AAOIFI Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
BASEL Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BoD Board of Director 
CCR claims contingency reserve 
CAGR compounded annual growth rate  
E & Y Ernst & Young 
FSA Financial Services Authority 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GWP Gross written premium  
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
IAH  Investment Account Holders 
IFI  Islamic Financial Institutions 
IIFM  International Islamic Financial Market 
IFCE Insurance Fundamentals Certificate Exam 
IFS Islamic financial services 
IFSB Islamic Financial Services Board 
INCEIF International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance 
IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
ICP IAIS Core Principles  
IOB Institute of Banking 
IRR Investment Risk Reserve 
ISCU Internal Shari’ah compliance unit/department  
ISRU Internal Shari’ah Review Audit  
JWG Joint Working Grouping 
NCB No Claim Bonus 
NCD No Claim Discounts 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PA Participants’ Account 
 PER  Profit Equalization Reserve 
PIF Participant Investment Fund 
PRF Participant Risk Fund 
PSA Participants’ Special Account 
QIC quality insurance congress 
RIA Restricted Investment Account 
SAMA Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 
SAR Saudi Arabian Riyal 
SSB Shariah Supervisory Board 
TO Takaful Operator 
UIA Unrestricted investment Account 
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Abbreviations Meaning 
DM Disclosure Mechanisms 
DIR Disclosure of Investment Returns 
DUS Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus 
DSC Disclosure of Sharia’h Compliance 
DCI Disclosure of Claims and Indemnities 
DFDQ Disclosure of Fees, Deficits and Qard 
DKP Disclosure of Key Personnel 
KPM Knowledge of the principle of the TOs Model 
KIR Knowledge of Investment Returns 
KUS Knowledge of Underwriting Surplus 
KSC Knowledge of Sharia’h Compliance 
KFDQ Knowledge of Charged Fees, Encountered Deficits and availability of Qard 
KKP Knowledge of Key Personnel Power and Activities 
KDC Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels   
PSC Preference on Sharia’h Compliance 
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PKP Preference on TOs Key Personnel 
PRU Preference on the reason to use takaful policy 
PCU Preference on claims and underwriting surplus 
SDM Satisfaction with TOs Disclosure Mechanism 
SIR Satisfaction with TOs Investment Returns 
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SFDQ Satisfaction with Fees, Deficits and Qard 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION  
The significant growth of Islamic financial institutions and markets along with the development 
of the supporting financial infrastructure and the standardized international rules and regulations, 
have all contributed to a robust international Islamic financial architecture for Islamic finance 
that is contributing towards ensuring the stability and soundness of the Islamic financial system 
(Aziz, 2007). The progress achieved in the development of the Islamic financial system, includes 
the takaful industry that has also experienced significant achievements. Takaful industries 
indicate clear manifestation of the recognition of Islamic insurance as an important source of 
enhancing Shari’ah-compliant protection against vulnerability or risk arising from untoward 
events (Aziz, 2007). The growth is reflected by the increase in the number of large takaful and 
retakaful operators worldwide and the growing participation of prominent global players in the 
takaful and retakaful market. 
 
Takaful grew at a compound annual growth rate of 39% over 2005 - 2008 in terms of global 
takaful premiums, 45% in the GCC, and 28% in South East Asia (SEA). The comparative growth 
of global insurance was 7% with the corresponding figures of 20% and 23.5%, respectively 
(Bhatty, 2010). The estimated size of the global takaful premium was US$ 5.3bn in 2008 and 
US$ 8.9bn in 2010 (Bhatty, 2010). By 2011, the takaful contributions reach US$ 11.9 bn, with a 
growth rate of 31% (E & Y, 2011) and expected to rise to US$ 12.5bn by 2015 (Lewis et al., 
2007). There were some 179 takaful companies and windows (20%) in 2008, and this number in 
2010 can easily be in excess of 200. The total capital committed within the takaful industry in 
2007 was around US$ 3.5bn (Bhatty, 2010). Saudi Arabia remains the largest takaful market in 
the GCC with contributions of US$ 2.9 bn in 2008 (E & Y, 2010). Meanwhile, in 2011, most 
GCC markets witnessed a slowdown in takaful growth with only the Saudi insurance market 
remaining strong. This was due to the compulsory medical insurance mandated by the 
government. Saudi Arabia’s introduction of compulsory medical insurance policies has 
contributed to a strong growth in family and medical takaful in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region (E & Y, 2011).  
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Although the takaful industry is well established internationally and is expanding rapidly with 
many new entrants, there remains confusion amongst the wider public about the difference 
between the Shari’ah-compliant insurance and conventional insurance products. There is a lack 
of understanding regarding how the takaful providers should be organized and operate and the 
providers themselves have not been effective in consumer education and marketing (Wilson, 
2007). Consequently, although it is easy to expand rapidly from a minimal base, further 
expansion will inevitably be more difficult unless potential clients are convinced of the merits of 
takaful and appreciate its distinction from conventional insurance and why it is regarded as 
Shari’ah compliant (Wilson, 2007). Yet, unlike its banking counterpart, takaful has been covered 
less in the literature on Islamic finance and its workings are not fully understood (Lewis et al., 
2007). As a result, more empirical and intensive studies are needed to conceptualize different 
issues related of takaful. This is particularly true for a country like Saudi Arabia where the 
potential market for the takaful business is forecasted to grow.    
    
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
The first modern takaful undertaking was found in Sudan in 1979. Its foundation was due to the 
solution by a Sudanese Shari’ah scholar (Dr. Muhammed Alamin Al-Dareer) of a juristic 
problem: how may the Shari’ah prohibition of trading insurance (in indemnities and guarantees 
more generally) be overcome? Part of the solution lies in the adoption of a structure for mutual 
underwriting of insured risks: the insured (participants) mutually insure one another, on a non-
profit basis, according to the principle of takaful (the Arabic word for “solidarity”). Another 
aspect of the solution consists of characterizing the policy contributions (premiums) to the risk 
fund as incorporating an element of conditional and irrevocable donation (tabarru), the donor 
making the contribution to the risk fund subject to being entitled to benefit from mutual 
protection against insured losses. However, the adoption of a mutual structure runs into two 
kinds of institutional obstacles: (i) the legal systems of many countries do not accept mutual or 
cooperative forms of company without share capital, (ii) even if such forms of company are 
accepted for insurance undertaking they need to be able to raise enough capital from 
policyholders to meet regulatory capital adequacy and solvency requirements (Archer et al, 
2009).  
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Therefore, to overcome these two obstacles the vast majority of takaful undertakings have a two-
tier hybrid structure in which the risk funds operate on a mutual basis but are managed by takaful 
operators (TOs) which are companies with shareholders (IFSB, 2010). However, this hybrid 
structure involves complexities and it raises the fundamentals of the true identity of the takaful 
scheme. Is the takaful scheme mutual or a proprietorship? Obviously, from a strictly legal 
perspective, it cannot be treated as a mutual when the law of the country does not cater for or 
accommodate the setting up of such forms of company with no shareholders. Moreover, the 
regulators issue the takaful license specifically to the TOs on the basis of its form as a 
proprietorship with properly identified share capital and shareholders. Thus, at least as far as the 
regulators are concerned, the takaful scheme is not a mutual (Hussain, 2009). Beyond, the legal 
form, it has to be highlighted that it is not purely a proprietorship either, since participant owners 
in the takaful fund cannot be eliminated. In other words to treat the takaful scheme as a pure 
proprietorship would directly jeopardize the whole takaful concept and contracts, since in 
principle a mutual is totally different type of legal entity than a proprietorship. Even if there is 
such a legal framework, mutuals and cooperatives per se in most countries may not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the financial regulatory authority. 
 
As a result, most if not all the takaful undertakings are set up by operators as proprietorships 
rather than mutuals. For the regulators a proprietorship can be regulated and supervised in a more 
direct manner, in the sense that they can categorically monitor and hold accountable the 
regulated parties. This is not possible in mutual and cooperatives as the policyholders themselves 
are the owners of the entity. The regulators may face an inconvenient dilemma that the regulated 
parties generally are also the supposedly protected party because they wear the hats both of 
clients and owners. The approach of having a proprietorship licensed as a TO is also convenient 
for the business owners who offer takaful products as a commercial initiative, motivated by the 
potential profits. The owners that are the shareholders of the TOs see themselves as better 
positioned to control the management and carry out activities in a manner that mutuals or 
cooperatives could be restricted from doing, such as raising funds through the issuance of shares 
(Hussain, 2009).   
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The above discussion raises concerns and challenges faced by the takaful industry. These include 
concerns with transparency and business monitoring, challenges in collation, analyzing and 
dissemination of credible and relevant financial and technical statistics, un-codified Shari’ah 
rules and principles, other challenges arising from standardization in accounting and operational 
approaches by markets, regions and jurisdictions (Bhatty, 2010). The main stakeholders affected 
in this dilemma are the takaful participants, especially those with long-term contracts, since they 
expect a variety of benefits out of their contributions to the fund. There is nothing that can 
restrict the TOs from challenging the regulators’ instructions. Based on the contractual 
arrangements it is the duty and obligation of the takaful participants themselves to make up for 
any deficit in the takaful fund. This is because the TOs are nothing more than managing agents 
and the takaful participants remain as the principles. 
 
Although the participants own the takaful fund they are supposed to be in a position to appoint 
another manager/TO to manage the whole scheme on their behalf if they are not satisfied with 
the performance of the current manager. However, these challenges and takaful structure 
dilemma have led TOs to exert more discretions and power over participants’ funds. As a result, 
participants are not in a position to exercise any governance controls and they do not attend 
general meetings, as policyholders in conventional mutuals have. As shareholders have control 
of the governance organs it is likely that the management would prioritize the interest of 
shareholders over the rights of the participants (who are in principle the owners of the takaful 
fund) since there are no incentive structures to make the management act in the interests of the 
policyholders. Accordingly, participants may find themselves in a disadvantageous position. The 
only right that participants can exert on the takaful scheme is to vote with their feet by 
discontinuing their contractual relationship with the company in case of dissatisfactions 
(Archeret al, 2009). 
 
As a result a significant amount of work has been conducted by international insurance and 
takaful bodies to develop a prudential system for insurance and takaful industry to protect the 
right of policyholders and participants. For example, the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) has issued the core principles of insurance supervision that is mainly 
concerned about customer protection through information disclosure, transparency toward the 
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market and corporate governance guidance. The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has 
also the same concerns of providing the required protections for participants as they have issued 
a number of takaful guiding principles, such as the takaful operations governance guiding 
principles, and the guiding principles on market conduct of business for Islamic institutions. The 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) standards and 
polices provide important rulings about TOs’ obligations towards participants, especially when it 
comes to the issue of participants financial return and ownership rights in the takaful fund. 
 
At the rational level, Saudi Arabia requires all insurance companies to operate under a 
cooperative business model which is a key feature of the takaful model (E & Y, 2011). Shari’ah 
scholars indicate that the Saudi cooperative model is similar to takaful models due to funds 
segregation and surplus distribution (Abouzaid, 2007). However, Saudi Arabia like other 
countries (Malaysia, Kuwait, Egypt, UAE, and Lebanon) that allowed takaful companies to 
operate in their jurisdictions do not follow AAOIFI standards and polices (with the exception of 
Bahrain and Qatar) (E & Y, 2011).  
 
In line with the current takaful challenges and the takaful structure dilemma, the significance and 
motivation to conduct the current research is to explore participants’ satisfaction levels, 
perceptions, knowledge and preferences about the services and products presented by the TOs in 
Saudi Arabia. The current research also aims to compare the cooperative insurance policies and 
standards of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)
1
, with the international takaful and 
insurance standards and polices of AAOIFI, IFSB, IAIS and other international insurance 
regulators. Exploring participants’ behavioural aspects and comparing the Saudi regulators 
standards and roles will provide the necessary recommendations that bring the required 
protections for takaful participants not only in Saudi Arabia but also for other participants who 
contributed to the takaful fund all over the world. To the researcher’s best knowledge, there are 
no studies that have been conducted before to study takaful participants’ behavioural aspects, 
needs and wants, which have different philosophical and operational aspects from the 
mainstream of commercial insurance policyholders. Moreover, no studies have been conducted 
                                               
1
 The takaful and insurance regulating body in Saudi Arabia is SAMA (E & Y, 2011). 
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that compare the Saudi insurance directives with the international directives with respect to 
participants’ protections.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES   
The dilemma about the takaful operational structures causes many challenges faced by the TOs, 
and a predicament exists between the recommended policies and standards stipulated by the 
international takaful regulators such as AAOIFI and IFSB with the policies and standards 
stipulated by most of the countries including Saudi Arabia. Against this backdrop this research 
aims to study the issue related to protection of participants’ rights and obligations in the takaful 
fund. This is done by (i) explore participants’ satisfaction levels, perceptions, knowledge and 
preferences, (ii) compare the Saudi insurance regulator’s laws and directives with the standards, 
polices and recommendations that have been stipulated by the international insurance and takaful 
regulations. Comparing the Saudi directives with the international ones will be done in 
accordance with the available guidelines, directives, laws and policies that address the issue of 
corporate governance, market conduct and disclosure. The main reason behind focusing the 
study on these two themes is because insurance regulators everywhere have issued a quite good 
number of directives and laws that aim to improve insurance companies’ corporate governance 
structures and to encourage insurance companies to act ethically in accordance to the ideal rules 
of market conduct and disclosure. 
   
Based on the findings, the research will be able to come up with recommendations to provide the 
required protections to the takaful participants, based on participants perceptions and behavioural 
aspects and based on the recommendations made for SAMA to provide a suitable directives and 
laws approach that suit the takaful operational schemes, to achieve the required and targeted 
protections for takaful participants.  
 
In order to fulfil the main aim of the study, a number of objectives were formulated: 
 
1. To identify the best international regulatory practices and standards of TOs in terms of 
corporate governance and market conduct & disclosure. 
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2. To explore the current laws and regulatory regime for the takaful companies operating in 
Saudi Arabia in terms of corporate governance, and market conduct regime and to 
explore the Saudi Arabian jurisdiction laws in resolving conflicts in the insurance 
industry. 
 
3. To explore participants’ satisfaction levels, and their perceptions, knowledge and 
preferences of the TOs services and products.   
 
4. To explore participants’ demographics characteristics that can make an impact on 
participants’ satisfactions levels. 
 
5. To explore the strength of relationships between participants’ satisfaction levels with 
their perceptions, knowledge, and preferences about the TOs services and products. 
 
6. To explore the form of relationships between participants’ satisfaction levels with their 
perceptions, knowledge, and preferences about the TOs services and products. 
 
7. To suggest solutions to improve the current Saudi Insurance Regulator directives and 
laws of the TOs. 
 
8. To propose some suggested solutions to improve the current TOs services, practices and 
products.   
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to achieve the identified research aim and objectives, the following research questions 
were formulated with the purpose of guidance on the overall conduct of the research, especially 
for the data collection, analysis, and interpretations process. The research questions are as 
follows: 
 
1. What are the best regulatory practices and standards of the TOs in terms of corporate 
governance, market conduct and disclosure? 
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2. What are the laws and regulations governing takaful companies in Saudi Arabia? 
 
3. What are Participants’ satisfaction levels, and their perceptions, knowledge, and 
preferences of TOs services and products?   
 
4. How do the participants’ demographics characteristics affect their satisfaction levels?   
 
 
 
5. What are the strengths of relationship between participants’ perceptions, knowledge and 
preferences, with their satisfaction about the TOs services and products? 
 
6. What are the forms of relationship between participants’ perceptions, knowledge and 
preferences, with their satisfaction about the TOs services and products? 
 
7. What are the suggested solutions for the Saudi Arabian Insurance Regulator to overcome 
any shortfalls in providing the required protections for takaful participants? 
 
8. What are the suggested solutions to overcome any shortcoming of the current practises 
conducted by the TOs in Saudi Arabia to institute the required protections to the takaful 
participants? 
 
1.5 RATIONALE FOR THIS STUDY  
The takaful industry is facing a number of challenges, some of which are the power and activities 
of shareholders and TOs on the takaful fund. This power can be a reason of the two-tier (mutual 
and proprietorship) hybrid structure of the takaful companies. The exerted power of the 
management and shareholders that exist is due to the regulators’ legal treatments: most if not all 
regulators are issuing takaful licenses on the basis of proprietorship with properly identified 
share capital and shareholders;  i.e. the regulators are not treating the takaful scheme on the basis 
of mutual insurance.  
 
Accordingly, to achieve the research aim and objectives a proper gauging technique is required 
to measure customer satisfaction. The SERVQUAL model was one of the options to measure 
customer satisfaction levels. However, due to the criticisms noticed by several researchers the 
model has proved to be unable to properly measures participants’ satisfaction levels in the 
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takaful business. Criticisms are such as inability of the model to work outside the Western 
countries, inability of the model to directly link customer satisfaction with the companies’ 
presented services, and inability of the model to serve the insurance sectors. To fill the gap a 
customized model is required. 
 
The model is based on the comprehensive topics covered in the literature review chapters, which 
address several researchers’ suggestions and findings about the importance of obeying customer 
perceptions, needs, wants and preferences which in a way enhance customer satisfaction levels. 
Previous researchers’ findings also indicate that customer motivations and preferences can be 
easily improved when a customer has a good knowledge about the basics and technical principles 
of the used model. The model is also based on the imposed polices and standards by the 
international takaful and insurance regulators which mainly focus on the importance of obeying 
customer expectations of gaining the required financial return and the Shari’ah compliance 
system. Regulators also acknowledge the importance of educating participants of their rights and 
obligations by having in a place a proper disclosure system. Regulators are also aware of the 
importance of the participants’ opinions and preferences by emphasising the recruitment of 
knowledgeable sales personnel and intermediaries who are responsive to the participants. 
Therefore, the suggested model will be structured according to the expected financial returns 
from the takaful fund in the form of investments and underwriting surplus returns. The model 
will also focus on the necessity of complaining within the Shari’ah rules. Accordingly, the main 
purpose of constructing the model is to determine the factors that enhance participants’ 
satisfactions by systematically linking their satisfactions with their perceptions, knowledge and 
preferences.  
Exploring TOs’ protection policies towards their participants and reviewing TOs’ perceptions 
about the services and products presented to participants is one of the aims of this study. 
However, due to the recent regulatory directives imposed by SAMA, it was not appropriate to 
view TOs perceptions on the services and products offered for the participants, as the majority of 
the TOs had to stop their operational activities and decided to retain the existing participants 
until full adherence to SAMA reform laws. Some of these requirements are the segregation 
between the insurance company from its main mother company (ex, bank affiliation) which 
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requires a separate capital and a separate Board of Directors (BoDs). Therefore, reviewing and 
comparing SAMA regulations with the international takaful and insurance regulations is an 
alternatives approach to fill the gap and to achieve the second main objective.   
The current research model is somehow similar to the research approach adopted by Wells et al 
(1995) who compare the results of consumer perception with regulatory assessment and 
directives to come up with proper recommendations for better service quality to serve the 
customers. In short, the current research effort can be used as a vital instrument for the TOs, 
since it is based on the policies and regulations that have been strongly recommended by the 
international insurance and takaful regulatory bodies to provide ultimate protection for the 
policyholders. The current research will fill the gap, by identifying a direct link between 
participants’ perceptions and their satisfaction levels, which will strongly highlight the important 
factors that TOs should considered to improve their service quality.     
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The research uses a qualitative methodology based on a triangulation method. The triangulation 
method is used because the current research combines two techniques, quantitative and 
qualitative. This study uses the qualitative method because it carries a textual analysis by 
comparing the Saudi directives with the international insurance and takaful directives. The study 
also used the quantitative method because it relies on primary data collections. The data has been 
collected from nine TOs in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and analyzed by using SPSS version 17 
software. A drop-off of a self-administered survey questionnaire and telephone calls techniques 
were used to collect participants’ responses. Accordingly, a total of 500 questionnaires were 
distributed, of which 420 completed questionnaires were received, where 120 questionnaires 
were rejected, leaving 300 completed and usable questionnaires for the research, yielding a 
usable response rate of 60 %. The survey questionnaire consists of 74 questions which are 
divided into 4 main dimensions (Disclosure, Knowledge, Preference and Satisfaction) with a 
total of 26 variables to cover the research objectives and themes. Most of the survey 
questionnaire is designed as close-ended type questions. The closed-ended or forced-choice type 
of question is preferable in this research because it will increase the response rate, since it is 
easier and faster to be answered by the prospective respondents, especially when using a phone-
call approach. The responses yielding a usable rate reflected the success of using these types of 
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questionnaires. To attain the aims and objectives of the study, a descriptive analysis with 
frequency distributions together with the measurement of mean, standard deviations and a chi-
square test have been used in this research to identify whether the discrepancy between 
categories is small, and the discrepancy is statistically significant or not. A set of non-parametric 
tests has been identified to be the most suitable technique for the current research, since the data 
was collected using a non-probability sampling technique. The non-parametric tests are also 
ideal for use when questionnaires are structured on categorical scales as with the current 
research. Accordingly, the current research uses the Mann-Whitney U-test and the Kruskal Walis 
test. To explore the relationships among variables a set of inferential statistics tools been used, 
Spearman’s Correlations and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis.  
 
1.7 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH CHAPTERS 
Following this brief introduction, the thesis continues with the remaining eleven chapters, which 
are closely interrelated. There will unavoidably be some overlapping of discussion and cross-
referencing. The overview of chapter 2 to chapter 12 is as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 - Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Overview: this chapter highlights the definition and 
functions of Islamic insurance along with the contemporary jurists’ judgments on the validity of 
commercial insurance contracts. This chapter also discusses the basic principles of the takaful 
contract along with the dominant takaful models. A comparison is also made between the takaful 
contract with other types of insurance contracts, such as commercial and the mutual-based 
contract.  
 
Chapter 3 - Insurance & Takaful Corporate Governance Policies: This chapter discusses 
different theories of conventional and Shari’ah governance, corporate governance models, 
governance key stakeholders, corporate governance challenges, and a reflection of the available 
international insurance and takaful polices. This chapter will provide an answer to the first part 
of research question 1. 
 
Chapter 4 - Market Conduct and Disclosure: This chapter discusses the relationship between 
market conduct and discourse, the problems associated with the insurance and takaful industry in 
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terms of claim and disputes settlements procedures, the importance of disclosing participants’ 
financial returns. This chapter addresses the second part of research question 1. 
 
Chapter 5 - Customized Approach to Measure Customer Satisfaction in the Takaful 
Industry: The chapter discusses customer satisfaction and how it is related to customer needs, 
perceptions and preferences. This chapter also discusses the importance of customer knowledge 
and understanding of the presented products and services, and how lack of knowledge can affect 
customer confidence and preferences. This chapter also relates service quality and satisfactions, 
and how lack of service quality can have a great impact on the services presented by the 
insurance industry.     
 
Chapter 6 - An Overview of Saudi Arabian Judiciary System & Insurance Industry 
Behaviours: This chapter provides a comprehensive history about Saudi Arabia insurance 
market developments, the current status of the TOs and the important regulations that were 
issued by SAMA to bring stability to the Saudi insurance market. This chapter provides an 
answer to research question 2. 
 
Chapter 7 - Research Framework and Methodology: The chapter discusses the research 
strategy and methodology adopted for the data collection process. It presents in great detail the 
recommended research procedures and the used technique. The rationale and justifications for 
each of the tools and techniques used throughout this study are presented.  
 
Chapter 8 - Description of Participants’ Characteristics’ and Perceptions: This chapter 
gives a descriptive insight into participants’ replies to the survey questions according to five 
sections of the survey: participants’ demographic characteristics, their perceptions about TOs 
disclosure system, participants’ knowledge, preferences and satisfaction levels about the services 
and products presented by the TOs. The descriptive analysis benefited from a frequency analysis 
which also includes the frequency percentage, mean, and standard deviations, value for each of 
the variables; this provides the reader with the grounding knowledge of the overall results. This 
chapter provides a justified answer to research question 3. 
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Chapter 9 - Exploring the Relationship between Variables Affecting Participant 
Satisfaction: Bivariate Analysis:  This chapter uses bivariate analysis statistical analysis tools 
to non-parametric data. In this chapter, participants’ satisfaction levels about TOs services and 
products are analyzed using statistical tools such as Mann-Whitney U-test, Kruskal-Wallis test. 
To find the strength and directions of the relationships between participants, satisfactions in 
accordance with their perceptions, knowledge and preferences Spearman’s correlations has been 
used. The results of the analysis are discussed and justified in order to respond to research 
questions 4 & 5. 
 
Chapter 10 - Exploring the Relationship between Variables Affecting Participant 
Satisfaction: Multivariate Analysis: The chapter uses a multivariate analysis approach for 
further analysis, of participants’ satisfaction levels. In this chapter, to find out the form of 
relationships, i.e. which variables causes the occurrence of the other variables, the multinomial 
logistic regression analysis has been used between participants satisfaction levels as a dependant 
variable, with participants perceptions, knowledge and preferences as independent variables. The 
results of the analysis are discussed and justified in order to respond to research question 6. 
 
Chapter 11 - Contextualization of Research Findings: Implications for SAMA: The chapter 
provides an interpretation and discussion of participants replies to the survey questions as per 
chapter 8. It also provides a discussion and justifications of the findings of the statistical analysis 
findings of chapters 9 and 10. The outcome of this chapter gives some insight in deriving the 
overall conclusions of the study which gives comprehensive answers to research questions 7. 
 
Chapter 12 - Contextualization of Research Findings: Implications for TOs:  The chapter 
discusses in great detail the current situation of the Saudi insurance market in terms of market 
behaviours and in terms of SAMA regulations. The outcome of this chapter gives some insight in 
deriving the overall conclusions of the study which gives comprehensive answers to research 
questions 8. 
 
The discussion, interpretations and justifications of chapter 11 and 12 makes cross-references to 
the theory and findings (that have been provided in the literature chapters) with the findings of 
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the bivariate and multivariate analysis with the literature chapters, and with participants’ 
demographic characteristics in order to link all the pertinent main findings in this study together 
and for better understanding and contextualization approach.  
 
Chapter 13 - Conclusion and Research Recommendations: The concluding chapter presents a 
summary of the major findings, recommendations, limitations, and offers suggestions for future 
research. To give a visual dimension to the structure of this research, Figure 13.1 provides an 
overall picture of the structure of the thesis: 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ISLAMIC INSURANCE (TAKAFUL) OVERVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Takaful offering insurance policy that complies with Islamic law is a growing and fast-
developing industry. Such business is highly recommended by most Muslim scholars because it 
reflects the real meaning of brotherhood in protecting individual and corporate bodies against 
loss or hazards to themselves and their properties. Akin to the English insurance law, Islamic 
insurance has its fundamentals and conditions which must be adhered to. These include the 
parties to the contract, legal capacities of the parties, offer and acceptance, consideration, subject 
matter, insurable interest and utmost good faith. The presence of certain elements and the 
absence of others can make a difference between a valid or void contract as per the Islamic laws. 
The takaful contract, however, will definitely rely on the used takaful model used. For instance 
the relationship between participants and the takaful operators (TOs) will differ in the case of 
wakalah model than the mudarabah model.  
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 presents background of Islamic insurance in 
terms of definition and functions. Section 2.3 discusses classical and contemporary jurists’ 
judgments on the validity of commercial insurance contracts. Section 2.4 gives an overview on 
the basic principles of the takaful contract. Section 2.5 highlights different takaful regulation 
bodies. Section 2.6 explores the most dominant and practiced models used to operate takaful 
companies worldwide. Section 2.7 gives an overview on the mechanisms of the takaful contract 
and Section 2.8 compares the takaful contract with other types of insurance contracts, such as 
commercial and the mutual- based contract and explains other takaful models such as the 
Sudanese takaful model and the Saudi Cooperative takaful model. Finally, section 2.9 draws 
conclusions.     
2.2 DEFINITIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF ISLAMIC INSURANCE TAKAFUL     
Takaful is derived from the Arabic root word kafala a verb which means guarantee, bail, warrant 
or an act of securing one's need (Ali et al , 2008). The idea of insurance in Islam must be in 
harmony with the objectives maqasid of Shari'ah with regard to securing benefits for the Muslim 
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client and preventing elements of harm (sin). The specific objectives are to protect religion, life, 
intellect, lineage and property (Al-Atar, 1983).  
 
Takaful is defined in Section 2 of the Malysian Takaful Act 1984 as:  
 
“A scheme based on brotherhood, solidarity and mutual assistance which provides 
for mutual financial aid and assistance to the participants in case of need whereby 
the participants mutually agree to contribute for that purpose.” 
 
AAOIFI
2
 (2004/2005) also defines Islamic insurance as per its Financial Accounting Standard 
No. 12, in Appendix E as: 
 
“Islamic insurance is a system through which the participants donate part or all of 
their contributions which are used to pay claims for damages suffered by some of the 
participants. The company's role is restricted to managing the insurance operations 
and investing the insurance contributions.” 
  
In 2007 AAOIFI defined Islamic insurance as per its Shari'ah Standard 26 (2) 2007: “Islamic 
insurance is an agreement between persons who are exposed to risks to protect themselves 
against harm arising from risk by paying contributions on the basis of a commitment to donate 
(iltizam bi al-tabarru). Following from that, the insurance fund is established and it is treated as 
a separate legal entity (shakhsiyyah i'tibariyyah) which has independent financial liability. The 
fund will cover the compensation against harms that befall any of the participants due to the 
occurrence of the insured risks (perils) in accordance with the terms of the policy.”   
 
Additionally, IFSB
3
 and IAIS
4
 (2006) described takaful as the Islamic counterpart of 
conventional insurance which can exist in either life (or family) and general forms. It is based on 
concepts of mutual solidarity and a typical takaful undertaking will consist of a two-tier structure 
that is a hybrid of a mutual and a commercial form of company.  
                                               
2 Accounting Auditing and Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions. 
3 Islamic Financial Service Board. 
4 International Association of Insurance Supervisors. 
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Takaful can be understood as an imperative upon Muslim believers only. It may be thought at 
first glance that takaful does not deviate from conventional insurance, since both types depend 
on the concept of pooling money from a group for the sake of helping the unfortunate of the 
same group in the event of encountering financial loss. However, unlike takaful, the spiritual 
mutual support is not a requisite of commercial insurance. Commercial insurance is based on the 
exchange whereby the insured pay a premium in exchange for protection in case of calamity 
exposure, thus it is common in conventional insurance not to compensate the insured in a case of 
no loss. In other words, the insurer’s promise to provide security to the insured will be so 
intangible that its value cannot be appreciated. However, the takaful mechanism is based on the 
concepts of tabarru (donation) combined with the intention (niah) to participate in the pooling 
aid mechanisms. Thus those who participate in the takaful mechanism will be less likely to 
encounter the feeling of receiving nothing if no claim occurs, the complete opposite will happen. 
They will be satisfied enough to help their colleague at the same pooling group in his loss, and 
they will feel grateful that no one has encountered any real loss. The concept of donation is 
considered to be the backbone of takaful in supporting the real meaning of mutual cooperation, 
as per Quran (5:2), “Help one another in furthering virtue and God-consciousness, and do not 
help one another in furthering evil and enmity”. Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him 
(P.B.U.H.) also said, “Verily a believer is one who can give security and protection to the life 
and property of mankind”.  
 
On the other hand, other contemporary Muslim scholars such Al-Qaradawi, suggest that donation 
should be the basis of the contract, if insurance is to be Shari‘ah-compliant (Al-Qaradawi, 2003). 
Another unique function which differentiates between conventional and Islamic insurance is the 
strong relationship between the TO and the participants. Relationship that goes even beyond the 
provisions of spiritual satisfaction needs, by providing services that stretch from the cradle to the 
Hereafter, services such as calculating and distributing zakah, hajj plan,  arrangements for 
continued charity involvement (Sadaqah Jariah) such as  building mosques, hospitals and 
schools on behalf of the participant upon his/her death (Nordin, 2007).  
 
While the conventional way of satisfying a customer is accomplished by fulfilling their material 
or worldly needs with benefits such as low prices, higher returns, faster delivery or even 
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benefiting the deceased’s family members after his death in the form of life insurance, this 
service goes from cradle to grave only. However, it does not mean that customer satisfaction in 
terms of price, quality, delivery and precision are not important to the TO, in fact they are 
important as along with the customer’s spiritual needs satisfaction. So when Muslims buy 
Islamic insurance they can combine two benefits; (i) They receive Islamic protection that 
complies with Shari ‘ah rules against financial loss, in the same way as conventional insurance, 
(ii) Customers can distance themselves from the possibility of the prohibition incurred by 
purchasing conventional insurance in line with Islamic law.  
 
Finally, although a believing Muslim is required to accept destiny, which may incorporate 
certain misfortunes, Islam encourages Muslims to take extra precaution to minimize potential 
misfortune, losses or injury arising from unfortunate events. Thus, having an insurance policy is 
not considered to be against the will of Allah, rather the will of Allah can be enhanced by 
holding an insurance policy to elevate the unexpected risk that exists in day-to-day life (Al-
Zarqa, 1962; Attar, 1983; Moghaizel, 1991).  
 
2.3 MUSLIM SCHOLARS’ OPINIONS ABOUT THE INSURANCE CONTRACT 
Muslim scholars differ in their views on the permissibility (halal) or prohibitions (haram) of 
conventional or commercial types of insurance. The majority of Muslim jurists invalidate 
commercial insurance since it does not closely resemble Islamic business transactions (Baltiji, 
1987; Al-Qaradawi, 2003). However, Islam is not against the concept of insurance itself, rather 
the means and methods being used (Hassan, 1979; Al-Qaradawi, 2003). While other jurists call 
for cooperation and solidarity by implementing insurance to benefit Muslims, they consider it a 
necessary means for economic progress and prosperity for the whole community (Siddiqi, 1985). 
The main disputes among jurists are due either to a lack of references in the primary sources of 
Islam i.e. Quran and Sunnah and the absence of any classical Islamic law on this subject with the 
exception of the Ibn Abidin reference regarding marine insurance (Al-Salih, 2004). It is also due 
to a different degree of understanding of the insurance contract among jurists. In addition, jurists 
have used different judgmental approaches towards the insurance contract, using approaches to 
insurance contracts from the Shari’ah perspective such as riba (usury), and gharar (uncertainty) 
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while others follow the economical, moral, social and political approach (Al-Salih,2004; 
Moghaizel,1991).            
Accordingly, Islamic jurists and researchers were divided into three groups according to their 
opinion of the permissibility of insurance contract specifically: 
1. Those who call for the prohibition of the insurance contract which they regard as being 
against Shari'ah principles, regardless of the insurance activity (general, life) and 
regardless of the types of insurance, i.e. conventional, cooperative or mutual 
(Aliyyan,1978 ;  Abdu,1987 ; Al-Salih,2004). 
2. Those who allow all types of insurance, on the condition that it is free from usury or 
interest (Al-Zarqa, 1962; Al-Khafif, 1966; Mudkor, 1975; Siddiqi, 1985; Mawlawi, 
1996). 
3. Those who hesitate in making straight judgements on insurance contracts; they validate 
some of the contracts such as mutuality and co-operation as long as it does not include 
usury activities and invalidate other commercial contracts (Attar,1983; Al-Sayed,1986; 
Baltiji, 1987; Al-Mahmood, 1994; Mawlawi, 1996; Melhim, 2002; Al-Qaradawi, 2003). 
While other scholars invalidate all life insurance contracts regardless of the types of 
insurance be it co-operative, mutual or commercial (Al-Mahmood, 1994).     
 
2.3.1 Commercial Insurance Contract Permissible School   
Conventional insurance was declared forbidden in the ninth declaration at the second session of 
the Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, with a notable dissent by the 
late Professor Mustafa Al Zarqa (Muslehuddin, 1969; El-Gamal, 2006) who permitted 
conventional insurance of all kinds. Al-Zarqa presented two papers in conferences in 1961 and 
1976, respectively in which he showed the historical roots, objectives and mechanisms of 
commercial insurance which he asserted. There is no proof in the texts of Islamic Shari’ah, or its 
legal theory, that would forbid insurance itself, in any of its three forms. On the contrary, the 
proofs of Shari’ah and its general objectives to point jointly toward its permissibility and 
approbation, as a means of eliminating risk and loss (Al-Zarqa, 1962). 
 
Based on Al-Zarqa’s analysis, a number of scholars published several papers that validated 
commercial insurance with minor recommended corrections such as Ali al-Khafif, Najatullah Al 
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Siddiqi, Ali Jum'ah, Rafiq Al-Misri (El-Gamal, 2006). The permissible scholars relied on 
specific justifications to validate commercial insurance, their justifications dealt with logical, 
moral, economic and social necessity concepts when interpreting and manipulating some of the 
Quran verses that support their position (Al-Salih, 2004). Their justifications were as follows: 
 
(i) Insurance is considered part and parcel of the necessary development of modern Islamic 
concepts. They argue that the universe is described as an adornment of Allah, hence Muslims are 
allowed to use all resources on the universe and earth, and all that is needed to facilitate this 
usage are thus permissible such as contracts. Accordingly, since an insurance policy is a contract 
by itself and there is no specific evidence to prohibit it in Quran or Sunnah then it is permissible, 
as they depend on Quran (45:13) and (2:29) respectively.  
 
(ii) The word ‘trade’ mentioned in the Quran is a broad and comprehensive subject. The 
insurance policy is a kind of business where the insured and the insurer know their duties and 
obligations very well, since they have agreed on the wording and conditions of the insurance 
contract; they rely on Quran (4:29): “O ye who believe! Eat up not your property among 
yourselves in vanities: But let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good will”. 
 
(iii) Muslims are committed to satisfy contract obligations in accordance with the Quran. 
However, it was a broad and comprehensive approach which would naturally comprise every 
contract that the Lawgiver has not specifically forbidden. The only basic requirement is the 
mutual consent of the parties (taradda minhum). Thus, an insurance contract is valid as long as it 
is intended for a good cause, and brings benefits (maslahah) to the insured; they rely on Quran 
(5:1) “O ye who believe! Fulfil (all) obligations”. 
 
On the other hand, the Hanbali School gives the freedom to contract as long as there is 
willingness (ridha) between them. Thus some scholars rely on Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal’s 
opinion that the norm in regard to contracts and stipulation (uqud wa shurut) is permissibility. 
Other scholars added another reason to accept commercial insurance based on an important 
concept in fiqh that is the illah (effective cause) and hikmah (wisdom). Illah is the basic feature 
of command whilst hikmah is the wisdom underpinning that command. An example of this is 
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when the Quran has prohibited drinking alcohol because of its harmful consequences that lead to 
certain disaster and to keep humans away from violent acts; the illah then is the loss of mind and 
the hikmah is the awful consequence that is built in drinking alcohol. However, it is permissible 
on some occasions to depart from the above procedures if the hikmah effectively renders the 
illah invalid, as with the case of eating pork. If there is no other food available, and it is a matter 
of death or life, then it is permissible to eat pork to remain alive and worship Allah (Ismail, 
2006).  
 
In the case of a contract which is dependent upon a future event occurring, the basic prohibition 
(illah) is due to disagreement between parties at a future date. In a similar vein with insurance 
the compensation to be paid in the event of loss of property is clearly defined from the outset, no 
arguments or disagreement should arise as the sum assured is clearly defined in writing, no more 
or less than the assured can be paid out. Thus as hikmah (avoidance of disputes) behind gharar is 
not an issue in insurance, therefore, the insurance contract is perfectly valid. Obviously the above 
scholars claimed commercial insurance as permissible due to insufficient evidence to declare it 
unlawful, hence they believe that any injunction to overrule this principle of permissibility must 
be decisive in meaning and transmission (nassul qati’ul thubut wa-dalalah). 
 
2.3.2 Commercial Insurance Contract Impermissible School  
The majority of Muslim scholars have invalidated the idea of insurance on its conventional 
concepts, since it is effectively a gamble upon the incidence of the contingency insured against, 
because the interest of both parties are diametrically opposed and both parties are not aware of 
their respective rights and liabilities until the occurrence of the insured events (Lewis, 2003). 
Another vital reason is due to the majority of insurance companies conducting their business by 
investing the collected premiums and reinsuring with other insurers, thereby, contravening the 
Islamic laws.  Such a contract inherits aleatory elements and a wagering contract of which the 
consequences are unknown (Lewis 2003). Accordingly, a number of resolutions prohibit the 
commercial insurance contract including the  unanimous decisions of the Fiqh Council of 
Muslims in Makah 1977
5
, The European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) 1992
6
, and the 
                                               
5
 For more details visit <www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite> 
6
 Ibid 
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Organization of the Islamic Conference’s (OIC) Fiqh Academy’s. Hence, after reviewing 
commercial insurance contracts in terms of forms, types, principles, and objectives of insurance 
and re-insurance, and after reviewing different papers in this regard, the OIC Fiqh Academy 
announced the following decisions: (i) the commercial insurance contract with a fixed insurance 
premium contains substantial gharar, which renders the contract defective, i.e. religiously 
forbidden, (ii) the alternative contract is cooperative insurance that relies on the principles of 
voluntary contribution and mutual cooperation, (iii) the academy called on Islamic countries to 
exert effort toward establishing mutual cooperative insurance institutions (El-Gamal, 2006). 
Furthermore, the Fiqh Academy declared that commercial insurance is a form of gambling, since 
the insured pays premium and receives no compensation or compensation far exceeds what he 
paid; also they debunked as invalid analogies all the arguments permitting insurance (El-Gamal, 
2006). 
 
A number of individual scholars and researchers have condemned dealing with insurance on its 
conventional concepts such as Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who defines the mutual agreements 
between the two parties in the commercial insurance as invalid in a transaction which is not 
based on justice and equities and not devoid of any trace of ambiguity or exploitation, where one 
party is to take all with no benefits guaranteed to the other, which prove that the relationship 
between parties does not constitute any partnership (Al-Qaradawi, 2003). Other scholars such as 
Sheikh Jad-al-Haq Ali Jad al-Haq, the former Grand Mufti of Egypt declared all life insurance to 
be prohibited under Shari'ah (Wahib, 1999; Billah, 2001; Lewis, 2003). He also advised 
Muslims through a fatwa against practicing life insurance policies as it involves unlawful 
elements and therefore, Muslims should not be making money or profits through unlawful means 
(Billah, 2001). While Sheikh Abdullah El-Galgeily, the Mufti of Jordan, judged all kinds of 
insurance as illegal in Shari’ah laws specially in the commercial form for several reasons i.e, 
they (a) are incompatible with natural and familiar methods of earning money, such as buying 
and selling, (b) are not free of the taint of gambling, (c) are not free of temptation and cheating, 
(d) involve an element of usury (Khorshid, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, scholars have denied and responded to the three justifications made by other 
scholars who validate commercial insurance in the following way (Al-Salih, 2004). All kinds of 
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contracts in Islam cannot be broadly valid, that the contract should not contradict the Islamic 
law, and since commercial insurance embodied major prohibition elements which are gharar, 
gambling and interest, then it is an invalid contract. Prohibited business is not allowed in Islam 
even if the contract parties were agreed upon, that the insurance contract that contains gharar is 
not a permitted trade. Islam has prohibited a number of contracts such as contracts containing 
gharar and interest, or contracts that deal with wine and pork business; thus the contract is never 
broadly without obligations and that the contract should be away from any prohibition elements 
that contradict Islam.  
 
Furthermore contracts in Islam can be deemed as impure or invalid if contains;  
1. Coercion (ikrah) 
2. Exploitation of distress 
3. Fraud and cheating (ghishsh wa ghaban) 
4. Obvious indeterminacy and hazard and ignorance likely to cause disputes (gharar-fahish 
and jahl mufdi ila niza) 
5. Detriment (darar) 
6. A contract within a contract (safaqat-fi-safaqat), or a contract where the outcome is 
dependent upon a future event (Siddiqi, 1985; Ismail, 2006). 
 
Discussions on insurance contracts are concentrated on points 4 and 6 only, which possess the 
prohibited elements of uncertainty of outcome (gharar) and gambling (maisir), and dealing with 
interest (riba) which is frowned upon by Shari'ah law. Thereby, the following explains the 
reason to forbid the aforementioned three concepts.   
 
2.3.2.1 Riba (Usury or Interest) 
The past tense root of the term riba is the Arabic verb raba, meaning to increase (El-Gamal, 
2006). Riba was interpreted by classical scholars such as Ibn Arabi, Mujahid, and Tabari as 
increase which has no wealth (mal) corresponding to it (Ibn Arabi); as reward for waiting 
(Mujahid) or increase which accrues to the lender on account of deferred payment due to an 
extension in the actual period of loan (Tabari), (Mirakhor et al, 2004). Literally riba refers to 
excess, addition and surplus, while the associated verb implies to increase, multiply, exceed, to 
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exact more than was due, or to practice usury (Al-Salih, 2004). Early Muslim scholars 
considered money to be a medium of exchange, standard of value and a unit of account, but 
rejected its function as a store of value; lending on interest was rejected as an act of 
ungratefulness and considered to be unjust, since money was not created to be sought for its own 
sake, but for other objects (Mirakhor et al, 2004). The prohibition of riba is mentioned in 
different verses of the Quran (30:39, 4:161, 3:130-2, 2:275-81). However, there is no available 
explanation of the prohibition of riba in the practice of the Prophet Muhammad (P.BU.H.) for 
two reasons; firstly, the Quranic verses regarding riba were revealed at the end of the Prophet’s 
life, hence riba questions were seldom asked to him. Secondly, the knowledge of riba was 
already known in the pre-Islamic period. When the Ka'bah was being re-built the donations 
made (for its rebuilding) containing an element of riba were rejected, as they were considered to 
be impure money (Mirakhor et al, 2004). Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) declared war on usury 
and those who deal with it; he pointed out its danger to society by saying “When usury and 
fornication appear in a community the people of that community render themselves deserving of 
the punishment of Allah” (Al-Qaradawi, 2003).  
 
Riba can be divided into two types; the first is riba al-nasiah.  Al-nasiah comes from the root 
nasa'a which means to postpone, defer, or wait. This type of riba deals with money-to-money 
exchange, that when exchange is delayed an additional charge is associated with such deferment. 
The worst type of al-nasiah is riba al-jahiliyya because it contains a time factor as was practiced 
in the pre-Islamic period. The second type of riba, riba al-fadl, occurs when trading the same 
goods but exceeding the quantities and qualities of one of the exchange parties which is 
prohibited as per the hadith of Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.), “gold for gold, silver for silver, 
salt for salt, dates for dates, barley for barley, and wheat for wheat, hand to hand, in equal 
amount; any increase is usury” (Al-Qaradawi, 2003).  
 
Riba starts when the insured person has paid his premium to the insurance company which  then 
invests the accumulated premiums from different clients into interest-bearing securities, such as 
bonds, deposits and equities that do not conform to Shari’a'h principles (Hassan, 1979; Attar, 
1983; Siddiqi, 1985; Al-Sayed, 1986; Baltiji, 1987; Al-Salih, 2004). The investment procedures 
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start when the accumulated premiums exceed the claims that the company has to pay out to the 
insured.  
 
2.3.2.2 Maysir (Gambling) 
Maysir or gambling is the second prohibited element that is embodied in commercial insurance, 
the literal meaning being the activities which involve betting, whereby the winner will take the 
entire winnings and the loser will lose his bet. Maysir is a sort of gambling, hazard game, game 
of chance or a zero-sum game, where the gamblers are looking for a huge amount of wealth 
without exacting much effort (Siddiqi, 1985). Gambling is forbidden in Islam in all its forms as 
per the Quran (5:90-91). The most extreme form of unbundled sale of risk is gambling: paying a 
predetermined price for some unproductive game of chance (a lottery ticket with a hope of 
winning the jackpot) (El-Gamal, 2006). The ancient Arabs also used to hold raffles (like the 
lottery) with their arrows, using them as a source of good fortune in a way that controlled their 
daily lives. Later, Islam considered such an act as gambling and prohibited it (Khorshid, 2004).  
 
Maysir is involved in insurance when the person to be insured purchases an insurance policy and 
hopes to get compensation in terms of indemnity if he encounters misfortune (Ali et al, 2008). 
Vaughan defined insurance as an aleatory gambling contract since there is a chance of paying 
either the indemnity by the insurer if the insured has suffered a loss, or not to pay if the insured 
has not encountered a loss (Vaughan, 1999). Ibn Qayyim on the other hand considered the 
aleatory sales prohibited by the Prophet and it falls either under the heading of riba or gambling 
(Ibn Qayyim, 1968). 
 
2.3.2.3 Gharar (Uncertainty) 
The third prohibition element encountered in commercial insurance is gharar. The literal 
meaning of gharar is ‘fraud’ but in transactions the word has often been used to mean risk, 
uncertainty, hazard and the ignorance of one or both parties of the substance or attributes of the 
object of sale, or of a doubt over this object's existence at the time of contract (Kamali, 2000). 
However, gharar is a broad concept which carries different meanings in different transactions. A 
number of scholars from different generations and schools cited gharar and they were specific in 
representing special cases of gharar, but many of them such as Ibn Abdin related gharar to 
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uncertainty about the existence of its subject-matter (Kamali, 2000) The Ibn Abdin definition is 
shared by Hanafi and Shafi'i schools (Al-Saati, 2003). Other scholars such as Al-Sarakhsi 
(Hanafi school) defined gharar as consequences which are hidden. Al-Shiraazı (Shafi'i school) 
defined gharar as nature and consequences which are hidden and Ibn Taymiya (Hanbali school) 
defined gharar as consequences which are unknown (Khorshid, 2004). Another explicit 
definition by Professor Mustafa Al-Zarqa is that gharar is the sale of probable items whose 
existence or characteristics are not certain, due to the risky nature which makes the trade similar 
to gambling (Al-Zarqa, 1962). Reviewing the above definitions Al-Zuhayli comments that 
gharar sale is any contract which incorporates a risk which affects one or more of the parties, 
and may result in loss of property (Al-Zuhayli, 1997).  
 
While the Quran explicitly forbids gambling (maysir) and usury,  the Sunnah forbids gharar sale 
and considers it to be vanity (albatil (Al-Darir, 1990; Al-Saati, 2003; Khorshid, 2004). 
Accordingly, gharar was forbidden in a number of hadith, perhaps the most strongest hadith is 
the one narrated by Muslim, Ahmad, Abu Dawud, Al Tirmidhi, Al Nasa'i, Al Darami and Ibn 
Majah on the authority of Abu Hurayra that the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) prohibited the pebble sale 
and the gharar sale, such as selling sperm and/or unfertilized eggs of camels, unborn calf in its 
mother's womb, birds in the sky or fish in the water (Al-Qaradawi, 2003).  Another hadith 
narrated by Muslim is that the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) forbade sales by throwing stones and sales 
involving uncertainty (Al-Qaradawi, 2003).   
 
Furthermore, vanity is forbidden in many Quranic verses: “And do not eat up your property 
among yourselves for vanities, nor use it as bait for the judges,” (Quran, 2:188). The 
prohibitions were repeated in many other Quranic verses (4:29; 4:161; 9:34). The gharar 
mentioned in the Quran verses above are interpreted as vanity. Ibn Al-Arabi explains vanity as 
unlawful because it is prohibited by the Shari’ah such as usury and gharar. While Al-Tabari 
considered vanity as eating up another’s property in a manner which was not permitted by 
Shari’ah. Sheikh Zamakhshari also considered acts forbidden by Shari’ah (such as theft, 
dishonesty, gambling and gharar contracts) as vanity. Al-Darir defines vanity as eating up 
property in ways forbidden explicitly by the Shari’ah (Khorshid, 2004).  
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However, not all gharar is invalid, since there is minor gharar which is tolerated as a necessary 
evil, and major or excessive gharar which invalidates contracts. Hence the main distinction 
between major and minor gharar is a strong cost-benefit analysis as the foundation for 
prohibition (El-Gamal, 2006). Al-Darir stated four conditions for gharar to invalidate a contract 
(Al-Darir, 1997; Zuhayli, 1997; El-Gamal, 2001) Firstly, gharar must be excessive to invalidate 
a contract, thus minor uncertainty about the object of sale (e.g. weight is known only up to the 
nearest ounce) does not affect the contract. Secondly, if the principles of contract such as price or 
object of sale is affected then the contract is invalid because of gharar, thus the selling of a 
pregnant cow is not considered invalid because the object of sale is the cow itself;, however, 
selling the unborn calf which is not the object of sale here is not valid based on gharar. Thirdly, 
if there is a real need for the commutative contract containing excessive gharar then the contract 
is valid, such as salam (prepaid forward sale) where the object of sale does not exist at contract 
inception, but because of the vital benefits behind such a contract, which might be used in 
agricultural and industrial activities, then the contract is valid. Fourthly, the potentially affected 
contract must be a commutative financial contract (muawadah) such as sales. Thus, giving a gift 
of a diver is valid, while selling it is invalid based on gharar, as in the case of takaful where it is 
based on donation and agency (wakalah), not a financial exchange contract. Gharar is the 
argument backbone of the permissibility of commercial insurance.  
 
2.4 PRINCIPLES OF THE TAKAFUL CONTRACT 
There are two basic building blocks to the takaful contract, the concepts of tabarru and 
mudarabah (Sharif, 2000). Tabarru means donation, contributing, offering or granting, while 
mudarabah is when the TO invests the policyholders’ accumulated donations or premiums in an 
islamically acceptable business. Thus, any person in society who has the legal capacity may 
contribute a sum of money to a mutual co-operative fund in view of ensuring material security 
for oneself against a defined risk probably encountered by another’s life or property. The 
business is conducted based on the concept of sharikat al-anan (unequal partnership) which 
allows the partners to evaluate each other’s skill and capability to determine the profit-and-loss 
sharing ratio between them; even if one contributes a smaller share of the capital a larger share of 
profit may be given to him (Hassan et al , 2007). Furthermore, akin to English law dealing with 
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contracts, Islam has its fundamentals which are required in an insurance policy. These 
fundamentals or conditions that are considered important pillars of the takaful contract:  
    
- Age of the policy holder, for the sake of public interest to ensure that proper co-operation, 
solidarity and brotherhood are taking place, the right of mutual co-operation may not be rendered 
to some people in society, because they are not capable to be participants in a takaful policy; 
these people are minors, or people who have not reached the age of maturity rushd, i.e. below the 
age of 18
7
, unless a guardian holds full supervision over the policy. The policy should be for the 
benefit of the minor such as for the sake of education when the minor reaches the required age. 
While there is no specific maximum age specified in the Malaysian Takaful act 1984 however, 
practically the takaful companies have fixed the maximum age at 50 for family takaful (Hassan 
et al, 2007).  
  
- Liability and Dhaman (guarantee) is based on the general insurance concepts of vicarious 
liability under the law of Tort, that the insurer is liable to compensate the insured in case of 
financial loss on the agreed subject matter (Rejda, 1982). Such concept was agreed upon by the 
Quran and the Sunnah and known as al-aqila. The dhaman or guarantee may only be payable to 
the victim or to the legal heirs if the victim dies, according to their respective shares in 
inheritance. 
 
- Utmost Good Faith, or as per the Latin phrase uberrimae fidei which is the name of a legal 
doctrine which governs insurance contracts .It is the enforcement of the policy that the parties 
involved should have good faith. Therefore, non-disclosure of material facts, involvement in a 
fraudulent act, misrepresentations or false statements is all elements which could invalidate a 
policy of insurance (Rejda, 1982; Rawlings, 2005). 
 
- Mirath’ and ‘Wasiyah’, is a principle implemented in a life policy, the assured (Muslim) 
appoints a nominee who is not the absolute beneficiary, rather a mere trustee or executor who 
                                               
7
Section 64, Takaful Act 1984, based on Age Majority Act 1971. 
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receives benefits from the policy and distributes them among the heirs of the deceased, in 
accordance with the principles of ‘mirath’ and ‘wasiyah’ (Kassim, 2007; Ali et al  ,2008).  
 
- Al-wakalah (agencies) is practiced for the purpose of making the transaction and dealings 
between the agents representing the insurer and the broker representing the insured more 
effectively.  Thus the takaful agency is someone who binds himself bilaterally to manage the 
fund according to Shari’ah principles and also to provide a reasonable financial security for 
those who genuinely deserve it against the loss or damage suffered by them resulting from a 
defined risk. 
 
- Al-Mudarabah, Al-Musharakah and Mutual Co-operation is based on the cooperation between 
the participants (paying their periodic premiums) and the TO (investing the accumulated 
premiums), through Shari’ah investment channels. Both parties mutually agree to share the 
profits based on an agreed portion. At the same time the TO is obliged to provide the insured 
with compensation in an unexpected future loss.  This kind of partner relationship between the 
TO and the participants is called al-musharakah, where the policy is run by the insurance 
company (Kassim, 2007; Ali et al , 2008). 
 
- Rights, Obligations and Humanitarian law is a principal that was emphasized by the holy 
Prophet on several occasions, that any person in the society is obliged to provide material 
security and protection against unexpected loss, damage or risk for himself, his property, family, 
and for the poor and helpless, widows, and for children against unexpected peril and dangers. As 
was narrated by Saad bin Abi Waqas, that the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) said, “It is better 
for you to leave your offspring wealthy than to leave them poor asking others for help.” Another 
hadith narrated by Safwan bin Salim, that the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) said, “The one 
who looks after and works for a widow and a poor person, is like a warrior fighting for Allah’s 
cause or like a person who fasts during the day and prays all the night” (Al-Qaradawi, 2003).   
 
The afore-mentioned principles must be dealt fairly and in a proper manner among the takaful 
contract parties, fair relationships among takaful parties can be achieved when the right 
conditions of the takaful contract mechanisms are adhered to. 
31 
 
2.5   TYPES & MODELS OF TAKAFUL CONTRACT 
The takaful products are available in two forms: general (Islamic General Insurance) and family 
(Islamic Life Insurance) takaful with the former being more comprehensive than the later. The 
global average market share figure of mixed life and general takaful was 30% for life and 70% 
non-life in 2007. However, there are some reasons leading family takaful to lag behind general 
takaful (Bhatty, 2007): 
  
 Muslims are more reluctant when it comes to insuring their lives (life, health and personal 
lines) due to religious concerns (Abdul Rahim, 2006). 
 Life insurance appeared to be more as a wager on life, since it has intangible benefits, unlike 
general insurance where it offers protection for business and assets. 
 Islamic investment tools were short-termed and very limited, thus not suitable to 
accommodate long-term liability products for family takaful. 
 Human factor, well-educated and trained people are needed to handle takaful products.    
 
More development was noticed for the family takaful business by early 2000, which led to more 
growth for the product by 2002, especially in the Middle East where family takaful represented 
less than 1 or 2% of the total, compared with 5% or more in life commercial insurance. Sudan 
was first to introduce family takaful followed by Malaysia in early 1980, Qatar 2001, and 
Bahrain 2002. The Arab countries are more focused on the group family takaful while Malaysia, 
Singapore and Indonesia are offering several types of family takaful. Family takaful offers 
different types of savings and protection products, such as education, mortgage, retirement plan, 
protection for critical illness or disability, retirement annuities, and a waqf plan. The family plan, 
may last as long as 10, 15 or 20 years (Bhatty, 2007). 
 
General takaful started first in Sudan in 1979, then developed in the Middle East market by the 
early 1980s (UAE 1980, Saudi Arabia 1983, Bahrain 1989 and Qatar 1995), driven by the boost 
in economic development as a result of high oil prices. General takaful is more concerned with 
causality types of product in the form of individual retail products such as household fires, 
motor, medical and health, personal accident during Hajj season, or corporate segments products 
32 
 
such as marine and aviation to cover transit cargo, engineering, or fire, the contract for which 
normally stands for one year (Bhatty, 2007). 
 
Overall, the global takaful market (life, family and general) was thought to be over US$2.1 
billion of premiums for 2002 and is estimated by market analysts to increase to premiums of 
US$12.5 billion by 2015 with over US$30 billion in funds. Interestingly, this figure for 2015 was 
revised from an earlier similar estimate of US$7.5 billion done in 1999, which indicates that 
business expectations may be materializing at a faster pace, driven to a large extent by strong 
market growth in the Gulf region and especially Malaysia (Wahab, Lewis and Hassan, 2003).  
 
There are several takaful operational models that have been adopted by TOs world-wide such as 
mudarabah, wakalah, waqf, hybrids of mudarabah and wakalah, ta’awuni and non-profit funds. 
However, the first two models are most dominant; mudarabah is widely used in Asia, while 
wakalah has become popular in the Middle East (Smith, 2007). Thereby, the operational 
mechanisms of the mudarabah or wakalah takaful models are described in the following section. 
 
2.5.1 Basic Wakalah Model 
The wakalah model can be operated according to two main models: either General or Family as 
follows:  
 
2.5.1.1 General Takaful 
There will be separate contracts in the wakalah model, of which one is used for underwriting and 
the other is used for investment activities of takaful funds. Although the wakalah model has 
widely been practised by TOs in underwriting activities, it is rarely adopted for investment 
activities (Tolefat, 2008). In the wakalah model the participants (policyholders) place their 
contribution into a pool of donations (tabarru), hence the wakalah operator (agent), is entitled to 
a wakalah fee for their effort to manage the takaful fund regardless of the performance of the 
fund. It is an upfront fee which is calculated based on an agreed percentage of the total fund; 
nevertheless the TO cannot ask for an additional wakalah fee in the future if the calculated fee 
was underestimated (Tolefat, 2008).  The wakalah fee should be approved by the Sharia’h 
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Supervisory Board (SSB)
8
. Thereby, most of the TOs will declare their wakalah fee at the 
beginning of the contract, but the loading will be calculated at the end of the year once the actual 
encountered expenses have been declared for an accurate fee calculation.  
 
The wakalah fee should be directed to the shareholders fund as an income for the TO, after that 
the TO manages the fund by complying with the following procedural steps: 
1. All direct expenses such as claims, expenses, legal claims costs and re-takaful arrangements, 
will be deducted from the remaining fund.  
2. Indirect expenses such as salaries and rents are paid by the TO only if there is a surplus in the 
takaful fund that has been shared between the TO and the participants, otherwise it will be 
paid from the takaful fund (Lewis, 2003; IFSB, 2009a). 
3. Participants will give the right to the TO to invest their funds for an operator investment fee, 
based on an agreed percentage of the total managed assets, regardless of the investment 
performance.  
4. The takaful fund at this stage represents the income generated from investments after 
deducting the management fee for the TO; add to that the underwriting surplus, the 
combination of them represents to total surplus in the takaful fund. 
5. The TO will take part of the surplus as a reserve to strengthen the position of the takaful 
fund.  
6. The remaining surplus in the takaful fund is purely owned by the participants and the TO has 
no right over this fund (AAOIFI, 2007). It is important to mention that some companies 
distribute the surplus for all participants including those who incurred a claim, which reflects 
the real purpose of brotherhood.   
 
As a result, the TO has three sources of income (i)  wakalah fee from underwriting activities, (ii) 
fund investments fee and (iii) investments on operator’s own capital.   
 
 
 
 
                                               
8 CCB Rulebook, 2005. 
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Fig. 2.1 Basic Wakalah Model for General Takaful Operational Flow-Chart 
 
 Source: IFSB (2009a: 28), Asaria (2009: 7). 
2.5.1.2 Family Takaful 
Like the general wakalah model, the model used here for underwriting and investment activities 
as shown in Figure 2.2,  can deviate according to the nature and sensitivity of the underwriting 
policy encountered (Tolefat, 2008). For example, if the policy is regarding (i) Risk protection 
from death, then the contributions split into two channels. The first contribution goes to the wakil 
(Agent), for their management effort and other fees related to the family policy if any, while the 
second contribution goes to the Participants’ Special Account (PSA), in the form of donations 
(tabarru) to participate in the risk of death protection pooling, the donations of the participants 
varies in accordance to his age at the time of the contract (Hassan et al, 2007). On the other hand, 
if the policy is written as (ii) Family Takaful savings policy, then the contributions split into 
three channels. The first two channels follow the aforementioned policy. However, a small 
portion also goes to the PSA to cover mortality risk, while a substantial portion goes to the 
Participants’ Account (PA) for the purpose of savings and investments. Furthermore, the PSA, 
and shareholders fund operates the same way as in the general basic wakalah takaful model. 
While the PA represents the savings policies, most of the investments here are accomplished on a 
long-term basis, thereby the TO deserves a management fee which is calculated as a percentage 
of the total invested assets and this fee represents their effort to manage such an investment fund. 
The TO as a result has four sources of income: (i) wakalah fee from underwriting activities, (ii) 
fund investments fee from PSA, (iii)  fund investments fee from PA and (iv) incentive 
performance fee if it followed the operational procedures (Tolefat, 2008). 
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Fig. 2.2 Basic Wakalah Model for Family Takaful Operational Flow-Chart 
 
Source: IFSB (2009a: 28)  
 
2.5.2 Basic Mudarabah Model 
The mudarabah model can be operated according to two main models either General or Family 
as following:  
 
2.5.2.1 General Takaful 
The contract under the mudarabah model will involve profit-sharing between the investor (rabb 
al-mal) and the fund manager/entrepreneur (mudarib), according to the predetermined ratio. In 
the classical contract there is no fixed return for investors as profit is undetermined. The TO or 
the mudarib has full control, i.e. rabb al-mal cannot participate in the ordinary course of business 
conducted by the mudarib (Tolefat, 2008). This model has been practised mostly in Malaysia, 
especially by the two oldest takaful companies, Syarikat Takaful Malaysia and National Takaful 
Company (Tolefat, 2008). The participants do not pay their contribution for the mudarabah 
investments capital as a principal objective, but the main objective is still to enter into a 
brotherhood mutual indemnity scheme by implementing the donations or tabarru contract. 
However, the mudarabah investments are considered a side activity to optimize the use of funds 
until claims are made or other expenses are incurred (Ali et al, 2008). There is only one contract 
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to cover both underwriting and investment activities, the contract scheme usually operates on the 
basis of one-year participation. There will also be no upfront management fee or investment fee 
to be taken out of the contribution toward the shareholder fund as in the wakalah model. 
However, other expenses such as claims, re-takaful arrangement and direct expenses are 
deducted directly from the takaful fund and paid by the participants, while other indirect 
expenses such as salaries and rent will be paid from the shareholder fund (Hassan et al, 2007). 
Furthermore, the TOs and the participants only share direct investment income as per a mutually 
agreed mudarabah profit share, while the underwriting surplus after deduction of all claims and 
reserves should not in principle be shared with the TOs because they are not a mudarabah 
investment profit but a residue of the takaful fund (Ali et al, 2008). The TO as a result has two 
sources of income (i) profit share in the investment activities surplus and (ii) profit on their 
capital investments activities.  
 
  Fig. 2.3 Basic Mudarabah Model for General Takaful Operational Flow-Chart 
 
Source: IFSB (2009a: 28), Asaria (2009: 7) 
 
2.5.2.2 Family Takaful 
The operational scheme here follows the same operation channels of the shareholder fund and 
the PSA that were followed in the basic family wakalah model. However, since the PA contains 
only a saving element of family takaful, the TOs share profits generated from investment 
activities. TOs as a result have two sources of income: (i) profit share from investment activities 
for PSA and (ii) a profit share from the asset investment under PA (Tolefat, 2008).  
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 Fig. 2.4 Basic Mudarabah Model for Family Takaful Operational Flow-Chart 
 
Source: IFSB (2009a: 28) 
 
2.5.3 Modified Wakalah Model  
The modified wakalah model follows the same operational concept as in the general basic 
wakalah model. However, the TOs here will share in the net underwriting surplus of the 
participants’ fund, such an act should be conducted with the full consent of the participants (Ali 
et al, 2008; Asaria, 2009). The underlying argument is that since the TOs will provide qard 
hassan to cover any deficit in the takaful funds, then the TOs is entitled to share in the good 
performance of takaful funds. Additionally, they argue that the surplus is a result of good and 
expert management by the TOs especially in the underwriting of contributions, assessment of 
risks and claim management. As good management contributes to the availability of the surplus 
thus they should be rewarded for such good performance. TOs as a result have four sources of 
income (i) wakalah fee from underwriting activities, (ii) fund investments fee, (iii) investments 
on the operator’s own capital and (iv) incentive performance fee, i.e. sharing in the net 
underwriting surplus of the takaful fund.   
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Fig. 2.5 Modified Wakalah Model Operational Flow-Chart 
 
Asaria (2009: 11) 
 
2.5.4 Modified Mudarabah Model 
The modified mudarabah model follows the same operational concept as in the general basic 
mudarabah model. However, the TO here will share the net underwriting surplus, the investment 
income is ploughed back into the takaful fund and the takaful company shares with the 
participant the surplus from the takaful fund (Ali et al, 2008; Asaria, 2009). This model was a 
necessary adaptation of the pure mudarabah model at a time when certain products such as a 
group takaful, yearly riders, and general takaful only had a very small savings element, thus 
making a pure mudarabah model not feasible (Ali et al, 2008). Under the modified mudarabah 
model, no profit from the mudarabah investment is shared between the TO and the participants. 
Instead profits are defined as the positive difference (or surplus) between the balance of the 
takaful fund at the end of the mudarabah contract and the balance of the takaful fund at the 
beginning of the mudarabah contract, i.e. the TO treats the net underwriting surplus as 
mudarabah profit and shares the ‘surplus’ on an agreed profit-sharing ratio. Such a practice been 
criticized as not complying with the definition of profit in mudarabah and thus is not compliant 
with mudarabah rules generally (Ali et al, 2008; Asaria, 2009). TOs as a result have two sources 
of income under this model: (i) a profit share in ‘net underwriting surplus’, and (ii) a profit on 
their capital investments activities.  
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  Fig. 2.6 Modified Mudarabah Model Operational Flow-Chart 
 
Asaria (2009: 10) 
 
2.5.5 Mixed Module 
This model is highly recommended by the AAOIFI to be used by the TOs (AAOIFI, 2003). It is 
dominating both the Middle Eastern and global markets, and it can be divided into general and 
family models as follows: 
 
2.5.5.1 General Takaful (Wakalah for Underwriting and Mudarabah for Investments) 
Under this model the wakalah contract is used for underwriting activities, risk assessments, re-
takaful and claim management. For this the wakil charges a specified and agreed management 
fee which may vary based on the performance of the TO (Ali et al, 2008; Asaria, 2009). At the 
same time, a mudarabah contract is used for the purpose of investments, that the operator acts as 
a mudarib on behalf of the participants (rab al-mal) and manages the takaful fund assets and 
shares in the income generated from the investments based on a pre-agreed profit ratio at the 
contract inception period to satisfy the Shari’ah requirements. Unlike the wakalah model the TO 
receives a share in the profit once generated from investment, otherwise there will be no income 
for the operation. However, the participants will be liable for a loss encounter.  TOs under this 
model have three main sources of income: (i) profit from wakalah fee for underwriting activities, 
(ii) a profit share generated from asset management of the takaful fund, and (iii) a profit from the 
operator’s own capital investments. Add to that the possibility of incentive or good performance 
fees (Tolefat, 2008).    
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Fig. 2.7 General Wakalah-Mudarabah Model Operational Flow-Chart 
 
 
Source: Ali et al (2008: 53). 
 
2.5.5.2 Family Takaful (Wakalah for Underwriting and Mudarabah for Investments) 
Under this scheme the shareholder fund and the PSA operates the same way as explained in the 
general mixed takaful model. While the operator invests the PA fund on a mudarabah basis, the 
generated profit will be shared between the operator and the participants upon the agreed ratio. 
The TO has four main sources of income in this model: (i) profit from the wakalah fee for 
underwriting activities, (ii) a profit share under PSA investment activities, (iii) profit share under 
PA investment activities and (iv) a profit from the investment of the operator’s own capital 
coupled with the possibility of incentive or good performance fees (Tolefat, 2008). However, the 
participants will be liable for any loss encounter (Ali et al, 2008). 
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Fig. 2.8 Family Wakalah-Mudarabah Model Operational Flow-Chart 
 
Source: Source: IFSB (2009a: 30) 
 
2.5.6 Other Takaful Models   
 
I. Sudanese Model 
The takaful operating in Sudan works in the same way as the mixed wakalah -mudarabah model 
in that wakalah is used for underwriting activities and mudarabah is used for investment 
activities. The operator will act as a manager looking after participants’ funds and dealing with 
technical issues for a wakalah fee. However, the fee is not calculated as a percentage of the total 
available fund rather than a lump sum as remuneration to the board of shareholders; the 
remuneration amount is considered negligible compared with the regular wakalah percentage 
fee. A wakalah percentage fee of the total contributed amount was prohibited by the Higher 
Shari’ah Supervisory Council (HSSC) in Sudan, which is run by an influential scholar, Professor 
Al-Darir. Al-Darir considers the wakalah percentage fee as riba in that the money is grown 
without any effort from the company (Al-Darir, 2004). Al-Darir argues that the participants of an 
Islamic insurance company should establish the company and they should act as shareholders of 
the company in the same way as in the mutual insurance company. He also believes there is no 
need for capital in the Islamic insurance company apart from legal requirements to establish the 
company.  The shareholders are not allowed to share the surplus of the takaful fund or to share in 
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the investments’ profits and also they are not required to provide qard-hassan in the case of 
deficit. The loan can gained from the available fund reserves. If the reserves are not sufficient to 
compensate the deficit then the operator will establish a central fund to act as the lender (Al-
Darir, 2004).     
 
II. Saudi Arabian Cooperative Insurance Model 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) requires all insurance companies to operate under 
a cooperative insurance business model, which is a key feature of the takaful model (E & Y, 
2010). Shari’ah scholars have indicated that the Saudi cooperative model is similar to a takaful 
model (funds segregation and surplus distribution) (Abouzaid, 2007).  
 
The cooperative insurance model works in the same way as the takaful model. The SAMA 
directives called the Implemented Regulations, Article 70, has identified the surplus distribution 
between the company and the participants. SAMA has indicated that 10% of the net surplus shall 
be distributed to the policyholders either directly or in the form of reduction in premiums for the 
next year. The remaining 90% of the net surplus shall be transferred to the shareholders’ income 
statement. Shareholders’ net income shall be transferred to the statement of shareholders’ equity 
similar to the takaful model. Furthermore, 20% of the net shareholders’ income shall be set aside 
as a statutory reserve until this reserve amounts to 100% of the paid capital (SAMA, 205b). 
Therefore, any deficit in the policyholders’ fund is borne solely by the shareholders.   
 
Despite SAMA regulations which are directed towards cooperative insurance, only a number of 
cooperatives operate as sole TO (E & Y, 2010, 2011). Examples of these operators are (AlJazira, 
2008; SAAB, 2009; AlAhli, 2010). These TOs are using the wakalah model to operate their 
takaful scheme and they have appointed Shari’ah boards to supervise business operations, 
including investments and ensure compliance with Islamic law. However, these TOs are 
following the Saudi cooperative insurance laws as SAMA did not issue specialized takaful laws 
and directives. 
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2.6 MECHANISM OF THE TAKAFUL CONTRACT  
Based on the above discussions about the different types of takaful models, there are four parties 
involved in a takaful contract: participa nt, TO, insured person, and beneficiary. Those who 
contributed to the mutual fund (ra’s al-mal) are known as participants (sahib al-mal), while 
those who among the participants face the risk and are assisted by the fund are known as insured 
(almoaman alih) and those who actually benefit from the fund are known as the beneficiaries (al-
mostafid) to the cooperative fund. The fund, managed by a registered or licensed body or 
corporation is known as a TO, defined
9
 as a person/organization who carries out takaful business 
as an operator, takaful agent or takaful broker, respectively. Hence, cooperation among these 
parties creates four mechanisms in the takaful scheme. Accordingly, takaful policy should 
witness a collaboration between the participants themselves, collaboration between the TO and 
the participants, and a linked mechanism between these parties and the takaful fund as follows:  
 
I. Contract between participant and fund 
The money belonging to the participant is transferred to the fund. In current practice, the fund is 
based on tabarru. In case of loss-risk the participants, as the members of the fund, can receive 
benefit by the cover that the fund provides. Thus, the money belonging to the fund operator is 
transferred to the participant when the risk events occur. The spirit embodied in the concept of 
tabarru is that the participants are not thinking only of their own protection but they should also 
be thinking of helping other participants; without the concept of donation the contract will be 
that of buying and selling of insurance (Lewis, 2003). However, tabarru in current takaful 
practices is not pure tabarru, but the commitment to tabarru. The difference between pure 
tabarru and commitment to tabarru is on the timing of transferring the ownership. In pure 
tabarru the ownership of the mutabarri (donor) is not transferred by the absolute contract 
wording, but transfer occurs after the donation is handed to the needy, i.e. ownership of such 
material money transfers from the donor to the needy once the money reaches the needy. In the 
commitment to tabarru, the ownership is automatically transferred to the mutabarra (donation 
recipient) by the absolute contract. The TOs cannot make demands to the participants to pay 
premiums if the contract is based on pure tabarru, because the ownership is not transferred when 
the participants pay their premiums as delivery to the recipient has not occurred when the 
                                               
9 According to Section 2 of the Takaful Act 1984 
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agreement was signed. On the other hand, the TO as an agent of all participants can make a 
demand to the participants to pay their premiums if the contract is based on commitment to 
tabarru, because the ownership has been transferred when the agreement was signed
10
.  
 
II. Contract between company and participant 
The relationship here is not as insurer-insured rather than as participants-operator – the 
participants insuring themselves, while the TO is engaged by the participants to manage the 
takaful scheme on behalf of them (Ali et al, 2008). The participant in a takaful contract is 
considered to be a muwakkil (principal) and the company as a wakil (agent) to manage the 
participant’s money. The duties of the company as a wakil or agent of the participant, is to 
manage the fund in terms of contract arrangement, all administrative matters, underwriting 
activities, technical issues, manage the investment portfolio of the fund. Depending on the type 
of the underlying contract, the TO may receive a fee, or share of the investments profit as a 
reward for managing the takaful scheme. The takaful company and the participant will enter into 
a long-term takaful contract, the contract spells out clearly the rights and obligations of the 
parties to the contract, where the participants is required to pay regularly the takaful instalments 
in consideration for his participation in the takaful plan, he/she decides the amount of takaful 
instalments that they wish to pay subject to the company minimum sum at the time of signing the 
contract (Hassan et al, 2007). 
 
III. Contract between company and fund 
The relationship here is as a contract to invest the participant’s money. The money belonging to 
the fund is transferred to the company, whether as a wakil (if the contract is based on wakalah) 
or as mudarib (if the contract is based on mudarabah). The mudarib will invest the general 
takaful fund in line with Shari’a principles and all returns on the investment will be pooled back 
to the fund. On the other hand, the participant agrees that the company shall pay from the general 
takaful fund, compensation or indemnity to fellow participants who have suffered a defined loss 
upon the occurrence of a catastrophe or disaster. The fund shall also pay for other operational 
                                               
10 Based on an interview with Dr. Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah, Member of Islamic Fiqh Academy, at the First Public 
Meeting with Bank AlJazira Shari’ah Board Members, Hilton Hotel Jeddah, Oct. 2009.   
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costs of general takaful business such as for re-takaful arrangements and the setting up of 
technical reserves (Tolefat, 2008) 
 
IV. Contract of participants’ mutual assistance 
Under this system, participants mutually and voluntarily agree to contribute money to support a 
common goal of providing mutual financial aid to the members of the group in case of specific 
need, such as perils or hazard. This system is based on mutual protection and solidarity the 
participants should embody certain principles and beliefs when dealing with each other such as 
piety, purification, brotherhood, charity (tabarru or contribution), mutual guarantee, community 
well-being as opposed to profit maximization (Ali, 2006). However, if the participants are 
intending to invest some of the money as their savings and donate some portions for mutual 
indemnity, then the governing contract is musharakah, together with tabarru or donation of a 
portion of the contribution to the takaful fund (Ali et al, 2008). On the other hand, everyone is 
allowed to buy a takaful policy whether Muslim or not.  In fact, in Malaysia by 2007, non-
Muslims made up the largest portion of takaful policy buyers with a range of 60% (Bhatty, 
2007).  
 
2.7 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TAKAFUL AND OTHER TYPES OF INSURANCE  
The following paragraphs illustrate the basic differences between insurance run on takaful 
approaches and other types of insurance such as conventional and/or mutual. 
\ 
2.7.1 Takaful and Conventional Insurance 
As can be seen from the previous sections, takaful is based on the concepts of tabarru, where the 
participants donate to guarantee cover for each other. The donation fund is managed and run by 
the TO in two ways, either as an agency (wakil) for a specified percentage of the whole available 
fund, or the operator can share the profit and/or the deficit out of investing the donation fund as a 
mudarib. In the two approaches mentioned above the TO is responsible for managing the 
underwriting and investment activities, while the participants bear all underwriting losses. 
Therefore, the TO has the right to call the participants to contribute for additional contributions 
to cover such loss, where qard hasan can be provided in case of underwriting loss in the takaful 
fund (Tolefat, 2008). Unlike takaful, conventional insurance is an exchangeable contract where 
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policies are sold and policyholders are the purchasers. The insurer is liable to bear underwriting 
loss and claims encountered according to the wording of the insurance contract. More details 
between takaful and conventional insurance differences can be found in Appendix A, Table A.1. 
 
2.7.2 Takaful and Mutual Insurance 
Islamic insurance is based on the principle of mutuality, in that members are both the insured and 
the insurers themselves (Lewis, 2003). The mutual insurance firm is owned by policyholders 
who are also the providers of capital, thus they cannot raise equity capital (Wilson, 2007). While 
in takaful the participants own the fund but the capital is owned and provided by the TO. In 
mutual insurance any profits made of investing premiums income is distributed to the 
policyholders or re-invested to build up reserves, rather than being paid out as dividends to 
independent shareholders (Wilson, 2007). Mutual insurance members on the other hand, do not 
have a limited liability, hence they may increase their premiums if they need to do so, and that 
occurs in the case of increasing numbers of claims (Wilson, 2007). Although the 
premiums/contributions are owned by policyholders/participants under both structures, the 
existence of the operator under takaful operations makes the cost of protection more expensive 
than mutual insurance since the TO is seeking profit from insurance business (Tolefat, 2008). 
Mutual insurance is acceptable by Muslim scholars provided that the assets are being invested in 
Shari’a- compliant assets.  
 
In contrast, other scholars and researchers claim that mutual insurance does not differ that much 
from commercial insurance because when the insured is asked to contribute an additional 
premium to enable the company to meet its financial obligations, such contributions cannot be 
pre-determined which involves an excessive uncertainty. Another reason is that the policyholders 
in formal terms own and manage the company. However, evidence shows that in the case of 
insolvency the policyholders will lose only their premium as would any other insured person 
who had contracted with a commercial insurer. Such an act may be due inter alia to the 
extremely low rate of participation in the election of directors (Khorshid, 2004). More details 
between takaful and mutual insurance differences can be found in Appendix A, Table A.2. 
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2.8  TAKAFUL REGULATION BODIES  
Many of the leading conventional insurance and re-insurance companies such as Munich Re, 
Swiss Re, Hannover Re, AIG, established either subsidiaries or windows to offer takaful 
products, which reflects the potential and strong of the takaful business. Also, organizations such 
as the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), International Association for Insurance 
Supervisor (IAIS) and Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) are playing a vital role in setting up standards and rules for takaful companies. In 
December 2008, the IFSB and IAIS established a joint working group
11
, to enhance the 
cooperation and understanding in mutual areas of supervision in the takaful industry. Both 
organizations have a common goal to promote the soundness and stability of the 
insurance/takaful industry through the development of international prudential standards and 
enhancing the cooperation among supervisory authorities. They will focus on standards that need 
to be adopted to cater for takaful structures such as corporate governance and solvency 
margins.
12
 
IFSB is based in Kuala Lumpur. Officially inaugurated on 3
rd
 of November 2002, it started 
operations by 10
th
 of March 2003. It serves as an international standard-setting body of 
regulatory and supervisory agencies that have a vested interest in ensuring the soundness and 
stability of the Islamic financial services industry, which is defined broadly to include banking, 
capital markets and insurance. In advancing this mission, the IFSB promotes the development of 
a prudent and transparent Islamic financial services industry through introducing new, or 
adapting existing international standards consistent with Shari'ah principles, and recommend 
their adoption.  Furthermore, the work of the IFSB is complementing that of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, International Organisation of Securities Commissions and 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
13
. By 2009, the 185 members of the IFSB 
included 43 regulatory and supervisory authorities as well as the International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, Bank for International Settlements, Islamic Development Bank, Asian 
Development Bank and the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector, Saudi 
Arabia, and 136 market players and professional firms operating in 35 jurisdictions. 
                                               
11
 IFSB & IAIS – Issues in Regulation and Supervision of Takaful (Islamic Insurance), 2006.  
12
 http://www.ifsb.org/preess_full.php?id=101&submit=more 
13 http://www.ifsb.org/background.php 
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Furthermore, Malaysia has enacted a law known as the Islamic Financial Services Board Act 
2002, which gives the IFSB the same immunities and privileges that are usually granted to 
international organizations and diplomatic missions.  
 Another standard setting body AAOIFI was established on the 26th February, 1990 in Algiers 
then shortly registered in the state of Bahrain on 27th March, 1991 when an Agreement of 
Association was signed by 14 Islamic financial institutions. AAOIFI is an Islamic international 
autonomous non-profitable corporate body that prepares accounting, auditing, governance, ethics 
and Shari'ah standards for Islamic financial institutions and the industry. Also it prepares 
different professional programmes to enhance the industry’s human resources base and 
governance structures. As an independent international organization, AAOIFI is supported by 
institutional members (200 members from 45 countries, so far) including central banks, Islamic 
financial institutions, and other participants from the international Islamic banking and finance 
industry worldwide. AAOIFI has gained assuring support for the implementation of its standards, 
which was issued as the initial Shari’ah aspects standard in October 2006, which are now 
adopted in Bahrain, Dubai, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Sudan and Syria. The relevant authorities in 
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and South Africa have 
issued guidelines that are based on AAOIFI’s standards and pronouncements (Kassim, 2007). 
At the national level, a few countries have their special laws governing takaful such as the 
issuance of Act 1984 (Act number 312) of Malaysia. Unlike Malaysia, there is no specific law 
that regulates the takaful operation in Bahrain. However, the Central Bank of Bahrain, formerly 
known as the Bahrain Monetary Agency, has introduced special regulations for takaful 
operations, which specify that the wakala model should be used for underwriting activities and 
the mudarabah model for investment activities and this approach appears to be favoured by 
AAOFI. Unlike Malaysia and Bahrain,, there is no specific regulation that specifically governs 
takaful in Saudi Arabia., The introduction of takaful in Saudi Arabia for more than a decade now 
is regarded as an advance in the principles of cooperative insurance and is becoming more 
accepted due to takaful adherence to the tenets of Shari’ah law (Smith, 2007). There are other 
Muslim countries have not established their own laws, which might be due to the fact that the 
English Insurance Act 1996 covers all insurance companies in more significant matters (Wilson, 
2007).  
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2.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter comprehensively defines the meaning and the function of takaful, along with the 
spiritual aspects that distinguish between conventional and Islamic insurance. This chapter also 
presents Muslim jurists’ judgments on commercial insurance. Scholars have divided into three 
groups according to their opinion of the permissibility of insurance contracts. However, the 
majority of them prohibit dealing with conventional insurance, because of the three prohibitive 
elements that are embodied in commercial insurance (riba, maysir, and gharar). This chapter 
highlighted different aspects of the takaful contract, that as the conventional insurance contract 
has its principles, takaful also has its own principles that leads to a fairness in conducting the 
business between the four main parties in the takaful contract (participants, operator, insured 
person, and beneficiary), principles such as liabilities, age, utmost good faith, mirath and 
wasiyah, obligations, wakalah and mudarabah. 
 
This chapter also highlighted the functions and works of two of the most active international 
takaful bodies AAOIFI and IFSB, along with three of the most active takaful territories in the 
world: Malaysia, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. This chapter also presented the dominant takaful 
models (mudarabah, wakalah, hybrids of mudarabah and wakalah, ta’awuni and the Sudanese 
model) as has been adopted in different countries. However, a convergence is observed in the 
market toward implementing the hybrids model, and that a number of TOs have implemented the 
mixed model, such as National takaful in Malaysia and Qatar Islamic Insurance.        
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CHAPTER THREE 
INSURANCE & TAKAFUL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided a comprehensive view on the most dominant takaful models, 
along with their features and operational mechanisms, which show participants’ eligibility to 
receive financial benefits out of their contributions in the takaful fund. Thus, it is important to 
highlight some of the international standards that reserve their rights in the takaful fund.    
 
Accordingly, the current chapter will highlight corporate governance standards and polices, as 
per the international insurance organizations bodies: International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Islamic 
Financial Service Board (IFSB), Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI). The main purpose of viewing such policies is to provide an answer to 
research question 1. 
 
It is important for the takaful operators (TOs) to implement an innovative cultural environment 
for better information transformation between upper and lower management levels, and to 
achieve better communication with the participants. TOs should adopt the best available 
corporate governance practices as outlined in the international standards bodies for insurance and 
takaful industries. The system should suit stakeholders’ needs and wants by providing better 
communication channels between participants and TOs to achieve better protection to 
participants’ rights. Therefore, the current chapter will provide a response to Research Question 
1:  What are the best regulatory practices and standards of the TOs in terms of corporate 
governance, market conduct and disclosure? 
The layout of the current chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 presents corporate and 
Shariah Governance Concepts and Fundamentals. Section 3.3 highlights different corporate 
governance models. Section 3.4 highlights Takaful Corporate Governance Model. Section 3.5 
elaborates on different types of corporate governance key stakeholders. Section 3.6 explains the 
challenges incorporated in corporate governance field. Section 3.7 highlights IFSB efforts to 
standardize the takaful Industry. Section 3.8 concludes the chapter.      
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3.2 CORPORATE AND SHARI’AH GOVERNANCE CONCEPTS AND FUNDAMENTALS.  
The word governance has been traced back to the Greek etymological root of the word kybernan, 
to the Latin gubernare and to the Old French governer, which means to ‘steer’, ‘guide’ or 
‘govern’14. Additionally, Arabic officially translates governance as hawkama (Chapra et al, 
2002; Sourial, 2004; Lewis, 2005).      
 
The World Bank has defined the concept of governance, broadly, as the political and institutional 
factors affecting structural adjustment (Frischtak and Atiyas, 1996). OECD has also defined 
governance from the particular viewpoint of donor institutions as denoting the use of political 
authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for 
social and economic development (OECD, 1995). 
 
An early definition of corporate governance was provided by Fuller (1954: 477) in relation to the 
economics concept as “good order and workable arrangements”. The second definition, based on 
Commons (1932: 4), “is the means by which order is accomplished in a relation in which 
potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains. These 
definitions make clear that the concept can be applied to a variety of organizations and 
institutions, and not limited to economic activities, and can be used in a variety of political and 
social science.” 
 
Proper governance arrangements are considered as preconditions for the workings of a market 
economy; however, what is also required is a culture of business. Hence, the system of corporate 
governance interacts with a number of other factors that shape the business environment and thus 
influences business outcomes. Corporate governance involves the conditions needed by any 
organized society engaged in productive activities. Such society needs to establish conditions or 
rules related to business organization, conditions related to (entry and establishment, form of 
business enterprise, ownership, financing, operation, exit and closure) (Lewis et al, 2009). 
  
Corporate governance is the set of processes by which companies are run (Tricker, 1984).  
Zingales (1995) argues that corporate governance is a system by which directors and managers 
                                               
14 The Macquarie Encyclopaedia Dictionary, 1990. 
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act in the best interests of outside investors (creditors and shareholders). OECD (2004: 11) 
defined corporate governance as “a set of relationships between company’s management, its 
board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders”. Shleifer et al (1997) define corporate 
governance as a means of satisfying providers of finance to corporations such that they get 
returns on their investment. Kaplan et al (2000) also claim that corporate governance is intended 
to establish a connection between directors, managers, employees, shareholders, customers, 
creditors, and suppliers to the corporation. 
 
Accordingly any weakness in the connections between these stakeholders can lead to substantial 
diversion of assets by managers in many privatized firms, and a non-existence of external capital 
supply to firms, such as in Russia (Boycko et al, 1995). A considerable amount of evidence has 
also documented a prevalence of managerial behaviour that does not serve the interest of 
investors (Shleifer et al, 1997).  Therefore, a good corporate governance system should protect 
the rights of investors and policyholders by providing answers to how corporate governance 
deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the 
profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or 
avoid investing that money in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? 
(Shleifer et al, 1997).  
 
In terms of protecting policyholders in the insurance business, IAIS (2003; 2004) has identified 
corporate governance as the manner in which the board of directors (BoDs) and senior 
management oversee the insurers’ business. It encompasses the means by which members of the 
board and senior management are held accountable and responsible for their actions. Corporate 
governance includes corporate discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, fairness and social responsibility. IAIS also asserts on the accuracy of disclosure 
on all material matters regarding the insurer, including the financial situation, performance, 
ownership and governance arrangements, as part of a corporate governance framework, 
corporate governance also includes compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. 
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IFSB (2009a) also stresses on treating participants fairly, as TOs might act against the interests 
of participants. This problem is observed particularly in proprietary structure company, where 
the BoDs and senior management are considered as shareholder representatives, hence they have 
fiduciary duty to maximise shareholders value. The company management should have similar 
fiduciary duty towards the participants. However, as participants lack representation and due to 
inadequate information environment, TOs management may have ample room for the 
maximisation of value for the shareholders at the expense of the participants’ interests. 
 
Shari’ah governance on the other hand, is the way of conducting activities in accordance with 
Shari’ah.  It entails “the institution pledge not to engage in interest-based debt transactions, not 
to conduct pure financial transactions disconnected from real economic activity, not to 
participate in transactions where there is exploitation of any party, and not to participate in 
activities regarded as harmful to society” (Grais et al, 2006: 1).  
 
IFSB (2009b: 2) also identifies “Shari’ah Governance System” as: 
 
“A set of institutional and organisational arrangements through which an IIFS 
ensures that there is effective independent oversight of Shari`ah compliance”. 
 
This means that Islamic banks have a fiduciary responsibility towards their customers to comply 
with Shari'ah rules and principles at all times (IFSB, 2009b). Accordingly, TOs must duly 
observe their fundamental obligations towards participants, particularly with regard to 
compliance with Shari`ah rules and principles; Shari`ah governance must remain an inherent 
feature of TOs (IFSB, 2009a). 
 
3.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS 
Most of the differences between systems of corporate governance around the world stem from 
the differences in the nature of legal obligations that managers have towards financiers as well as 
the differences in how courts interpret and enforce these obligations (Manne, 1965; Easterbrook 
and Fischel, 1983). Such debates about corporate governance tends to focus on two alternative 
54 
 
paradigms or models, with an innovated Islamic model that been modified from the conventional 
stakeholder model. 
 
3.3.1 The Anglo-Saxon Model 
Also known as a market-based system or a shareholder value system or principle agent model, it 
is considered the most dominant theory used in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
which is characterized as a relationship between corporations and investors who are concerned 
about short-term returns (Frank et al, 1994). “The shareholder value system has been the 
dominant academic view of corporations for many years that are concerned with shareholder 
value only” (Miller, 2004: 2).  
 
Cernat (2004) explained, as shown in Figure 3.1 below, that this model is based on the corporate 
concept of the fiduciary relationship between the shareholders and the managers which is 
motivated by profit-oriented behaviour. This is derived from the belief of market capitalism in 
which the interest and the market can function in a self-regulating and balanced manner. 
Accordingly, share ownership is widely dispersed and shareholders influence on management 
will be weak, hence the main focus of the Anglo-Saxon system is to protect the interests and 
rights of shareholders along with typical capital market and ownership features. 
 
Figure 3.1: Corporate Governance - Anglo-Saxon Model.  
 
Source: (Cernat, L., 2004: 153). 
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3.3.2 The European Model  
The continental European or stakeholder model gives consideration to a number of classes of 
stakeholder including shareholders, creditors and employees. In this system, companies raise 
most of their external finance from banks that have close, long-term relationships with their 
corporate customers. The model is focused on a relationship-based model that maximizes the 
interests of a broader group of shareholders (Adams, 2003: 4). The European model of corporate 
governance is practiced by the majority of European countries where many large firms are part 
of the social and economic structure. The European model implies that all stakeholders have the 
right to participate in corporate decisions that affect them, that managers’ fiduciary duty is to 
protect the interests of all stakeholders, while the objective of corporations is to promote the 
interests of all stakeholders and not only shareholders (Mirakhor et al, 2004: 46). 
 
The special attribute of the European model of a corporate governance system is the practice of 
the two-tier system which has been used in Germany and France. The system, as per Figure 3.2 
below, would comprise of an outside supervisory BoDs and a separate management board of 
executive directors - a structure in which the two boards meet separately (Yvon et al, 2005: 7). 
The same concept has been practiced in France where boards of directors and managers have a 
duty not only to the company itself but to the employees, trade unions, work councils and to the 
public at large (Snyder, 2007: 238- 239). 
 
Figure 3.2: Corporate Governance - European Model 
 
Source: (Cernat, L., 2004: 153). 
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This ongoing debate over the two models has recently been critically reviewed by Letza et al 
(2004: 257) who argued that:  
 
“The current dichotomised and theoretical approach used in corporate governance 
research, which presupposes two extreme and opposite ideal models, cannot fully 
explain the complexity and heterogeneity of corporate reality”. 
 
This view is given support in a review of the failure of Enron (Deakin et al, 2004) in which they 
concluded that effective corporate governance would result from directors being regarded as 
stewards of the longer-term interests of the company.   
 
In fact, the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical importance. Even in 
advanced market economies, there is a great deal of disagreement on how good or bad existing 
governance mechanisms are. For example, Easterbrook et al (1991), Romano (1993), Shleifer et 
al (1997) made a very optimistic assessment about the United States’, Germany’s, and Japan’s 
corporate governance systems. These countries have some of the best corporate governance 
systems in the world, because they are governed through a combination of legal protections that 
give investors power from expropriation by managers and by concentrated ownership (ownership 
by large investors). Thus a good corporate governance system should combine some type of 
large and small investors with a legal protection for both sets of rights, In fact, the opinion of 
authors who voted that the U.S. corporate governance system is strong, was consolidated with 
the passage of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act in late 1999 which allowed U.S. banks to enter the 
insurance business and mandated a greater reliance on internal corporate governance to control 
the actions of financial institutions (Wang et al, 2007).  
 
In terms of the insurance industry, Macey et al (2003) believe that the insurance industry 
confronts a different set of agency costs and may lack adequate corporate governance controls as 
a result of the distinctive nature of its assets and liabilities, the special character of its ownership 
structure, fewer hostile takeovers, and a higher degree of financial leverage. Therefore, the 
corporate governance research needs to recognise the complexity and heterogeneity of corporate 
reality even within the Anglo-Saxon model; this is why most of the international organisations 
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such as OECD, IAIS, and IFSB agree that there is no single model of corporate governance that 
can work well in every country and for all types of business. Thus each organization should 
develop its own model that caters for its specific needs and objectives (OECD, 2004; IAIS, 2004; 
IFSB, 2008, 2009a).  
 
3.3.3 The Islamic Corporate Governance Model 
Corporate governance is one of the most vital elements of any corporation’s development and it 
is even more challenging to the Islamic finance system on account of the additional risk involved 
when compared to the conventional banking system. For example, a depositor would be exposed 
to various kinds of risks when an Islamic bank involves itself in risk-sharing modes such as 
mudarabah and musharakah (Chapra, 2007: 338). However, despite the fact that conventional 
corporate governance models are based on attaining maximum profitability, economic efficiency 
and fair dealing in accordance with moral standards it seems very difficult to use for  the Islamic 
model on account of the following:  
 
(i)  Western ethical foundations stem from a secular humanist rather than a religious moral basis, 
(ii)  Western corporate culture in its basic or modified model is based on self-interest rather than 
the interests of society, and (iii)  Available corporate governance models are based on agency 
theory rather than on stewardship theory (Davis et al, 1997).   
 
On the other hand, scholars believe that the basis of Islamic corporate governance emanates from 
the Islamic concept of tawhid, or the oneness of God (Allah) (Al-Faruqi, 1982). Nienhaus, (2003: 
290) states that “Islamic corporate governance should be value-oriented and promote the 
principle of fairness and justice with respect to all stakeholders”. While Chapra et al (2002); 
Mirakhor et al, (2004) suggest adopting the stakeholders’ model with some modifications. Other 
scholars argue that Islamic corporate governance is a modified model of the stakeholder-oriented 
model, which may adopt different elements of corporate governance that are based on the 
principle of shura or consultation where all stakeholders share the same goal of tawhid 
(Choudury et al, 2004).  
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Figure 3.3 below represents Choudhury et al arguments (2004), that there are four principles of 
Islamic corporate governance which were originally embedded in the Quran and Sunnah. These 
principles are an extension of tawhid via interactive, integrative and evolutionary processes to 
the interacting environmental factors; the principles are justice, productive engagement of 
resources in social, economic activities, and recursive intention amongst the above stages.  
 
Other scholars argue that Islamic corporate governance is a system based on shura, hisba, and 
the Shar’iah supervisory process and religious audit. The holy Quran clearly mandates that any 
decision involving more than one party should access and consult on the basis of principles of 
shura, that shuratic decision-making procedures should provide a vehicle for ensuring that 
corporate governance activities and strategies are fully discussed and a consensus seeking 
consultative process is applied. Thus directors and senior managers would be expected to listen 
to the opinions of other executives before making a decision. Shura members would include, as 
far as possible, representatives of shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers. Also other 
stakeholders including the community should also play a role in providing mutual cooperation to 
protect interests as a whole and to stimulate the social wellbeing function for social welfare 
(Choudhury et al, 2004).   
 
Hisba offers a framework of social ethics that encourages and monitors correct and positive 
ethical behaviour, such as ihsan (goodness), tawakkal (trust in God), amanah (honesty), infaq 
(spending to meet social obligation), sabr (patience) and istislah (public interest) (Lewis, 2005). 
Shari’ah or Islamic auditing on the other hand, considers a device to solicit juristic advice, and to 
monitor compliance with Shari’ah law by a means of implementing the principles of Islamic 
economics, which has a direct impact on corporate practices and policies such as zakah (the alms 
tax), and the prohibition of malpractices such as riba (usury) and speculation. Also, it should 
help avoid negative values such as ihtikar (hoarding), zulm (tyranny), bukhl (miserliness), hirs 
(greed), iktinaz (hoarding of wealth) and israf (extravagance).  
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Figure 3.3: Corporate Governance – Islamic Model 
 
Source: (Choudury et al, 2004: 80) 
 
Accordingly, there are two main institutions involved in the above process of corporate 
governance namely, the Shari’ah board and the constituents of the Shura’s group of participants 
i.e. all the stakeholders.  
 
3.3.4 Comparison between Western and Islamic Corporate Governance Models 
For decades the managed corporation
15
 model of Western corporate governance has dominated 
the American corporate arena, it has a legacy of the rise of large public companies and dispersed 
share ownership (Pound, 1995). In this model the managers lead and directors and shareholders 
follow. Boards and shareholders are kept at a distance from the corporate decision-making 
process and strategy and policy settings. Boards have the job of hiring managers and 
firing/rewarding them depending on company performance, while shareholders have the sole 
function of replacing board members should the corporation not perform well. Hence, the Anglo-
Saxon model focuses more on prioritizing shareholders’ value alone, while the European model 
protects all the stakeholders’ interests and rights. Islamic corporate governance on the other 
hand, rejects rationality and rationalism as the episteme of Shari’ah corporate governance and 
replaces it with the episteme of tawhid or the oneness of Allah (Hasan, 2009). The ultimate goal 
                                               
15 Managed model is another name of the Anglo-Saxon Model (Pound, 1995). 
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of Islamic corporate governance is to protect the interests and rights of all stakeholders by 
complying with maqasid al-Shari’ah (Chapra, 2007). Thus, Islamic corporate governance 
considers Shari’ah to be the governing law of all affairs of the corporation which leads to the 
establishment of the Shari’ah board as part of the corporate governance institution. 
 
3.4 TAKAFUL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL  
The debate in corporate governance literature has mainly focused on whether corporate 
governance should focus exclusively on protecting the interests of shareholders or stakeholders 
(Many et al, 2003). Thus, good corporate governance is a mechanism that encourages 
management to work towards the interests of the shareholders, by establishing an effective risk 
management system, audit committee, a visionary BoDs representing the interest of shareholders 
and investments account holders (IAH), adequacy of information to shareholders and IAH, etc 
(IFSB, 2009c).   
 
The situation of participants and shareholders in a takaful undertaking is comparable to that in 
Islamic banks where two principals exist i.e. shareholders and IAH. In both types of institutions 
the management is the agent, with the absence of control over other governance rights for both 
participants and IAH. Accordingly, it is likely that the management would prioritize 
shareholders’ interests because (i) shareholders have control of the governance organs in both 
institutions, takaful and Islamic banks, that shareholders will have the power to appoint the TO 
management, and (ii) there are no incentive structures to make the management act in the 
interests of participants or the IAH. Such behaviour would cause a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and participants (Archer et al, 2009). Also Greuning et al, (2007: 29) stated that, 
 
“IAH are like quasi-equity holders but without participation in the governance of 
the Islamic bank. As a result, IAH do not have any direct recourse to the bank to 
protect their rights”. 
 
According to Grais et al (2006a), IIFS offer three categories of depositors or IAH accounts: 
current, restricted investment (RIA) and unrestricted investment (UIA). The most similar account 
to the participants in the takaful scheme is UIA holders, since they enter into a mudaraba 
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contract with the institution, bearing the risk of the performance of the investment pool, except 
for misconduct. The UIA holders do not have an institutional voice in the conduct of business, 
and delegate the appointment of their agent to another principal whose interests may not always 
accord with theirs. 
 
Furthermore, because the takaful hybrid structural scheme is combined of mutual and 
proprietary, simultaneously following the principles of taawun, tabarru and the prohibition of 
riba, then a conflict of interest may appear. As TOs are considered the custodian of a takaful 
fund they might exert a good amount of discretion to determine the range of products, pricing, 
terms and conditions of contracts. An additional conflict arises due to an agency problem; the 
separation between TOs and participants’ funds will raise an asymmetric information and 
insufficient power of the participants to monitor TOs as a result of lack of representations 
(Hussain, 2009). Hence, a clear separation is required in Family takaful between the assets of the 
Participant Risk Fund (PRF) and those of the Participant Investment Fund (PIF), as well as 
between the assets of the Takaful Fund and those of the shareholders’ funds. Therefore, the 
accumulation of investment profits in the PIFs requires transparent methods of profit calculation 
and accounting, and an efficient accounting system to record the declared PIF’s profit and credit 
it to the respective takaful PIF (IFSB, 2009a). 
 
However, because proper management of participants underwriting and investment funds 
determines, among other factors, the returns of shareholders, then shareholders should have a 
long-term interest in monitoring the performance of the BoDs so that it exercises proper control 
over management in order to look after the interests of the participants. Such a practice is used 
by the Islamic banking system to attract IAH, known as vicarious monitoring; shareholders can 
also minimize their equity as much as they can to mobilize IAH funds to benefit from generated 
profits under mudarabah mechanisms (Archer et al, 2009). However, the situation would be 
different in the case of short-term opportunisms or in the absence of effective competition, since 
it would encourage the benefits of shareholders at the expense of participants (Archer et al, 
2009). 
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While, the BoDs would serve the interests of shareholders by setting the wakalah fee and 
mudarib share of the profit at a level that would give the shareholders a return on their equity 
comparable to similar instruments in the market. They must, however, bear in mind that they 
have enough funds to meet participants’ claims and to achieve a surplus and to pay or avoid 
deficit. Thus, by adhering to such a balance, shareholders would exert enough discretion toward 
participants; in return participants would show similar loyalty toward the company. An 
alternative action that might be utilised by the BoDs to satisfy participants and IAH is similar to 
what is currently being used by the Islamic banking system as described by Archer et al (2009). 
 
(i)  Profit Equalization Reserve (PER) which is an amount set aside from the income of both IAH 
and shareholders before the allocation of the bank’s share as mudarib to smooth the profit of 
IAH to match the returns of instruments in the market, thereby encouraging IAH to retain the 
funds with the bank to manage them on their behalf. (ii) Displaced commercial risk, that banks 
would ask shareholders to give up part or their entire mudarib share to the IAH to motivate them 
into continuing to place their funds with the bank. This technique is comparable to the situation 
in takaful where shareholders in TOs have to provide capital baking in the form of a standby 
qard-loan facility to finance an underwriting deficit. The difference, however, is that 
shareholders in banks will not require a refund for their loan, unlike the case in a takaful scheme. 
 
Another method that can be used by the TOs simulating those used by the deposit insurance 
schemes approach to satisfy participants, is what is known as Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) 
which is likely to encourage management to engage in excessive risk-taking (Grais et al, 2006b). 
However, such a technique might raise the moral hazard awareness of policyholders. Any losses 
would be financed by the IAH fund and shareholders which could increase the management’s 
risk appetite to a higher level than that of the IAH. The IRR is appropriated from profits after the 
calculation of the mudarib share which is unaffected, while in the case of a loss, mudarib share is 
zero irrespective of the size of the loss. Even if a loss arose due to misconduct and negligence, it 
could wrongly be absorbed by the IRR, although, according to the mudarabah contract it should 
be borne by the shareholders. It would indeed be difficult for IAH to be aware of such 
occurrences because of the absence of either adequate disclosure or adequate governance 
structures to prevent such practices (Grais et al, 2006b). 
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3.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KEY STAKEHOLDERS  
This section will identify the key stakeholders that play an important role in the insurance 
company’s corporate governance system. Accordingly, BoDs, External Auditors, Actuary, and 
Shari’ah supervisory Boards with their affiliated staff members will be presented in this section. 
The elaboration about insurance companies’ key stakeholders’ rules and power will be based on 
Islamic and conventional insurance international standards (IAIS, IFSB, OECD, and AAOIF). 
However, some of the Pakistani takaful rules and the British Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
reform policies on actuaries will be used to reflect the importance rules of the actuaries in the 
insurance market, since the UK market has gone through a noticeable development stage to 
regulate the actuarial works. 
 
3.5.1 Board of Directors  
Board of directors BoDs (known in other jurisdictions as statutory board, external board, 
supervisory board, administrative board, or board of governors or overseers) must be individuals, 
in most cases elected by the owners or shareholders or by policyholders in case of mutual 
insurance, while the Chair of the board can be elected by the board members (IAIS and OECD, 
2009).  
 
BoDs can be structured in two tiers (tier 1 and/or 2). The main difference between 1-tier and 2-
tier structure of BoDs, is to rely on BoDs powers, duties, qualifications, independence and 
responsibilities. The 1-tier structure is allowed by law to delegate the managing of the insurer to 
a designated president or chief executive officer CEO or to a collective of managers. The 2-tier 
structure compromises two formal bodies - a supervisory board and a management board. In the 
two-tier system, for shareholders in USA to sue management in case of negligence or tort, it 
would take a majority, or 10 per cent at a general meeting to file a court petition (Scott, 2003: 
529-530).  
 
The supervisory board is responsible for overall strategy and oversight whilst execution and 
management is carried out by a management board whose chairman sometimes is also referred to 
as CEO (IAIS and OECD, 2009; IAIS, 2011; OECD, 2011). Thus, the supervisory board will 
have the power to elect and monitor the effectiveness of the management board. However, the 
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supervisory boards do not have much decision-making responsibility (IAIS, 2011; OECD, 2011). 
The management board relies on another body of senior management for executing decisions 
made by the board and for managing the insurers on a day-to-day basis (IAIS and OECD, 2009; 
IAIS, 2011; OECD, 2011).  
 
In all board categories the BoDs must satisfy the fit and proper criteria for their roles, of which 
they should have a good reputation for honesty, fairness, and should have sufficient skills, 
expertise, necessary judgment, leadership, independence and prudence to understand and oversee 
the activities of the insurer, assess the major risks facing the insurer and develop appropriate 
strategies and business plans (OECD, 2011). The BoDs should act in good faith and exercise 
their powers in the best interest of policyholders, shareholders and the insurer as a whole, in 
compliance with the law and they should not allow their own personal interests to come before or 
conflict with the interest of the insurer (IAIS and OECD, 2009; IAIS, 2011; OECD, 2011). BoDs 
have a duty to respect the rights of participant and give due regard to their interests in its 
decision-making, and participating policyholders should be able to exercise any governance 
rights attached to their contract effectively and receive the information necessary to exercise 
such rights (IAIS and OECD, 2009; IAIS, 2011; OECD, 2011). 
 
BoDs must set the direction for and oversee the affairs of the insurer and ensure that it meets its 
strategic objectives and is managed efficiently and prudently (OECD, 2011). Accordingly, BoDs 
should establish appropriate internal control framework, policies and an effective governance 
system to achieve these aims and for better communication and information delivery, they should 
review governance arrangements and assure that internal policies have been monitored, and act 
as the final decision-maker in the case of ambiguity or overlap (IFSB, 2009a).  
 
The BoDs as a governance steering body has other duties as follows: 
 
1. Assigning an actuary who can be internally appointed as an employee of the firm or an 
external party. In the case of the latter, a strict process shall be adopted to protect the 
sanctity of participants.  
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2. Assigning an independent governance committee or independent trustee, which usually 
in the takaful industry consists of three parties (non-executive directors, Shari’ah 
scholar, and actuary) who report their recommendations directly to the BoDs, the 
committee may also include a participant’s representative (IFSB, 2009a: 14). The 
purpose of the committee is to act as a whistle-blower for the sake of stakeholders, 
particularly participants, and the main objectives of the committee are to: 
 
 Achieve adequate protection for takaful participants by monitoring the reserve 
and distribution of underwriting and/or investment profit.  
 Resolve operational and management conflicts of interest, particularly in relation 
to setup costs and expenses chargeable to the takaful fund, and to review the level of 
underwriting surplus produce in order that the takaful fund will not be abused.  
 
 
On the other hand, the shareholders, BoDs or the audit committee should appoint the external 
auditor. The external auditor is the one who performs an audit of the accounts of the insurer, at 
least annually, to assure the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent 
the financial position and performance of the insurer in all material respects, in accordance with 
the applicable financial reporting framework (IAIS, 2011; OECD, 2011). 
 
3.5.2 Shari’ah Supervisory Board  
Each institution offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) has in-house religious advisers, who 
are known as the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) which may consist of no less than three 
members (who are not full-time employees of the institution) appointed by the general assembly. 
Members of the SSB are appointed by the bank shareholders or in some cases by the BoDs 
(AAOIFI, 1999; IFSB, 2009b). However, the remuneration of the SSB members is decided by 
the BoDs based on the recommendation of the management (AAOIFI, 1999). Furthermore, the 
SSB has the right to attend the annual general meeting of the institution and to perform all or 
some of the following duties (Karim, 1990): 
 
1. Design and approve contracts for a bank’s basic activities and issue religious rulings in 
response to requests by the staff.  
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2. Advise the external auditors and the management of the bank of the accounting treatments 
which require departure from generally accepted accounting principles in order to comply with 
Shari'ah precepts.  
3. Ensure that IFS practices conform to the spirit as well as the letter of Islamic teaching. 
4. Prepare a religious compliance report as part of the annual report, in which it attests whether 
the IFS operations are in conformity with the Shari'ah.  
 
Grais et al (2006b) added another two duties: calculating and paying zakat, and advising on the 
distribution of income or expenses among shareholders and IAH.  The Shari’ah board shall meet 
regularly to carry out periodic reviews to monitor Shari’ah compliance of the operations of the 
TOs. However, when necessary, the Shari’ah board can hold a meeting if the TOs urgently 
require its advice and opinion on Shari’ah-related matters. The Shari’ah board should arrange to 
meet with the BoD’s of the TOs at least twice a year to discuss issues of common interest (IFSB, 
2009b). 
 
In practice, the role of the SSB is limited in conducting ex-post monitoring of Shari’ah 
compliance. The ex-ante monitoring is carried out by the staff members of the Internal Shari’ah 
Review Audit (ISRA). The ISRA is responsible for the internal review/audit for verifying that 
Shari’ah compliance has been satisfied. Accordingly, the Shari’ah review/audit should be 
conducted by someone adequately trained in Shari’ah compliance review/audit and in 
accordance to the SSB pronouncements / resolutions (IFSB, 2009b). 
 
The finding should be then reported to the SSB and where the ISRA should recommend the 
findings to the company management to address and rectify any issues of Shari’ah compliance. 
However, the burden of ensuring a sound and effective Shari’ah governance system should not 
be left to members of the SSB alone, such task may be also assigned to an appropriately 
competent external auditor or external Shari’ah firm (IFSB, 2009b).  
 
The ISRA is an integral part of the organs of governance of IIFS and operates under the policies 
established by the IFS. The staff members of ISRA are nominated by the management and 
approved by the SSB because they are considered to be the ‘right hand’ of the SSB in that the 
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SSB carries out its tasks in accordance with the information and the various reports given by 
ISRA. ISRA is tasked with looking into the day-to-day transactions of the bank and reports back 
to the SSB for major Shari’ah issues that need collective discussion.  
 
On the other hand, it has been strongly recommended to develop an in-house capability by 
having a dedicated Internal Shari’ah Compliance Unit (ISCU) comprising Shari’ah officers with 
appropriate qualifications and experience. The job of ISCU would be to ensure  compliance with 
the Shari’ah pronouncements/resolutions and seek refererence to a juristic opinion on any matter 
pertaining to Shari’ah issues (Gambling et al., 1993; IFSB, 2009b). The IIFS should equip the 
ISCU with the appropriate compliance-monitoring skills and relevant knowledge of the Shari’ah. 
 
The IIFS should also ensure that the ISCU is separate and independent from the business units 
and departments. The SSB is responsible for appointing an ISCU or an individual Shari’ah 
officer, to enable future delegation of SSB main functions to the ISCU. The SSB may also 
delegate its powers and authority to the ISRA in reviewing, from time to time and on a regular 
basis, the level of Shari’ah compliance, particularly with regards to the actual implementation 
and operation of financial contracts involving the IIFS (IFSB, 2009b). Accordingly, IIFS should 
clearly segregate the process and procedures between the ISCU and ISRA through a written 
standard operation manual and/or framework. The main difference between the two groups, 
while the internal auditor ISCU will usually report to the audit committee, the ISRA shall report 
to the Shari’ah board. 
 
Also, the SSB should have separate and independent access to the ISCU and ISRA, respectively, 
to check that internal control and compliance procedures have been appropriately followed and 
that applicable rules and regulations to which the IIFS is subject have been complied with (IFSB, 
2009b). Furthermore, as IIFS requires the BoDs and senior management to comply with certain 
minimum criteria, it has been appropriate that a certain ‘fit and proper’ criteria be imposed on 
members of the Shari’ah board as well as on officers of the ISCU and ISRA (IFSB, 2009b).   
 
The SSB report should follow AAOIFI Governance Standard No. I (AAOIFI, 1999), which 
generally reflects all contracted documents and related transactions, processes and profits are 
68 
 
conducted with an adherence of the Islamic Shari`ah principles. It is also worth noting that 
AAOIFI Governance Standard No. I on Shari`ah Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition 
and Report, states that the SSB's report should be appropriately address the requirements of the 
local laws and regulations. The reports should also indicate whether the TO has complied with 
Shari`ah requirements throughout the financial year, the report can be in a form of annual report 
or more detailed account of compliance work undertaken addressed specifically to the 
supervisory authorities. For takaful, undertaking corporate governance would extend to the 
Shari'ah board to ensure all governance relationship and responsibilities are clearly and 
appropriately allocated to overcome any conflict of interest.  
 
In this regard, the IFSB has assigned Shari'ah governance Guiding Principles which focus 
mainly on the SSB. The principles are then divided into five parts or objectives, General 
Approach to the Shari`ah Governance System or disclosure, Competence, Independence, 
Confidentiality, and Consistency. The Guiding principles enable all stakeholders to understand 
and perform their roles in achieving the Shari`ah governance objectives, and help to promote the 
soundness and stability of the IIFS (IFSB, 2009b). The SSB should also demonstrate truthful 
assessment and disclosure of Shari'ah compliance of all the required information by stakeholders 
such as fatwa, duties, Shari`ah compliance channels, etc.  
 
The SSB should also be competent in its knowledge of both Shari`ah law (Fiqh al-Muamalat) 
and commercial and accounting practices. The SSB should show independent decision in 
accordance to the Shari`ah law and not be influenced by the agenda of the BoDs because it 
would damage the SSB’s reputation and the confidence of shareholders and stakeholders (Grais 
et al, 2006b). The SSB should also exert a degree of confidentiality particularly if the members 
of the Shari'ah board are significant shareholders in the takaful firm or hold managerial 
positions, or because of the limited number of Shari'ah scholars competent in the field. There is 
also a possibility that they may hold shares or management roles including Shari'ah board 
membership at the firm’s counterparts or competitors. In this case the rules must be put into 
place to require appropriate management of any conflicts of interest as per (ICP 7, Suitability of 
Persons) (IAIS, 2004). The SSB should also show a consistency of judgment across different 
TOs over time, or across jurisdictions within the same firm (IFSB, 2009b). 
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3.5.3 Appointed Actuary  
The repetition of insurance sector failures led to the appearance of an individual, known as the 
Actuary, who takes the role of judging over and protection of the interests of a specific group of 
stakeholders, namely policyholders. The appointed Actuary can either be an employee or 
external to the firm; however, for larger insurers the appointed actuary can be a senior employee 
(Letza et al., 2004). 
 
Actuaries’ roles in UK life insurance governance and regulation go back as far as the Life 
Assurance Companies Act of 1870. The Act gave authority to report a firm’s assets and liabilities 
and to make this information available to the public so that shareholders and policyholders could 
evaluate the firm’s financial position and apply proper judgement. This regulatory principle was 
known as freedom with publicity (Daykin, 1999). The onus was for policyholders and 
shareholders to take all responsibility in evaluating whether or not the firm was financially 
healthy before engaging them in business and thus detailed regulation of the sector was avoided 
(Dewing et al, 2001).  
 
The appointed Actuary had an indirect relationship with policyholders, due to the broad nature of 
the company and its approach to the treatment of policyholders, and was expected to take steps 
to ensure that prospective policyholders are not misled in their expectations. Thus, whenever 
needed the Actuary should act independently of the TO in accordance with the professional code 
of conduct and ethics established by the professional body of which he or she is a member. The 
Actuary must disclose to the relevant stakeholders (including the supervisory authority) any 
material concerns in respect of having accurate data, integrity and sufficiency in the course of the 
work that is undertaken with all honesty and with the highest professionalism (IFSB, 2009a). 
Therefore, the role of the appointed Actuary was reviewed by FSA (2002) to: 
 
(i)  Unify supervisory arrangements across each sector of the financial services industry. 
(ii)  Apply a single financial soundness measure to each individual institute, which depends 
on the long-term risk encounter in the case of insurance firms. 
(iii)  Resolve the problems of insurance companies.  
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Thus, the appointed Actuary of life insurers has a unique corporate governance role based on 
statute with responsibilities to the board, to policyholders and to supervisors, including 
responsibility for whistle-blowing. Another vital rule is added to the appointed actuary in the 
takaful industry that the actuary and the Shari’ah Board will be in charge of finding proper 
investments contracts to run participants funds either by mudaraba, wakala or a combination of 
the two. They should also be in charge of appointing wakala fees for investments management or 
any other combination, and they should set and advice the fee structure and the profit-sharing 
ratio on the investment management between participants and the operator – such a task for the 
appointed Actuary to be clearly spelled out in the participants’ membership documents (Pakistan 
Takaful Rule, 2005). The actuary is also responsible for allocating and approving the takaful 
benefits to participants in the family takaful business such as distribution of underwriting and/or 
investment profit (Pakistani takaful rule, 2005). 
 
The appointed Actuary in family takaful should ensure that the products are sound and workable 
whereas the Shari’ah Board should ensure that these conform to the Islamic principles (Pakistan 
Takaful Rule, 2005). In short, the appointed Actuary is responsible for controlling the integrity 
and quality of information disclosed by TOs to the board, participants and other organs in the 
firm. The Actuary is also responsible for monitoring risks, financial solvency, evaluating takaful 
funds, estimations of fund contribution to the participants, valuation of PRF assets to meet 
liabilities (IFSB, 2008).  
 
Table 3.1, summarizes the controlling and compliance functions of the TOs governance system 
in comparison with the conventional insurance business, which includes the roles and functions 
of key stakeholders for corporate governance.  
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Table 3.1 Governance Function Comparisons between Conventional and Islamic Insurance 
Companies 
Functions Typical Financial Institutions  Addition in IFS 
Governance  BoDs Shari`ah board 
Control  
 
- Internal auditor  
- External auditor 
- Actuary 
- ISRA 
- External Shari`ah review 
- Actuary 
Compliance Regulatory and financial 
compliance officers, unit or 
department. 
ISCU 
Source: (IFSB, 2009b), Author has added the work of Actuary to the table.   
 
3.6 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 
The main challenge of corporate governance arose from the implications of separating ownership 
(shareholders) and control (management) of an industrial corporation, in a situation known as an 
agency problem (Fama et al, 1983).This was supported by the emergence of large firms with 
dispersed shareholdings in certain countries such as USA and UK (Berle et al, 1932). The 
problem arose because the owners were not able to control the management due to asymmetry of 
information, since the management is much better informed about the firm’s condition and 
prospects than the owners. Smith (1776: 700) outlined the problem as follows:  
 
“The directors of joint stock companies are managers of other people's money, 
hence, it cannot be expected that their actions will be taken with same vigilance as 
if they are the owners of the company. Therefore, negligence and profusion will 
always exist in the management of the company”. 
 
Managers might expropriate investors and shareholders resources by entrenching themselves and 
stay on the job even if they are no longer competent and qualified (Ruback, 1983; Shleifer et al, 
1989). However, when managers cannot expropriate resources outright and they have the right 
not to return money to investors as discussed by Jensen et al (1976) then managers will go ahead 
with investments that will assure their benefits despite the fact it might be costly for investors. 
Investors are not guaranteed to get paid if managers, in case of shortage in funds, believe that the 
future benefit of being able to raise external funds are lower than the cost of paying what the 
investors already promised. Such a problem unravels so that there is no possibility of external 
finance because the fact that the legal enforcement contract virtually does not exist, the 
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phenomena is explained as managers paying initial investors with money raised from later 
investors, thereby creating an illusion of high return (Eaton et al, 1981; Bulow et al, 1989).  
 
In countries like USA and UK, the relevant political philosophy is neo-liberalism, which requires 
less intervention by the government in the capital market and allows the market to regulate itself 
giving more priority and protection to shareholders over other interested parties of corporation 
(Cook et al, 1999). Thus, policyholders are always kept in a disadvantageous position, 
policyholders are treated as ‘customers’ rather than ‘stakeholders’ which leaves them dependent 
on market forces and competition for protection of their rights (Archer et al, 2009).  
 
Such treatment exists on account of a lack of product transparency and problems relating to 
information asymmetry which blunts the effectiveness of market forces (Archer et al, 2009). 
While, neo-corporatism is related to stakeholder theory based on the combination of a society's 
culture and history as well as cultural and social changes that occur with modernisation, 
economic development and industrialisation.  
 
Unlike neo-liberalism and pluralism, under neo-corporatism the government plays a central role 
in regulating and organizing the social and economic interests of society such as employers’ 
organisations and labour unions. Hence, if a neo-corporatist position is adopted, then the issue of 
control rights for participant’s policyholders has to be considered.  
    
3.6.1 Asymmetry of Information and Stakeholders  (FSA Reform)  
In United Kingdom, the reform of corporate governance arrangements for life insurers were 
undertaken after the failures of Equitable on December 8
th
 2000, as a result of illegal allocation 
of terminal bonuses between groups of with-profit
16
 policyholders, which led the company to 
reduce terminal bonuses to meet guaranteed annuity claims. However, the claim is not solely 
responsible for the crises, since the claim of £1.5 billion should not have brought down a society 
                                               
16
 With-profits policies are long-term in nature, where the insurers use the premiums to invest in a pooled of fund, 
made up of a range of assets; accordingly, it will be a share of profit and loss, and it will be a share in any 
distributions from the inherited estate, the with-profit will also work as a general investment/savings vehicle (FSA, 
2001).   
 
 
73 
 
with funds of £32 billion. The problem was a culture of manipulation and concealment of the 
true state of the company’s financial position by the previous senior management team which 
had allowed a bonus policy to develop (Dewing et al, 2001).  
 
Despite the clear responsibility placed on the appointed Actuary to inform the board in that 
regard, the appointed Actuary failed to report to the board, while the board additionally failed to 
check society policy. As a result, the board found itself in 2000 and 2001 without full knowledge 
and understanding of the developing position which led to financial weakening (Dewing et al, 
2001).  
 
Accordingly, one of the important suggestions to prevent this failure to encounter in future is to 
rely on the regulator to ensure that the continued relevance of the regulatory tools is regularly 
assessed and implemented, especially in a constantly developing industry. Government also has a 
responsibility to inform and educate consumers about the nature of the financial system (Dewing 
et al, 2001).  
 
The FSA (2000) has suggested four regulatory objectives: market confidence, public awareness, 
policyholder protection, and reduction of financial crime. The new regulations will mainly set a 
minimum amount of capital required to be held by insurers and to provide more protection to 
policyholders by increasing the accountability of actuaries, auditors and the board, and improves 
information flows, both in terms of quality and quantity. The FSA has also launched the 
Financial Capability Steering Group, which will examine the approach to consumer education, 
since the UK is considered as the world pioneer to incorporate consumer education as a key 
statutory objective of the financial services regulator (FSA, 2003). 
 
The FSA suggests special corporate governance arrangements for with-profits review to resolve 
the breadth of discretion of management in managing the fund. Accordingly, the FSA has 
constructed rules and guidance in relation to treating with-profits policyholders fairly according 
to the FSA’s Conduct of Business Handbook (COBS 20) and the associated Principles:  Principle 
6, Customers’ interests, Principle 7, Communications with clients, and Principle 8, Conflicts of 
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interest (FSA, 2010). The purpose of the guidance principles and rules is to examine the 
insurance company to support: 
 
I. With-profits policyholders’ interests are properly protected. 
II. Policyholders receive sufficiently comprehensive, timely and clear information to enable 
them to view their balance at the fund.  
III. Policyholders receive fair payouts and firms apply policy conditions fairly and 
proportionately to ensure all classes of policyholders are treated fairly. 
IV. Policyholders only bear costs that are incurred in the running of the fund.  
V. Investments are appropriate to the with-profits fund and do not prevent policyholders 
from receiving fair pay-outs or bonus distributions. 
VI. New business is written on terms that, at a minimum, are unlikely to make existing with-
profits policyholders materially worse off (FSA, 2010). 
 
With proposed changes in the role of actuaries, the FSA has removed responsibility for making 
key decisions on asset allocation and distribution in with-profits funds from the appointed 
actuary and transferred it to the company BoDs to take full responsibility for its decisions (FSA, 
2003). Furthermore, the board’s responsibility toward actuarial valuation has increased so that 
the appointed actuary no longer certifies nor confirms any aspects of regulatory return; this 
responsibility is in the hands of the board. The boards now will be fully informed of the company 
important issues, and to provide fair treatments to policyholders, since the actuaries might be put 
in a position of advocating a shift towards one group of stakeholders (ex. policyholders at the 
expense of shareholders). The FSA has also identified several points of reform towards three 
roles for actuaries: (i) actuarial function, (ii) with-profit actuary, and, (iii) reviewing actuary 
(FSA, 2003). 
 
The role of with-profits Actuary will be an advisor to the board. The with-profit Actuary will 
advise BoDs on the methodology and calculation of the valuation of policyholder liabilities. The 
reviewing Actuary will report directly and privately to the auditor, giving his/her reasonableness 
of the valuation of liabilities by the firm, the methods used and the economic, market and 
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actuarial assumptions. As a result, it is not permitted that the Actuary holds a position on the 
board, because he/she may provide input into other business decisions (FSA, 2003). 
  
The FSA has also imposed certain changes in the rules of the auditors, in that the auditors are 
now responsible for the audit of liabilities, so that auditors no longer rely on the calculations 
previously certified by appointed actuaries (FSA, 2003). Auditors are now required to make use 
of the advice of the reviewing Actuary and to state they have done so in their audit opinion. This 
change in reporting was described by the FSA as realistic reporting; the new reporting system 
should increase confidence of users. 
 
3.7  IFSB EFFORTS TO STANDARDIZE THE TAKAFUL INDUSTRY    
In an effort to standardise the takaful industry, the IFSB has conducted an agreement of 
development and implementations of the IAIS Core Principles (ICPs) and practice guidelines on 
the takaful industry in order to achieve a number of objectives. One of these objectives is to 
provide appropriate levels of consumer protection in terms of both risk and disclosure (IFSB, 
IAIS, 2006). Since, most of the IAIS (2011) Core Principles (ICPs) tend to highlight the correct 
way of dealing with policyholders both before a contract is entered into through to the point at 
which all obligations under a contract have been satisfied. A very important core principle of 
IAIS is (Corporate Governance, ICP 7) focusing on the BoDs because they are supposed to be in 
charge of insurer performance. One of their many functions is to set out policies that address 
conflicts of interest, the fair treatment of policyholders and information sharing with 
stakeholders, while senior management should provide direction on a day-to-day basis in 
accordance with the firm objectives and policies that were set out by the BoDs. 
 
Accordingly, as the ICPs codes are considered vital to bring protection to policyholders and to 
provide the required stability to the insurance industry, the IFSB has launched in 2005 a 
development agreement called the (JWG)
17
 with IAIS concerning the applicability of IAIS core 
principles ICPs issued in 2003 (recently 2011) to the regulatory and supervisory standards for the 
takaful industry, and relying on OECD guidelines for insurers’ governance issued in 2005 
(recently 2011).  
                                               
17 Joint Working Group. 
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3.7.1 IFSB Standards and Guidelines for Takaful Operators    
IFSB (2008) has identified several premises and objectives that serve the interest of all parties 
involved in a takaful business arrangement. Accordingly, six guiding principles divided into 
three parts are put forward for adoption and implementation by TOs. The guiding principles 
should apply to all takaful undertakings, irrespective of their legal status, or operational models. 
These parts are focused on the reinforcement of good governance practices as in insurance 
companies while addressing the specificities of takaful companies, a balanced approach that calls 
for their fair treatment of all stakeholders, and an impetus for a more comprehensive prudential 
framework for takaful undertakings. As far as this thesis is concerned, the following represents 
some of IFSB recommendations related to dealing fairly with the participants of the takafull 
scheme (IFSB, 2008): 
            
TOs should structure a corporate governance framework that specifies the strategic, operational 
roles, responsibilities, functions of all organs of the firms including but not limited to the BoDs 
and its committees, the management, Shari’ah governance function (whether in the form of a 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board, as well as the internal and external auditors (IFSB, 2008).   
 
It must address the rights and interests of stakeholders, and assign compliance mechanisms of 
underwriting and investment according to identified legal and regulatory frameworks. The TOs 
should also design a balance of governance mechanisms that satisfies all stakeholder parties i.e. 
shareholders and participants. Such a balance environment will create a good and strong culture 
of governance. The mechanisms will be structured so that a clear segregation of the takaful 
participants’ funds from the TOs shareholders’ funds will be declared to avoid information 
asymmetry, misalignment of the incentives of the principal and agent, which results in a 
reconciliation between shareholders and participants (IFSB, 2008).   
  
TOs shall put in place an appropriate code of ethics requiring employees and agents to observe 
high standards of integrity, honesty and fair dealing. Thus, codes observation should be 
conducted periodically via an adequate system that can monitor compliance with this code and to 
effectively address any dishonourable behaviour. They should strive to assure that the code of 
ethics is properly delivered by whoever promotes or advertises the takaful product, such as a 
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conventional bank with a takaful window, brokers, agents, actuaries, representatives, etc. In 
terms of investment activities, TOs should strictly adhere to Islamic ethical codes.  
 
Furthermore, for long-term takaful contracts especially family takaful plans where long-term 
relationships are established between takaful participants and the TOs, an adequate code of ethics 
and conduct should be observed by the representatives of the TOs at the point of contract and 
after the point of contract. For example, in the case of family takaful investment products, the 
pre-contract illustration should be clearly expressed and presented for better understanding and 
appreciation by takaful participants who may not be familiar with takaful terminology (IFSB, 
2008).   
 
Takaful participants must recognize in which structure the company is operating i.e. is the 
company totally established in a mutual structure, or hybrid structure with a proprietary company 
as TO, rather than a pure mutual. Under the mutual structure, participants can vote for the 
appointment of the board and/or the management, while they cannot achieve such goals when the 
takaful scheme is run as a proprietary scheme. However, it should be noted that experience with 
mutuals in conventional insurance suggests that effective governance by participants can be 
difficult once they grow above a certain size. In this situation, management may effectively 
become autonomous (IFSB, 2008).  The TOs must establish a mechanism of checks and balances 
that gives participants appropriate powers to review their PRF and PIF. This ensures the TOs 
adherence to interest protection while satisfying the mutual assistance scheme among the 
participants (IFSB, 2008).   
 
3.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided a comprehensives review on the Corporate Governance polices and 
regulations as per the international insurance organization (IAIS, OECD, IFSB, and AAOIFI).  It 
also highlighted the rules, power and activities of some of the key personnel in the insurance 
companies such as BoDs, Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB), and actuaries, since it’s believed 
that these key stakeholders has an effective impact on the success or failure of any insurance 
company.   
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The current chapter has also identified the main issue related to corporate governance i.e. the 
agency problem, which is a result of the existing ownership separation between the owner 
(shareholders) and the controller (management), since management is much better informed 
about the firm’s condition and prospects than the owners, which causes asymmetry of 
information. Accordingly, this chapter reflect the the failures of Equitable insurance company 
which was the result of the failure of the company senior management to convey the required 
information about the company financial position to the BoDs, with an obvious missing role of 
the company actuaries to inform the BoDs of the current financial positions of the company 
which caused the insurance company to declare bankruptcy.  
 
The chapter also distinguished between the types of roles that the government can adopt to 
control the financial system in the country – that the government can either follow the Neo-
corporatism or Neo-Liberalism system. Furthermore, insurance companies can adopt a certain 
corporate governance to run their business – that the companies can follow the Anglo-Saxon 
Model, the European Model or the Islamic corporate governance Model. 
 
To resolve the issue of the agency problem in the takaful industry which might cause denial of 
some of the participant’s rights, the IFSB and the IAIS (2006) has conducted a Joint Working 
Group, which aims to implement the IAIS conventional insurance core principles into a suitable 
set of core principles that can suit the takaful insurance industry, since most of the IAIS (2011) 
Core Principles are aimed to provide better treatment of policyholders. The IFSB (2008) has also 
made a couple of recommendations which eventually will serve the financial benefits of the 
contributed participants. This chapter also highlighted some of the FSA roles that give better 
protection to policyholders. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INSURANCE & TAKAFUL MARKET CONDUCT AND DISCLOSURE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter is a continuation of the previous chapter (corporate governance policies), but 
focusing on the international
18
 insurance and takaful regulations and policies regarding Market 
Conduct and Disclosure.  Market conduct and disclosure are considered important issues with 
regards to Takaful Operators (TOs) obligations towards participants, since participants will be 
interested to review their financial benefits in the takaful fund from time to time as well as being 
interested to review their claims and indemnities situation. An active company disclosure system 
will allow participants to review the company financial profile, such as the rate of investments 
return and underwriting surplus, amount of loan available in the shareholders balance sheet to 
support the takaful fund whenever a deficit encounters.    
 
Overall TOs adherence to the best available market conduct and procedures standards and 
policies will bring better stability in the insurance market, as well as better protection for 
stakeholders. This chapter will give an answer to the second part of research question 1, which is 
:  What are the best regulatory practices and standards of insurance and takaful companies, in 
terms of Corporate Governance and Market Conduct and disclosure? 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 defines market conduct and disclosure. Section 
4.3 presents the hidden disclosure problem. Section 4.4 presents the requirements for public 
disclosure. Section 4.5 presents sound investment return in accordance with the established 
insurance market conduct and disclosure standards. Section 4.6 presents sound surplus 
distribution in accordance with the established insurance market conduct and disclosure 
standards. Section 4.7 draws a conclusion.  
 
 
                                               
18 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB), Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). 
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4.2 MARKET CONDUCT AND DISCLOSURE 
Market conduct refers primarily to the way insurers deal with existing or prospective 
policyholders whether directly or through intermediaries; it also covers other market players such 
as investments managers. The strength of market conduct varies from one jurisdiction to another. 
However, even in advanced jurisdictions market conduct regimes for insurance have lagged 
behind the development of prudential regulation and behind other sectors (Casey, 2009). 
Regulators are always concerned about market conduct in terms of contract terms and pricing 
(rate and reform), disclosure requirements and suitability (Casey, 2009). The supervisory 
regimes as a result requires insurers to have sound market conduct policies and procedures, 
especially when dealing with policyholder expectations (IAIS, 2002).  Disclosure is considered 
as a prudential aspect for proper efficiency of the financial market, as per IAIS (2002: 3):  
 
“When provided with appropriate information that allows them to assess an insurer’s 
activities and the risks inherent in those activities, markets can act efficiently, 
rewarding those companies that manage risk effectively and penalizing those that do 
not. This is often referred to as market discipline. It serves as an adjunct to 
supervision”. 
 
Accordingly, sound market conduct policies and procedures will not be satisfied without having 
effective supervisors that can encourage insurers to make effective disclosure, by maintaining 
efficient, fair, safe, and stable insurance markets for the benefit and protection of policyholders 
(IAIS, 2002).  The supervisors will need to have sufficient knowledge about takaful to be able to 
understand the products which they are dealing with and the significant differences between 
takaful contracts and conventional ones. The takaful contract should cover the contractual 
relationships between TOs and participants, including the circumstances of any additional 
contributions that may be sought and the basis for the distribution of any surplus.
19
 Such a 
contractual relationship will have one main goal which is participants’ protection while not 
restricting competition and innovation in the market (Casey, 2009).   
                                               
19 The contractual structure in case of family takaful should cover relationships governing Participants Investment 
Fund (PIF) and circumstances in which PIF may be called upon to meet a deficit of Participants Risk Fund (PRF), 
another disclosure should be made in regards to Shar’iah supervisory process especially if Shari’ah principles lead a 
takaful operator to exclude circumstances that would normally be covered by a conventional insurer. 
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4.3 HIDDEN DISCLOSURE PROBLEM  
The main market conduct problem faced by TOs is the issue of intermediaries
20
 and regulations, 
which vary from one jurisdiction to another in regulating intermediaries. For example, some 
jurisdictions regulate intermediaries directly, and some place the onus on the insurer, while 
others have scarcely any provisions at all (Casey, 2009). However, TOs should ensure that their 
representatives provide relevant and meaningful information to the takaful participants to avoid 
any risk of misleading the takaful participants into expecting that takaful is no different from 
conventional insurance (IFSB, 2009a).  
 
Although regulations might ask the TOs to take the responsibility of letting their intermediaries 
disclose the required information to the customers, a suitability regime however, is very difficult 
to apply especially if an intermediary is an agent to another company. Thus, the suitability issue 
will be much easier if the takaful product is sold via the operator itself, since intermediaries will 
be required to acquire a wide set of information about customer preferences, such as customer 
perspective and their views on Shari’ah issues  (Ali et al, 2008). 
 
As the intermediaries can play an important role, IAIS (2011) has identified ICP 18 as one of the 
core principles to enhance the intermediaries’ roles in the insurance business. Accordingly, they 
apply  certain criteria which are considered essential for intermediaries:  (i) be licensed or 
registered, (ii) have adequate general, commercial and professional knowledge and ability, (iii) 
have a good reputation, (iv) have sufficient safeguards to protect participants funds, (v) to 
provide consumers with information on their status. In case of takaful insurance the 
intermediaries shall have adequate knowledge on Shari’ah issues and its implications (Ali et al, 
2008). 
 
Even non-Muslim customers should indicate their preferences on matters such as the required 
amount of underwriting surplus, investment portfolio and the expected profits, type of assets 
instruments used by the takaful business. As a result supervisors will have a responsibility of 
ensuring consumer satisfaction by receiving a suitable takaful product. Even when intermediaries 
                                               
20 An agent such as a broker, who is given commissions by insurance company for selling its policies (Source: 
Dictionary of Insurance Terms, 4th Edition, 2000, Barron’s).  
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are directly regulated, the supervisors’ roles should be there to measure the required output and 
to make sure that the prescribed disclosures are made, and that this is done in a way that is clear, 
fair and not misleading (Casey, 2009).   
 
Furthermore, another common problem in the insurance industry is the level of inherent 
uncertainties in the business. As a result of the inverse nature of an insurance contract, whereby 
the policyholder can pay single premium in exchange for an uncertain amount of benefit in time 
in future, a systematic problem can arise as a result of under-/over-estimations of liabilities.  
 
In the takaful business the payment of claims might cause a problem, especially when TOs treat 
participants’ indemnity as an issue of ex gratia21 payments since the TO may be tempted to make 
payments, in pursuit of goodwill and future business, ignoring the fact that the PRF from which 
the payments are made belongs to policyholders and not the shareholders. Therefore, the proper 
way to overcome some of the disclosure problems is by putting in place a proper system for 
claims decisions along with documentation justifying the reasons for any unusual decisions 
(Casey, 2009).  
 
4.3.1 Claim Settlement Procedures 
The concept of insurance was established to provide indemnity or to substitute personal loss of 
an agreed amount as per a stipulated policy. However, not all claims or losses are identified and 
sometimes a dispute might take place as to whether to provide an indemnity or not. It is very 
important that the insurance company pays its claims fairly and promptly, and it is equally 
important that the company resist unjust claims and avoid overpayment. Thus, claims 
adjuster/representative should be appointed by the insurance company to investigate, negotiate 
and settle such disputes (Lawry et al, 2004). 
 
An adjuster is a person who investigates losses and determines the liability and the amount of 
payments to be made. The Adjuster can be an agent (authorized to settle small first-party claims 
                                               
21 Payments can be paid as a gift from the insurer to the insured, whether the insured deserve it or not, to overcome a 
harsh situation (Lawry and Rawlings, 2004). 
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up to some maximum limit), salaried staff (when a company has a large volume of claims), a 
bureau (an adjusting claims organization supported by insurers who use their service), an 
independent (an individual who offers his service to insurance companies for an agreed fee) or a 
public adjuster (representing the insured in case of complex loss situations, where he received a 
certain agreed fee by the insured) (Lawry et al, 2004). 
 
To indemnify a policyholder upon a claim of loss occurrence, the adjuster shall verify that, the 
claimant is included in the policy; the loss took place during the policy period and to check if the 
perils causing the loss against are in the policy (Lawry et al, 2004).  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the insured should adhere to certain settlement procedures for the insurance company 
to accept his/her indemnity request. One of these requests is the notice of loss which is informs 
the insurer that a loss has occurred. The insured shall also file a proof of loss within a specific 
time after the occurrence of loss. Upon, satisfying these procedures an investigation would be 
conducted to determine if there was actually a loss covered by the policy: if so, the amount of 
loss shall be identified (Lawry et al, 2004).  
 
4.3.2 Payment or Denial  
If the above steps were satisfied then a payment will be made to the insured; sometimes a 
payment can be made as a gift (ex gratia). However, the payment can be denied in case of no 
loss, the policy did not cover the loss or there is a dispute about the amount of the claim (Lawry 
et al, 2004). In this case, the situation has to be resolved by either negotiation, litigation (court 
proceeding to resolve the dispute) or arbitration
22
. Arbitration can provide five distinct 
advantages to the policyholders: 
I. Speed: reduce the amount of court hearings which might take place over a period of 
years. 
II. Privacy: to avoid media involvement and reporting of such cases that may create a 
negative reflection on the insurer’s reputation. 
                                               
22 Arbitration is a condition sometimes stated on the policy, whereby if there is a dispute about the quantum (amount 
to be paid) and not a dispute about liability as per legislation, then the parties are allowed to go through a process of 
arbitration before embarking upon litigation.  
84 
 
III. Cost: arbitration might be cheaper than the normal court hearing fees which is extremely 
expensive. However it is not implemented all the time. 
IV. Protection: the insured might blackmail the insurer to proceed with the court sessions, 
which might adversely affect the insurer’s public image, but which would be impossible 
with arbitration.   
V. Expertise: an arbitrator23 can be hired to come up with a better decision than that 
achieved through litigation; it is unlikely that the judge would have the same degree of 
knowledge as the arbitrator (Vaughan, 1999). 
 
Another way of resolving an insurance dispute is to use the Financial Ombudsman Service
24
. 
This body is an independent organization with professional expertise to provide a free service to 
resolve a dispute in insurance or other financial service in the UK as per the Ombudsman Act, 
1980 (Act XV of 1980). The organization receives tens of thousands of disputes every year, and 
they are easy to get in touch with as they have a dispute form which can be filled online or via 
the phone. The Ombudsman service is not as formal as the law court but it is as completely 
independent as the judge in a court since it fairly treats both sides of the dispute, giving fair 
judgment and advising of the proper steps to be taken to resolve such a dispute. 
 
4.4 PUBLIC DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS  
Public disclosure to the market contributes to good corporate governance by identifying those 
insurers who are using best practices and those who are lagging behind, as well as insurers, key 
stakeholders who are responsible for such underperformance. In short, disclosure, transparency, 
proper corporate governance and internal control will contribute to proper corporate conduct and 
deter fraud and corruption, allowing insurers to compete on the basis of their products offered 
and to differentiate themselves from insurers who do not practice good governance (IAIS, 2011; 
OECD, 2011). One of the IAIS (2011), core principles is ICP 20 (Public Disclosure), which 
states that supervisory authorities are to require that insurers disclose relevant information on a 
timely basis. Since proper disclosure will give market participants a clear view of the business 
                                               
23 A person of expertise who has technical knowledge on quantum dispute cases. 
24 Material of this paragraph has been taken from the Information of Financial Ombudsman Services by accessing 
the following Web-Sites:  
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/default.htm  
http://www.lawcommissionbangladesh.org/reports/31.pdf 
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activities and financial positions of the insurers and facilitate the understanding of the risk 
exposures of the insurers, disclosure shall also address insurance company obligations and 
commitments towards their customers.  
 
4.4.1 Disclosure of Product Suitability and Obligations  
Accordingly, the concept of disclosure is closely linked to the requirement to provide 
information to the prospective policyholders to enable them to make proper and informed 
choices as to the suitability of the proper insurance product to be selected to meet their needs.  
Suitability is linked to the insurer’s obligation to ensure that the product sold is suitable for the 
policyholders to prevent policyholders suffering when insolvency situations are encountered. 
Unfortunately, takaful, contracts and product information tend to be drafted in legalistic and 
protective terms, with the aim primarily of protecting the TO, rather than of plainly informing 
the takaful participants of their rights and obligations (IFSB, 2009a). 
 
It is necessary for participants to make proper judgments about TOs before entering into a 
contract, and for better comparison
25
 between different TOs available in the market (Casey, 
2009). Hence, information should be characterized as accessible, comprehensive, reliable, 
comparable
26
 and consistent. Information should reflect takaful benefits, the takaful fund’s asset 
allocation, claims information, encountered expenses, fees and other relevant aspects of the 
operations of the takaful fund, including methods applied, assumptions used, and the accounting 
and actuarial policies (IFSB, 2009a). Takaful contracts should be written in plain language 
utilizing consistent takaful terminology (including applications of the takaful core principles). In 
this respect, it is recommended that the supervisory authority develop a set of prescribed 
disclosures to be made prior to contract, including disclosures on the takaful core principles and 
Shari’ah governance arrangements (IFSB, 2009a).  
 
Complying with Shari’ah is another commitment of TOs. For instance TOs should ensure that 
the re-takaful and reinsurance arrangements are consistent with the sound takaful principles and 
                                               
25 By exploring one reporting period to another, which can only be made if the reader is informed how the methods 
and assumptions of preparation have changed and, if practicable, the impact of that change. 
26 It is recognized that, until international standards are developed and adopted uniformly, true comparability cannot 
be achieved. 
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are as per the guidelines provided by its Shar’iah Board; such a practise is considered acceptable 
so long as there is no practicable Shari’ah compliant alternative (Pakistan Takaful Rule, 2005). 
However, TOs should ensure that any re-takaful arrangement duly serves the purpose of the 
takaful undertakings and is undertaken with the interests of takaful participants as the foremost 
consideration. TOs should also strive to use re-takaful operators, rather than conventional 
reinsurers, in support of a fully Shari’ah-compliant financial system for the takaful undertakings 
(IFSB, 2009b). Another way of proving company obligations and commitments towards their 
customers is by spending more efforts on research and development. Accordingly, insurance 
companies should disclose their strategies toward research, development, education and training 
of their employees for better reputation in gaining good results on financial performance and 
risk- management achievement (IAIS, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, information should be properly disseminated according to the international 
standards and designed through adequate methods and assumptions to bring to the attention of 
participants of the relevant information. Hence, one of the best channels to disclose information 
to the public is by using the internet as an effective way to disseminate information, which can 
easily reflect the development patterns over time with a comparison against the previous periods 
(IAIS, 2011). 
 
Other channels that might be used as a way of disclosing information might include insurer 
annual reports, interim financial reports, annual general meetings of shareholders, prospectus 
reports for public offers and/or listings, merger and takeover documentation, and ad hoc 
statements. These disclosure channels should reflect the company financial position, financial 
performance and its risk management by identifying intangible assets and the way to mitigate 
them. TOs might also reflect the developmental state of the industry and the overall balance of 
products and markets (IAIS, 2011). Despite the fact that disclosure is a vital approach to 
participants, more disclosure might increase direct and/or indirect cost for the company and the 
companies may experience a competitive
27
 disadvantage from increased disclosure of proprietary 
information (IAIS, 2002; 2008). Therefore, various jurisdictions have different requirements on 
                                               
27 It is appropriate that commercially sensitive information (such as trade secrets, proprietary information or 
information that, if disclosed, may have adverse effects on the insurer) not be publicly disclosed (IAIS, 2008). 
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what communication channels to use, contents of disclosure and disclosures timing (IAIS and 
OECD, 2009). 
 
4.4.2 Disclosure of Takaful Model and Corporate Governance Strategy  
Insurance companies should disclose fundamental information about their business activities and 
models, management and corporate governance strategy (IAIS, 2002). Insurers should disclose 
their corporate governance policy to deliver accurate information to participants in a timely 
manner at the beginning of the contract. Corporate governance information should be related to 
company market position, its strategy and its progress toward achieving its strategic objectives, 
the board structure
28
, senior management structure
29
, incentive structure
30
 and overall corporate 
culture, legal entity and lines of business structure including group structure, ownership structure  
(IAIS, 2002). TOs should also disclose their takaful model in their annual report and on their 
website for better understanding of takaful products. IFSB (2009a) asserts that the model 
disclosure should include the following:  
 
I. Whether contributions are made for the overall fund or for the risk fund, it is important to 
determine the basis of underwriting surpluses. 
II. The source and level of remuneration for the TOs should be shown separately for Family 
and General takaful businesses, including charges performance and fee or sharing 
arrangements for investment profits and/or underwriting surpluses. 
III. Expenses and fees charged to the takaful funds. 
IV. Distribution of underwriting surpluses and/or investment profits, including the eligibility 
of takaful participants who are entitled to a distribution of profit, the ratio of profit 
sharing. 
V. For Family takaful, information about policies and procedures based on the product 
design/type concerning the separation between PIFs and PRFs, as well as between profit 
and/or underwriting surplus allocation bases. 
VI. Obligations of the TOs and takaful participants. 
                                               
28 Size of the board, the board committees and membership. 
29 This would includes responsibilities and reporting lines. 
30 How compensation for executive and staff is set and the amounts of that compensation. 
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VII. An assurance that all the information given to the potential participant is accurate, fair 
and not misleading. 
 
Accordingly insurance companies should design and disclose a framework to meet the regulator 
and/or international specified standards (IAIS, 2002). On the other hand, in order for participants 
to avoid being misled during the sale process, participants will need to rely on present and past 
financial performance, be made aware of the current position of the insurance company, have 
prediction figures about the future financial position of the company and whether it will be able 
to fulfil its obligations towards participants.   
 
4.4.3 Disclosure of Insurer’s Current and Past Financial Position and Performance 
Disclosure of an insurer’s financial position and performance is considered an important factor in 
enhancing and developing the insurance business, because these aspects will affect the 
company’s ability to fulfil its promises and its strength to meet its obligations to its participants.    
 
Past financial performance should include information on the sources, amounts of income, and 
expenditure of the cash flows such as: statements of profit and loss, statement of changes in 
equity showing gains and losses and financial relationship between shareholders and 
policyholders, investments return, management discussion and analysis of financial performance, 
claims history patterns incurred and paid, technical underwriting account, underwriting strategy, 
gross and net of reinsurance, impact of acquisitions (IAIS, 2002). Past information should be 
supplemented by present information and prospective risk exposures, risk management strategies 
and practices, investment strategies, and basic business management and corporate governance 
information (IAIS, 2002).  Accordingly, insurance companies should provide a description on 
the investment portfolio and the contents of the assets instruments with the weight of written 
assets and the expected asset return. Description about the investments performance management 
which should explain the frequency and types of measurement used and methods adopted to 
monitor performance, with a description on prices fluctuation of equities securities and their 
income, realized gains/losses, unrealized gains/losses (IAIS, 2005). TOs past and present 
financial performance will allow policyholders to assess and predict future performance, 
including any future expenses and profitability and their variability over time. 
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4.5 INVESTMENT RETURN, SOUND MARKET CONDUCT AND DISCLOSURE  
Not Adhering to the proper investment return practises can have a negative impacts on the  
soundness of the takaful market conduct and disclosure, which can affects participants long term 
financial benefits; some of these of factors are: 
  
4.5.1 Takaful Operators Investment objectives  
Investment strategy, objectives and the rationale behind conducting investments business is an 
important factor to attract customers. Some of the objectives might be to create a balance 
between underwriting and investments activities of the participants. In order to cover deficits of 
underwriting activities a back-up should be available either from the reserves built through 
underwriting surpluses or through participants’ investments return or by relying on shareholders 
interest-free loans (qard hasan). Accordingly, IFSB (2009a) asserts that TOs should disclose 
their investment objectives and assets allocation rationale with the content of the assets 
instruments and their weight in the investments portfolio, and whether they are suitable to match 
short-term or long-term liabilities. TOs should explain the difference between PIF and PRF 
accounts and the expected investment return on each account, with a brief on the type of assets 
instruments used on each account and the expected time horizon to gain profit on their 
investment fund. 
 
4.5.2 Framework of Takaful Model and Participants’ Investment Return   
Investment contracts will differ depending on the type of takaful model that TOs use. If wakalah 
is used then different investment procedures will be used which require two contracts for 
investment and underwriting, an upfront investment fee, incentive remuneration, a description of 
the outsourcing
31
 investments policy and how it maintains control, ownership and oversight (if 
the investment is running by an outside investment company). If the used model is mudarabah, 
then only one contract for investment and underwriting is required, which includes the 
percentage of investment return between the TO and participants. Accordingly, TOs should 
disclose a framework that includes the used takaful model, either wakalah or mudarabah with 
the investment management function, the investment profit-sharing distribution, product 
                                               
31 Including outsourcing to related entities within the insurance group or financial conglomerate. 
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benefits
32
, termination charges in the case of early termination of a takaful contract with the exit 
options and the consequences of losing benefit payments from both the Participant Risk Fund 
(PRF) and/or Participant Investment Fund (PIF). The framework should also disclose the 
frequency of investment profit and/or underwriting surplus declaration and their estimated 
returns and the complaints-handling and other contractual arrangements (IFSB, 2009a). 
 
The disclosed framework should also fit with the main organization structure, the corporate 
governance mechanism used by the Board of Directors (BoDs) to control the company, overall 
risk management, and with the control and update mechanisms
33
. The framework should also 
include any changes to key personnel and other management infrastructure that can directly or 
indirectly play a vital role on the company’s investments strategy (IFSB, 2009a).  
 
The disclosure framework would also address the issue that will affect participants’ investments 
return, such as disclosure about the management who handle the investment procedures of the 
takaful fund and their incentive fees and remuneration. These are required according to AAOIFI 
standard on Investments Disclosure No. 13 which also states that disclosure should be toward the 
party that manage the investment policyholders’ funds and shareholders’ funds and the 
remuneration it receives
34
.   
 
AAOIFI asserts that TOs should disclose the basis applied for determining incentive 
remuneration. AAOIFI Standard No 13 indicates that the basis applied by the company in 
determining the remuneration of the party that manage the company’s investments on the basis 
of mudarabah or a specified agency fee should be disclosed. TOs are also required to disclose 
the used methodology and approach to distribute investment returns among participants, since it 
will also affect the takaful fund’s overall investment return. Therefore, as per AAOIFI No 13, 
there should be disclosure of the basis applied by the company in allocating the profit generated 
from investing policyholders’ funds and shareholders’ funds. 
                                               
32 (Ex, aims of product, cover, conditions). 
33 It is a mechanism that works in accordance to the changes on the local market behaviour and to the political 
forces. 
34 Percentage of investments profit in the case of mudarabah or a specified agency fee 
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Takaful-charged expenses can also affect participants’ financial benefits in the takaful fund; 
hence TOs need to disclose sufficient information on different type of expenses. According to 
AAOIFI No.13 disclosure is to be in line with the bases applied by the company in calculating 
expenses affecting policyholders’ funds such as pre-operating expenditures, reserves, cost of 
assets used in operations, claims and compensations.  
 
4.5.3 Disclosure of Asset-Liability Matching 
The manner in which asset-liability matching is managed is of paramount importance to insurers. 
An unmatched position may increase the risk of loss but can enhance profitability (IAIS, 2005).  
 
One of the main problems encountered in the GCC region is lack of sukuk in the primary and 
secondary markets which raises a problem to match long-term liabilities (Tolefat, 2008). As a 
result TOs should explain their investments strategy in accordance with the local jurisdiction 
regulations on the basis that lead them to cover long-term liabilities, as well as their view on 
investing on volatile or illiquid assets classes such as equities and real estate. Other solutions to 
overcome the assets-liability matching problem have been suggested by IAIS (2005) which 
identifies two approaches to monitor the adequacy of matching assets-liabilities:  
 
I. Insurers have to be constantly providing assurances that their assets are in excess of 
their liabilities (solvency dimension).  
II. The ability of an insurer to have enough funds available to meet payments of policy 
benefits and other obligations as they fall due (liquidity dimension). 
 
Accordingly, TOs should disclose the risk framework or model that leads them to adhere to the 
two dimensions above for proper achievement of assets-liability matching procedures and 
management. The framework should give an explanation on types of assets instruments that are 
being used as well as contingent, or intangible assets. Such information will provide a good 
picture about the assets and whether or not they have strong capital to absorb losses when 
needed, which depends strongly on their liquidity situation.  
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The framework should disclose the suitability of the assets to generate profit in the short-term or 
on the long-term time horizon (IAIS, 2002; IFSB, 2009a). The framework should also explain 
how the TO is able to release its investments quickly if necessary without substantial loss in 
value. They should also identify the sensitivities of these investments to fluctuations in key types 
of market variables such as exchange rate, and equity price indices and credit risks. TOs should 
also disclose the reasons of heavily investing in equities which are considered very volatile 
assets, especially in the GCC market with the high fluctuations equities market. Failure in these 
markets can drastically reduce the insurer capital, and consequently affect participants’ rights in 
providing investments return, underwriting surplus, or protection by giving the right-deserved 
indemnity. Therefore, insurance companies should disclose qualitative information of assets-
liabilities models, types of parameters used and how they are calibrated, the performance of the 
model over time, and model testing and validation methodologies (IAIS, 2005).  
 
Furthermore, takaful operations require a separation between participants’ funds and 
shareholders’ funds. As TOs might have different operational structures to serve participants 
such as general
35
 wakalah model and family
36
 wakalah model, they may be required by statutory 
laws to design a separate investment portfolio to suit the requirement needs to match assets-
liabilities and for better risk controlling of that specific portfolio. Therefore, it is impractical to 
disclose a generalized balance sheet or assets-liabilities matching framework for different models 
and structures. Separate disclosure will give participants a more precise view on how each model 
and structure is intended to be, and is being managed, and to reflect a wide picture on the capital 
backup structure used on the participants model and a clear guidance on the concentration 
percentage of assets, as well as amount of loan facility available from shareholders to support 
deficit of participants (IFSB, 2009a). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
35 Engineering, Coverage, Motor, etc. 
36 Life insurance, educational, Investments purposes, etc. 
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4.5.4 Asset class segregation, description and profiling 
As mentioned previously, takaful investments assets portfolio consists of different types of 
instruments with a variety of characteristics that some classes of assets might differ in their 
volatility. Equities, for instance, are considered more volatile than investments accounts, while 
real estate is very difficult to be liquidated when needed. While some assets may be suitable to 
match short-term liabilities, others may be preferred to match long-term liabilities.  Accordingly, 
assets have to be valued in different manners according to their expected returns, sensitivity to 
market variables, level of liquidity or constraints on disposal. TOs should also describe the 
nature and types of intangible assets, or any sort of assets that have uncertain realizable value, 
embedded risks, double-counting value,  physical assets or other assets that can lose their value 
in the event of run-off or winding-up. TOs should also disclose, describe and list any investments 
not specified in any other asset class (IFSB, 2009a). 
 
Furthermore, for meaningful analysis of risks and performance, instruments exhibiting similar 
risk and return behaviour need to be grouped. Grouping them can be achieved either by type of 
asset classes
37
, or more developed jurisdictions can group them in accordance to the risk 
exposure. The fact of the matter is that disclosure, at an excessive level of segregation, may 
overwhelm market participants and incur unnecessary costs for insurers. On the other hand, over-
aggregation may conceal important information (IAIS, 2005). Therefore, segregation and 
classifications of assets according to their nature and risk sensitivity will add an advantage for 
TOs for achieving better investments strategies, and for participants to get a wider picture on the 
company investments activities IFSB (2009a). IAIS (2005) also stresses the importance of 
disclosing the methods and assumptions used in measuring asset values, significant terms and 
conditions that may affect the amount, timing and certainty of future cash flows (IAIS, 2005). 
TOs should also disclose information in regards to the amount of assets invested in the PIF or 
PRF, the lent assets, as well as the amount of assets that are dependent on the related parties such 
as the parent company, subsidiaries or associates. The disclosed assets information should be in 
line with the local supervisory authority requirements (IFSB, 2009a).   
 
                                               
37 It is preferable since it will not encounter high costs and it will not need highly skilled personnel to effect the 
segregations.   
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4.5.5 Disclosure of Investments Return and it’s Impact on Participants’ Claim Situations   
Comprehensive disclosure should be conducted towards claim coverage strategies, i.e. how the 
TO is going to cover PRF claims – is it from the investments return fund of the PIF, or does the 
TO strategies imply that investment return of a certain PIF should cover a deficit of other 
business lines of the same takaful company for later compensations. Such information, which 
should be clearly disclosed to the public, will have a great effect on participants’ expectations to 
receive investments return and profit in due time or not, and hence a proper decision can be made 
by participants to either do business with these takaful companies or not.  
 
TO obligations to pay participants indemnity for their claims can also be affected by TOs 
behaviour in conducting investment. Some TOs might have a high-risk appetite by investing in 
high volatile assets such as equity which may lose value when the market faces severe economic 
changes. When these negative scenarios are encountered then participants’ rights to receive 
claims will be affected since TOs will have no back-up to offset any shortage on underwriting 
activities. TO indemnity obligations can also be affected by operator investments fees, or by the 
remuneration that the operator requires for the effort spent to generate profit. As these require 
charging fees increase participants’ investment return decreases. Accordingly, TO promises to 
cover participants’ claims will decrease and result in underwriting deficit. The lower return on 
profit may not be able to cover the encountered deficit.       
 
When participants’ claim issues are affected, then underwriting activities will be affected as well. 
This can cause a delay in providing indemnity to participants. As the TO fails to generate 
investments return for participants as a result of economic changes which may cause assets to 
lose value, it is possible for the TO to encounter a huge amount of unpaid claims that will lead it 
to ask shareholders for qard hasan. However, paying back the qard hasan will require the TO to 
increase participants’ taburru or premium rate, or delay or stop their future investments return to 
an unknown time in the future until they pay back the qard or build up participants’ reserves. In 
either case this will affect participant’s rights to receive investments return or getting the 
required indemnity at the required time.      
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TOs should adhere to Shari’ah in order to satisfy participant’s desire to invest their funds. 
Accordingly, the Shari’ah board plays a vital role in setting standards for the types of assets in 
which TOs can invest, and standards for choice of assets within an asset class. Therefore, TOs 
will need additional governance structures and processes that facilitate (i) the consistent 
screening of the investment portfolios in order to ensure they remain Shari’ah-compliant, (ii) the 
purification of any return on the investment from non-Shari’ah-compliant income (Hussain, 
2009). Disclosure should reflect the Shari’ah mechanisms in valuing assets. However, quick 
Shari’ah board judgments on certain assets to be compliant with Islamic law is very important as 
any delays encountered in making the judgment can cause a loss by not investing the assets in 
the right timeframe. Accordingly, participants can be affected by losing such a chance to gain a 
descent investment return on that asset (IFSB, 2009b).   
 
Disclosure should also be made to guarantee participants’ rights on receiving investments return 
and clearly identify a fast and sound Shari’ah board response channel that can quickly and 
effectively approve availability of assets for investment. Also a safeguard mechanism should be 
disclosed to ensure proper allocation of participants’ investments return are reached with no 
priorities being made to favour shareholders over participants as per AAOIFI No. 13, which 
requires disclosure of any priority given to policyholders or shareholders in making allocation of 
income-producing investments and the basis for the priority, in cases where such funds could not 
be fully utilized for income-producing investments. Therefore, as an important step to ensure 
Shari`ah adherence to the public, the Shari`ah board should present a Shari`ah annual report 
which should include the following: (IFSB, 2009b) 
I. A fact-finding report. 
II. Ex-ante report in relation to product design and development. 
III. Ex-post internal Shari`ah audit/review report on the products offered to customers.  
IV. An annual Shari`ah compliance report. 
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4.6 SURPLUS DISTRIBUTION, SOUND MARKET CONDUCT AND DISCLOSURE  
AAOIFI Shar`iah Standards (2010) defined surplus as excess of the total premium contributions 
paid by policyholders during the financial period over the total indemnities paid in respect of 
claims incurred during the period, net of reinsurance and after deducting expenses and changes 
in technical provisions. Accordingly, participants should receive relevant, sufficient and reliable 
information in connection with their participation rights on a timely and regular basis (IAIS and 
OECD, 2009). AAOIFI also, in its Islamic Insurance Accounting Standards No. 13, identifies 
disclosure in determining and allocating surplus or deficit in Islamic insurance companies. Rule 
No. 13 treats underwriting surplus as the excess of the total contributions paid by policyholders 
during the financial period over the total indemnities paid in respect of claims incurred during 
the period, net of re-insurance and after deducting expenses and changes in technical provisions ( 
i.e. Contributions - Indemnities = Surplus) (Ali et al, 2008: 110). 
 
As a takaful contract is a combination of tabarru’ and agency or profit-sharing, the takaful fund 
is considered a musharaka (partnership) among participants. The relationship between the TO 
and participants’ funds is based on either wakala contract to manage the underwriting activities, 
and/or a mudarabah to manage the underwriting or investment activities
38
. Accordingly, the 
main difference between takaful operations and conventional insurance is the concept of 
underwriting surplus – conventional insurance underwriting surplus means profit for the 
insurance company, while underwriting surplus is not regarded as profit for takaful operators 
(Hassan, 2008). Therefore TOs are not entitled to share the surplus of the fund with participants. 
However, they can, for the sake of the best benefits and with full consent of the participants, use 
the surplus as reserves, reduction of the contribution, charitable donations and partial/full 
distribution of the surplus among the participants
39
. AAOIFI Shari’ah standard No. 26 (5/5) of 
2007, has stated that surplus can only be distributed back to the participants and cannot be taken 
by the TO; the distribution of surplus will be based on a percentage share of participant’s 
donations. 
 
                                               
38 Refer to Chapter 2 for further discussion.  
39 Refer to chapter 2 for further discussion.  
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Despite the fact that TOs are not allowed to share the surplus with participants, until recently, the 
mudarabah model adopted by Malaysian TOs refers to profit as the underwriting surplus plus 
investment returns. This arrangement marks a departure from the original mudarabah model, 
which will entitle the TO a ratio in the investment returns, without sharing in the underwriting 
surplus (Soualhi, 2008: 2). Later on, the modified mudarabah model justified the sharing of the 
underwriting surplus on the grounds that such an arrangement would allow TOs to withstand 
competition and avoid overpricing (Soualhi, 2008: 2). 
 
Another AAOIFI
40
 standard on takaful (5/5) comes as a counter-argument to the Malaysian 
approach, which stated:  
 
“It is permissible for the policy to contain a provision to deal with the underwriting 
surplus according to maslahah, as stated in the terms of the policy, such as the 
establishment of reserves, the reduction of prices, donating to charities, or 
distributing it or a part thereof to the participants, provided the Takaful operator does 
not share in it”.  
 
The previous contradictions indicated the need for a united organized body to enforce takaful 
rules and obligations for ultimate protection of stakeholders and for stabilizing takaful markets 
worldwide. On the other hand, the AAOIFI standards rule above indicated that part or the total 
surplus can be used to support social activities such as building mosques or can go to poor 
people, or other forms of noble causes. Thus, it is normal to find that a lot of takaful participants 
do not reclaim their portions of the surplus from the takaful operators for the sake of supporting 
noble activities. However, other participants who do not reclaim their surplus may be due to the 
reason that they are unaware of their rights to receive such surplus or that the surplus might be 
considered too little for them to claim. Eventually a substantial amount of participants’ surplus 
will accumulate with no one to claim it. Therefore, the Shari’ah board resolves the issue by 
requesting TOs to have in place a special account to cater for the undistributed surplus, by 
                                               
40 AAOIFI (Manama: AAOIFI, 4-5), p.437. 
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distributing this fund through noble channels such as the case in Jordan
41
 (Sabbagh, 2009). 
Accordingly, it is required of the TOs, as a sign of good market conduct, to disclose and 
announce if there is an account launched for undistributed underwriting surpluses as per AAOIFI 
No. 13. 
 
Another market conduct matter that touches surplus distribution, is the process of adding the 
investment profits to the whole takaful fund, which will make the surplus distribution process 
confusing, because of the difficulty to differentiate between gross surplus and net surplus. 
Another difficulty that may be faced by the TO on the surplus distribution process is the 
unknown amount of gross surplus at the beginning of the takaful contract, in that underwriting 
surplus can only be known at a given point in time. Thus great emphasis will be put on the 
reliability of the actuarial calculation to calculate liabilities based on the uncertainty embedded on 
the future expected value of underwriting liabilities, which will be much higher in value than the 
accounting liability approach; in other words the actuarial liabilities will impact liabilities more 
than the accounting ones (Hassan, 2008). This is shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Fig. 4.1: Surplus in the Takaful Operation 
 
Surplus = Assets - Actuarial Liabilities - Accounting Liabilities 
Source: Hassan (2008: 51) 
 
Accordingly, academicians and practitioners suggested that principles of soundness, equity and 
flexibility must be applied in the distribution of takaful surplus, which should be based on solid 
mathematical and actuarial statistical techniques
42
 (Hassan, 2008). However, in order to properly 
                                               
41 Sharikat al-Ta’amin al-Islamiyah in Jordan spends around 20,000 Dinar through charity channels each year from 
the undistributed surplus account. 
42 Such techniques will not be discussed on this research as it will be out of the aim of the research. 
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come up with the right principle, an adequate definition of surplus should be available; such a 
definition might vary according to the applied model in a certain jurisdiction.  
 
The AAOIFI (2010) Shari’ah Standards has defined surplus as an amount which comprises 
residual premiums of the participants in addition to the reserves and profits, after deducting all 
expenses and indemnity amounts
43
; hence the total surplus amount in the risk pool can be an 
excess of the contribution over claims, re-takaful, expenses and reserves, as shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Fig. 4.2: Formation of Underwriting Surplus in the Takaful Operation 
 
 
Source: Tobias (2009) 
 
AAOIFI also in its Shari’ah Standards (2010) has indicated the following three approaches to 
allocate underwriting surplus justly among participants, which is in line with suggestions of authors 
such as Tobias (2009), Haytham (2009), Younes (2008) and Al-Qurradaghi (2006):   
 
I. Pro-rata mode: Underwriting surplus must be allocated to all takaful participants in 
proportion to the contribution paid by the participants, without differentiating between 
claimable and non-claimable accounts, since they all contributed to the fund with a noble 
goal of brotherhood protection with no intention to achieve a surplus. Thus, the surplus must 
be equally distributed among them (Haytham, 2009).  
II. Selective mode: Underwriting surplus must only be allocated to those participants who have 
not made any claims for a given financial year. This mode tends to indemnify non-claimable 
accounts only and deprive claimable accounts so that they become more prudent in the 
                                               
43 paid or payable during the same year   
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future. This is meant to apply justice among takaful participants as it is unfair to give 
claimable accounts part of the surplus since they have already received takaful benefits 
(Haytham, 2009).  
III. Offsetting mode: Underwriting surplus must only be allocated to those participants where the 
amount of claims is less than the contribution paid. That is. where the claims ratio is below 
100%, then the surplus would be distributed after deducting the amounts of claims received 
in the given valuation period (Tobias, 2009).  
 
The above three approaches to allocate underwriting surplus should be clearly disclosed to 
participants as per AAOIFI No13, which requires disclosure of the method and the Shari`ah basis 
applied in allocating the underwriting surplus. 
 
4.6.1 Factors affecting Underwriting Surplus   
Earning underwriting surplus is considered as a common requirement for both policyholders and 
TOs so that the distribution of surplus will be an incentive for participants to enhance their 
loyalty towards the company. In practise paying back part of the surplus makes the takaful 
participants responsible and aware not to make false or fraudulent claims that would lower the 
surplus rate. On the other hand, surplus means a great reward incentive for TOs as many TOs are 
very keen to share the underwriting surplus with participants. TOs can argue that the recorded 
surplus at the end of the financial year is the sign of efficient management and prudent 
practices
44
. Accordingly, this section will identify some of the factors that can affect the amount 
of underwriting surplus in the takaful fund, which will causes a negative financial impacts on the 
takaful participants, accordingly affecting the overall market conduct and discipline.       
 
I. Amount of Participants’ Contributions 
Figure 4.2, illustrates that the value of underwriting surplus can be positively or negatively 
affected by the participants contributions and/or by deductable items (claims, expenses, re-
takaful arrangement fees, reserves management) from the takaful fund. Accordingly participants’ 
contributions represent an important factor in the analysis of the underwriting surplus. The 
AAOIFI Shari’ah Standards (2010) define takaful contribution as the amount of the contribution 
                                               
44 Refer to chapter 3 for further discussion. 
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which the participant donates, along with its related profits, for the benefit of the insurance 
scheme; this is the main source for the takaful operator to cover the future damages or losses of 
takaful participants. An adequate amount of contribution can bring a balance to the takaful 
scheme so that the takaful business can attract participants if the amount of the contribution is 
fairly calculated. Conversely if the contribution amount is too high then it will not attract 
participants. A general concept is that more participants mean more contribution to the takaful 
fund, which implies more surpluses would remain in the takaful fund. Thus, establishing a proper 
takaful contribution is a complex job which involves the incorporation of mathematical analysis 
into competitive business decision processes, which depends on different factors such as takaful 
products, risk degree, statistical information, operational cost and competition in the market 
(Arther et al 1998).  As a result of participants making contributions with the intention of helping 
each other, then they will be eligible to be indemnified from their own contributed fund to cover 
their claims. As claims are paid out from the takaful fund the amount of the underwriting surplus 
for that financial year is going to be reduced accordingly as the reported claims increase. The 
reduced underwriting surplus will negatively affect other participants in the same takaful fund. 
Therefore, it is vital for TOs to have proper mechanisms to fairly identify fraudulent claims.  
 
II. Investment Return  
Surplus can be positively correlated with investments return if the takaful model allows 
investments to be added to the takaful fund; the more investment returns on the participants’ 
fund, the more net underwriting surplus will be encountered in the takaful fund, since 
participants are entitled to get investments return profit as per AAOIFI (2010) Sharia’h 
Standards, which state that the insurance account is entitled to the insurance assets and their 
returns on investment. However, because of the different structures of takaful models and 
because of company-specific strategy, TOs might decide not to add the investment return on the 
takaful fund due to the reason of covering deficits on other accounts, that the TO might use the 
investments return of PIF to cover the deficit of PRF or vice-versa.   
 
TOs might add the investment return to the participants’ funds; however, they might ask for extra 
contribution from participants to cover an underwriting deficit that still exists even with the 
addition of the investments return. Therefore, it is normal to witness participants’ accounts 
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generating investments profit. However, if TOs ask participants for extra contributions to cover 
underwriting activities deficit, it is important for TOs to disclose such information and scenarios 
in order that the participants be made aware of different expected circumstances (Hussain, 2009).  
 
III. Fees and Expenses  
Participants’ contributions can also be used to cover different types of expenses, either direct or 
indirect according to the used takaful model as Shari`ah Standards of AAOIFI (2010) states that 
the insurance account shall bear all the expenses and fees that relate to insurance activities.  The 
upfront wakalah fee, for instance, is used to cover the encountered expenses, while in the 
mudarabah model the expenses will be covered from the takaful fund which will directly affect 
the amount of underwriting surplus. Thus as more of the takaful fund is used to cover expenses 
so the lower the underwriting surplus will be. Management remuneration and incentives is 
considered as another form of expenses which will eventually affect the underwriting surplus. 
Hence TOs need to disclose the incentive percentage they charge as per AAOIFI No. 13 which 
requires the disclosure by the party that manages the insurance operations of the remuneration it 
receives, whether in the form of a specified agency fee, a share of underwriting surplus on the 
basis of mudarabah, or other bases. 
 
TO administration and management fees can also affect the participants’ fund underwriting 
surplus – a higher underwriting surplus indicates more benefits to the TOs. For example, Archer 
et al (2009) mentioned that TOs calculate their upfront fees from the year’s contribution. Also 
TOs charge an annual management fee of 1.5 % of the total available fund as well as charging a 
contract administration fee of 0.25 % of the fund value. Therefore, TOs should disclose enough 
information in regards to expenses and management fees that will be deducted from participants’ 
funds as per AAOIFI No 13 regarding disclosure of the basis applied by the company in 
calculating expenses affecting policyholders’ funds such as pre-operating expenditures, reserves, 
costs of assets used in operations, claims and compensations, etc. 
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IV. Amount of Participants’ Fund Reserves  
TOs are required as part of the regulation and operational requirements to hold a sufficient 
amount of assets (known as reserves, special reserve, or claims contingency reserve (CCR) or 
equalization reserve depending on the takaful market) to back up the company in case of 
financial stress. The goal of the actuarial reserve in the takaful business is to match the receipt of 
each contribution in the accounts to the equivalent risks taken (Ali et al, 2008). The level and 
type of reserves depend on the financial position of the takaful operator as well as the takaful 
operational model being used.  In case of a financial loss which will lead to a deficit, the TO will 
be required as a manager to back up the deficit. In some jurisdictions such as in Malaysia TOs 
are obligated to give an undertaking to the regulator to provide a qard hasan facility to be drawn 
down in the event of a deficit of a takaful fund (Hussain, 2009). 
 
Accordingly, TOs will make sure to cover the deficit by deducting the reserve amount from the 
takaful fund namely, the claims contingency reserve (CCR) which will lower the underwriting 
surplus. However, in case the reserve is not enough to cover the deficit then the TOs will ask 
shareholders to provide qard hasan
45
 facility to cover the deficit (Tobias, 2009). In order to make 
up the reserve, participants may be asked to pay regularly more than what is needed for the 
anticipated compensations in a given period, with the extra amount being built up as reserve 
back-up capital for extraordinary damages (Archer et al, 2009); or the reserve can be built up by 
deducting from the past underwriting surplus (AAOIFI, 2010). 
 
To pay back the qard hasan to shareholders, TOs will either use the available amount of reserve 
to repay back the qard hasan, or they can make a repayment from future participants’ 
contributions which will lower the underwriting surplus (Archer et al, 2009), or through future 
underwriting surpluses, including those from new business developed over time by the takaful 
operator (Hussain, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, as the takaful fund is under the direct management of the TO then under 
normal circumstances the qard hasan facility should fall under the concept of related party. 
Accordingly, under company law transactions it must be publicly disclosed and must be without 
                                               
45 Depending on the country’s jurisdictions. 
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unduly favourable terms. However, should the existence of the qard hasan facility be disclosed 
or should it be disclosed only if it is actually drawn down? The latter type of disclosure might be 
problematic because it might create panic amongst the public and have a negative effect. 
However, it seems desirable to disclose the existence and amount of the qard hasan facility, as 
well as disclosure if it has been drawn down (Hussain, 2009). Participants should also be assured 
that certain safeguards are there to ensure that qard hasan is not employed to favour certain 
pools among many pools of the takaful funds. Thus, it is vital for TOs to disclose the 
consequence and conditions that guarantee the qard hasan facility to serve the shortfalls of 
participants’ funds (Hussain, 2009). It is also a matter of ethics that the TO should be responsible 
for the encountered deficits if they were a result of his misconduct or negligence (IFSB, 2009a). 
 
V. Shareholders’ Power and Activities  
Shareholders can exert their power to use participants’ fund underwriting surplus to enhance 
their financial position, as shareholders have the right to appoint the company BoD’s. 
Accordingly, there are acceptable practices in the takaful contract, which allow shareholders’ 
intrusion in participants’ fund e.g.  (i) Shareholders are allowed to invest the underwriting 
surplus with an express provision for an agreed consideration (profit-sharing or fee), with a 
complete consent for policyholders to either agree or reject the contract, (ii) Shareholders have 
exclusive right to invest and share the return from investments, (iii) Shareholders have the right 
to share in the underwriting surplus with policyholders (Ali et al, 2008).  
 
From the previous contractual options it seems that shareholders will have the ultimate power to 
decide surplus distribution channels that suit their needs. However, the three practises 
relationship between participants and shareholders should be clearly disclosed to the public as 
per AAOIFI No. 13 which states that disclosure of the bases governing the contractual 
relationship between policyholders and shareholders that touch on: 
I. Management of insurance operations. 
II. Investments of policyholders’ funds. 
III. Investments of shareholders’ funds and the body that approve these bases. 
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4.7  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
Market conduct and disclosure is a vital topic that deals with regulations and polices defined by 
the local supervisory authorities for the purpose of protecting stakeholders. Hence, local 
authority should have all the knowledge and expertise needed to regulate and control the local 
insurance market. The current chapter has provided an answer to research question 3, which 
reflects the best available market conduct and disclosure policies in accordance with the 
international insurance standards. Accordingly, the IAIS (2011) has issued the core principles 
ICP 18 to enhance the intermediaries’ role in conveying the required knowledge to the 
policyholders and the importance of defining a certain measurement by the local authority to 
measure the intermediaries output. 
 
Policyholders’ claims and indemnities are other important issues that insurance and takaful 
companies should consider in order to achieve policyholders’ ultimate goal of buying an 
insurance policy. Insurance and takaful companies should assign an adjuster who can fairly make 
the right judgment to indemnify policyholders’ claims; the company should also make a proper 
disclosure for claims and indemnities decisions along with documentations of the reasons for any 
unusual decisions included.  Public disclosure is one of the items that the IAIS, (2011) has 
addressed by issuing core principle ICP 20, which requires insurance companies to disclose 
relevant information on a timely basis in order to give market participants a clear view of the 
business activities and financial positions of the insurers. Investments disclosure, on the other 
hand, is an important issue for policyholders, especially if they possess an investment takaful 
policy. Accordingly, the IFSB (2009), has stressed that TOs should clearly and simply disclose 
their business model, type of investments contracts they use to run their business  is it wakalah or 
mudarabah, assets allocation and classifications, investments managers, TOs historical figures of 
investment return, assets-liabilities matching plan, impacts of the intangible assets on the whole 
investments performance, etc.  
 
Furthermore, IAIS (2005) has identified two approaches to monitor the adequacy of assets-
liabilities matching plan, that insurance companies should make sure at all the times that their 
assets is in excess of their liabilities and insurance should have at all times enough funds 
available to meet payments of policy benefits and other obligations. TOs should also disclose the 
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type of underwriting surplus they are offering to their participants i.e. is it gross underwriting 
surplus or net underwriting surplus. This chapter also reflected the factors that affected 
underwriting surplus such as amount of participants’ contributions, investment return, 
shareholders’ power and activities, fees and expenses, amount of reserves, etc. Hence, it is 
importance to notify participants of the used approach to allocate underwriting surplus among 
policyholders i.e. Pro-rata mode, Selective mode, or Offsetting mode. 
 
In conclusion, participants should therefore receive periodical disclosures on: (i) Overall 
investment strategy and objectives, (ii) business lines performance management, (iii) the 
management of liquidity, and asset-liability matching, explaining the appropriateness of 
investments in matching liabilities; (iv) the actual and historical distribution of underwriting 
outcomes (surpluses or deficits) and/or investment profits; (v) reserving policy; (vi) Shari`ah 
compliance; (vii) actual and historical fees and participation ratios; and (viii) investment 
activities for both the PIFs and PRFs. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
MEASURING CUSTOMER SATISFACTIONS IN THE TAKAFUL INDUSTRY: A 
CUSTOMIZED APPROACH  
  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters indicated the importance for the Takaful Operators (TOs) to implement a 
well structured framework based on the international corporate governance and market conduct 
and disclosure polices and standards as per the international insurance and takaful bodies. By 
doing so, insurance market stability will be achieved which will eventually bring the required 
protections to takaful participants. In line with the previous chapters, the current chapter will 
highlight the importance of implementing a proper customized service quality system which 
relies on participants’ behavioural aspects such as, participants’ needs, preferences, knowledge, 
perceptions, expectations, and satisfactions level. These factors will support a better quality of 
service in the insurance and takaful industry, which will eventually lead to participants’ 
protection.  
This chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 conceptualises satisfaction. Section 5.3 
elaborates on customer needs and perceptions towards satisfaction. Section 5.4 presents customer 
knowledge and motivation in the Islamic Financial Institutions. Section 5.5 links between service 
quality and satisfaction. Section 5.6 presents services evaluation techniques in the insurance 
industry. Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.   
 
5.2 SATISFACTION CONCEPTUALIZED 
Although the subject of satisfaction has received considerable attention in various disciplines, 
there is no consensus on the definition of the concept, which is admittedly difficult to define 
(Oliver, 1997). If the customers perceive the performance of products (goods or services) being 
below their expectations then dissatisfaction results. Alternatively, a consumer is happy or 
satisfied if the benefits received or performance after purchase either matches or exceeds 
expectations (Jobber, 1998; Adcock et al., 2001; Kotler et al, 2001). In other words satisfaction 
will depend on the evaluation or judgment of customer-perceived performance against their 
expectations.  However, Gorst (2000) asserts that in today’s competitive business world, it is no 
longer enough to merely satisfy customers, because a ‘satisfied’ customer remains a customer so 
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long as there is no better offer; whereas a ‘delighted’ customer is more than likely to remain 
loyal. Donovan et al (1994), McNealy (1994), Jobber (1998), Kotler et al (2001) also support 
this view, that companies should not only satisfy their customers but rather delight them.  In 
simplest terms, a satisfaction is the customer’s evaluation of a product or service in terms of 
whether that product or service has met their needs, wants and expectations (Zeithaml et al, 
2000). Hence dissatisfaction will be a consequence of failure to meet the customer’s needs and 
expectations. In the case of financial services, where the products are intangible and are sampled 
only rarely, the services accompanying the product will often form the main determinant of 
overall customer satisfaction (Krishnan et al., 1999).  
 
Geyskens et al. (1999) distinguish between two kinds of satisfaction which are required to 
provide insight into the role of satisfaction in the development and maintenance of a long-term 
relationship: (i)  economic satisfaction, which is described as a member’s evaluation of the 
economic outcomes that flow from the relationship with its partner such as sales volume, 
margins, and discounts and (ii) social satisfaction, which is described as a member’s evaluation 
of the psychological aspects of its relationship, in interaction with the exchange partner are 
fulfilling, gratifying, and facile.  
 
In fact the importance of customer satisfaction and how it can negatively impact financial 
institutions’ sales opportunities has led scholars and organizations to do more research to 
enhance customer satisfaction levels. The University of Michigan’s ongoing American Customer 
Satisfaction Index shows that between 1994 and 2002, the average customer satisfaction had 
gone down by 2.5% for life insurance and 6.1% for personnel property insurance. The same 
rating index has shown that American Customer Satisfaction for year 2010 has dropped by 2.7 % 
for health insurance; however, life insurance made a small improvement in customer satisfaction, 
while property & casualty insurance was unchanged.
46
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 The American Customer Satisfaction Index (www.theacsi.org). 
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5.3 CUSTOMER NEEDS AND PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS SATISFACTION   
This section reflects different authors’ opinions about the definitions of the terms ‘needs’ and 
‘perceptions’, and the importance for service companies to take effective measures to satisfy 
customers’ needs. This can be done by reviewing their perceptions about the products and 
services, which imply that the companies should transfer the right knowledge and education to 
their customers. 
 
5.3.1 Customers’ Needs and Satisfaction  
Since this research effort revolves around the concept of satisfaction then it is vital to reflect on 
the idea of needs or preferences because customer satisfaction fulfils the concept need and 
preference. Kotler et al (2001) define human needs as states of felt deprivation, which include 
basic physical needs for food, clothing, warmth, and safety; social needs for belonging and 
affection; and individual needs for knowledge and self- expression. Chinyio (1999) also concurs 
that a ‘need’ is ‘a deficiency of some kind’, but goes further to argue that it ought to be desired 
on a regular basis in order to be regarded as being part and parcel of one’s personality. Blythe 
(1997) argues that need goes beyond lack and describes need as a perceived lack, i.e. the 
individual must realize (preference) their need in order for it to be described as need. This 
recognition (perception) of lack (unfulfilled need) has been linked to a series of resultant 
activities in the mind of the consumer. Closely related to the term ‘need, is the term ‘want’. Want 
has been defined as the form assumed by human needs as they are shaped by culture and 
personality (Kolter and Armstrong, 2001). Kolter (1997) also defined want as desires for specific 
satisfying of needs.  
 
Based on the two definitions put forward by Kolter (1997) and Kolter et al (2001), it seems that 
‘wants’ are ‘needs’ modified by preference, whether it be motivated/influenced by culture and/or 
individual personality, which was illustrated by Samwinga (2009: 64): 
 
“An individual may need (i.e. requires or lacks) food but wants (i.e. prefers to satisfy 
his need with) a hamburger, French Fries, and a soft drink. In contrast, another person 
may need food but want mango, rice, lentil stew and vegetarian sausage”.   
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The above illustration implies an element of preference and prevailing cultural practice in the 
definition of wants whereas needs seems to be linked to necessity. Such a conclusion was made 
by Chinyio (1999) who indicated that observed often suggest ‘necessities’, whereas wants are 
associated with individual preferences. In short, it is essential for businesses to have an 
understanding of what their customers’ needs, wants or preferences are and to tailor their 
services to meet and/or exceed them. In the context of this research policyholders’ preferences 
about the services from the TOs will be address based on the international insurance organization 
policies and standards that have been presented on the corporate governance and market conduct 
literature review.        
 
5.3.2 Customer Perceptions and Satisfaction  
It is essential to consider the idea of perception, when individuals make judgment about 
situations. Encyclopaedia Britannica (2002) defines perception as awareness of the elements of 
environment through physical sensation; physical sensation interpreted in the light of experience. 
 
The above definition of perception suggests that the individual involved in perception is 
subjected to some stimuli (a sensation) and that the interpretation is then made in the context of 
experience (existing data, expectations, past experience) (Samwinga, 2009). 
 
Other researchers suggest that perceptions are generated by stimuli gathered by the senses, i.e. 
the process of perception involves sensory stimulation (Chisnall, 1985; Gross, 1996; Foxall et 
al., 1998) which is complemented by information gathering, modification and sorting resultings 
in our own construct of what the situation appears to be. Hence, perception is not necessarily an 
absolute tangible but rather inherently subjective (Chisnall, 1985; Auchterlounie et al, 2001). 
Ranaweera et al (2003: 377) defined customer satisfaction as an evaluation of an emotion, 
reflecting the degree to which the customer believes the service provider evokes positive 
feelings. Hence, satisfaction occurs when customers compare their perceptions of the 
performance of the products and services in relation to their desires and expectations (Spreng et 
al, 1996).   
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Furthermore, Krishnan et a.l (1999) have designed a questionnaire instrument to investigate 
customer satisfaction in a four distinct factors relating to customer experience (perceptions) of a 
firm offering financial services - in terms of personal contact, usage of telephone and IT systems, 
product performance, and periodic financial statements. Lassar et al. (2000) attempt a similar 
exercise, but provide separate measures of customer satisfaction of the firm’s technical offerings 
(in terms of product and systems performance) and functional offerings (in terms of the interface 
with front-office staff). However, both approaches’ results confirm that customer satisfaction 
with a company’s services is determined to a large degree by the quality of service the customer 
receives (Parasuraman et al., 1985; Cronin et al, 1992).  
 
In short, for the customers to have the required perceptions to identify his/her needs, wants and 
preferences, then it is necessary for the customers to have the right and required knowledge and 
awareness about the products they are dealing with. Having the right knowledge will let 
customers express their motivations of possessing such services and products.  
 
5.4 CUSTOMER PATRONAGE, KNOWLEDGE AND MOTIVATION IN THE ISLAMIC 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.   
This section highlights different research efforts that address empirical analysis findings on 
customer knowledge about the Islamic financial institutions’ products and services. It also 
reflects on how customers’ lack of knowledge and awareness about the basics and technicality of 
the products and services they are dealing with can lead to an obvious deficiency in customer-
motivated reasons to possess Islamic products and services. Research into customers’ behaviour 
including perceptions, patronage and customer service satisfaction, in the context of the Islamic 
banking industry is still considered scarce (Gait et al, 2008). The limited number of studies in the 
field of the Islamic financial system can be partly explained by the fact that the industry is still 
considered to be at the maturing stage, since the first ever Islamic bank, Mit Ghamr, was 
established only in 1963 in Egypt. In addition, data availability either primary or secondary, 
posed a considerable obstacle to most of the interested researchers, especially in relation to the 
liability side of the Islamic banks’ balance sheet, namely customer deposits (Tahir, 2007).   
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The same statements apply for the takaful industry where there are scarce or no empirical studies 
introduced to enhance and improve participants’ patronage and satisfactions. This is due to the 
fact that takaful is still in the process of evolving as evidenced by the fact that the first takaful 
company was only established in 1979 in Sudan, and hence a number of raised issues still remain 
open to be resolved by the various Shari’ah scholars (Wahab et al, 2007). There are also a 
number of challenges that prevent researchers and practitioners carrying out research on 
participants’ satisfactions in the takaful industry. The challenges include (i) collation, analyzing 
and dissemination of credible and relevant financial and technical statistics, (ii) standardization 
in accounting and operational approaches by markets, regions and jurisdictions, (iii) cooperation 
among takaful bodies and other international insurance bodies to standardize the takaful business 
(Bhatty, 2010).  
 
Other challenges might be due to (i) awareness and knowledge of the takaful concepts among 
customers is very limited (so operators have to invest considerable time and effort to educate 
their customers about takaful features) and (ii) Islamic banks and takaful operators find it 
difficult to manage and meet the demands of Shari’ah-compliant investments which have limited 
investment options available (Malaikah, 2006).   
 
Therefore, as there is not enough information to address the participants’ satisfaction status in the 
takaful industry, then it will be beneficial to refer to some of the Islamic banking literature that 
address customer satisfaction conditions. This is because participants in both fields have one 
common goal which is to have financial transactions that comply with the Shari’ah laws.  
Accordingly, this section will briefly explore participants’ knowledge, awareness and 
preferences and the reason that led them to become involved with Islamic financial institutions. 
Knowledge and awareness are considered as two of the main challenges that the takaful industry 
is facing. Howcroft et al. (2003) stressed the importance of the level of knowledge and 
understanding of the financial products the customer should have, as this will determine their 
level of confidence in using any of the products, especially the sophisticated ones. Dar (2004) 
also asserted that knowledge and understanding is the utmost prerequisite for customers to 
engage in Islamic finance.  
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The importance of customer education and knowledge was realized by the British Government, 
as one of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) reforms to address the communication 
weakness in the insurance industry after the failure of the Equitable insurance company, was to 
launch the Financial Capability Steering Group to examine consumer education. Accordingly, it 
recommended that other countries follow the FSA consumer education programme. 
 
5.4.1 Customer Knowledge about Islamic Financial Institution Products 
Most of the research that has been conducted around customer knowledge and awareness about 
the Islamic banking service and products comes from the Malaysian market. Most of the 
empirical studies indicate customer low knowledge and awareness about the principles of the 
Islamic financial institutions products. Haron et al. (1994) have conducted an earlier study on 
Malaysian commercial bank customers. The results showed that although respondents 
demonstrated a high level of awareness of the existence of Islamic banking, the level of 
knowledge is deemed low, even though Malaysia is considered as the Islamic finance hub of the 
world.    
 
Hamid et al (2001) have also explored the awareness and knowledge of Malaysian customers 
towards Islamic banks; accordingly they indicated that most of the Malaysian customers did not 
know the difference between Islamic banks’ products and traditional banks’ products, though the 
majority had enough awareness about the existence of Islamic banks in Malaysia and their 
services. Even though half of the respondents dealt with Islamic banks, they still had a lack of 
understanding of the Islamic banking products. 
 
Other authors such as Amin (2007) and Haque et al. (2009) have conducted research in Malaysia 
to reflect customer awareness and knowledge of Islamic finance products. They have found 
similar results in that participants have a low level understanding of the technical aspects of 
Shari’ah contracts.  Okumus (2005) conducted similar studies on the Turkish Islamic banks and 
he found that the majority of the customers are only aware of the basic Islamic banking products. 
Most of the respondents showed a lack of knowledge about advanced products and services as 
well as a lack of knowledge about the full range of Islamic banking products available. The 
survey also indicated that the majority of customers selected the banks for religious reasons.  
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Similar studies were conducted in other Muslim countries such as Bahrain (Metawa et al, 1998), 
the United Arab Emirates (Bley et al, 2004), Jordan (Naser et al., 1999) and Libya (Gait et al, 
2009a; 2009b). The results showed similar findings that most of the customers of these countries 
have a high level of awareness and knowledge of at least the basic Islamic banking financing 
schemes such as savings accounts, current accounts, and ATM services (Metawa et al, 1998), 
with some respondents adding that they are aware of the Islamic banking products which have 
conventional compatible products such as letters of credit and travellers cheques (Naser et al., 
1999). However, these studies demonstrate that most of the respondents are not aware of the 
terminology used to describe products and services offered by the Islamic banks such as 
mudarabah, musharakah, and murabahah (Bley et al, 2004; Gait et al, 2009b; Metawa et al, 
1998; Naser et al., 1999; Zaabi, 2007).  
 
As mentioned earlier, there is only a limited amount of research that has been conducted on the 
takaful participants to review their awareness and knowledge of the principles of the takaful 
products and services. One recent study has been conducted by Hamid et al (2009) who launched 
a research on a sample of 232 banking customers among Muslims in Malaysia to explore their 
knowledge about the concept of takaful.  Surprisingly, the results show that 67.24 % of 
respondents do not understand the concept of tabarru, and the majority of the respondents are 
not aware of some of the practised takaful models such as wakalah, while 68% of the 
respondents do not understand the elements of gharar and maysir. The researchers found that the 
main reason that led respondents to differentiate takaful from conventional insurance, is the 
promotion of the Islamic finance products. It is important to mention that despite the fact that the 
research reflected people’s knowledge about takaful, unfortunately, the research does not reflect 
the knowledge of the participants who possess takaful contracts, since survey was conducted on 
banking customers only.   
 
In conclusion, the findings above concluded that respondents have a limited knowledge and 
understanding, but with acceptable awareness levels, of the advanced products and services. This 
implies that pertinent information about the technical aspects of the products was not explained 
to customers in the way they should have been (Abdullah et al, 2007; Khan et al. 2007). Finally, 
Abdi (2007) asserts that the future of the takaful industry is dependent on industry players who 
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must take a more active role in educating their customers and regulators while enhancing 
discipline in their activities. Therefore, it is useful to view participants’ knowledge about the 
principles of the used takaful model, which will give an indication whether the TOs have exerted 
the required efforts to educate their participants of the different aspects of takaful that affect their 
benefits in the participants’ fund.     
 
5.4.2 Customer Motivation and Preferences in Islamic Financial Institutions   
Customer motivation and preferences in selecting an Islamic financial institution is considered an 
important predictive factor for managers to improve their services and products. As has been 
described previously, customer preference is an individual realization of a need, which is a 
perceived lack (Blythe, 1997). Thus, negative adherence to customer preferences and 
motivations might carry a negative connotation concerning the image of Islamic institutions. 
Therefore managers and company key personnel must take all necessary action to assure their 
service quality measurements are set accurately to address any future malfunctions on the 
company products and services. Erol et al (1989) were the first to study the factors that enhance 
Jordanian customer behaviour towards, and patronage of, Islamic and conventional banks. Their 
studies indicated that factors such as fast and efficient service, the institutes reputation and 
image, and confidentiality, respectively, were the primary selected criteria for Jordanian 
customers. Another similar study conducted by Erol, Kayank et al (1990) examined patronage 
behaviour of Jordanian customers. Their findings were similar to the earlier study. However, 
they found that there was no effect at all for religious motivation in the use of Islamic banks’ 
services by Jordanian customers. 
 
Haron et al (1994) discuss in their study the bank patronage factors of Muslims and non-Muslim 
customers in Malaysia. Their factor analysis results indicated that high quality services presented 
the most significant selected factors, while religious motivations were not the primary reason for 
Muslims dealing with Islamic banks in Malaysia. In contrast, Metwally (1996) has used the 
factor analysis and correlation matrix to study the attitudes towards Islamic banks of Muslims in 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, and he found that religious factors were the major reason in 
choosing Islamic banking by Muslims in the three-mentioned countries. Similar results were 
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found by Omer (1993) about Muslims in the UK, as well as Hegazy (1995) about Muslims in 
Egypt.  
 
Metawa et al (1998) also investigated Islamic banks customers’ attitudes towards the Islamic 
banking products in Bahrain and they found that the most important factor in motivating 
customers to participate in the Islamic banks was religion rather than profitability. They also 
indicated that Bahraini customers are not satisfied with the Islamic banking scheme because of 
the high level of costs. Naser et al (1999) examine Jordanian customer satisfactions and attitudes 
towards Islamic banking products. They found that the majority of Jordanians were satisfied with 
the Islamic banking products and services. In addition, religion and a bank’s reputation were the 
most significant factors that determined their bank selection criteria. 
 
Alsultan (1999) analyzed 385 participants in the Islamic banking sector in Kuwait, and the factor 
analysis also confirmed that adherence to the Islamic rules was the primary motivational reason 
for customers to deal with Islamic banking products. Alsultan also found that 51.7 % of 
respondents preferred to deal with conventional banks because of their better service. This 
indicates that even though the 385 participants had religious reasons for using Islamic methods 
of finance, more than half ranked quality of service at the top of their banking selection criteria.  
Okumkus (2005) conducted a survey about the satisfaction levels of Turkish customers towards 
Islamic banking products in Turkey. He found that the majority of Turkish customers expressed 
religion as the primary motivation for them to use Islamic banking products and services; they 
also expressed their satisfaction with the products available from the Islamic banking sector. 
However, Turkish respondents like other respondents in previous studies were found to be 
generally aware of the basics of Islamic methods of finance, except with the more complex 
Islamic finance structures such as profit/loss-sharing methods of finance. Okumkus (2005) also 
indicated that there was a significant relationship between customer satisfaction and variables 
such as customer age (20–39 years).     
 
Dusuki et al (2006) explored respondents’ motivations to deal with Islamic banks, and they 
found that quality and speed of service are important factors influencing customers’ banking 
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selections. They also indicated that elderly people who are relatively well educated preferred 
Islamic banking products. 
 
Another important factor that leads depositors to select the Islamic banking system is the higher 
rate of return (Erol et al, 1989; Erol et al., 1990; Haron et al., 1994; Rammal et al, 2007; Yusuf 
et al, 2006). Customers are also willing to move their money from the Islamic banks either to 
another Islamic bank or even to a conventional bank if the financial return is not favourable and 
does not meet their expected return (Erol et al, 1989; Erol et al, 1990; Gerrard et al, 1997; 
Hamdan, 2007; Yusuf et al, 2006). The fact that customers’ willingness to move to a 
conventional bank as a reason of low financial return was supported by Ramlee (2000), Bacha 
(2004), Sukmana et al (2005). They found that there were significant deposit outflows from 
Islamic banking to conventional banking as a result of a declaration made by the Islamic banking 
system of a lower return than their conventional counterparts.   
 
Accordingly, Islamic financial institutions should understand that one of the main reasons that 
Islamic banking depositors open accounts with Islamic banks is to use Shari’ah-compliant 
financing or loans (Wilson, 1984). And the fact is that Islam does not prohibit people to gain 
profit as long as it is Shari’ah-compliant and according to the spirit of Islamic business ethics of 
honesty, justice and equity (Haron et al, 2005a). Therefore, Islamic institutions should realize 
that overall perceived service quality will be elevated as a consequence of high-return payouts on 
the investment deposits (Zaabi, 2007).  
 
On the other hand, other researchers have shown that respondents do not perceive cost and 
benefit as the main factors in selecting Islamic banks, i.e. Shari’ah-compliant systems were 
ranked as the first priority while higher financial return was ranked as the least important criteria 
(Kader, 1993, 1995; Hegazy, 1995; Okumus, 2005; Dusuki, 2007b, 2008).  Dusuki (2007a) also 
suggests that customers and depositors in Malaysia believe that profit/loss- sharing principles are 
the only principles representing the true spirit of the Islamic banking system.     
 
In conclusion, the above research efforts based on primary data indicate that respondents differ 
in their preferences and priorities in respect of choosing Islamic financial institutions’ products 
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and services. Some respondent’s rank Shari’ah compliance as a first priority and financial return 
comes as secondary, while other respondents have the opposite view as they rank financial 
returns as first priority followed by Shari’ah compliance.  
 
One of the reasons of the differences in respondents’ preferences and motivations to choose 
Islamic institutions might be due to lack of understandings and knowledge concerning the 
technical aspects of the Islamic financial institutions’ products and services as was clearly 
illustrated in the previous section. As Dar (2004) asserted, knowledge and understanding is the 
utmost prerequisite for customers to engage in Islamic finance, that without proper knowledge 
about the Islamic products they could not identify their preferences in acquiring these products or 
services. Howcroft et al. (2003) also stressed on the importance of the level of knowledge and 
understanding of the financial products the customer should have, as this will determine their 
level of confidence in using any of the products, especially the sophisticated ones. So when 
customers have enough knowledge and confidence about the products then they can identify 
their preferences and motivation reasons. Therefore, as the family takaful scheme has a similar 
Shari’ah and financial system as the deposits accounts in Islamic banking, then participants 
would expect their funds to be used in a Shari’ah-compliant way, and they will also seek for 
some investments return and underwriting surplus as a reward for their contribution in the fund. 
Hence, it is wise to view participants’ preferences and motivations that led them to buy a takaful 
policy.  
 
5.5 SERVICE QUALITY AND SATISFACTION 
The service industry is an important sector and makes a significant contribution to both national 
GDP and employment figures in many countries. In the UK for instance the service sector has 
been on an upward trend from 1960 to 1995, increasing in terms GDP share from 57% to 70%, 
as well as in terms of percentage of employment which rose from 51% to 71% (OECD, 1997). 
Previous OECD figures supported Shephered et al (2000) conclusions, that there are strong 
relationships between service quality improvements, customer satisfaction and economic 
success. Services have a number of characteristics including: intangibility, inseparability, 
variability and perishability (Kotler, 1997; Gabbott et al, 1998). Unlike physical products, 
services are by nature intangible, they cannot be seen, tasted, felt, heard, or smelled before they 
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are purchased. Hence a person getting counselling service, for instance, cannot know exactly 
what the outcome will be (Kotler, 1997; Gabbott et al, 1998). Similarly a person insuring in a 
conventional or takaful company cannot evaluate the company claims and indemnities services 
procedures, unless he/she encounters a loss. It has been said that the insurance industry services 
are falling behind other financial services business in satisfying the customer and must thus 
recognize that quality is critical (Deragon, 1997). 
 
The link between satisfaction and quality exists because quality has a direct impact on the 
performance of a product and consequently upon customer satisfaction (Kotler et al, 2001). 
Brady (2001) asserts that the foundation of service quality theory lies in the product quality and 
customer satisfaction. Jamal el al (2002), Levesque et al (1996), Taylor et al (1994), Anderson et 
al (1993),  Oliver (1993), Cronin et al (1992), Bitner (1990), Woodside et al (1989), and Kim et 
al (1979) assert that the service quality of any financial institution is the primary motivator in 
improving customer satisfaction, which reflects the organization’s ability to obtain repeat 
business from its existing customers and to obtain referrals from these customer to potential and 
new customers. Accordingly, ongoing satisfaction measurement is required over time in order to 
keep the existing customers (Oliver, 1980). Bruhn et al (1998) also state that satisfaction comes 
as an initial stage in causal links. While Ndubisi (2006) states that overall customer satisfaction 
is a key determinant of relationship quality and that service quality, communication, trust, 
commitment, and conflict handling are considered customer satisfaction indicators that support 
repurchase behaviour resulting from enhancement of the relationship quality. Thus, service 
quality is a prerequisite for being in business and providing services; businesses who do not 
produce quality products will not survive in the years to come (Hasksever et al., 2000). Stafford 
et al. (1998) indicate that service quality and customer satisfaction are critical aspects in many 
service industries. As a result, many organizations regularly measure and record the level of 
service quality, as perceived by their customers (Zeithaml et al., 1990). Parasuraman et al (1988) 
define perceived service quality as a global judgment, or attitude, relating to the superiority of 
the service. Similarly, Bitner et al (1994) define service quality as the consumer’s overall 
impression of the relative inferiority/superiority of the organization and its services. Cronin et al 
(1992) and Boulding et al. (1993) seem to support this description of service quality.  
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Parasuraman et al. (1988) have elaborated on whether customer satisfaction leads to service 
quality or vice versa. They pointed out that perceived service quality is a long-run overall 
evaluation of a service, whereas satisfaction is transaction-specific evaluation. In other words 
customer satisfaction leads to service quality in the sense that incidents of satisfaction over time 
results in customer perceptions of service quality. However, Lee et al. (2000) found that service 
quality is in fact an antecedent of customer satisfaction; satisfaction exerts a strong influence on 
customers purchase intention than doe’s service quality. Accordingly, Parasuraman et al. (1988) 
identify the standards by which customers evaluate their satisfaction, perceived service quality 
and the basis of expectation that drive satisfaction is prediction of what is likely to happen during 
the transaction. Whereas the basis for service quality evaluations is customers’ wants or desires 
and this is driven by the customers’ perceptions of what they should receive from the service 
provider. Zeithaml et al (2000) have made a scheme to reflect the relationship between service 
quality and satisfaction as shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1 Service Quality and Satisfaction Perceptions  
 
 
Source: Zeithaml and Bitner (2000: 75). 
 
Although, there have been several studies on the issue of service quality and satisfaction, there is 
still a call and a need for greater understanding of the relationship between perceived service 
quality and satisfaction (Spreng et al, 1996). Stafford et al (1998) attribute the apparent 
confusion about the nature of the service quality/satisfaction relationship to the common link 
with the disconfirmation paradigm
47
. While Carman (1990), Gravin (1983), Parasuraman et al. 
                                               
47 Disconfirmation paradigm is a comparison between consumers’ expectations and their perceptions of service 
actually received. 
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(1985, 1988) and Rathmell (1996) assert that service quality remains an abstract and elusive 
construct that is difficult to define and measure.  
 
5.5.1 Service Quality in the Insurance Industry    
In recent years the world has suffered from a widespread financial crisis, which has impacted the 
service sector. The insurance industry has also been affected by these cyclical economic 
consequences. The negative cycle has created a decrease in the productivity of the industry and a 
fall in policy purchase thereby reducing the industry income as well as its ability to compensate 
claims (Bollini, 2002). These factors have further compromised service quality in the industry, 
exposing the industry to further criticisms and thereby seriously denting the image of the 
industry in the eyes of the insurance public (Bollini, 2002) since the insurance public believe that 
the industry is bent on over-promising yet under-delivering what they have promised to their 
customers (French, 2002).  
 
Accordingly, a number of policyholders have withdrawn from long-term commitments before 
their contract has expired, and have consequently received poor value of money. The poor 
persistency rates
48
 associated with these long-term savings contracts provide tangible evidence of 
widespread customer dissatisfaction and poor service quality (Marwa, 2005). Persistency rates in 
long-term insurance contracts remain low in spite of the penalties that customers, intermediaries 
and product providers incur from early withdrawal from the contract. Policyholders who effect 
early withdrawal from their contracts may suffer a financial penalty because the policy proceeds 
received (the surrender value)
49
 may be less than the premiums paid, particularly if withdrawal 
occurs in the early years of the contract. Similarly salesmen and intermediaries will also suffer, 
as low persistency means lower renewal commissions (Diacon et al, 2002).  
 
The insurance industry worldwide is being penalized for the heavy legacy of poor standards, i.e. 
poor standards of selling especially selling through agencies, poor standards of product design, 
small print syndrome and excessive product complexity and equivalent offering with rare service 
                                               
48 Percentage of life insurance or other insurance policies remaining in force .The higher the percentage, the greater 
the persistency; most companies extend every effort to increase persistency (Rubin, 2000).    
49 Action by the owner of a cash value policy to relinquish it for its cash surrender value or fee charged to a policy-
owner insured when a life insurance policy or annuity is surrendered for its cash value (Rubin, 2000).    
122 
 
quality measurement especially in the life insurance field (Francis, 2002). Therefore, a better 
service quality may be the only way to differentiate the insurance industry from other service 
sectors (Sherden, 1987; Siddiqui et al, 2010). Meltzer (1997) also asserts that quality in 
insurance means providing customers insurance products/service that they want when they want 
them, a requirement that demands insurers’ understanding of their business, and being attentive 
to their customers needs by providing products and services that meet their needs. 
 
Similar to insurance poor standardization, takaful companies have not adopted a single financial 
reporting framework, and this has resulted in a lack of transparency and comparability of 
financial statements (Hassan et al, 2009). Hence, more collaborative efforts are required from the 
industry players and the international regulatory bodies such as AAOIFI, IFSB, ITA
50
, IAIS, etc. 
to unify the takaful standards.  
 
The public criticism and outcry about the insurance industry after all is justifiable and the 
reasons exist, therefore, to believe that the industry (worldwide) has not left behind a quality 
legacy (Marwa, 2005). Accordingly, a number of authors have asserted that the poor service 
quality in the insurance industry can be attributed to a number of factors listed below:  
  
I. Failure to focus services to meet customer needs 
Several research efforts have confirmed widespread customer dissatisfaction in the insurance 
industry, stemming from poor service design and delivery (Wells et al, 1995; Friedman, 2001a, 
2001b; Cooper et al, 2001). Customers are demanding a lot more than the industry has been 
willing to give in the past, yet the industry has not been willing to make hard decisions to meet 
these increased demands, leaving clients frustrated with their services (Robert, 2000). Most of 
the decision-makers in the insurance industry are far removed or disengaged from customers and 
their needs and the closer they can get is through sterile research when analyzing internal data 
and actuarial models (Marwa, 2005).  
 
Customers become like statistics and data is provided based on past activities and not what 
would happen if customers were treated differently, which leads insurers to set up processes that 
                                               
50 International Takaful Association. 
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are not only disappointing but also alienates customers (French, 2002). Disappointing services 
are associated with incorrect billing; unnecessary delays in responding to issues central to 
customers’ needs such as claims processing and indemnity; absence of creativity in providing 
coverage; insurers having been accused of avoiding customers for most of the policy terms, and 
only initiating contracts towards renewal of polices, are practices which most customers think are 
negative and unprofessional (Meltzer, 1997; Marwa, 2005). French (2002) also claims that most 
of the insurance industry players are overly concerned on getting new customer to grow their 
business, and considerable insurers’ resources are spent on marketing and advertising at the 
expense of internal quality auditing of existing accounts. This causes the insurance loss ratio to 
go up and the industry thereby denies itself an opportunity to concentrate and invest in quality 
clients that would offer tangible growth. Instead insurance companies use premium rate increases 
as a blunt instrument to correct poor financial results and at the same time treating customers 
disrespectfully (French, 2002). 
 
Insurers are being challenged to serve as communication conduits (listening channels) which 
hear what customers have to say about them; as a dissemination channel, which enables the 
insurers to communicate their feelings and observations to other members of the industry and, 
lastly, as a transmission channel which makes it clear to the customers that what they 
(customers) said is being heeded and acted upon (Witt, 1996). Accordingly, Mandel et al. (2002) 
strongly believe that insurers should focus their attention on improving and enhancing the 
customers' experiences by reinforcing customers’ positive feelings/perceptions of the service, 
and insurers should formally or informally develop means of scoring satisfaction within their set-
ups which will alert them to quality problems so as to respond promptly to such threats. It is 
crucial to identify the participants’ involvement process as it is one of the most relevant 
influences in the buying behaviour, especially in the family takaful sector as they search for more 
information to minimize risks and maximize benefits Hanbali (2007). Bhatty (2007) asserted 
customer segmentation in the takaful industry is necessary in covering both needs and wants of 
customers and it should lead to an understanding of the likely behaviour and potential 
profitability of the business.    
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II. Poor Staff Training 
Friedman (2002) argues that these staff are key to the quality services in the insurance industry 
as they play roles as part psychologists, part diplomats and part loyal employees to do their jobs 
which is indeed a miracle, considering that they do not easily burn out while dealing with an 
ever-demanding and impatient public. Pratt (2002) argues that insurance companies have not 
cultivated a culture of recruiting competent staff, considered key to the long-term growth, 
increased sales, and greater profitability of the industry. The wisdom of the traditional insurers in 
placing heavy reliance on actuarial skills alone at the expenses of other equally important skills 
in a changing global market is increasingly being challenged (Reuters, 1999b). Indeed most 
insurers have realized that it is imperative to develop expertise in investment, marketing, 
customer retention, segmentation, and product distribution (Reuters, 1999b). Insurers should also 
develop a positive work environment that generates high staff morale, invest in corporate 
training, skills development and opportunities for job transfer, as well as advancement in 
monitoring and retention (Voelker, 2000). 
 
The industry has not provided a lot of serious training, particularly to customer-facing staff 
(Marwa, 2005). While in the takaful scheme as most of the senior management have gained their 
formal underwriting qualifications and expertise in the conventional sector before moving across 
to the Islamic insurance sector, then a dual training system is needed to enhance their knowledge 
about the principles and technicality of takaful products (Abdi, 2007).  Abdi (2007) also asserts 
that takaful-developing staff is fundamental for long-term prosperity of the industry and 
investment in people is needed on two levels, at the commercial level and at Shari’ah level.   
 
III. Lack of differentiation in the Insurance industry   
Goch (1999) argues that one of the major factors that have contributed to the insurance 
industry’s unfavourable rating by the insuring public is the inability of insurers to differentiate 
themselves from their competitors within their respective groupings. Insurers also fail to educate 
their customers on how they are different than others insurers, i.e. in their products, marketing 
and advertising campaigns, management styles, clients focus, traditions, beliefs and values. 
Insurers have not fully mastered the art of where to add value over their competitors, and it is 
taking long for the industry to realize that the significant strength of an insurer does not wholly 
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lie in risks-underwriting but also in product innovation, distribution and investment management 
as broad business areas (Reuters, 1999a). Bhatty (2007) asserted that strategies are needed to 
promote takaful products including brandings, marketing, and advertising. He also asserted that 
customer education is needed to differentiate the quality of takaful products from other types of 
insurance.   
 
In order to address the above-mentioned shortfalls and failures within the insurance industry, 
adaptability to change might be one of the solutions to these problems. However, the insurance 
business has become more complex that no one person should presume to know all. Accordingly, 
insurers’ survival will thus primarily depend on establishing networks/teamwork. Brandon 
(1996) asserts that the emphasis has shifted from command and control leadership to principle-
centred or value based leadership, as there is no one formula for renewing or transforming 
insurers as each entity is unique. Exactly how and the extent to which they need to change can 
best be determined and accomplished by people within their respective organizations. The 
takaful business will need an active networking and motivated scheme to reach end-users 
quickly, hence collaborations with the international banks can play an important role in boosting 
the growth of takaful through reaching out to the customer (Bhatty, 2007).  
 
Insurers must identify customers’ needs and create solutions to these needs using quality 
products and services (Drury, 2003) and by adopting a products reengineering approach 
(Williams et al., 1995). Product development will give insurers an immediate advantage as a 
means to lock-in existing customers through an increased perception of quality and service 
(Marwa, 2005). Reuters (1999b) asserted that insurers should move away from the traditional 
spread contracts which has a low transparency and that the returns given to policyholders remain 
at the discretion of insurers, which makes it difficult for investors to realize how returns and 
bonuses are derived. For the takaful industry, Bhaty (2007) asserted that TOs should design their 
products to satisfy customers’ needs and wants and that TOs need to follow the usual life cycles 
approach, matching customers needs at different stages according to the customer segmentation 
of the available market. 
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IV. Under-investment in IT 
Many insurers in the industry particularly those in developing economics are yet to appreciate 
the full potential of IT and have committed relatively fewer resources towards IT capacity 
development resulting to poor customer services (Marwa, 2005). Some insurers are still stuck in 
paper documentation that requires considerable storage space, thereby limiting the ability to 
integrate information within an insurer’s departments besides hampering faster communication 
with clients, which prevents insurers from making the most from existing customer relationships 
(Gow, 2000). However, in the developed economies, countries like USA have become better at 
exploiting technology to allow them to deliver better customer service, better risk pricing and 
reduction in internal costs while others continue to lag behind (Marwa, 2005).  
 
Therefore, investing in technology around key business drivers can make the firms more 
attractive to investors (KPMG, 2003). IT management and company-wide implementation of 
generic systems, which reduces processing and administrative costs thereby, allow insurers to 
increase their customer base (KPMG, 2003). Insurers need to view IT systems operations not as 
separate support functions but they must realize that customers want 24/7 access to their 
information which means availability of server access 24/7; it is all about improving insurers’ 
communication capabilities and there does not seem to be alternatives other than investing in 
more robust IT systems (Roy, 2002).  
 
Insurers should not treat IT systems separately from the company operations but rather central to 
operations and there is a need to combine strong underwriting expertise, involving sophisticated 
risk modelling systems, with the ability to successfully manage a broker-based distribution 
network. In other words, insurers must not look at IT only as an instrument for reducing 
expenses and gaining revenue but also as a means of improving customer service quality through 
delivery and execution (Marwa, 2005). Bhatty (2007) asserted that technology is continuously 
changing and the way insurers do things must therefore also change. Hence, direct selling of 
takaful products through electronic means may be useful to increase business volume, greater 
access to customers, help to be proactive, and to gain economic of scale. Bhatty also asserts that 
the beauty of takaful products is that a great deal of cross-selling and up-selling can take place. 
For instance, cross-selling between a takful company and a bank can generate a huge amount of 
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additional business and revenues, but which requires continues efforts to build and update 
customer profiling vastly aided by an active IT system to enable easy and fast access to it. 
 
V. Poor Distribution Channels  
Diacon et al (1995) and McCabe et al. (1997) suggest that there are strong relationships between 
insurers’ service quality and the quality and professionalism of advice provided by sales staff. 
Furthermore, surveys of financial services consumers in the U.K. often indicate concern about 
the performance of the sales process (Diacon et al, 2001). Salespeople might practise 
unacceptable sales pressure on policyholders, giving an unsound or biased advice, and reflecting 
unobservable charges (Diacon et al, 2002). Thus, Mercantile & General Reinsurance (1993) 
concluded that the quality of life assurance sales are dependent on the quality of the people 
selling, the training they receive, the commission structure by which they are remunerated and 
the cultural environment in which they work. Gower (1984) was critical of the lack of training of 
life insurance salesmen and the conflicts of interest that can arise from commission payments.  
 
Accordingly, the role of sales people will have a great effect on customer satisfaction, which was 
strongly obvious by the inclusion measurement suggested by Parasuraman et al. (1988).  The 
first four elements of of five dimensions indentified by Parasuraman et al. (1988) relating to 
product and process (i.e., reliability, responsiveness, assurance, empathy and tangibility) has 
elements of human action/intervention in the service delivery; such an inclusion has been 
validated by numerous studies which highlight the importance of customer interface in 
determining service quality (Roth et al, 1995; Krishnan et al., 1999).  Cross et al. (2007) argued 
that a high level of customer orientation reflects a high level of concern for customers’ needs, 
while a low level of customer orientation reflects a selfish concern for the achievement of short-
term objectives (sales). Hence, sales orientation may not affect the job performance of 
salespeople, but it can negatively affect customer satisfaction (Goff et al., 1997).   
 
Accordingly, because of the vital role a salesman can play in enhancing customer knowledge, the 
UK government has issued the Financial Services Act 1986 which obligated salesmen to comply 
with a code of conduct that required them to consider the needs and circumstances of their 
customers and give best advice. While, as the takaful business concerns commercial and 
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Shari’ah issues, Ali et al (2008) assert that it will be better if the takaful product was sold via the 
operator itself, since intermediaries will be required to acquire a wide set of information about 
customer preferences, such as customer perspective and their view in regards to Shari’ah issues. 
 
VI. Distrust of the Industry   
Darcy (1996) asserts that there is a growing distrust of the industry not only by its customers and 
prospects but also by employees, regulators, shareholders and the public. This has been caused 
by bad practices and callous treatment of those involved in the insurance business, that planned 
productivity does not materialize early, or at all. As employees become engulfed with fear and 
the level of organizational stress rises by the day words such as teamwork and corporate family 
become meaningless to the work force, as they watch in disbelief the increase in financial 
compensation of top executives following downsizing of their organization.  
 
Customers’ fears have been further fuelled by industry regulators, following public disclosure of 
major insurers’ business malpractices that have attracted record fines and class-action lawsuits 
estimated at millions of dollars (Marwa, 2005: 84).  A better solution to improve the distrust 
situation is by enhancing ethical behaviour among the company employees, as the insurance 
business suffers from less attention towards ethics. As Smith (1996) asserted, insurers were 
treating ethical behaviour in organizations as a one-year-only event. While Marwa (2005) 
asserted that as top management in the insurance industry hardly provide any budget and staff to 
promote ethics, employees generally have little if any opportunities to discuss ethical dilemmas 
with their seniors; neither are there any procedures in place that encourage employees to report 
any wrongdoing without fear or repression.   
 
Accordingly, the insurance industry must hold itself to formal ethical standards in order to 
improve its image in the eyes of the public, and insurance companies who did not have any 
ethics awareness programmes or code of ethics should urgently develop such programmes so as 
to demonstrate their commitment to exemplary ethical behaviour  (Smith, 1996). Smith (1996) 
also asserted that insurance companies should designate an ethics staff member to make sure that 
the company and its employees behave ethically towards co-workers, customers and 
intermediaries. The ethics staff will be charged with prompting ethical behaviour up front, and 
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hence the management should provide adequate budget and staff to fortify the office of the ethics 
officer 
 
In term of takaful, Lewis (2005) asserts that TOs’ should encourage and monitor correct and 
positive ethical behaviour, such as ihsan (goodness), tawakkal (trust in God), amanah (honesty), 
infaq (spending to meet social obligation), sabr (patience) and istislah (public interest). While, 
Bhatty (2007) asserts that TOs’ must embody the ethical nature of their business, not just from 
the religious point of view, since the takaful system is a fair system for all and everyone should 
be able to benefit from it.  
 
5.6 EVALUATION OF SERVICES IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY  
In the 1990s there were calls for quality practices throughout the service sector following the 
success stories in the manufacturing sector in the USA, and the successful adoption of these 
practises in banking, hospitality and other service industries. Accordingly, the insurance industry 
had the impetus to adopt these quality practises and set up its own quality research and 
sensitization unit called the Quality Insurance Congress (QIC)
51
. The birth of QIC saw numerous 
research efforts directed at service quality being initiated (Deragon, 1997; Marwa, 2005).  
 
These research efforts reflect that customer satisfaction measurement is a fundamental 
component of service quality, which involves the assessment of how well customers’ 
expectations are being met or exceeded in a company’s offering; in other words an organizations 
should, as a way of a continues improvement, determine the level of customer satisfaction with 
the services or goods provided. An indication of customer dissatisfaction regarding the company 
service quality is the percentage of customers’ withdrawals. Accordingly, a consumer survey 
conducted by the U.K. insurance regulator reported that the policy type with the highest 
withdrawal rate had the highest proportion of policyholders saying they regretted taking out the 
product and a high rate of complaints (Collard, 2001).  
 
                                               
51 The Quality Insurance Congress was formed in 1993 in USA, to create a forum for the system of insurance and its 
customers to facilitate change that would improve customer satisfaction. 
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In contrast, regarding the withdrawals notion, the results of a survey of the policyholders who 
had withdrawn from the life insurance companies in the UK, 80% of the policyholders said they 
were satisfied with the overall service provided by the company, and 88% reported that the main 
reason for withdrawing was a change in personal circumstances (Survey Research Associates, 
1992).  
 
Wells et al (1995) have reflected another important study that addressed policyholders’ 
complaints ratio. Wells et al (1995) undertook a study on Consumer Perceptions vs. Regulatory 
Perceptions. The research compared consumer perception of insurers’ service quality with 
regulatory assessment of insurers’ service quality in the USA. Three important findings have 
been reported: First, lower complaints ratios are significantly related to higher levels of 
perceived service quality, implying that regulators perceive service quality more accurately. 
Second, consumers tend to rate service quality higher if they are aware of their right to complain 
to the regulator. The awareness that a consumer advocate exists may reduce feelings of 
helplessness, dissatisfaction, or resentment that consumers might ordinarily have when dealing 
with a large insurance company. Third, a consumer’s actual knowledge of insurance, as 
measured by how much specific insurance education the consumer has had, seems to be 
negatively related with service quality. 
 
Wells et al (1995) viewed their research as the first step in evaluating present regulatory tools 
used to assess service quality and called for the development of a more rigorous model of 
measuring service quality in the insurance industry. The researchers are calling regulators to seek 
more sophisticated and accurate diagnostic models for assessing insurers’ service quality in the 
insurance industry.  Accordingly, a number of models to evaluate customer perceptions were 
introduced such as SERVQUAL, SERVPERF, SERVCON, Priority Search and the American 
Customer Satisfaction Index. Of these, the SERVQUAL model is the most widely used approach 
(Gorst, 2000). In the context of the Islamic financial services industry, the pioneer in using the 
SERVQUAL model to measure service quality is a study by Othman et al (2001).  They 
modified the model by including the compliance element as part of the assessment; the new 
Islamic service quality model is termed as CARTER. 
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5.6.2 SERVQUAL and CARTER models 
Most of the studies related to satisfaction measurements have used the Parasuraman et al. (1988) 
SERVQUAL model which is a 22-item instrument for measuring customers’ expectations and 
perceptions along five quality dimensions: Tangibles: The appearance of physical facilities, 
equipment, personnel and communications materials. Reliability: The ability to perform the 
promised service dependably and accurately.  Responsiveness: The willingness to help customers 
and to provide prompt service. Assurance: The knowledge and courtesy of employees and their 
ability to convey trust and confidence. Empathy: The caring and individualized attention 
provided to customers, including approachability and ease of contact with the service provider 
and the efforts made to understand the customers and their needs. 
 
The questions on the scale were designed to assess customers’ perceptions of a service on the 
five dimensions. The original instrument involved a gap analysis methodology, where the 
customers’ expectations of service quality are assessed at the same time as their perception of the 
actual service performance. The difference between these two scores is then used as a basis for 
further analysis. Basically, the service quality model was derived from the magnitude and 
directions of five gaps as shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Service Quality Model 
 
Source: Parasuraman et al. (1988) 
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The five gaps addressed the following:  
 
GAP 1 (Understanding): the difference between consumer expectations and management 
perceptions of consumer expectations. 
GAP 2 (Service standards): the difference between management perceptions of consumer 
expectations and service quality specifications. 
GAP 3 (Service performance): the difference between service quality specifications and the 
service actually delivered. 
GAP 4 (Communications): the difference between service delivery and what is communicated 
about the service to consumers.   
GAP 5 (Service quality): the difference between customer expectations of service quality and 
customer perceptions of the organization’s performance.  
 
Finally, as has been mentioned earlier, Othman et al (2000; 2001) have modified the five 
dimensions (Tangibles, Reliability, Responsiveness, Assurance, and Empathy) of the 
SERVQUAL model into the 6-dimensions CARTER model, by adding one additional dimension 
called Compliance. The compliance dimension will measure the firm’s ability to comply with 
Islamic law and principles with a total of 34 items. Both models define customer satisfaction as 
perceived service quality, by identifying the gap between expected service and perception of 
service quality received. However, for the purpose of this research the SERVQUAL model will 
be described in more detail, because of the availability of a number of insurance studies that have 
used the SERVQUAL model to analyze the service quality of a certain insurance sector by 
reviewing policyholders’ perceptions and expectations view.   
 
5.6.3 Criticism of the SERVQUAL Approach 
Although several studies have found that the SERVQUAL model is the required and the efficient 
model to measure service quality, some other studies contradict this view.
52
 These other studies 
disagree with the SERVQUAL model on two major issues:  the dimensions of service quality 
and the lack of a clear link between satisfaction and perceived service quality.        
                                               
52 Babukus and Mangold (1992); Bebko and Grag(1995); Bowers et al. (1994); Carman (1990); McAlexander et 
al.(1994); Fusilier and Simpson (1995); Brown and Swartz (1989); Walbridge and Delene (1993); Teas (1993) and 
Cronin and Tayler  (1994). 
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A number of marketing-oriented researchers (Babukus et al, 1992; Carman, 1990; Finn et al, 
1991; Gagliano et al, 1994; Lam, 1995) have identified factor stability as a problem for the 
SERVQUAL instrument’s assessment of service quality. Cronin et al (1994) found evidence that 
SERVQUAL is supported by little empirical and/or theoretical evidence; adding that 
SURVQUAL represents a uni-dimensional model. Other researchers (Akan, 1995; Lam, 1995, 
1997; Raajpoot, 2004) asserted that the SERVQUAL model is not suitable to be used outside its 
marketing domain countries (USA and Europe); they also indicated the need for customization of 
the metric prior to its use. These findings were also supported by Dotchin and Oakland (1994) as 
they stated that SERVQUAL depends on the context in which it is applied and cannot be 
generalized in all and any service industry.  According to Raajpoot (2004) the SERVQUAL 
dimensions fail to fully capture the construct of service quality in non-Western cultures and 
proposes usage of culture-specific quality dimensions. Winsted, (1997), Donthu et al, (1998), 
Mattila, (1999), Furrer et al. (2000), Imrie et al., (2000) and Imrie et al. (2002) found out that 
consumers in different cultures not only evaluate service-encountered quality along the five 
dimensions of SERVQUAL but also evaluate quality along dimensions not captured by the 
SERVQUAL model. These researchers also argued for the expansion of the existing 
conceptualization of the SERVQUAL metric to incorporate non-Western quality values/virtues.   
 
Oliver (1993) added that the SERVQUAL model does not allow customers to have low quality 
expectations. Also the satisfaction approach to measure quality runs into difficulty when 
complex services are evaluated as customers may not know what to expect, and even after the 
service is delivered they may not know with certainly how good the services were (Lovelock, 
1996). Additionally the model gives inaccurate representation of service quality in small firms 
(Haksever, et al., 2000). Carman (1990) asserted that the SERVQUAL model five dimensions 
were not always generic. Carman also indicated that distribution of the SERVQUAL 
expectations questions should be distributed to customers before using the service not after 
trying the service. Carman further notes that even after this was done, expectations and 
perceptions showed little relationships, if any, to one another.       
 
Teas (1993) questioned SERVQUAL’s discriminate validity. He notes that service quality 
expectations may have serious discriminate validity short-comings which can cause the 
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(perception-expectation) service quality measurement framework to be potentially misleading 
indicators of perceptions of service quality. Brown et al. (1993) also indicated that because the 
SERVQUAL scale scores are difference scores (perception-expectation) then problems of 
reliability, discriminate validity, and variance restrictions exist, as well as non-normal 
distribution of model scores.  The SERVQUAL model may be appropriate for large service 
organizations, but it will represent inaccurate service quality measurement in small firms 
(Haksever et al., 2000). Finally, Marwa (2005) clarifies that the case against other service quality 
models such as SERVPERF is really the case for SERVQUAL, since the demerits of 
SERVPERF are in essence the merits of the SERVQUAL metric. Accordingly, since the Islamic 
service quality model, CARTER, is essentially an adoption of the SERVQUAL model with the 
extension of one dimension (Compliance), then obviously the same criticisms can apply for the 
CARTER model, with an exemption of Shari’ah compliance, since there are only a very few 
studies that have been conducted to reflect the validity of the CARTER model; unfortunately, 
none of these studies have addressed the takaful business.       
 
5.6.4 SERVQUAL’s Application in the Insurance Industry  
A few valuable studies using SERVQUAL have been undertaken in the insurance industry. 
Stafford et al (1999) have surveyed customers of four major USA insurance companies with the 
main goal of identifying the predictors i.e. perceived service quality and satisfaction in the auto 
casualty insurance industry. They used the confirmatory factor analysis and multiple regression 
analysis to validate the existence of the five SERVQUAL dimensions. The findings showed that 
all dimensions have not successfully predicted the perceived service quality during the auto 
casualty insurance claims with the exception of the ‘reliability’ dimension.  
   
Graham (2004) has used the SERVQUAL model on the Greece insurance market. However, 
Graham has renamed the model as GIQUAL, since he added 4 more statements (Price, Product 
Quality, Ambiguity of insurance contracts terms, and Delays in claims settlement) to the original 
22 statements of customer perceptions of the SERVQUAL model. GIQUAL was distributed to 
168 customers among 3 anonymous Greek insurance companies to find out the gap between their 
expectations and perceptions. Graham has used the correlation matrix and factor analysis to 
figure the validation of the existing five SERVQUAL dimensions. The factor analysis findings 
135 
 
showed that only the Tangibles and Reliability dimensions successfully predicted the perceived 
service quality, while other dimensions have merged together.   
 
Marwa (2005) has used the SERVQUAL model on the Kenya insurance market. He filtered the 
22 items through a pre-test to yield 19 items, and then added another 24 items to yield a total of 
43 items. The surveys were distributed to 210 insurers among 4 insurance companies. The factor 
analysis approach has been used to validate the existing five SERVQUAL dimensions. Marwa 
has indicated that the factor analysis results were inconsistent, thus rendering it difficult to 
decide on the number of factors. However, the dimensions Reliability and Empathy were the 
most deficient. 
 
Marwa (2005) and Graham (2004) concluded that the SERVQUAL metric requires substantial 
modification (customization) prior to its application and researchers ought to be cautious when 
applying the diagnostics; SERVQUAL is not a ready-to-use tool-kit. They also added that further 
research is necessary to investigate the consistency and universality of the constituent attributes 
of the SERVQUAL diagnostic.      
 
Finally, the SERVQUAL five dimensions (22 items) model was used to figure out the gap 
between customers’ expectations and perceptions on one of the biggest life insurance companies 
in India (Life Insurance Corporation). A total of 337 customers participated in the study. 
Accordingly the factor analysis results did not follow the factor structure as given by 
Parasuraman et al. (1998). The gap scores did not merge into the five dimensions of service 
quality; rather the perceptions scores merge into three dimensions. The findings of the study 
concluded that the SERVQUAL instruments are not applicable to the Indian life insurance 
sector. Therefore further research is imperative to improve service quality in life insurance 
sectors (Bala, Sandhu, Nagpal, 2011). Table 5.1 gives a summary illustration of the conducted 
research efforts as has been explained previously.   
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Table 5.1: Summary of SERVQUAL Literature Review Applications on Insurance Market 
Author/s Year Country Insurance production Methods Findings 
Stafford et a.l 1998 USA Auto casualty 
Regression and 
factor analysis. 
Dimensions have not 
successfully predicted 
service quality.  
Graham 2004 Greek Insurance market. 
Regression, 
correlation and 
factor analysis. 
The model is not ready 
to be used as tool-kit. 
Marwa 2005 Kenya Insurance market. 
Correlation and 
Factor analysis. 
The model is not ready 
to be used as tool-kit. 
Bala, 
Sandhu, 
Nagpal 
2011 India Life insurance. Factor analysis. 
The model is not 
applicable to the Indian 
life insurance sector. 
Source: Author’s own. 
 
In conclusion, although some of the already-mentioned studies (Marwa et al, 2004) have adopted 
a customized factor that can suit the insurance industry in their countries, they concluded that the 
model is not ready to be used as a tool-kit. Furthermore, most research studies do not support the 
five-factor structure of SERVQUAL as proposed by Parasuraman et al. (1988) and administering 
expectations items is also considered unnecessary (Kettinger et al., 1994). The results can be 
better interpreted as being an even stronger support by using the perceptions portion only, as the 
expectations portion of the SERVQUAL scale adds no additional information beyond that which 
is obtained from performance perceptions alone (Brady et al., 2002).    
 
5.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter has provided a comprehensive literature review on the factors that affect customers’ 
needs, preferences, perceptions, and motivations which can impact their satisfaction levels in the 
insurance industry. The current chapter has shown the importance of satisfying customers’ 
preferences which are reflections of their needs and wants. It is also important to review 
customer perceptions about the service presented by the insurance company, as customers are the 
ones that are directly exposed to the company services. Their opinions represent real judgments 
on the services represented by the insurance company. The current chapter also reflects on the 
importance of customer knowledge which leads to customer motivations and satisfactions and 
comes to the conclusion that lack of customer knowledge can lead to a deficiency in customer 
confidence which will eventually affect their preferences and motivations, such results were 
similar to the research effort by Howcroft et al. (2003). Adhering to customer perceptions, 
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knowledge and preferences can lead to customer satisfaction; in a way satisfying customer needs 
and wants can eventually lead to enhance their satisfaction level.  This chapter also highlighted 
the encountered problem in the insurance industry with some recommendations which have been 
imposed by several insurance researchers. Hence, a reflection of the most popular service quality 
measurement models has been presented. However, due to several malfunctions to implement 
these models on the insurance industry, a customized service quality instrument has been 
suggested, which reflects the main purpose and rationale of conducting such a research. These 
instruments will be structured based on the international insurance regulatory bodies as has been 
presented on the previous chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN OVERVIEW OF SAUDI ARABIAN LEGAL/REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY BEHAVIOURS   
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will provide an overview of the insurance industry in Saudi Arabia and the 
regulatory instruments it operates under the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), with a 
brief on the situations of the licensed insurance companies in the Kingdom. The current chapter 
will also provide information and data on the Saudi insurance market growth rate and financial 
performance. By doing so, the chapter answers research question 2:  What are the laws and 
regulations governing takaful companies in Saudi Arabia?  
 
This chapter is organized to gives sufficient answer to research question 2 as follows: section 6.2 
presents a background about Saudi Arabia and its economy. Section 6.3 highlights the legal 
system in Saudi Arabia. Section 6.4 presents a background about Saudi Arabian insurance 
industry and current status of insurance companies. Section 6.5 reflects Saudi insurance market 
behaviours. Section 6.6 reflects reforms in SAMA regulations. Section 6.7 draws conclusion.  
 
6.2 BACKGROUND OF SAUDI ARABIA  
Saudi Arabia is a developing country in Asia, and Riyadh is the capital city. The modern state of 
Saudi Arabia dates back to 1932 when King AbdulAziz (1880-1953) announced the foundation 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Al-Angari, 2004). The country, which is the largest in the 
Middle East, comprises 95% desert, including the Rub' Al Khali, the biggest land size of sand on 
the planet.  Saudi Arabia is situated in the South West of Asia, having an area of about 2,100,000 
SKM (868,730 SM), with a population estimated at more than 25 million (Ministry of Economy 
and Planning, 2007; Al-Angari, 2004). The local currency is the Saudi Riyal (SAR) and SAR 6.1 
is equivalent to one GBP (as of January 2012). Arabic is the official language, while English is 
used as the business language. 
 
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy that is restricted to the male descendants of King Abdulaziz. The 
monarchy system in Saudi Arabia is centralized which gives the King wide-reaching authority, 
including the management of internal and external affairs. Moreover, all important positions, 
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such as internal affairs, foreign affairs, and the defence ministry are limited to male descendants 
of King Abdulaziz. The Consultative Council, established in 1991, has a limited role in the 
legislative system of Saudi Arabia. It acts as an advisory body to the King and any decisions can 
only be applied once final approval has been received from him. Saudi Arabia has never been 
ruled by another country and it has therefore developed its own culture, language, society and 
economy. Before 1937, Saudi Arabia was a poor country mainly relying on agriculture. In 1937, 
oil was discovered and today the country is the world’s largest producer and exporter of oil. The 
discovery of oil has brought about gradual changes to the social and economic life and the 
political position of the country in the Middle East. Saudi’s economy is primarily based on 
petroleum exports which  represent roughly 90-95% of the total national income and 35-40% of 
the gross domestic product (GDP), which brought the country’s GDP to 577.9 (US$b),  and GDP 
/ Capita  to 20,500 (US$) by 2008 (World Development Bank, 2009). 
 
According to the Ministry of Economy and Planning (2007), Saudi Arabia is thought to hold 
approximately one quarter of the world’s proven petroleum reserves and will continue to be the 
largest producer of petroleum for the foreseeable future (Falgi, 2009). Furthermore, it dominates 
a large percentage of petroleum production among OPEC members with 34% of the total output 
which gives it a leading role in affecting petroleum prices in the world (OPEC, 2009). Saudi 
Arabia has recently witnessed many reforms, including in its political system, social life and 
business. For example, after long negotiations, it became a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) after adopting numerous regulations to its legal system in 2005 (Falgi, 
2009). In addition, one of these reforms established the Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority (2000) which aims to enhance the investment environment and attract local and 
foreign investors by eliminating obstacles and tackling shortcomings (Falgi, 2009). Overall, the 
Saudi business environment has recently witnessed gradual development which has contributed 
to reinforcing Saudi’s economy.  
 
6.3 THE LEGAL SYSTEM  
A country’s legal system plays an important role in effecting its regulations and practices. The 
Saudi Arabian constitution is based on the Islamic law which is derived from Holy Quran and the 
guidelines laid down in the traditions of the Prophet Mohammed (Sunnah) and other sources 
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associated with Islamic law (Shari’ah). Accordingly, Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state in terms of 
its legal system and in general terms, and adheres to Islamic regulations (Al-Angari, 2004). 
Saudi Arabia holds a special position among Arabic and Islamic countries since it is the home of 
the holiest Muslim sites of Mecca (the direction of prayer and pilgrimage for more than one 
billion Muslims) and Medina, where the Prophet Mohammed emigrated and was buried (Falgi, 
2009). In terms of social behaviour, Saudi Arabia is pre-dominantly a tribal society based on 
Arabic traditions and this maintains a considerable degree of impact over local and national 
events (Falgi, 2009). 
 
Equally, the Saudi legal framework has mainly been affected by Islam, upon which the country’s 
constitution is based. Since Saudi Arabia has a strong historical relationship with the US and 
Britain, the business environment has been greatly influenced to a large extent by those 
countries’ legislations, such as company law systems (Al-Angari, 2004). All banks and financial 
companies are subject to international accounting standards. However, while the aspect of the 
Saudi legal system that relates to the business environment is a mixture of rules and regulations 
from American, British and other countries’ legislations, the legal system is controlled and 
influenced by an Islamic framework. In other words, the derived or borrowed regulations have 
been adapted in accordance with Islamic regulations and the character of the Saudi environment 
(Al-Angari, 2004). 
   
6.3.1 Judiciary System Commercial litigation 
The Saudi Arabian courts system is currently going through major reforms under a new Judiciary 
Regulation and a new Board of Grievances Regulation, which were both enacted under the Royal 
Decree No. M/78 of (1
st
 of October 2007).
53
 The Saudi Arabian courts system is divided into the 
Shari’ah (Islamic Law) courts on the one hand, and specialized statutory tribunals on the other 
hand. The Shari’ah courts are of general jurisdiction, and they are mainly concerned with matters 
relating to land, family disputes, personal injury claims, and criminal cases (Ghazzawi et al., 
2011). 
 
                                               
53Legal Department, Ministry of Commerce Grievances Court at  
http://www.saudicommercialoffice.com/settlement_of_commercial_dispute.html. 
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Of the statutory tribunals, the most important by far is the Board of Grievances. Its jurisdiction 
includes disputes involving the Saudi Arabian government and government agencies (judicial 
review of administrative action and government contract disputes), most types of commercial 
cases, the enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards (Ghazzawi et al., 2011). 
Establishment and conduct of commercial courts is regulated by the Royal Decree No. 32 issued 
on the (2
nd
 of June 1931). Under this law, all commercial disputes except for those related to 
insurance business are settled by the Ministry of Commerce by appointing a Committee for 
Commercial Disputes, comprising two Shari’ah judges and one legal adviser.54  
Insurance disputes and claims to which insurers have become subrogated are adjudicated by a 
special committee, the Committee for the Settlement of Insurance Disputes. There is an 
automatic right of appeal from the Committee for the Settlement of Insurance Disputes to the 
Board of Grievances. Since 31
st
 December 1987, Commercial Disputes have been adjudicated by 
the Grievances Court (Diwan Al-Mazalem), Commercial Circuit, instead of the Committee for 
Commercial Disputes.
55
  
On the other hand, most disputes arising in Saudi Arabia can be submitted to arbitration in 
accordance with the Arbitration Law, promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/46 dated 25
th
 April 
1983 and the Rules for the Implementation of the Arbitration Regulation of 1985, which form a 
reasonably comprehensive code derived largely from Islamic law principles (Ghazzawi et al., 
2011). Under these statutes, the authority which has original jurisdiction to hear the dispute 
retains extensive control over and involvement in the conduct of arbitration. In most commercial 
disputes this is the Board of Grievances. Broadly, only the conduct of the hearings and the 
decision-making is the arbitrators’ responsibility, whilst all pre-hearing and post-hearing 
procedures, and other ancillary matters, are the responsibilities of the Board of Grievances 
(Ghazzawi et al., 2011). In particular, the arbitral tribunal is not properly constituted until the 
Board of Grievances approves an arbitration instrument which must be executed and signed by 
the parties and the arbitrators. Nor is an award final and enforceable until it is approved by the 
Board of Grievances. Hence, the losing party in arbitration has an automatic right of appeal to 
                                               
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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the Board of Grievances on points of law or procedure, opening the door to yet further appeals 
on points of law or procedure to the Board of Grievances Review Panel (Ghazzawi et al., 2011). 
 
6.4 SAUDI ARABIAN INSURANCE INDUSTRY  
The insurance industry in Saudi Arabia was unregulated prior to the passing of the Control of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies Law, which came into force on 20 November 2003 along with 
its implementing regulations published on 23 April 2004, together with the Cooperative 
Insurance Regulations (Hodgins et al, 2009). However, the implementation of regulations was 
delayed to April 2008, until the unlicensed entities operating in Saudi Arabia brought their 
operations into accordance with the requirements of the new law and regulations that have been 
imposed by SAMA (Wilson, 2007). Prior to the implementations of the insurance regulations, 
the only options for individuals or businesses operating in Saudi Arabia seeking insurance were 
between taking out a conventional insurance either overseas or with an unlicensed provider in the 
Saudi Arabia or taking out cooperative insurance with Saudi Arabia’s former state monopoly 
provider, the National Company for Cooperative Insurance (NCCI), now known as (Tawuniya) 
(Hodgins et al, 2009). 
Shortly after implementation of insurance laws, SAMA established an independent team of 
insurance supervisors to operate in its banking inspection department (SAMA, 2010a). The team 
has developed from a small internal department of 9 employees to an independent supervisory 
authority with a team of 44 employees (Hodgins et al, 2009). The regulatory body has four main 
objectives: (i) Protect the rights of policyholders and shareholders’, (ii) provide better insurance 
services for fair and effective competition, (iii) foster stability of the insurance market, and (iv) 
establish a developed insurance industry by providing training and employment opportunities 
(SAMA, 2010a).   
SAMA is mandated as the regulator for all licensed insurance companies including insurance 
brokers, insurance agents, insurance consultants, surveyors, loss adjusters and actuaries. In other 
words, SAMA is responsible for licensing and authorization, supervision, rule-making, 
supervision of investment of assets and monitoring compliance with capital and reserve 
requirements (SAMA, 2010a). Such extensive control by SAMA is due to the regulations that 
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accompanied comprehensive laws that have been represented by a number of Articles. These 
Articles define different types of insurance, the conditions for licenses being granted, corporate 
governance and regulatory and supervisory procedures (Wilson, 2007).  
The implementation of the new regulations and laws has made the kingdom to be the largest 
insurance market in the GCC and one that has developed substantially since insurance business 
was first permitted in the 1990s (E & Y, 2011). Driven by strong macroeconomic performance 
due to the global rise in oil prices, rising income levels and positive demographic trends, the 
Saudi insurance market has grown by double digits for the past 5 years (OBG, 2011).  
Finally, in order to enhance the supervision and control and application of insurance international 
standards and practices, SAMA has become a member of the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and it participates in all its main committees and sub-committees. 
In addition, SAMA is a member of the Arab Forum of Insurance Supervision and Control 
Authorities (SAMA, 2010b). Accordingly, SAMA is considered one of the strongest insurance 
regulatory authorities in the GCC, which was obvious by their reactions to the adverse 
competitive trends by restricting new licenses; and players wishing to enter the market are being 
advised to buy existing licenses (E & Y, 2011). 
 
6.4.1 Status of Insurance Companies in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia hosts a number of prominent multinational firms in addition to several domestic 
players that rival them in size. By April 2009 there were 29 Saudi insurers in the country 
including 20 that had completed SAMA’s licensing process and were publicly listed; 5  were 
publicly listed but awaiting a license and 4  were neither publicly listed nor licensed. By the end 
of the first quarter of 2010, SAMA has approved 33 insurance and reinsurance companies, of 
which 27 were finally licensed to practice insurance and/or reinsurance (SAMA, 2010a). In 
addition, one insurance company was listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange but it had not obtained 
a final license yet to offer insurance services. The Council of Ministers also approved the 
establishment of five other insurance companies, and two more insurance companies were 
recommended by SAMA to be approved initially, and their license procedures reached advanced 
stages (SAMA, 2010b). By July, 2011 SAMA has given operation licenses to seven takaful 
insurance providers to operate in Saudi Arabia (Al Ahli Takaful, SABB Takaful, Wiqaya Takaful 
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Insurance & Reinsurance, Solidarity Saudi Takaful, AlJazira Takaful Ta’awuni, Saudi Takaful 
insurance, Watani Takaful)  (OBG, 2011). The history of AlJazira Takaful Ta’awuni is an 
example that reflects the development of the takaful companies in Saudi Arabia and presented in 
Appendix B.   
 
6.5 SAUDI INSURANCE MARKET BEHAVIOURS  
This section addresses different issues concerning the Saudi insurance industry. Among others, 
the performance of different insurance lines of business, insurance market penetration rate, and 
the market claim ratio are presented.      
6.5.1 Performance of Saudi Arabian Insurance Market    
Saudi Arabia’s insurance sector has been able to weather the worldwide financial crisis well, 
outperforming a number of other business segments to post consistent year-on-year growth 
throughout the duration of the global economic downturn (OBG, 2011). The country’s insurance 
sector is now able to play a more significant role in the national economy and enjoys a greater 
capital position as more local businesses and individuals become aware of and recognize the 
value of having adequate insurance coverage. 
 
Figure 6.1 represents the overall insurance business performance, which has been classified by 
business line. In 2009, the insurance market witnessed a substantial growth rate of 33.8%, with 
gross written premium (GWP)
56
 reaching SAR
57
 14.6 billion compared to a total of SAR 10.9 
billion in 2008. In 2010, the GWP has reached SAR 16.4 billion, which represents a growth rate 
of 46% (SAMA, 2010b). The increases was due mainly to the growing awareness of the 
importance of insurance and the favourable economic conditions during the year, as well as the 
introduction of compulsory motor insurance and cooperative health insurance (SAMA, 2010b).  
 
 
 
 
                                               
56 Net Premium, plus operating and miscellaneous expenses and agents’ commissions (Rubin, 2000).  
57 Saudi Arabian Riyal. 
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Figure 6.1: Gross Written Premiums (2006 to 2010, SAR Millions) 
 
Source: (SAMA, 2010b) 
 
Health insurance, reported the biggest line of business in 2010, its contribution to total GWP 
increased from 50% in 2009 to 53% in 2010, followed by general insurance, with a contribution 
to the total business volume decreasing from 43% in 2009 to 41% in 2010. Protection and 
Savings insurance remained the smallest line of business accounting for 6% of total GWP, with a 
decrease in its written premiums by 3.1% in 2010 (SAMA, 2010a). Health insurance became the 
most demanded line of business in Saudi Arabia, which accounted for SAR 1.39 billion of the 
SAR 1.77 billion increase in 2010 (SAMA, 2010a). More information on specific insurance line 
of business growth rates can be found in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Gross Written Premiums by Line of Business (2006 to 2010, SAR Millions) 
 
1. Source (SAMA, 2010b). 
2. Motor and Health insurance accounted for around 73% of total GWP in 2010. 
3. Health insurance (compulsory and non-compulsory) accounted for 53% of total GWP in 2010.   
4. Motor insurance (compulsory and non-compulsory) accounted for 20% of total GWP in 2010.  
5. Aviation insurance GWP increased by 75% in 2010. 
6. Health insurance was the second fastest growing line of business with growth rate of 19%. 
7. P&S underwritten premiums decreased by 3%. 
The impressive rate of growth seen in 2010 looked poised to continue, with Saudi Arabia’s 
insurance sector believed to be one of the regional industry’s prime movers. OBG (2011) 
referred to the report released in late August 2010 by the Investment bank Alpen Capital, which 
indicated that the premium growth across the GCC region would increase by some 20% a year 
between 2011 and 2015, lifting total premium values from the current SAR 67.5 billion to SAR 
138.75 billion. Of this total growth, 75% would be concentrated in Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates.  
The report also expected that the Saudi Arabian life insurance sector will have a compounded 
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 48%, while the non-life sector will grow at a steadier CAGR of 
14%. Overall, the Saudi insurance sector is forecasted to expand by a CAGR of 18% by the 
middle of the decade, reaching a total value of SAR 34.62 billion. Insurance is expected to grow 
due to the forecasted increase in the country’s construction industry. This is a result of the 
government’s massive infrastructure investment programme over the next decade, with billions 
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being ploughed into transport, housing, health and education developments. A raft of insurance 
opportunities will arise from the developments since hundreds of projects will need 
comprehensive coverage (OBG, 2011). As has been mentioned previously, the Saudi market is 
dominated by health and general insurance business lines, which currently account for around 71 
% of the market’s gross written premiums, However, protection and savings products, have 
become the fastest- growing insurance segment, posting a 68.9 % annual growth and now 
accounting for 7 % of gross written premiums, largely attributed to the introduction of Islamic 
insurance (takaful) products (SAMA, 2010a). Accordingly, while most of the GCC markets have 
witnessed a slowdown in takaful growth, the exception is the Saudi market which remains 
strong. Figure 6.3, shows the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of GCC countries from year 
2005 to 2009.  
 
Fig 6.3: Gross Takaful Contributions in the GCC (US$ million)  
 
Source (E & Y, 2011). 
 
6.5.2 Insurance Penetration in the Saudi Arabian Market 
Insurance penetration (GWP/GDP) has been growing at a CAGR of 17% in Saudi Arabia. Over 
the past five years the increase in the insurance market penetration was attributable to the 
growing demand for all types of insurance (SAMA, 2010a). However, in 2010, insurance 
penetration decreased to 1%, down from 1.06% in 2009, mainly due to a strong growth in total 
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GDP (18.6% in 2010 compared to -21.2% in 2009), while the penetration rate of protection and 
savings insurance was low compared to general and health insurance as shown in Figure 6.4 
(SAMA, 2010b). 
 
Figure 6.4: Insurance Penetration of Total GDP
2
, (2006 to 2010, % of Total GDP) 
  
 
1. Source (SAMA, 2010a). 
2. Total GDP of SAR 1,308, SAR 1,414, SAR 1,758, SAR 1,384, and SAR 1,642 Billion in 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, and 2010, respectively (SAMA, 2010a). 
 
Despite these impressive penetration figures, however, Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s 
most underinsured countries. Penetration rates will need to improve considerably if the Kingdom 
is to reach the levels of more developed markets, both in the region and internationally. Saudi 
Arabia’s insurance sector still has a long way to go before matching levels in many Western 
countries. Whereas the Kingdom’s insurance sector is now valued at 1% of GDP, the ratio of 
premiums to domestic product is well over 10% in France and around 13% in the UK, as shown 
in Figure 6.5 (E & Y, 2011). 
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Fig 6.5: Insurance Penetration and Real GDP Growth for Select Countries
 
 
Source (E & Y, 2011). 
Saudi Arabia, however, remains the largest takaful market in the GCC with contributions of US$ 
1.7 billion in 2007 and US$ 2.9 billion in 2008 (E & Y, 2009; 2010). Takaful penetration in 
Saudi Arabia is very low compared to commercial insurance as shown in the table below.  
 
Table 6.1: Saudi Arabian Insurance and Takaful Fact Book 
 
Source: Economic Figures have been taken from Ernst & Young, 2008, 2009; World Development Bank, 
2009; insurance and takaful penetration figures calculated by the researcher. 
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6.5.3 Claim Ratio
58
 
Total claims paid by line of business in the Saudi Arabian insurance market has reported a 
straight increase from SAR 5.2 billion to SAR 7.3 billion with a growth rate of 38.9 % between 
2008 and 2009, and a recent increase of SAR 8.51billion and 17 % growth rate between 2009 
and 2010, as shown in Figure 6.6 (SAMA, 2010b). 
Figure 6.6 Gross Claims
59
 Paid by Line of Business (2006 to 2010, SAR Millions) 
 
Source (SAMA, 2010a). 
 
Health and motor insurance together, accounted for 82.9 % and 77.6 % of all gross claims paid 
between 2008 and 2009 respectively, with an increase in gross claims paid that grew by 36 % 
and 16 %, respectively in 2010. However, in 2009 the highest growth rate in gross claims paid 
was recorded by energy insurance, rising to SAR 570 million compared to SAR 27 million in 
2008  (SAMA, 2010a: 78). In 2010, marine insurance recorded the highest growth rate in gross 
claims paid, after increasing by 66 % from SAR 167 million to SAR 276 million. These high-
growth percentages in gross claims reflected the relatively high ratios of these lines of business 
of the total market premiums (SAMA, 2010a; 2010b).  
 
Furthermore, Protection and Savings, which includes takaful insurance, has reported a decrease 
in the claim ratio from 2009, by 19 %, due to compulsory rules that cannot force people to buy a 
                                               
58 Claim Ratio = Claims Incurred / Earned Contribution (E & Y, 2010). 
59 Claims paid during the policy year plus the claim reserves as of the end of the policy year, minus the 
corresponding reserves as of the beginning of the policy year. 
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family takaful (life insurance) policy. However, takaful claims ratios in Saudi Arabia remains 
high compared to other countries as shown in Figure 6.7, due to structured underwriting practice 
(E & Y, 2010). 
Figure 6.7: Claims Ratios for Different Jurisdictions
 
Source (E & Y, 2010) 
 
6.6 SAMA REGULATIONS  
SAMA has issued a number of laws and regulations that aimed to regulate and standardized the 
Saudi insurance industry. In August 2005, SAMA issued the Cooperative Insurance Companies 
Control Law, which contains 25 articles. The main headings for insurance companies operating 
laws include licensing procedures and conditions, the required capital, key personnel 
responsibilities, auditing and annual reports, the role of the Ministry of Commerce and the role 
of SAMA in dealing with insurance companies, etc. In the same year SAMA has issued the 
controlling law that contains 84 articles, which gives an extensive illustration of the previous 
control laws.    
SAMA has also issued a number of specific regulations that address certain issues in the Saudi 
insurance industry, with the aim of strengthening transparency and accountability and to enable 
SAMA to enforce better business practices in the Saudi insurance market, some of these 
regulations are:    
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 Insurance Market Code of conduct Regulations.    
 Risk Management Regulation. 
 The Regulation of Reinsurance Activities.      
 Insurance Intermediaries Regulation.   
 Investment Regulation for Insurance & Reinsurance Companies. 
 Actuarial Work Regulation for Insurance & Re-Insurance Companies. 
 Audit Committee Regulation in Insurance and/or Reinsurance Companies. 
 Outsourcing Regulation for Insurance, Reinsurance & Insurance Service Providers. 
 
Complying with these regulations is mandatory, as the beginning of each regulation document 
states that non-compliance with the requirements set forth in these codes will be deemed a 
breach of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies and its Implementing 
Regulations and licensing conditions and may subject companies to enforcement action. 
 
SAMA also stipulates at the beginning of every regulation that it is the responsibility of the 
insurance companies to follow internationally accepted best practices, if it is found that SAMA’s 
regulations have not been fully codified,. SAMA also asserts in each regulation document that 
insurance companies must establish appropriate internal controls and procedures to ensure and 
monitor compliance with this code. SAMA has also continued to work on the link project with 
insurance companies through an electronic system which enables SAMA to monitor the solvency 
of insurance companies, the volume of written premiums, the quality of assets and obligations 
and other financial and non-financial data. SAMA has conducted a supervision and control 
process over insurance companies which include off-site supervision and on-site examinations. 
These examinations will ensure the companies’ prudential procedures, by conducting regular 
visits to insurance companies that are expected to be granted licenses and those that have already 
been licensed (SAMA, 2010b, SAMA, 2005a).  
 
The main objectives of SAMA’s directives, laws and regulations, and their restricted approach to 
comply with their regulations and the international regulations is to provide a protection to 
policyholders and shareholders, encouraging fair and effective competition, and enhancing the 
stability of the insurance market in Saudi Arabia (SAMA, 2005b). In line with the discussion of 
the previous chapters the following sections will highlight SAMA’s efforts in regulating the 
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Saudi insurance industry in setting standards in areas of  corporate governance and market 
conduct and disclosures.  
 
6.6.1 SAMA Corporate Governance Regulations         
The Saudi Arabian insurance industry is following the neo-corporatism philosophy, which is 
based on the stakeholder theory. This approach requires the government to play a central role in 
regulating and organizing the social and economic interests of society and to protect the 
policyholders’ rights which was one of the main objectives announced by SAMA. 
 
To resolve the issue of agency problems and asymmetry of information, SAMA has issued 
several regulations: the audit committee regulation, the actuarial work regulation, insurance 
intermediary’s regulation, insurance investment regulation, etc. SAMA has also defined the 
responsibilities of the key governance personnel, and requires proper insurance information 
transparency among all the company staff. SAMA also stresses on the importance of education 
of the employees to bring qualified knowledgeable personnel to bring the service level of the 
Saudi insurance market in line with a similar level of the more developed international insurance 
industry.        
 
6.6.1.1 SAMA Educational Efforts  
Given the importance of education among insurance employees, SAMA identifies minimum 
educational requirements related to the licensing and examination of a person providing 
insurance and reinsurance services in Saudi Arabia. SAMA also states that it is the duty of each 
company to keep their employees’ skills and knowledge of the insurance business up-to-date and 
be informed of the products and services offered by the company, or companies, they represent 
and the intended use of these products and services (SAMA, 2008).  
 
In an effort to educate the financial and insurance sectors, SAMA has launched the Institute of 
Banking (IOB), which was established in 1965 as the Institute of Banking Training. At that time, 
the institute provided conventional academic education to banking sector employees, who 
achieved a diploma in banking and financial studies after they had successfully passed the 
courses. However, with the development of the banking business and the introduction of 
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advanced technologies in the banking sector, the IOB has continued its march by offering 
cognitive solutions to the financial services sector, including banks, insurance and investment 
companies. 
 
Within the framework of SAMA’s efforts to regulate the insurance sector and motivate 
companies and their employees to adhere to professionalism and practice insurance activity on a 
scientific and methodological basis pursuant to rules, regulations and instructions in force, 
SAMA has prescribed the Insurance Fundamentals Certificate Exam (IFCE) as a mandatory 
certificate for employees at insurance and insurance-related companies. It has to be completed 
over three years in accordance with a timetable which determines the period during which each 
category of employees must pass the exam. The exams cover rules and regulations of insurance, 
code of conduct and the basics of insurance operations. These ensure that any employee handling 
and making decisions affecting customers business has a minimum level of knowledge and 
competence in the area of insurance. 
 
6.6.1.2 Power and Activities of Key Stakeholders   
To overcome the asymmetric information problem, SAMA has implemented several regulations 
and introduced article laws that can control the discretionary powers of the companies’ key 
personnel. SAMA has implemented the fit and proper programme which requires the insurance 
and reinsurance services provider’s chairman, board members, directors, and senior managers to 
go through certain procedures to be accepted in the nominated positions. Accordingly, SAMA 
may object to the appointment of some specific insurance companies Board Members and 
executive managers. SAMA is putting more restrictions conditions on the nomination of Board 
of Directors (BoDs).SAMA’s permission is required when the insurance company is about to 
nominate a new member onto the BoDs who previously held a similar position in a company that 
had been liquidated, or if he was dismissed from a similar position in another company (SAMA, 
2005b).  
 
SAMA also restricts BoDs and/or executive officers to hold other sensitive position in the 
company.  For example, SAMA prohibits insurance companies BoDs and/or executive officers 
from being members of the insurance company audit committee; they are also prohibited to act 
155 
 
as responsible actuary, independent actuary, work for any actuarial service company. BoDs are 
also not allowed to hold similar position in other insurance companies (SAMA, 2005b).  
 
SAMA (2005a: 4) states that, the “chairman, managing director, board member and the general 
manager of insurance and re-insurance companies shall be each in his respective capacity, 
responsible for any violation of the provisions of this Law or it’s Implementing Regulations”.  
 
These rules put the burden on the key personnel of the company to act in an honest manner to 
protect and respect the policyholders’ financial benefits. Violating these rules and regulations 
can result in the suspension or dismissal of any board member or employee held responsible for 
such violations (SAMA, 2005b). Accordingly, SAMA requires insurance companies to give a 
report within 45 days from the end of each year and provide the Agency with the names of 
members of the BoDs, managing directors, general managers, senior managers in all branches 
and affiliates and foreign representative offices, including the names and current positions and 
dates of appointment and the number of years of service in the company. The report also 
includes their compensation rates in the company (SAMA, 2005b).  In terms of shareholders’ 
power and activities, SAMA has limited the concentration of ownership in the insurance 
companies. SAMA requested companies to notify them of the ownership of any shareholder who 
owns 5% or more of the company shares through a quarterly report (SAMA, 2005b). 
 
6.6.1.3 The Audit Committee regulation 
SAMA has issued a draft of its audit committee regulations for insurance and reinsurance 
companies. Among key reforms in the new regulation is the creation of audit committees by all 
insurers and reinsurers operating in Saudi Arabia. The newly established audit committees will 
be required to submit reports and recommendations directly to SAMA and to the company BoDs. 
Companies must maintain adequate records to demonstrate regulation compliance (SAMA, 
2011a). On the other hand, the audit committee must have a degree of independence and should 
consist of at least 3 and no more than 5 members. However, there are certain conditions 
applicable to being member of the committee (SAMA, 2011a): 
I. The committee member should not be an executive director or manager of the company, 
with a majority of non-board members.  
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II. The committee member should not be a member of the BoDs or Audit Committee of any 
other company operating in the insurance sector and he is not entitled to be a founder of 
any similar companies. 
III. The committee member should be familiar with financial issues, accounting, financial 
reporting and insurance companies’ audits. 
IV. The company chairman of the BoDs should not be a member or president of the Audit 
Committee.  
 
The term of the committee is for three years, and the BoDs is entitled to renew the term of the 
committee or one of its members, after obtaining SAMA’s permission in writing for another 
three-year term and for one time. However, SAMA is entitled to dismiss a member or members 
of the Audit Committee in case of any violation of this Regulation or violation in the law on 
supervision and its Implementing Regulation (SAMA, 2011a). 
 
The Audit Committee has certain tasks which include monitoring the performance and 
implementation of the internal control systems of the company. It should also ensure the 
effectiveness and efficiency of those systems, verify the implementation of internal control 
decisions and actions, and verify compliance with SAMA’s regulations and its implementations, 
other applicable laws, regulations, and instructions in addition to the requirements set forth in 
this regulation. The committee has the task of reviewing the actuary and the external auditor’s 
reports and suggestions and then submitting a recommendations report to the BoDs and to follow 
up with the BoDs recommendations. The committee has been given an authority to directly 
contact all employees, committees, legal consultants, internal and external auditors in the 
company’s head office and/or branches, in addition to the other stakeholders. It also has the right 
without the BoD’s approval to check all registers and documents (private and confidential) and 
regulations to perform its activities (SAMA, 2011a: 8). 
 
To have an effective Audit Committee, SAMA requires insurance companies to structure two 
departments with one main purpose, which is to provide the committee with the required 
information they need. The first department is the Compliance Department and is considered as 
an independent department that reports to the Audit Committee on technical matters and to the 
Chairman of the BoDs administratively. Its mandate is to report any violations of the laws, by 
verifying the company’s compliance with the laws, regulations, and instructions imposed by 
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SAMA (SAMA, 2011a). The Internal Audit Department is the second independent department 
that reports to the Audit Committee on technical matters and to the Chairman of the BoDs 
administratively. Its mandate is to set the audit action plan for the company, to monitor the 
company’s performance through evaluating and verifying the operations to ensure that there are 
no financial or non-financial violations of the company’s internal systems, particularly to the 
policies and procedures related to the company’s different activities (SAMA, 2011a). 
Appointment of the managers of the two above-mentioned departments is conducted by the 
company BoDs after referring to the recommendations raised by the committee after obtaining 
SAMA’s approval. The committee is also responsible for recommending a proper actuary and 
external auditor to the BoDs after obtaining SAMA’s approval.  
6.6.1.4 The Actuarial Work Regulation 
SAMA has issued the Actuarial Working Regulation to establish procedures for appointing two 
important kinds of actuaries, the Responsible and the Independent actuaries, and define their 
roles and responsibilities. The regulation will promote high standards of actuarial practices 
within the Saudi insurance market, since the insurance company shall ensure compliance with 
the required actuarial duties and reports. Otherwise, SAMA will appoint an actuary at the 
company’s expense to undertake the actuarial duties (SAMA, 2005b, and 2011b).  
 
To give more accuracy to the actuarial works in the Saudi insurance market, SAMA has assigned 
a role to the Independent Actuary to review the work of the Responsible Actuary to ensure it 
complies with the statutory requirements and the professional standards (SAMA, 2011b).  The 
external auditor, the company Audit Committee, and the BoDs shall review the independent 
actuary report to identify any future risks that the company might face. SAMA has to be 
provided with copies of these reports in a timely manner (SAMA, 2005b). The Responsible and 
Independent actuaries should hold a designation of a Fellow, have a prior experience to act as an 
actuary, have no disciplinary action, suspension or cancellation of membership at any time by the 
Actuarial Organization of which he/she is a member and should not have been convicted of a 
felony. Thus, the company shall provide full details of the responsible actuary experience and 
educational certificates along with the proper and fit form to SAMA. Accordingly, SAMA will 
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notify the company to either keep or replace the Responsible and Independent actuary in case 
he/she is unqualified to perform the required job (SAMA, 2011b). 
Furthermore, the company shall notify SAMA in case of the actuary’s termination from the post 
and the company shall employ or contract another actuary within a period not exceeding 45 days 
from the date of termination (SAMA, 2011b). Accordingly, SAMA has stated that no one can 
exercise the duties of actuaries in the Saudi insurance market without obtaining SAMA’s prior 
written approval, in accordance with the requirements of laws and regulations, since the actuary 
shall be professionally liable for his/her advice and technical services provided to the company 
(SAMA, 2011b). The Responsible and Independent actuaries have the right of access at all times 
to the accounting books, other records and documents of the company and be entitled to require 
from the BoDs and senior management of the company the information and explanations deemed 
necessary for the carrying out of their duties and the company should provide it to them (SAMA, 
2011b). The Responsible and Independent actuaries shall, in the presence of immediate or future 
risks facing the company, and/or if the company breached the provisions and laws of SAMA or 
other international insurance laws and regulations and/or if the company has not allowed them to 
perform their duties, submit a report on an urgent basis directly to the company’s BoDs. The 
BoDs shall examine the report and recommend corrective actions, and forward all related 
information to SAMA within ten working days after receiving the actuary report (SAMA, 
2011b). 
   
6.6.1.5 SAMA Claims and Indemnities Handling Procedures  
As an effort to satisfy policyholders’ losses, SAMA identifies certain procedures for proper 
claims and indemnities.  Insurance companies in Saudi Arabia should set up a claims department 
with procedures for accepting policyholders’ claims, claims evaluation and processing (SAMA, 
2005b; SAMA, 2008). The claims department must respond to the policyholders’ claims in a 
prompt manner. Thus, the insurance company should provide adequate guidance to the insured 
customer by filling in an information form which will include the claims of the beneficiary under 
a protection and savings policy. Upon filling the right form the company shall notify the 
policyholder of the receipt of the claim, and informing the policyholder of any missing 
information and documents within 7 days from receiving the claimant’s application form. The 
insurance company shall also update the policyholder about the progress of the claim request at 
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least every 15 days (SAMA, 2008). When necessary the insurance company shall appoint a loss 
adjuster to conduct a reasonable investigation of the claim within a time period not exceeding 10 
days, and the insurance company shall notify the customer of such an appointment within 3 
working days. Accordingly, the insurance company shall notify the policyholder in writing of the 
claim acceptance or refusal promptly after completing the investigation with the reasons for that 
(SAMA, 2008). 
In case of disputes about the claim, the insurance company shall explain to the policyholder how 
to fill a dispute form; by filling the dispute form the complaint will be escalated to the claims 
committee (SAMA, 2008). The requirement for a claims committee was established by the Edict 
of the Council of Ministers on a recommendation of the Minister of Commerce, with an 
objective to resolve disputes arising between insurance companies and their customers or 
between the company and other companies when they subrogate
60
 the policyholders and settle 
violations of supervisory instructions issued to insurance companies. The committee consists of 
three specialized members, one of whom, at least, must be a legal consultant (SAMA, 2005a). 
 
6.6.2 SAMA’s Market Conduct and Disclosure Reforms   
As has been explained in Chapter 4 market conduct as a term refers primarily to the way insurers 
deal with policyholders whether directly or through intermediaries; it also covers other market 
players such as investments managers (Casey, 2009). SAMA pays a lot of attention to market 
conduct as is apparent in its regulations which state the following at the beginning of each issued 
regulation:   
Insurance companies operating in Saudi Arabia shall act in an honest, transparent 
and fair manner, and fulfil all of their obligations to customers, which they have 
under the laws, regulations, and SAMA guidelines. Insurance companies should not 
unfairly discriminate between customers; treatment should not differ based on 
customer race or gender and insurance companies shall take a reasonable measure 
to identify and address conflicts of interest to ensure fair treatment to all customers. 
 
                                               
60 Insurance policy giving an insurer the right to take legal action against a third party responsible for a loss to an 
insured for which a claim has been paid (Rubin, 2000). 
160 
 
An example of good market conducted by SAMA is fair pricing of an insurance policy, which 
states that insurance companies shall provide SAMA with the justifications and the basis used in 
setting the insurance policies prices. The insurance policy prices shall be fair and reasonable in 
accordance with the company’s underwriting guidelines and appropriateness to the risks 
undertaken by the company (SAMA, 2005b). 
6.6.2.1 Disclosure of Information to Customers 
As has been explained in Chapter 4 one of the IAIS (2011), core principles is ICP 20 that deals 
with Information, Public Disclosure and Transparency towards the market. In line with ICP 20 
principles of IAIS, SAMA has affirmed that the insurance company shall communicate all 
relevant information to customers in a timely manner to enable them to make informed 
decisions, hence, companies must take reasonable measures to ensure the accuracy and clarity of 
the information provided to customers and make such information available in writing (SAMA, 
2008). 
 
The wording of the document shall use simple language and sentences, and printed in clear, 
readable text, with no fine print. The policy shall include a disclosure statement indicating that 
the policy contract is the entire contract. The policy should reflect the coverage period, and 
coverage descriptions and limits, deductibles and retentions, insurance rates and premium 
amounts, basis of premium calculation and the amount of commission paid under the policy 
(SAMA, 2008). The policy shall also give a description of the insured’s duties after a loss has 
been incurred, and description of the claims and dispute handling procedures (SAMA, 2008). 
Furthermore, the insurance company shall also notify customers promptly of any changes in the 
disclosures or conditions made to the customers at the time of entering into the insurance 
contract. This includes changes in the company’s’ contact details and changes in the claims filing 
procedure (SAMA, 2008). 
 
The annual statements are considered vital pieces of information to policyholders. Accordingly, 
the insurance company should provide an annual statement to their policyholders to include the 
projected amount received at the policy period, with the current sum insured, total premiums 
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paid in the previous year, while the insurance investments policy should show the value of the 
units in each fund (SAMA, 2008). 
 
Another important disclosure issue is policyholders’ rights whenever an insurance company is 
planning to cease their operation in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, SAMA has requested insurance 
companies to provide evidence that they have fully discharged their obligation to the 
policyholders, and they shall provide evidence that they kept aside an adequate reserve to meet 
their obligations toward the policyholders. The insurance company shall also transfer all 
policyholders’ policies in force to another company. Insurance companies shall also announce 
their intention to cease their insurance services in two local newspapers, and policyholders shall 
file their objections to SAMA within a period not exceeding three months from the publishing 
date of the notice (SAMA, 2005b). 
 
6.6.2.2 Policy Cancellation 
An important issue that can create difficulty to policyholders is the lack of proper ways to cancel 
an insurance contract or not having proper channels to leave the company whenever 
policyholders no longer like the service or the products presented by the insurance company. To 
tackle this problem SAMA indicates that the insurance company should include cancellation 
terms that are fair and reasonable to customers and are appropriate with regard to the product. 
The cancellation conditions must be clearly stated in the policy contract, with a description of the 
premium refund due to the policyholder’s cancellation of the policy and when it would be 
payable (SAMA, 2008). The insurance companies shall not cancel a valid insurance policy 
except for conditions stated in the policy cancellation clauses, and the company shall provide 
credible reasons for denying, cancelling, and not renewing the policyholder’s insurance policy 
(SAMA, 2005b). However, when a cancellation occurs the company shall refund the premium on 
a pro-rata
61
 basis (SAMA, 2005b: 17). The insurance company shall notify the policyholder in 
writing with cancellation notice requirements and period, where the period shall be afforded to 
the policyholders with a minimum of 30 days (SAMA, 2008). However, the policyholder may 
                                               
61 Revocation of a policy by an insurance company, return to the policyholders of the unearned premium (the 
portion of the premium for the remaining time period that the policy will not be in force) (Rubin 2000). 
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cancel the insurance policy and recover part of the paid premium, provided there are no unpaid 
or outstanding claims (SAMA, 2005b). 
 
On the other hand, SAMA has identified a certain timing period for policyholders to test the 
suitability of the insurance contract to suit his needs. The insurance company shall provide at 
least 21 days from the date of delivery of the insurance contract for the policyholder to review 
the contract to assess its suitability and whether it provides the benefits described (SAMA, 
2008). 
6.6.2.3 Brokerages and Intermediaries  
SAMA has issued the Insurance Intermediaries Regulations in (2011c) which states that non-
compliance with this regulation may subject intermediaries to enforcement actions (SAMA, 
2011c: 5). SAMA stresses that the intermediaries shall act in an honest, transparent and fair 
manner to fulfill their obligations towards policyholders and the insurance company, and where 
these obligations have not been fully codified intermediaries should abide by internationally 
accepted best practice. SAMA also stresses that the intermediaries shall have proper knowledge, 
training and enough experience (SAMA, 2011c). 
 
SAMA also identifies the duties of intermediaries which are to communicate all relevant 
information including coverage details, conditions, exceptions and restrictions of the insurance 
policy to the customers in a timely manner, and to ensure that customers are aware of the 
commitment they are about to make to enable them to make a suitable decision. Hence, 
intermediaries will have the burden to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the customer 
fully understands the type of service being offered and to ensure that the policy proposed is 
suitable for the customer’s needs. Intermediaries shall advise on the matters within their field of 
expertise and seek or recommend specialists if necessary, to identify and address conflict of 
interest to ensure fair treatment to all clients (SAMA, 2011c).  In another regulatory document, 
SAMA (2005b) identified the duties of intermediaries to provide customers with comparisons in 
terms of price among several products, premiums paying mechanism, services fees charged and 
additional fees that might be encountered, guidance of the claim and proper handling process. 
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6.6.2.4 Investment and Surplus Distribution Disclosure 
In an effort to regulate the investment technicalities and administrations of the Saudi insurance 
industry and to protect stakeholders’ financial benefits, SAMA (2011d) has issued the 
investments regulation. In this regulation SAMA has stressed the importance of the insurance 
company to adopt an investment policy that complies with the SAMA regulations. All insurance 
companies operating in Saudi Arabia shall establish an investment policy and submit the policy 
to SAMA on a quarterly and yearly basis for approval. The investment policy shall include the 
company’s investment strategy, rationale for asset allocation and values, investment management 
and governance structure, segregation of investment assets with described details of assets 
classes, policyholders’ and shareholders’ funds segregation, asset portfolio testing and valuation 
analysis, investment performance measurements, audit and internal procedures to control 
investments procedures and encountered investments risk. SAMA stresses the importance of 
communicating the investment policy to all company departments and staff members for 
transparency and easiness of information transference among the whole of the employees. 
SAMA also requires that the insurance company assign a qualified and expert employee who 
will be responsible for implementing, conducting, monitoring, controlling and reporting 
investment activities.  
 
 
SAMA regulation maintains that the insurance company shall have an effective disclosure 
system to reflect investment qualitative information to the public in general and to policyholders 
in specific. The company disclosure system shall reflect investment performance management, 
assets historical cost, methods used to monitor performance, investments assets classes’ criteria, 
expected future return and cash flow, and expected expenses.   Insurance companies are also 
required to disclose specific information about each assets class, for example if the investments 
portfolio includes sukuk or bond security assets, properties assets, equities/securities assets, etc. 
The company shall also break these assets down into small classes. In the case of bond security 
assets, the company shall break it down by government, semi-government and corporate 
securities with its rating percentage and maturity date. SAMA has also classified the percentage 
of the investments portfolio assets class, in accordance to the type of insurance activities, 
general, protection and savings (which includes family takaful) as per Table 6.2:     
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Table 6.2 Assets classes’ percentages in the investments portfolio: General Insurance and 
Protection and Savings Insurance.  
 
 
Source: SAMA (2005b)  
 
SAMA prohibits investments activities in certain assets classes without its permission i.e. in 
derivatives, structured products, hedge funds, deposits with foreign banks, private equity 
investments and any off-balance-sheet instrument. Furthermore, SAMA enforces the role of 
specialists involved in running the company investments activities. A number of key investments 
personnel are identified by SAMA that have a direct and/or indirect relationship with the 
company investments activities, such as BoDs, investments managers, investments committee, 
actuary, audit committee, the role of BoDs, investment committee and senior management in 
overseeing, and being accountable for, investment activities. The financial statements that are 
presented to SAMA include a determination of the earned premiums and other insurance 
operations revenues with the determination of the incurred indemnification. The company 
presents the obtained surplus distribution by making a difference between the total incurred 
premiums and indemnification, less the marketing, administrative, technical provisions, and 
other general operational expenses (SAMA, 2005b). 
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The insurance company shall also indicate the net surplus figures, by adding the investment 
return of the policyholder’s invested funds, and subtracting the general expenses related to the 
policyholder’s portion of the investment activities, where 10% of the net surplus shall be 
distributed to the policyholders directly, or in the form of reduction in premiums for the next 
year, the remaining 90% of the net surplus shall be transferred to the shareholders’ income 
statement (SAMA, 2005b). Furthermore, 20% out of the 90 % of the net shareholders’ income 
shall be set aside as a statutory reserve until this reserve amounts reaches 100% of the paid 
capital. Hence, SAMA is stressing the importance of documenting and disclosing the mentioned 
surplus distribution mechanism to the public, and SAMA’s written approval of the company 
surplus distribution mechanism will be based on the accuracy of the insurance company in 
achieving the required percentage for policyholders’ net surplus distribution and timing (SAMA, 
2005b). 
 
6.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has complemented the previous chapter’s effort to reflect the ideal policies and 
regulations and aims to ascertain a proper benchmark that should be used by the TOs in Saudi 
Arabia to provide the required protection to policyholders. By doing so, the chapter has 
addressed esearch question 2 which requires reflection of the current regulations, laws and 
reforms polices that have been imposed by the main financial regulatory body, SAMA.  This 
chapter has shown the development process of the insurance industry in Saudi Arabia and how it 
has been recently (end of 2003) shifted from an unregulated insurance market that issued no 
licenses to insurance companies, to an organized and well- controlled insurance market that 
oversees and licenses all insurance-related business, with certain objectives to protect 
stakeholders and bring stability to the insurance industry in Saudi Arabia. This chapter also 
presents the recent status of the number of insurance companies operating in Saudi Arabia,. A 
reflection on the Saudi insurance market’s current behaviours, in terms of market performance, 
gross written premium and compounded annual growth rate, claim ratio and the Saudi TOs 
claims ratio among international takaful markets, has also been provided in this chapter.      
 
To consolidate SAMA’s role in the controlling and supervising process, the agency has become a 
member of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). SAMA has also 
166 
 
established a project to be electronically linked with the insurance companies operating in Saudi 
Arabia to enable SAMA to monitor insurance solvency situations. It has also been stressed that a 
certain qualification level or exam, the Insurance Fundamentals Certificate Exam (IFCE) should 
be obtained by most of the employees who are working in the Saudi insurance industry, for 
better market conduct approach. SAMA has also issued a number of reforms regulation and 
polices that simulate the international insurance organizations standards. Adherence to these 
regulations is considered mandatory and any breach found may cause SAMA to seize the 
operation of that company. Regulations are such as Market Conduct Regulations, Intermediaries 
Regulation, Investment Regulation, Actuarial Regulation, and Audit Committee Regulation. 
SAMA has made it mandatory for any insurance company operating in Saudi Arabia to establish 
an internal audit department and to establish an audit committee, to ensure the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the company performance and verify compliance with SAMA’s regulations and its 
implementations. Insurance companies shall also establish an investments policy to be submitted 
to SAMA on a quarterly and yearly basis. The policy shall include statements of investments 
performance, assets segregation of policyholders and shareholders, measurement methods to 
assess investment performance, measurement of investments risk, etc.      
 
A mechanism of filtering or reviewing the operations of the insurance companies has been 
established by SAMA by requiring them to have audit committees.  The audit committee will be 
responsible for reviewing the internal audit department decisions, reviewing the work of the 
actuary and the external auditor’s reports and suggestions and then submitting a recommendation 
report to the BoDs, while the independent actuary is in charge of reviewing the reliability of the 
responsible actuary reporting and decision.   Another important subject that has been addressed 
by SAMA is clarifying the rules and activities of the company’s governing personnel, with the 
form of relationships between them For instance the company BoDs and/or executive officer 
cannot hold a position of Responsible actuary, Independent actuary or even cannot be a part of 
the audit and/or investments committee. SAMA also stressed the vital roles of intermediaries in 
that intermediaries shall communicate all relevant information in an honest and timely manner 
with the policyholders.   
167 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has the purpose of presenting the framework of the research methodology used to 
conduct the empirical work to address the remaining research questions. In doing so, it connects 
the preceding informative literature review chapters with the coming empirical and analysis 
chapters. Based on the previous literature, polices and standards from national and international 
insurance bodies, a questionnaire was constructed to collect data to carry out statistical analyses 
so that the research objectives are met.   
 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 7.2 outlines the meaning of research methodology 
and proper framework to conduct a research. Section 7.3 presents proper research design and 
strategies. Section 7.4 highlights several techniques used in the research methods. Section 7.5 
focuses on the research objectives and questions and relates these to the questionnaire contents, 
research instruments and variables. Section 7.6 deals with sampling process, data collection, data 
analysis, data quality and reliability. Section 7.7 presents the pilot testing process. Section 7.8 
highlights the operationalizing data collection and participants’ response rates. While Section 7.9 
represents different techniques used to analyze the collected data, Section 7.10 reflects data 
quality and reliability approach. Section 7.11 reflects on limitations and difficulties faced in 
empirical work. Section 7.12 draws conclusion.    
 
7.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
A research methodology can be defined as a framework which may be inclusive of research 
design, theoretical frameworks, the selection and analysis of relevant literature, and justified 
preferences for particular types of data gathering activities (Saunders et al. 2007).  It is the wider 
research framework which includes, among others, the research design and research methods i.e. 
data collection and analysis techniques (Saunders et al., 2007). Kumar (2008) also defines 
research methodology as a way of systematically solving the research problems. Hence, 
appropriate research methodology and procedures would assist the researcher in developing clear 
research framework to resolve research problems to meet research objectives and goals. 
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There are two types of research methodology, namely quantitative and qualitative. While 
quantitative research methodology is a process which involves observations that are quantifiable 
or data that can be converted into numbers, qualitative research methodology is used to observe 
or investigate matters that relate and affect human behaviour, which covers the study of people’s 
culture, value systems, attitudes, behaviours, concerns, motivations, and aspirations (Kumar, 
2008). In order to achieve the main aim of studying how to protect participants rights in the 
takaful fund, the current study investigates the following two aspects, (i) search a particular 
aspect of human behaviour, namely takaful participant satisfactions by exploring their 
perceptions, knowledge and preferences about the services and products offered by the TOs in 
Saudi Arabia, (ii) comparing the Saudi Insurance Regulatory Authority directives and laws with 
the international takaful regulations to provide the protection for the participants which will 
eventually lead to their satisfaction. Hence, the current analysis would qualify as a qualitative 
study because the study explores participants’ behavioural towards the takaful services and 
products and will also provide an interpretive and comparative study of the current Saudi 
insurance regulations and the international insurance standards with respect to providing proper 
protection mechanism to the takaful participants in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Furthermore the research methodology and research approach cannot be looked at in isolation, as 
they are interrelated (Saunders et al, 2007). Bryman et al (2003) state that social research which 
studies behavioural aspects can be conducted by using either an inductive or a deductive research 
approach. The deductive approach aims at testing theories by deducing them into hypotheses and 
then testing these hypotheses to confirm or modify a theory in the light of the findings. Such an 
approach is associated with quantitative research and positivism (Bryman, 2008). The main idea 
of the inductive approach begins with an idea or expectation which may develop into a research 
hypothesis. The research hypothesis is then tested. Accordingly, data need to be gathered through 
various data collection methods such as interviews, observations, surveys, or a combination of 
them. The results of the observations are used to form a general preposition or a theory. This 
approach will be associated with qualitative research and interpretivism (Bryman et al, 2003; 
Bryman, 2004; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 2008). Figure 7.1, shows the process of the 
inductive approach. 
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Figure 7.1: The Process of Induction
 
 
Source: Bryman et al (2003:12) 
 
This research primarily uses the inductive research approach which is considered the most 
appropriate method, since data collected from observations will be used to form conclusions 
concerning participants’ behavioural aspects towards the takaful insurance services and products 
in Saudi Arabia. The results from participants’ perceptions along with reviewing and comparing 
the Saudi Insurance Regulatory Authority directives and laws with the international takaful 
regulations will provide suggested recommendations for both takaful operators (TOs) and for the 
Saudi Insurance regulators. This will be done with one objective i.e. to provide the protection to 
participants that will eventually lead to their satisfaction. Such an approach is expected to 
produce useful results for developing theoretical bases to find a better service for takaful 
participants not only in Saudi Arabia but worldwide.  
 
7.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND STRATEGIES    
Research design or strategies, as very crucial factors in any particular area of research, is the 
vehicle through which all the research questions will be properly put into perspective and a 
proper general plan can be formulated in order to achieve the research objectives (Bryman et al, 
2007; Saunders et al., 2007). It constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement and 
analysis of data. The research design provides answers for questions such as, what techniques 
will be used to gather data, what kind of sampling will be used, how time and cost constraints 
will be dealt with (Cooper et al, 2003). In other words, it is a master plan specifying the methods 
and procedures for collecting and analyzing the needed information (Zikmund, 1991). Thus, 
when undertaking a research project a proper research design must be formulated by using the 
most appropriate tools. Since, each method and tool has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
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The researcher can achieve the research aims and objectives, as well as accurate results and 
conclusions by selecting the right research process and by putting all research questions into 
perspective and formulating a general plan in which research objectives can be met (Saunders et 
al., 2007). However, before proceeding with the research design, the researchers must decide and 
identify the purpose of their study. Accordingly, there will be three main designs of study 
classifications: “exploratory, descriptive and explanatory” studies (Sekaran et al, 2009; Saunders 
et al., 2007; Kothari, 2004; Kumar et al., 2002; Sekaran, 2000). 
 
An exploratory study is undertaken when not much is known about the situation at hand, or when 
the researcher is looking for answers to unknown situations or in a situation when there is not 
much information available to solve such a problem (Sekaran et al, 2009; Saunders et al., 2007; 
Sekaran, 2000; Zikmund, 2003; Churchill, 1983). While, the hypothesis testing study or 
explanatory study is conducted to explain the interaction or causal relationships between 
variables or differences among groups in a situation that contribute to, or result in, a particular 
observed phenomenon or outcomes (Saunders et al., 2007; Sekaran, 2000). Meanwhile, the 
descriptive study is used when the purpose of the study is to give an accurate description of the 
profile or characteristics of variables of interest in a situation, i.e. the descriptive research study 
will describe the characteristics of the variables of interest in a situation (Sekaran et al, 2009).  
Hence, the main difference between the descriptive study and exploratory study is on the depth 
of the research. Exploratory study is useful if there is a limited knowledge or research available 
on the subject matter, or phenomenon of interest. Therefore, an exploratory study involves 
extensive preliminary works in order to build a comprehensive understanding on the research 
topic, followed by data analysis.   
 
Furthermore as some of the authors have described research strategy as research design, six 
research designs comprise experimental design or research strategies: experimental design, 
cross-sectional or survey design; longitudinal design; case study design; and comparative design, 
as described and shown in Table 7.1: 
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Table 7.1: Types of Research Design Strategy 
Research design Description 
Experimental 
A design employed to determine whether any changes in one or more independent 
variables affect one or more dependent variables. 
Cross-sectional 
A design where the collection of data is based on more than one case at a single 
point in time in connection with two or more variables to detect patterns of 
association. 
Longitudinal A process where the collection of data is made at several points in time. 
Case study 
An in-depth, intensive and contextual analysis of similar situations of a single case 
such as a single community and a single school. 
Comparative 
A design strategy where the researcher is using identical methods for two or more 
contrasting cases, for example in a study of cross-cultural and cross-national 
research. 
 
Survey 
A strategy that adopts a standard format which would allow the researcher to collect 
a huge amount of data and analyze it using descriptive and inferential statistics. 
     
Source: (Bryman et al, 2007; Saunders et al., 2007) 
 
Based on the nature of the topic being investigated and for better achievement of research 
objectives, this research uses a combination of strategies. Accordingly, survey techniques using a 
cross-sectional data have been used, as well as case studies of the TOs in Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, this study also combines the research purpose through exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory means. The combination of design strategies will enhance achieving the objectives 
of the research as suggested by Saunders et al., (2007). Therefore, the study is exploratory since 
the research attempts to explore takaful participants’ satisfaction levels, through an exploration 
of their perceptions, knowledge and preferences. The research is also explanatory since the 
research will study the relationship of three independent variables (participants perceptions about 
the TOs disclosure system, participants knowledge and participants preferences) on participants’ 
satisfaction as a dependant variable. The study is descriptive, because it contributes to 
understanding the behaviour of participants towards the takaful products, i.e. their perceptions, 
knowledge, preferences and their satisfaction level about the takaful products and services. The 
research also makes descriptive contributions by comparing the international insurance and 
takaful corporate governance and market conduct standards (that have been adopted by the 
international insurance and takaful organizations and bodies) with the current Saudi insurance 
regulations and directives to come up with better protection for the takaful participants.      
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7.4 RESEARCH METHODS 
Another important element under the research methodology framework is the research method, 
which is quite important since it is related to how the data is collected and analyzed (Creswell 
2003; Saunders et al., 2007). Hence, research methods are quite vital since they will define the 
suitable processes and techniques adopted by researchers in gathering their data for analysis. 
There are two types of research approaches that could lead to a data-gathering process namely, 
‘qualitative’ approach and ‘quantitative’ approach. The qualitative research method is defined as 
“research involving analysis of data/information that is descriptive in nature and non-quantified” 
(Sekaran, 1992: 424). The quantitative approach will involve the collection of mass data which 
predominantly with quantity (Creswell, 1998; Grix, 2001). The quantifiable data has a few 
variables and many cases which can be analyzed using statistical tools, which can be interpreted 
by subjective experiences (Grix, 2001).  
 
As a result, the researchers must be able to identify the most suitable approachable methods for 
better achievable results which can bring the ultimate way to answer the research objectives by 
bearing in mind the advantages and disadvantages of each method (Easterby-Smith, 2008;  
Thorpe et al., 2008; Bryman et al, 2007; Bryman, 2004; Bryman et al, 2003). In the context of 
this research, as has been mentioned earlier, the main objective of the current research is to find a 
proper way to protect participants by, (i) exploring participants behaviour towards the takaful 
products (perceptions, knowledge, preferences, and satisfaction level), and (ii) analyzing and 
comparing the Saudi insurance directives with the international ones. To achieve both objectives 
a survey technique to gather cross-sectional data has been used, as well as case studies of the 
TOs in Saudi Arabia, leading to a combination of research purpose i.e. exploratory, descriptive 
and explanatory. Accordingly, a quantitative technique will be used to cover the first part of the 
main objective, since it will include a collection of mass data which can be analysed later using 
statistical tools. A qualitative method will be used to cover the second part of the main objective, 
since it will include an analysis of information that are descriptive in nature and non-quantified 
such as reviewing the international and local insurance directives to come up with the required 
recommendations to serve the interest of the takaful participants. Thus, the current data-gathering 
technique will follow the triangulation method, in which two or more research methods can be 
used to achieve the research objectives and to answer the research questions. The triangulation 
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technique frequently results in superior research results (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Implementing the triangulation method will serve to expand the understanding of one method to 
another and to confirm findings from different data sources (Creswell, 2003).  
 
7.5 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS  
Several research instruments are available when collecting data which range from questionnaires 
to different interview structures. However, the researcher should consider and plan to have good 
response rates and good data analysis tools; such considerations must be given great importance 
when deciding and formulating research instruments (Vaus, 2002).       
 
7.5.1 Data Collection Tools 
Primary data and secondary data are the two main categories in any research project; the primary 
data refer to information obtained firsthand by the researcher on the variables of interest for the 
specific purpose of the study, while the secondary data represent information gathered from 
sources already existing (Sekaran, 2003). The primary data is mainly conducted because data is 
subjective and not readily available. The primary data sources can be individuals, focus groups, 
and panels of respondents etc. However, data collected by other researchers for a specific 
purpose is not necessarily suitable for other research efforts. Churchill (1983) also explained that 
the primary approach is suitable for the following types of data: demographic/socioeconomic 
characteristics, attitudes/opinions, awareness/knowledge, intentions, motivation, and behaviour. 
While, secondary data can be obtained from other sources, either published or raw format 
(Saunders et al., 2007). The sources include government statistical reports and publications, 
industry analysis, economic indicators, companies’ financial reports and shares prices, and other 
similar information which are available from reliable sources. Therefore, due to unavailability of 
suitable data about the takaful industry in Saudi Arabia, and also due to the nature and objectives 
of this research which is to aspect participants’ perceptions, knowledge, preferences and 
satisfaction level, the most appropriate way of obtaining data is through a primary data collection 
process. In fact, this method has been widely used by other similar studies, for example in the 
research conducted by Erol et al (1989), Erol et al. (1990), Kader (1993), Haron et al. (1994), 
Okumus (2005), and Dusuki (2007).  
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Churchill (1983) divided primary data choices into two broad categories, namely communication 
and observation. Communication is a method where the researcher needs to ask the respondents 
questions in order to secure the desired data. By contrast, for the observation method, the 
researcher needs to observe the subject matter or area of interest, and subsequently the relevant 
facts, actions, or behaviours are recorded. The communication choice can be further broken 
down into two main methods, namely interview and survey method. Saunders et al. (2007) have 
listed three main interview techniques, each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages, 
according to its suitability for the area of research.  
 
Meanwhile, Wilson (2006) and Burns et al (2003) have explained the survey methods quite 
extensively through various interviewer-administered and also self-administered techniques.  A 
self-administered survey means that the prospective respondents will complete the given survey 
questionnaire by him or herself without any interference from the researcher (Burns et al, 2003; 
Wilson, 2006). On the other hand, the interviewer-administered survey is a technique where the 
questions of the survey are being read out and recorded by the researcher or enumerators either 
face-to-face or by telephone (Burns et al, 2003; Wilson, 2006). The researcher should make sure 
that respondents will answer the questionnaire without   interference. Burns et al (2003) asserted 
that answering the questionnaires without any interference by the researcher make the 
respondents more comfortable and honest in answering them.   
Furthermore, the telephone interviewer-administered surveys have many advantages over face-
to-face interviews for various reasons. Colombotos (1969) illustrated telephone costs are lower 
than the expenses the interviewer would have incurred in travelling from one candidate to 
another, especially if the respondents were not at home, busy, or unavailable. Uhl et al., (1969) 
illustrated that, when comparing the cost per return between personal, postal, and telephone 
interviews, the latter is much the cheapest option. Also, in impersonal situations, some evidence 
indicates that a participant is more likely to be candid (Buzzell et al., 1969), and a significant 
level of anonymity is secured by telephone usage (Falthzik, 1972). Meanwhile, Larsen (1952) 
argued that face-to-face interviews may increase the likelihood of prestige-motivated 
overstatements by participants as compared with phone interviews. However, many authors 
confirmed the failure of telephone interviews to obtain in-depth information about complex 
topics or to allow for reflection compared to face-to-face interviews, especially if the phone 
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interviews are short. This notion is contradicted by Payne (1956) who claimed that the length of 
telephone interview and the range of subject matter are not as limited as believed. Also, 
Hochstim (1963) made a wide comparison of data collected by different methods - telephone 
interview, personal interview, and mail questionnaire - from randomly selected subsamples of his 
study target. In general, similar results were obtained from all three data collection methods.  
For more diversifications in receiving participants’ responses on the research survey 
questionnaires, two channels have been used to get participants responses: drop-off method and 
telephone call method. The survey questionnaire is designed as the self-administered type which 
consists of mainly close-ended type questions. The closed-ended or forced-choice type of 
question is preferable in this research because it will increase the response rate, since it is easier 
and faster to be answered by the prospective respondents (Vaus, 2002). In addition, the closed-
ended type of question also has the advantages of being easier administered, coded and analyzed 
(Vaus, 2002). Drop-off survey is one of the methods in a self-administered survey method where 
prospective respondents are approached and the objective of the survey is explained, and then the 
questionnaire handed for the participants for completion on their own. The completed 
questionnaire can either be returned on the spot or later through collection in person. The other 
technique used here was telephone calls where participants were approached by calling them to 
answer the questionnaire by phone. Accordingly, some participants were asking to be called back 
later when they would have enough time to listen to the survey questions, while other 
participants were quite happy to answer on spot.      
 
7.5.2 Level of Measurement 
Scaling measurement is considered an important approach to ensure that research objectives are 
fulfilled, since it will affect the data analysis and interpretation (Malhotra et al, 2007; Proctor, 
2005). The researcher undertook various standard measurement and scaling methods when 
formulating the questionnaires, namely nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio (Malhotra et al, 2007; 
Kumar et al., 2002; Burns et al, 2003; Proctor, 2005). There are four main scales of 
measurement as follows: 
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Nominal Scale is the simplest scale, where numbers or letters are assigned to objects, which 
serve as labels for identification or classification (Zikmund, 2003). Examples of nominal scale 
are gender, geographical location, and marital status. 
 
Ordinal Scale is a scale that arranges the object by order with regards to some common variable 
(Kumar et al., 2002). Examples of ordinal scale are class ranking and companies rating. Ordinal 
scales are also normally used in many studies related to perception, attitudes, opinions and 
preference. 
 
Interval Scale is “a scale in which the numbers are used to rank objects such that numerically 
equal distances on the scale represent equal distances in characteristic being measured” 
(Malhotra et al, 2007: 340). Example of interval scale is rating a specific product from 1- 5, with 
number 1 being the lowest rating and 5 as the highest rating. 
 
Likert Scale it is the most widely used approach to scaling responses in survey research, When 
responding to a likert questionnaire item, respondents specify their level of agreement or 
disagreement on a symmetric agree-disagree scale for a series of statements. In other word, a 
likert item is simply a statement which the respondent is asked to evaluate according to any kind 
of subjective or objective criteria; it is considered symmetric because there are equal amounts of 
positive and negative positions (Sekaran, 2000). 
 
Ratio Scale is the highest scale level among scales of measurement. The scale allows the 
researcher to identify or classify objects, rank order of the objects and compare intervals or 
differences and also add another advantage of computing ratios of the scale (Sekaran, 2000).  
 
The current research uses nominal, ordinal and likert scales as they were found to be the most 
suitable for this study. However, few questions are using an interval scale. Questionnaire scaling 
is a mix of various rating types that was adopted in designing the questionnaire according to the 
nature and objectives of the questions; these include dichotomous, category, likert and itemized 
rating scales. Most of the scales used in the current research were easy to understand by the 
respondents, which yield a better response rate and more reliable results for the research effort. 
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7.5.3 Identification of Variables  
 This study was undertaken with the main objective of providing the required protection to 
participants in the takaful industry. To achieve the main objective, the study will follow two 
parallel paths similar to Wells et al (1995) research effort; they compared consumer perception 
of insurer service quality with regulatory assessment of insurer’s service quality. Accordingly, 
the current research will be conducted as follows:     
 
(i) Explore participants’ satisfaction levels by examining their perceptions, knowledge and 
preferences about the takaful operators (TOs) services and products.  
(ii) Compare the Saudi insurance regulatory directives with the international laws and standards. 
This is conducted to identify and overcome any shortfalls that may exist in the Saudi 
directives towards providing the required protections for takaful participants.     
 
I. Achieving the First Part of the Main Aim 
To achieve the first part of the main aim, three models have been constructed with a 26- item 
instrument with 4 dimensions to explore participants’ satisfactions as a dependant variable, with 
three independent variables (perceptions, knowledge and preferences) as shown in Figure 7.2.  
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Figure 7.2 Research Main Variables: Participants’ Satisfactions, Perceptions, Knowledge and Preferences. 
Participants' Perceptions about TOs 
Disclosure System
- Disclosure Mechanisms (DM)
- Disclosure of Investment Returns (DIR)
- Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus(DUS)
- Disclosure of Sharia’h Compliance (DSC)
- Disclosure of Claims and Indemnities (DCI)
-Disclosure of Fees, Deficits and Qard (DFDQ), 
-Disclosure of Key Personnel (DKP).
Participants' Knowledge
-Knowledge of the principle of the
T.Os Model (KPM) 
- Knowledge of Investment Returns (KIR) 
- Knowledge of Underwriting Surplus (KUS) 
- Knowledge of Sharia’h Compliance(KSC) 
- Knowledge of Charged Fees, Encountered 
Deficits and availability of Qard (KFDQ)
- Knowledge of Key Personnel Power and 
Activities (KKP) 
- Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels 
(KDC) 
Participants' Preferences
- - Preference on Sharia’h Compliance (PSC) 
- Preference to have a representative on Board of 
Directors BoDs (PRB) 
- Preference on T.Os Key Personnel (PKP)
- Preference on the reason to use takaful policy 
(PRU)
- Preference on claims and underwriting surplus 
(PCU)
Participants' Satisfaction
- Satisfaction with T.Os Disclosure Mechanism 
(SDM) 
- Satisfaction with T.Os Investment Returns (SIR) 
- Satisfaction with T.Os underwriting Surplus (SUS) 
- Satisfaction with Sharia’h Compliance System 
(SSC)
- Satisfaction with Claims and Indemnities(SCI)
- Satisfaction with Fees, Deficits and Qard(SFDQ) 
- Satisfaction with Key Personnel (SKP) 
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The three models instrument has been constructed on a well-formulated questionnaire based on 
the comprehensive topics covered in the literature review chapters, which address several 
researchers suggestions and findings and are based on the imposed polices and standards by the 
international takaful and insurance regulators. The covered literature reviews were mostly 
focused on the importance of satisfying customer perceptions, needs, wants and preferences 
which in a way enhance customer satisfaction levels. In terms of policies and regulations, a great 
emphasis was noticed towards satisfying participants’ desires to gain financial return and to 
strictly comply with the Shari’ah rules. The regulators also insisted on educating participants of 
their rights and obligations by having a proper disclosure system in place. The regulations were 
also focused on the importance of listening to participants’ opinions and preferences by 
emphasising the recruitment of knowledgeable sales personnel and intermediaries who can listen 
to the participants. 
 
II. Achieving the Second Part of the Main Aim 
The service quality assessments implemented by the local insurance regulatory body, represented 
by their regulations, directives and laws, are important factors in bringing better market stability 
as well as better customer protection since consumers tend to rate service quality higher if they 
are aware of their right to complain to the regulator (Wells et al, 1995). The second reason that 
led the current research to study the Saudi Insurance Regulatory environment is the new 
regulations implemented by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) which requires TOs 
to stop taking new customers and retain the existing ones, which makes it very difficult to 
question the TOs senior management, since they are in a transition period. Accordingly, 
reviewing the current Saudi insurance laws and directives will be the best available choice for 
recommending a better approach to protect the participants in the takaful industry. Comparing 
the Saudi insurance laws and directives with the international takaful and insurance policies and 
standards, which have been established by a well-known international organizations and bodies 
such as IAIS, IFSB, OECD, and AAOIFI
62
, will be the best way to fairly make a judgment on the 
validity of the Saudi insurance directives to ascertain whether or not there has been success in 
                                               
62
 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI). 
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providing proper protections for the takaful participants. Accordingly, to obtain better results in 
achieving the main research aim, a set of research objectives and questions are presented in 
chapter 1.   
  
7.5.4 Questionnaire Content 
The survey questionnaire is divided into 4 main dimensions (Disclosure, Knowledge, Preference 
and Satisfaction) with a total of 26 variables to cover the research objectives and themes. 
Participants’ perceptions of TOs’ disclosure systems consist of 34 questions, participants’ 
knowledge consists of 14 questions, participants’ preferences consist of 8 questions and 
participants’ satisfactions consist of 18 questions. Other sections in the questionnaire included in 
the survey are put in place to measure participants’ personnel and demographics information, as 
well as type of participated fund. A description of the research questionnaire section is as 
follows: 
 
Section 1: This section consists of 7 questions which are intended to obtain participants’ 
personal and demographic characteristics. It is used as supported variables for the research. 
 
Section 2: This section consists of 2 questions which are intended to view participants’ 
distributions among TOs and to view type of takaful fund that participants are participating in.   
 
Section 3: This section consists of 34 questions that deal with participants’ perceptions about 
TOs’ disclosure systems. These questions are used to formulate 7 variables DM (11 questions), 
DIR (6 questions), DUS (4 questions), DSC (5 questions), DCI (1 question), DFDQ (4 
questions), and DKP (3 questions).  
 
Section 4: This section consists of 14 questions that deal with participants’ knowledge about 
TOs’ services and products. These questions are used to formulate 7 variables KPM (3 
questions), KIR (1 question), KUS (2 questions), KSC (1 question), KFDQ (3 questions), KKP 
(2 questions), and KDC (2 questions). 
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Section 5: This section consists of 8 questions that deal with participants’ preferences about 
TOs’ services and products. These questions are used to formulate 5 variables PSC (2 questions), 
PRB (1 question), PKP (1 question), PRU (2 questions), and PCU (2 questions). 
 
Section 6: This section consists of 18 questions that deal with participants’ satisfaction about 
TOs’ services and products. These questions are used to formulate 7 variables SDM (4 
questions), SIR (2 questions), SUS (2 questions), SSC (2 questions), SCI (4 questions), SFDQ (2 
questions), and SKP (2 questions). 
 
The final questionnaire was prepared with two versions: English and Arabic. The back-
translation
63
 technique was used to translate the survey from English to Arabic language; the 
English version (source questionnaire) was first translated to Arabic (target questionnaire) by one 
person, and then translated back to English by another independent translator
64
. This technique 
was selected because it minimizes the probability of errors and discrepancies that might occur 
during the process, and at the same time it is still not costly (Saunders et al., 2007). Accordingly, 
minor inconsistencies between the primary source questionnaire and the translated questionnaire 
were found, which were rectified immediately.  
 
7.6 SAMPLING PROCESS  
If a proper process of selecting samples is followed, the outcome of the research may be used to 
draw conclusions about the population (Zikmund, 2003). Meanwhile, sampling procedures is 
another vital subject to ensure that the research findings are at least representative, albeit not 
conclusive about the population. To get a representative sample, it is essential to make a proper 
sample selection, which can be made by following proper sampling procedures. Zikmund (2003), 
reflected proper guidance for sampling procedures as per Fig. 7.3  
 
 
 
 
                                               
63
 According, to Saunders et al. (2007), there are four translation techniques (direct translation, back-translation, 
parallel translation and mixed techniques); each technique has its own advantages and disadvantages.  
64 Refer to Appendix F, for English and Arabic form of questionnaires. 
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Figure 7.3: Stages in the Selection of Sample 
 
Source: Zikmund (2003: 292) 
 
7.6.1 Research Population 
Studying the supply side of the takaful industry was one of the essential objectives of this 
research. Accordingly, a well organized questionnaire based on the literature chapters mainly 
corporate governance and market conduct, has been structured to address the TOs mangers. The 
main purpose of structuring the TOs survey is to identify any shortfalls in the Saudi takaful 
industry which might hinders participants from exerting their rights and obligations in the fund. 
However, due to SAMA recent mandatory instructions, which requires the TOs to have a 
separate shareholders and separate reserve capital from the mother company (ex, affiliated 
banks). Almost all the TOs refuse to participate on the questionnaire.          
 
Accordingly, Takaful participants in Saudi Arabia were identified to be the main research 
population for this study. The targeted populations were clients of all TOs in Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia, since a number of large TOs have their headquarters in Jeddah. The targeted participants 
are those with a family takaful policy. Thus policyholders are expected to have a long-term 
contract with the TOs and expected to have a periodic financial returns (Underwriting Surplus & 
Investment Return). The participants should not possess takaful contracts that belong to 
corporations, i.e. the takaful contracts are between the TOs and the participants directly. The 
main justification behind these conditions is that participants with personal family takaful 
policies should have a usual communication with the TOs to discuss their rights and obligations 
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in the fund. Hence, exploring those participants’ perceptions, knowledge, preferences and 
satisfaction levels, will cover the study objectives.  
 
The reasons for choosing participants with personal takaful policies not through corporations are 
because if corporations are involved, then participants will not be exposed to any communication 
with the TOs and they will not be entitled to gain any financial benefits since all financial 
benefits will be transferred to the corporate bank account. Also those participants who have 
funds with corporations will not experience the turmoil and feelings of anguish when the fund 
encounters a deficit which might cause their regular contributions to increase, or they might be 
prohibited to receive the expected financial benefits due to the need of having to pay back 
shareholders loans. Furthermore, TOs’ employees are not allowed to participate in the survey as 
they might possess more information than regular participants because of their working 
experience in the takaful business, and they might give misleading replies to the survey as they 
are part of the TOs’ management team.     
 
7.6.2 Sampling Frame 
Sampling frame is a process where the researcher will need to list all the elements from which 
the actual sample may be drawn (Churchill, 1983). The sampling frame is also called the 
working population because it provides the list for operational work (Zikmund, 2003). However, 
it will be hard to get a complete list of the population elements especially in populations of 
unknown size, very large populations, and in situations where there are legal restrictions that 
make the complete list of population elements unavailable. Hence, other acceptable alternatives 
might reflect the population elements. An example given by Zikmund (2003) is that in the 
absence of a complete list of population elements, other materials such as maps or aerial 
photographs may be acceptable as the sampling frame. 
 
In this study, the ideal situation is having a list of participants with their contact details for all 
TOs in Saudi Arabia. However, there are limitations that hinder researchers from obtaining a 
complete list of the participants as per SAMA regulations (2008: 6) which restrict the public 
from accessing participants’ profiles. Therefore, it is impossible to get access to the complete list 
of the takaful participants in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, an alternative sampling frame has been 
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constructed based on three techniques, (i) Handing the survey to the walk-in participants of the 
takaful company based on the geographical location of TOs’ branches. The prospective 
participants will take the survey home as a self-administered survey to answer it in his/her own 
pace and return it to the researcher or his distribution team by calling them to pick up answered 
surveys (drop-off approach). (ii) Approaching other participants by implementing the snowball 
technique. The snowball sampling frame is a technique to identify additional respondents, by 
using the information gathered from the initial respondents (Zikmund, 2003: 384). (iii) 
Approaching participants via takaful sales-personnel at selected TO branches, who are given 
surveys to distribute among their participants whenever the participants visit these branches. This 
method of using survey representatives was one of the methods suggested by Burns et al (2003, 
244 - 257). 
 
7.6.3 Sampling Methods 
Sampling methods can fall under two broad categories, probability sampling and non-probability 
sampling. Probability
65
 sampling can be used when a member or element of the population is 
known and has an equal chance of being selected as the sample. Non-probability sampling is 
more suitable for situations where the selection of samples is carried out on the basis of personal 
judgment or convenience; in most cases the population members are unknown (Zikmund, 2003; 
Saunders et al., 2007; Sekaran, 2000). Since the current study population size is unknown and is 
deemed impossible to identify, hence the appropriate sampling technique is the non-probability 
sampling approach. The most common non-probability methods are convenience sampling, 
purposive (judgement) sampling, referral (snowball) sampling, and quota sampling (Burns et al, 
2003; Zikmund, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, it was necessary to follow the Zikmund (2003) recommendations to select the 
appropriate, realistic and manageable non-probability sampling techniques, as Zikmund (2003) 
has identified critical factors that need to be given due consideration such as cost, time, and also 
the availability of resources, and cooperation. Accordingly, considering these limitations, gives a 
                                               
65 There are few sampling methods suggested under the probability sampling method (simple random sampling, 
systematic sampling, stratified sampling, cluster sampling and multistage area sampling); for more details see 
Zikmund (2003), Sekaran (2000), Saunders et al., (2007); Burns and Bush (2003). 
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better sampling methods which will be a combination of purposive, convenience and referral 
sampling methods.  
 
The purposive sampling method is a process where the researcher uses his or her personal 
judgement based on certain knowledge in deciding who will be part of the sample for the 
research (Burns et al, 2003). The convenience sampling method is the easiest way to get the 
desired sample size, for example when a person is interviewed at random in a shopping mall 
(Saunders et al., 2007). For this research the purposive sampling methods will be used as the first 
stage to narrow down the geographical area of the sampled TOs’ branches, and then the 
convenience sampling method was applied in selecting participants, while snowball used to 
identify additional by using the information gathered from the initial respondents. Accordingly, 
due to cost, timing constraints and shortage in manpower, three TOs were selected with nine 
different branches located in Jeddah. In the second stage, participants’ samples were selected 
from walk-in participants over a particular time frame. 
 
7.6.4 Sample Size 
As this research is based on a non-probability sampling method, the process of sample size 
determination is not as rigorous as in probability sampling methods. Burns et al (2003: 392) 
stated that “when using a non-probability sampling, sample size is unrelated to accuracy, so cost-
benefit considerations must be used”. Nevertheless, adequate sampling size is still needed in 
order to get better interpretation of the research outcomes.  
 
But the question still remains as to how a researcher would know the proper sample size to 
conduct a research. Scholfield (1996) explained that the relation between the sample size and the 
population size is misunderstood. Therefore, determining the sample size is considered one of 
the more controversial elements in research design and sampling procedures for the majority of 
studies. This is because drawing a large sample may waste time, resources and money, while a 
small sample may not give accurate results, which will affect the research reliability and validity. 
Noorzai (2005) enquired into the optimal sample size that could represent a population and 
provide a level of confidence. Many authors have proposed different ideas to determine sample 
size. Comfrey et al (1992) suggested rough guidelines for determining adequate sample size: 50 - 
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very poor, 100 - poor, 200 - fair, 300 - good, 500 - very good, 1000 or more - excellent. 
Therefore, for this research the minimum targeted completed questionnaires has been decided to 
be 400, in other words between 300 and 500 completed questionnaires. Questionnaire 
distributions can be conducted either by a walk-in participant in the takaful company, or by 
making phone calls to participants by following the snowball techniques. Due to time and 
manpower constraints it was strongly suggested that each walk-in participant in the takaful 
company kindly make a referral to other participants.  
 
7.7 PILOT TESTING  
A pilot study is a trial run-through to test the research design with a small sample of respondents 
who have similar characteristics to those identified in the main study sample (Gill and Johnson, 
1991). A pilot study is described as a small study aimed to test research protocols, data collection 
instruments, sample recruitment strategies, and other research techniques in preparation for a 
larger study (Polit et al, 2004: 196). Pilot studies are used in different ways in social science 
research to serve many aims including the preparation for the main study and to pre-test a 
particular study instrument (Baker, 1994; Polit et al., 2001; Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001). De 
Vaus (1993: 54) asserts “do not take the risk, pilot test first”. Additionally, a pilot study is used 
to check the full study analysis and results, assess the suitability of the study scale, define the 
sample design and frame properly, and collect some initial data about the study field and 
customers (Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001). 
 
According to Malhotra et al (2007) and Saunders et al. (2007) there are critical areas that must 
be given due attention by the researcher during the pilot testing process, (i) it is recommended 
that the questionnaire will not take much of the respondent’s time, (ii) the instruction given in the 
questionnaire should be clear enough to guide the respondent to answer the questionnaire easily, 
(iii) the unclear question should be amended to make it clearer or drop less important questions, 
(iv) identify questions that are deemed to be difficult to answer. It is suggested that the questions 
should be restructured to make them easier to understand or drop them, (v) any omission of a 
major topic, (vi) clear, attractive, sequence of layout presentation. 
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Zikmund (2003) suggests that there are two major groups of respondents that are recommended 
for participation in the pilot-testing questionnaire. The first group is expert professionals, and the 
other group is a sample from the actual population. Following Zikmund’s (2003) suggestions, 
two separate pilot tests were conducted. The first pilot testing comprised 20 members of the 
actual population (PhD students, colleagues, family and friends); the second pilot testing 
compromised 16 takaful expert professionals (CEOs, senior management, sales personnel, 
intermediaries, brokers, and university lecturers). Almost all the takaful experts who participated 
on the pilot testing were from the professionals who participated on the London takaful summit 
2009 and 2010. On the other hand, there were some issues with regard to the content and also 
question structures that were identified, coupled with some issues concerning the layout of the 
survey form. All the necessary modifications were carried out. The modified questionnaires were 
presented again to some of the professionals and the result was encouraging with another few 
comments, which required minor modifications to the questionnaire. 
 
7.8 OPERATIONALIZING DATA COLLECTION & PARTICIPANTS RESPONSE RATE 
The data collection processes were carried over 3 months starting in early January and ending 
early April 2011. Burns et al (2003: 244 - 257) mention that “the researcher or the survey 
representative approaches a prospective respondent, introduces the general purpose of the survey 
to the prospect, and leaves it with the respondent to fill out on his or her own”. Accordingly, as 
has been mentioned earlier, three techniques have been used in this research to distribute the 
surveys among participants: the first two techniques were handing the surveys to the walk-in 
participants, and the third technique was approaching participants by the snowball method where 
the walk-in participant was asked to make a referral to other participants to enable conduct of the 
research effort. To make it possible to achieve the targeted survey distribution plan (500 surveys 
in a 3-months timeframe), an assistance distribution team, which consisted of 8 survey 
representatives,
66
 was recruited by the researcher to assist in distributing the surveys. Conducting 
a training session to the research assistance team was highly recommended by Vaus, (2002) who 
stated that the competence of research assistants is one of the critical success factors for the data 
                                               
66 The researcher approached a marketing company that has experienced personnel with the required talent and 
ability to convince respondents to answer the survey; the team was distributed among 9 branches of 3 TOs in 
Jeddah. They started their work from 9 am to 2 pm, and then they worked from their homes from 6pm to 9 pm to 
call the referral participants. For confidentiality reasons, as was requested by the TOs, the identity of the 3 TOs were 
kept anonymous; however, the 3 TOs were coded as A, B and C.      
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collection process, since it will affect the accuracy and reliability of data gathered during the 
fieldwork. Accordingly, the researcher trained the assistance team on the principles of takaful 
insurance, the purpose of conducting the research, ethics of distributing the questionnaires, ethics 
of making a phone calls to participants, participants matching conditions as per the research 
population section of this chapter, the layout structure and the content of the survey questions 
and lastly the administrative matters such as recording and indexing the completed 
questionnaires. In addition to the training session, the researcher was on daily contact with the 
assistance research team to identify weaknesses and implement appropriate remedial action 
strategies.  
 
The overall response rate was considered encouraging. A total of 500 questionnaires were 
distributed, of which 420 completed questionnaires were received, of which 120 questionnaires 
were rejected for bias reasons, leaving 300 completed and usable questionnaires for the research, 
yielding a usable response rate of 60%. Accordingly, the drop-off approach was proven to be the 
best choice for getting a high response rate, as suggested by Burns et al (2003). The phone calls 
method was also proven to be among the best methods to approach participants, as the research 
assistance teams were approaching participants during their free time when they were more 
relaxed to answer the survey questions. Consideration was also given to some of the participants 
to rearrange phone call interviews at a time to suit their availability to answer the survey more 
comfortably; such a conclusion was supported by Buzzell et al., (1969) who indicated that 
impersonal situations indicate that a participant is more likely to be candid. The success of both 
methods was in parallel with Hochstim’s (1963) indications who suggested similar response 
results of implementing different methods, - telephone interview, personal interview, and mail 
questionnaire. Based on Comfrey et al (1992) suggestion the response rate and number of 
respondents were sufficient for statistical analysis, there was no attempt to increase the number 
of respondents. Finally, the adopted survey technique for this research was also among the high 
response rate from the other previous research that related to the financial customer behaviour, 
and perception studies, which were also using a similar technique. For example, Jamal et al 
(2002) yielded 85%, Dusuki (2005) yielded 84%, Metawa et al (1998) yielded 75%, Gerrard et 
al (1997) yielded 55%; Naser et al. (1999) yielded 69% response rate. The current survey 
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indicates that the closed-ended self-administered and phone-call questionnaires are suitable for 
research into this type of customer behaviour. 
 
7.9 RESEARCH METHOD FOR DATA ANALYSIS: TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS 
Appropriate data analysis techniques would facilitate the researcher to get valuable interpretative 
results which enable the researcher to achieve a meaningful conclusion that meets the research 
objectives (Kumar et al., 2002). Inappropriate or misused data analysis would result in unclear, 
incomplete, and in the worst case, erroneous conclusions (Kumar et al., 2002). Hair et al. (1998) 
also claimed violation of the measurements conditions and obligations will lead to biased 
outcomes or non-significant relationships among the study factors.  
 
Researchers have suggested certain steps to be followed to conduct successful data analysis. 
Sekaran (2000: 302) suggested the following essential steps for data analysis: (i) getting the data 
ready for analysis, (ii) getting a feel for the data, (iii) testing the quality of data and, finally (iv) 
testing the hypothesis. Following Sekaran’s (2000) suggested steps, the current research data 
analysis presentations will be:  
 
Step 1 - Getting the data ready for the analysis: SPSS statistical software version 17 was used 
for the analysis. Prior to running the SPSS analysis the data should be carefully prepared as 
specified by Miles et al (1994), Sekaran (2000), Kumar et al. (2002), and Proctor (2005). To 
arrive at the variables used in the study, the following steps were taken: 
 
I. The data were checked and the necessary steps (such as handling incomplete or missing 
data) were taken to ensure the data was entered correctly. 
II. The data were coded and keyed-in into the system. Note that each variable had a set of 
questions with different answers, with some having yes/no option and others with 5-likert 
scale option. For consistency purposes all 5-likert scale responses were converted to 2- 
likert scale as specified by Lambert (1992), Cunningham et al. (1996), Demetrio et al. 
(1998), and Francis et al. (2007).   
III. For each variable, the recoded values of all the questions within the group were added to 
come up with a unified figure.  
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IV. The unified figure was standardized by dividing it by the number of questions that 
represents each variable.  The resulting variable had values ranging from 0 to 1.  
  
Step 2 - Getting a feel for the data: The complete version of data was tabulated in order to get a 
preliminary idea of the survey outcome. For better feelings about the data, the frequency 
distributions analysis, the mean, the standard deviation has been used in order to see the 
preliminary perceptions of the participants towards the key variables that were asked in the 
questionnaires. In addition, the Chi-square test was also used to get an extra insight as to how 
significant the survey questionnaires were (Pallant, 2010).  
 
Step 3 - Quality of the data: Data were tested to ensure the reliability and validity. For this 
research, Cronbach’s Alpha reliability test has been used (as reported in Section 7.10.1 below).   
 
Step 4 - Hypotheses testing: At this stage the data are ready for further analysis. However, 
given the nature of the current research, the hypotheses testing is substituted by addressing the 
main research questions exploring takaful participants’ behavioural aspects which is rare 
especially in the GCC area. Meanwhile, researchers have to identify appropriate statistical tests 
that would turn out results that meet the research objectives. In this research, a set of statistical 
approaches have been used for the descriptive and empirical as discussed next. 
 
7.9.1 Analytical Methods  
7.9.1.1 Descriptive analysis: The purpose of descriptive analysis is to describe the 
characteristics of the data or in other words, it is used to summarize, organize and describe the 
data (Pallant, 2010). In this analysis, frequency distributions were used together with the 
measurement of mean, standard deviations. In addition, Chi-square test was used to identify 
whether the discrepancy between categories (possible responses) is small, and the discrepancy is 
statistically significant or not (Pallant, 2010).   
 
7.9.1.2 Empirical analysis: Various empirical statistical analyses were used. In 
determining the appropriate inferential analysis to be used, the researcher needs to identify the 
best approach for statistical testing suitable for the data, parametric or non-parametric. Pallant 
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(2010) has laid down several assumptions that need to be fulfilled in order for data to qualify for 
using parametric testing statistical tools. These are (i) the level of measurement should be 
measured at the interval or ratio level that uses a continuous scale rather than discrete categories, 
(ii) the sampling must be based on probability sampling or random sampling, (iii) the data 
distribution is assumed to be a normal distribution. Meanwhile, non-parametric testing is more 
lenient, as it does not make assumptions about the underlying populations’ distributions. It is 
therefore also known as distributions-free test (Field, 2005). For the current research the non-
parametric tests are more appropriate for the type of data gathered, since the data were collected 
using a non-probability sampling technique (non-random sampling). In addition, non-parametric 
techniques are ideal for use when questionnaires are structured on categorical scales (Pallant, 
2010). Furthermore, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics test for normality test reflect that the 
Sig. value of the dependant variable is more than 0.05 (Tabachnick et al, 2007: 87; Pallant, 
2010:63). Accordingly; non-parametric statistical techniques will be use as the data didn’t adhere 
to the normality distributions conditions, as shown in Appendix C (Table C.1) of the Normality 
Test.  Therefore, the most appropriate inferential statistical testing is using non-parametric 
testing. The statistical tools used for the empirical analysis are as follows: 
 
I. Non-Parametric Tests 
Mann-Whitney U-test: It is a test that is equivalent to the independent t-test for the parametric 
statistics. It is used to tests difference between two independent groups on continues measure 
(Field, 2005; Pallant, 2010). The test is also able to indicate which group has better scores, for 
example, do males and females differ in terms of their self-esteem (Pallant, 2010). In this 
research the Mann-Whitney U-test was used to determine whether there was any statistically 
significant difference in terms of the level of satisfactions among male and females with the TOs 
services and products. 
 
Kruskal Wallis test: The function of Kruskal-Wallis test is similar to Mann-Whitney U-test but 
it measures the differences of independents samples for three or more groups (Field, 2005; 
Pallant, 2010). In this research, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used to determine whether there are 
any statistically significant differences in the level of participants’ satisfactions in relation to 
their personal and demographic characteristics (age, education, premium paid, members in the 
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takaful contracts, contract durations, and job categories). Similar to the Mann-Whitney U-test, 
Kruskal Wallis test results are also able to determine which group has a better score. 
 
Chi-Square test: the Chi-Square test is used with non-parametric data analysis, which involves a 
categorical data and a specific proportion against which the observed frequencies are tested 
(Pallant, 2010; Agresti, 1996). The purpose of the Chi-Square test is to identify whether there is 
difference in proportion in each category (50% / 50%), i.e. it will find out if the discrepancy 
between categories (possible responses) is small, and whether that discrepancy is statistically 
significant or not. In short, the larger the Chi-Square test statistic, the greater the discrepancy, 
and the significant between categories (for example; “yes” and “no” responses). 
 
II. Exploring Relationships Among Variables 
Spearman’s Correlations: Spearman’s correlation is used to describe the strength and direction 
of the linear relationship between two variables. However, unlike Pearson’s correlation which is 
designed for interval level (continuous) variables, Spearman’s correlation is designed to be used 
with ordinal level or ranked data (Pallant, 2010). The correlation can take values from -1 to +1; 
the positive sign indicates a positive relation whereby increase in one variable leads to a rise in 
the other and vice-versa with the negative sign (Pallant, 2010). In this research, the Spearman’s 
correlation was used to determine the strength and direction between participants’ perceptions 
about TOs disclosure mechanism, participants’ knowledge, and participants’ preferences with the 
participants’ satisfaction. Spearman’s correlation was also used to determine the strength and 
direction between participants’ perceptions about the TOs disclosure system with participants’ 
knowledge, and the strength relationship between participants knowledge with participants 
preferences.  
 
Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis: It is a branch of multiple regression models, and 
the only difference is that the dependent variable is dichotomous (Field, 2005; Pallant, 2010). In 
other words, the dependent variable used in the logistic regression model should be categorical, 
i.e. ‘yes/no’, or ‘pass/fail’, instead of continuous (Field, 2005; Pallant, 2010). In addition, logistic 
regression also allows the independent variables to be categorical, continuous or a combination 
of both (Pallant, 2010). The purpose of the multinomial logistic regression is to predict the 
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independent variables that may predict the outcome of the categorical dependent variable 
significantly. The difference between the multinomial logistic regression and the binary logistic 
regression is that the binary uses dichotomous variables when the researcher uses only two 
output categories, while the multinomial logistic should be used if the number of output 
categories is more than two (Pallant, 2010). In this research, multinomial logistic regression was 
used to determine the significant form of relationships between the three independent variables 
(participants’ perceptions about TOs disclosure mechanism, participants’ knowledge, and 
participants’ preferences) and the participants’ satisfaction levels as a dependant variable. 
Multinomial logistic regression was also used again to determine the significant relationships 
between participants’ perceptions about the TOs’ disclosure system (independent variable) with 
participants’ knowledge (dependant variable), and between participants’ knowledge 
(independent variable) with participants’ preferences (dependant variable). 
 
It is necessary to highlight the difference between correlation and regression. Correlation can 
provide an indication that there is a relationship between two variables; it does not, however, 
indicate that one variable causes the other which is considered a function of the regression 
analysis (Pallant, 2010). In short, regression is interested in the form of the relationship, whereas 
correlation is more focused simply on the strength of a relationship. Accordingly, it is not 
required to have similar directions of association between variables when implementing the 
multinomial regression analysis as in the Spearman correlations, as the multinomial logistic 
regression does not make any assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance 
for the independent variables (Agresti, 1996). 
 
7.9.1.3 Qualitative Data Analysis: Textual Analysis 
Textual analysis probably is the most prevalent approach to the qualitative analysis. It comprises 
a searching out of underlying themes in the materials being analysed. Qualitative researchers 
study spoken and written records of human experience, including transcribed talk, films, novels, 
and photographs. The process through which the themes are extracted is often not specified in 
detail. The extracted themes are usually illustrated, for example with brief quotations from 
newspaper article or magazine (Bryman et al, 2003). As part of the textual analysis, document 
analysis helps to uncover the issues related to the research question. As it helps to deconstruct 
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the documents to reveal the implications of the written material. For the current research a 
textual analysis has been conducted by comparing SAMA regulations and directives with the 
policies and standards imposed by the international Islamic and conventional insurance 
organizations such as AAOIFI, IFSB, IAIS and OECD.   
 
7.10 DATA QUALITY AND RELIABILITY  
Validity and reliability of data for any particular research are crucial for avoiding errors which 
could lead to a misrepresentation of the research concepts. Thus, the researcher should ensure 
that the content and measurement of the variables in the questionnaires are reliable and valid 
(Vaus, 2002). “Reliability refers to the consistency in reaching the same results when the 
measurement is made over and over again” (Proctor, 2005: 208). Hence, Vaus (2002: 53), has 
suggested various ways of improving the reliability of any survey, such as careful wording of the 
question, and proper interviewer/research assistant training. Vaus (2002: 53) also suggests that it 
is sensible to avoid asking questions that the respondents are unlikely to have an opinion or 
knowledge of, or, in other words, questions which they are likely to avoid answering.  
 
Validity refers to “the degree to which the question measures what it is supposed to be 
measuring” (Proctor, 2005: 208). In other words, the measurement used in the survey must be 
appropriate and tally to the concept that the research intends to measure. An example is when a 
researcher wants to measure social status then it is appropriate to use education level as a 
measurement variable (Vaus, 2002). Vaus (2002) also asserted that there are three basic ways in 
which to access validity, content validity, construct validity, and criterion validity. 
 
For the current research, the pilot testing process which has been discussed earlier could be the 
best tool to minimize or overcome any problems with regards to validity and reliability issues, as 
the pilot testing provides a careful design of the research questionnaires by obtaining takaful 
experts’ and colleagues’ feedback. In addition, the training session that was provided to the 
assistance research team increases the competency among the team which enhances the 
accuracy, validity and reliability of data gathered during the fieldwork. Finally, the variety in 
giving participants the choice to either answer the survey through the drop-off approach, or to 
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answer the survey over the phone in their free time will add another validity and reliability 
approach, since participants will choose whatever approach that suits their timing availability. 
     
7.10.1 Cronbach’s Alpha Test 
One of the most commonly used indicators of internal consistency is Cronbach’s Alpha 
coefficient, which refers to the “degree to which the items that make up the scale ‘hang 
together’” (Pallant, 2010: 97). The test is carried out to determine the consistency of a 
respondent’s answer for one item compared to other scaled items (Vaus, 2002). Ideally, the 
higher the score of the test, the more reliable is the scale (Pallant, 2010; Vaus, 2002). Pallant 
(2010) suggested that the outcome of the test should be at least 0.7 which is considered 
acceptable. However, values above 0.8 are preferable. In other words data scaling is considered 
to be reliable (the scale has good internal consistency). For the current study, the Cronbach 
Alpha coefficient indicator for all question sections was 0.822 after considering 89 items that 
used the scale, as per Table 7.2 below. The value of 0.822 is above the recommended 0.7, 
signifying that the scale has a good level of internal consistency. Therefore, it would be 
acceptable to say that the scale used in this research sample was reliable. 
 
Table 7.2: Reliability Statistics (Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient) 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha N of items 
0.822 89 
 
7.11 LIMITATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES  
As mentioned earlier, one of the main challenges faced in the current research is the inability to 
reach a full list the takaful participants due to legal restrictions which hindered the researcher to 
use the probability sampling methods. In terms of cost, the data collection process was self 
funding which limited the researcher from extending the scope of geographical data collection to 
other cities in Saudi Arabia; also it was quite hard to continue with the research assistance team 
to conduct more than 420 surveys. As mentioned previously, a private marketer with experience 
to market different commercial products was used for the survey. The researcher paid SAR 15 
per completed survey, as well as paying for all combined fees such as phone calls, etc.  
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Another vital limitation was the time taken to collect the data since the participants’ names were 
not listed or readily available. The research team was racing against time to accomplish the job 
within the targeted duration of three months. The lack of full cooperation of the TOs’ sales-
personnel is considered another difficulty that had been faced, in that only 20 surveys were 
collected from the takaful sales-personnel for the whole three months. Add to that, it was very 
difficult to explain the importance of conducting the research to them, since they were very busy 
and they rarely listened to the researcher’s needs for conducting the study. Another challenge 
faced is that some of the participants interviewed insisted on knowing full information about the 
researcher such as his full name, his specialized area of study, his identity, etc. at the beginning 
of the interview either by phone or face-to-face. The researcher was committed to give simple 
information about the study’s main objective and simple information about the researcher’s 
identity.  
 
7.12 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter presented the research framework and methodology used in this study. The chapter 
began with a discussion of the questions and objectives development revolving around 
participants’ different behavioural aspects (perceptions, knowledge, preferences and satisfaction) 
with regards to TOs’ services and products. Accordingly, this chapter has discussed the research 
design and the research strategy. This research is based on the triangulation method since 
primary data gathered by means of survey questionnaires as a research method and a 
comparative analysis between the Saudi insurance regulations and the international insurance 
and takaful regulations will be made to come up with the required recommendations for 
participants. The chapter further discussed various matters and issues related to the research 
methods and fieldwork, including sampling  population and identification, questionnaire 
instrument development, data collection mode, data analysis techniques, and data validity and 
reliability. The current chapter also highlights the limitations and difficulties faced throughout 
the data-collection process. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT   
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERCEPTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS: A DESCRIPTIVE 
ANALYSIS   
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The current chapter will describe and analyze the findings of participants’ responses to the 
collected survey questionnaires. The survey questionnaires were structured in accordance with 
the literature reviews of corporate governance and market conduct in the previous chapters. 
Accordingly, this chapter will provide a descriptive and an introductory analysis to provide an 
overall insight of participants’ data characteristics. It will describe the data in the form of 
univariate analysis, considered to be the simplest form of quantitative (statistical) analysis and 
will be carried out with the description of a single variable and its attributes of the applicable unit 
of analysis (Babbie, 2007). In other words, the descriptive analysis will describe the 
characteristics of the data or will summarize, organize and describe the data (Pallant, 2010). 
 
Descriptive analysis utilizes “descriptive statistics which are normally associated with a 
frequency distribution that helps summarize the information presented in the frequency table” 
(Kumar et al., 2002: 362). Basic statistical tools such as the mean, median and mode are used for 
measuring central tendency, while standard deviation is used for measuring range of dispersion. 
However, for categorical variables such as sex or marital status, or “yes/ no” questions, using the 
mean or standard deviations, etc. are not useful (Pallant, 2010). Instead the researcher has used 
the Chi-Square to test for more useful details that can be obtained from the data collected. Since 
the Chi-Square test is usually used when the researcher wishes to explore the relationship 
between two categorical variables, it is used as an additional tool to give extra insight as to how 
significant the survey questionnaires are  (Pallant, 2010). This chapter provides an answer to 
research question 3 of the main research questions indicated at the start of this thesis. To recap: 
 
Research Question 3: What are Participants’ satisfaction levels, and their perceptions, 
knowledge, and preferences of TOs services and products?   
The data was analyzed by utilizing SPSS software version 17, a popular software package among 
social science researchers who adopt questionnaire-based surveys as tools for their data 
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collection process. This chapter is organized as follows: section 8.2 gives a description and 
explanation of the main demographic characteristics of participants. Section 8.3 reflects 
participants’ distribution figures among TOs with their selected fund. Section 8.4 represents an 
overview of participants’ perceptions, knowledge and preferences about TOs’ products and 
services, along with their participants’ satisfaction levels. Section 8.5 reflects overall combining 
figures that represent participant perceptions of TOs’ disclosure mechanisms, and participants’ 
knowledge and preferences related to TOs’ products and services. Section 8.6 draws a 
conclusion.  
 
 
8.2 PARTICIPANTS’ PERSONAL  AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
This section provides an overview of the most important demographic characteristics of 
participants (gender, age, education level, premiums paid, number of members included in the 
contract policy, contract durations, and job status). These demographic characteristics are 
believed to have noticeable impacts when determining attitudes towards the Islamic methods of 
finance (Okumkus, 2005; Zainuddin et al., 2004; Metwally, 2002; Alsultan, 1999; Jalalulddin, 
1999). Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics will be used in the next chapter linked to 
participants’ satisfaction levels, in order to compare the results across groups within the 
respective demographic profile.  
 
Gender 
Table 8.1: Gender Classifications 
 
 Gender Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
Valid 
Male 289 96.3 96.3 96.3 
Female 11 3.7 3.7 100.0 
Total 300 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 8.1, shows participants’ gender of which the majority of participants were male with 289 
participants (96.3 %), while only 11 participants (3.7 %) were female. The reason for this is due 
to the fact that heads of households in Saudi Arabia are generally male. Such results are parallel 
to Al-Nouri’s, (1995) and Gaits’ (2009) findings, that males are repeatedly reminded of the 
responsibilities(as husband and father) awaiting them when they reach the adulthood stage, while 
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girls anticipate marriage, motherhood and housekeeping. Such a socio-cultural behaviour may 
account for women’s vast dependency (Al-Nouri, 1993).  
 
Participants’ Age Groups 
 
Table 8.2:  Age Grouping Classifications 
 
 Age Grouping Frequency Percent Mean Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Valid 
Age from 21to 30 28 9.3 
41.09 7.837 
Age from 31 to 40 128 42.7 
Age from 41to 50 107 35.7 
Age > 51  36 12.0 
Total 299 99.7 
Missing System 1 0.3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.2, shows that the majority of participants were from the 31 to 40 years old age group, 
with 128 (42.7 %) of participants, followed by the second-ranked age group of 41 to 50 years old 
with 107 (35.7 %) of participants. The results reflected expectations as people at these stages are 
trying to build up their financial positions to support their responsibilities as a spouse/parent, 
especially in Saudi Arabia, were people get married at an early age. The third-ranked age group 
is the 51 years old and above with 36 (12 %) participants; people of this age-group are at a 
settled stage of life, insofar as they will be released from some of their responsibilities when they 
reach 50. This is because they have already reached a stage where they have found a stable 
constant income to support their financial needs. Finally, the last-ranked age group is of 21 to 30 
years olds with 28 (9.3 %) participants; people of this age group are still searching for better 
careers that can support their needs. As a result, they are not yet in a position to be burdened with 
regular monthly payments such as a contribution to the takaful fund.      
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Education Level 
Table 8.3:  Education Level Classifications 
 
 Education Level Frequency Percent 
Mean 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Valid 
Doctorate 5 1.7 
3.39 0.946 
Masters 24 8.0 
Bachelor’s 178 59.3 
Diploma 34 11.3 
High school or lower 59 19.7 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.3, describes the education level of participants, the majority of which i.e.178 (59.3 %) 
are bachelor’s degree holders, while 93 (31 %) participants hold high-school level education or 
diploma which represents the second largest group of participants. Finally, those with masters 
and doctoral degrees number the fewest with 29 (9.7 %) participants. The mean value of 
participants’ education is 3.39, as participants’ education levels were coded from 1 to 5, where 5 
represents doctoral degree and 1 represents high school or lower.   
   
Premium Grouping 
Table 8.4: Premium Grouping Classifications 
 
Saudi Arabian 
Riyals  SAR 
Frequency Percent 
Mean 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Valid 
1 - 500 98 32.7 
1.5142 0.78791 
501 -1000 84 28 
1001 - 2000 62 20.7 
2001 - 3000 31 10.3 
3001 - 4000 4 1.3 
4001 - 5000 2 .7 
SAR > 5001 1 .3 
Total 282 94.0 
Missing System 
 
18 6.0 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.4, shows that most of the participants, 98 (32.7 %) pay monthly contribution premiums 
up to SAR 500, followed by 84 (28 %) of participants who pay between SAR 501 - 1000; both 
groups represent a majority of premiums paid with 182 (60.7 %) participants who pay up to SAR 
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1000. The third group of participants, 62 (20.7 %) pay a monthly premium of between SAR 1001 
– 2000, whereas the last and smallest group of participants 7 (2.3 %) pay above SAR 3000.  The 
mean value is 1.5142, as participants’ premium groupings were coded from 1 to 7, where 7 
represents the highest paid premiums SAR > 5001, and 1 represents the lowest paid premiums 
SAR 1 – 500.  
 
Members Included in the Takaful Policy 
Table 8.5:  Members’ Classifications 
 
Number of 
participants 
in a policy 
Frequency Percent 
Mean 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Valid 
1 84 28.0 
3.2847 1.93261 
2 33 11.0 
3 43 14.3 
4 51 17.0 
5 36 12.0 
> 5 48 16.0 
Total 295 98.3 
Missing System 5 1.7 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.5, shows that the majority of participants 84 (28 %) buy an individual policy, followed 
by 51(17 %) participants who have four members included in the policy, while the third, fourth 
and fifth groups have participants of more than 5 (16 %) members, then 3 (14.3 %) members and 
2 (12 %) members included in the policy, respectively. The above figures conclude that 
participants are more interested in buying individual policies, rather than multimember policy.    
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Contract Duration 
Table 8.6:  Duration Grouping Classifications 
 
Duration 
Years 
Frequency Percent 
Mean 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Valid 
0 - 5  138 46.0 
8.78 7.467 
6 - 10  86 28.7 
11 - 15  16 5.3 
16 - 20  17 5.7 
Duration 
> 20  
30 10.0 
Total 287 95.7 
Missing System 13 4.3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.6 shows that 138 (46%) participants buy a takaful policy with a duration of up to 5 years, 
followed by 86 (28.7%) who buy takaful policies of 6 to 10 year durations. Surprisingly, the 
third largest group are 30 participants (10%) with policies of more than 20 years duration. The 
smallest group of participants were those who buy a takaful policy with an11-15 year duration, 
16 (5.3%) participants.   
 
 
  Job Status  
Table 8.7: Job Category Grouping Classifications 
 Job Category  Frequency Percent 
Mean 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Valid 
Academicians / Education1 53  17.6 
1.34 0.473 
Security2 47  15.6 
Managerial3 44 14.6 
Merchants / Business 38 12.6 
Technical’s4 36 12 
Secretaries and Clerks 36 12 
Retired 23 7.6 
Professionals5 19 6.3 
Students  4 1.3 
Total 300 100.0 
1. University, Primary and Secondary School. 
2. Police, Army, Marine,  etc, 
3. Section Managers, General Managers, Operational Managers, VPs, etc. 
4. Lab Technicians, Electricians, Maintenance Workers.,  etc. 
5. Lawyers, Engineers, Accountants, Doctors, etc. 
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Table 8.7 demonstrates that academicians constitute the group with the highest rate of purchasing 
a takaful policy, with 53 (17.6 %) participants, followed by people who work in security, with 47 
(15.6 %) participants. Managers, merchants, technical and secretary jobs come in with similar 
percentages of 14.6%, 12.6%, 12% and 12%, respectively. Retirees and professionals follow 
with 7.6% and 6.3%, respectively, and lastly students with only 1.3 %. This is to be expected as 
students do not have large enough incomes to pay for takaful policies. The mean value comes in 
at 1.34, since participants’ job categories were coded from 1 to 9, where 9 represents student 
participants and 1 represents academicians.   
 
In short, participants’ most dominant demographic characteristics are:  
- Gender: Male (96.3 %),  
- Age: 31 - 40 Years (42.7 %), 
- Education level: Bachelor Degree (59.3 %), 
- Premium Paid: SAR 0 - 1000 (60.7 %), 
- Members included in policy: One Member (28 %), 
- Contract Duration: 0 - 5 Years (46 %), 
- Occupation: Academicians (17.6 %).  
 
8.3 PARTICIPANT DISTRIBUTION ACROSS THE TOS AND PARTICIPANTS’ SELECTED FUNDS 
 
This section shows the distribution of participants among the three cooperating TOs and also 
provides an overview of the particular funds selected by participants, which will be either a 
savings fund or a risk fund. It should be noted, however, that all the TOs visited during this 
research project were reluctant to fully cooperate with respect to revealing participants’ identities 
on account of concerns regarding competition and participant confidentiality. Therefore, due to 
company requests participant identities are kept anonymous. As a result, this section only 
provides a brief analysis of the findings.         
 
Participant Distribution Among the Three TOs 
  Table 8.8: Participant Distribution Among TOs 
Q1 
Takaful 
Operator  
Frequency Percent 
Mean 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Valid 
A 246 82.0 
1.2100 0.47608 
B 45 15.0 
C 9 3.0 
Total 300 100.0 
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Table 8.8 shows that the chosen participants were selected from the biggest three TOs operating 
in Saudi Arabia. The majority of surveys collected were from company A with 246 collected 
surveys, as they represent the largest and oldest takaful company operating in Saudi Arabia; 
while 45 and 9 completed questionaires were collected from company B and C, respectively. The 
mean value comes at 1.21, since TOs were coded from 1 to 3, where 1 represents TO A, and 3 
represents TO C.   
Participants’ Selected Funds   
Table 8.9:  Participants’ Selected Funds. 
Participate in Risk Fund 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent Mean 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
No 225 75.0 
  Yes 75 25.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Participate in Investment Fund 
Valid 
No 70 23.3 
  Yes 230 76.7 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.9 shows that the majority of participants, 230 (76.7 %), buy their takaful policy in order 
to generate investment profits and/or to make future plans for themselves and/or their families. 
Almost 70 (24%) of participants buy their takaful policy to cover future risks with a suitable 
indemnity that guarantees a decent life for themselves and their spouses should an event occur 
unexpectedly. In short, TO A is the most dominant company with 82 % of the total number of 
respondents who participated in the survey, while 76.6% respondents buy takaful savings 
policies rather than a risk policy.     
  
8.4 PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTIONS DISCLOSURE, KNOWLEDGE AND PREFERENCES  
This section explores participants’ perceptions about TOs’ disclosure system’, participants’ 
knowledge, and participants’ preferences which could have an impact on their level of 
satisfaction. Accordingly, this section is divided into three sub-sections reflective of the three 
variables mentioned. Each variable will be described in terms of frequency, percentage and 
significance of the questions by using the Chi-Square test to discover whether there is an existing 
discrepancy between participants’ replies. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the questions that 
represent each variable were selected on the basis of the standards and regulations imposed by 
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the international standards and policies presented by related organizations, such as AAOIFI, 
IFSB, IAIS, OECD, etc. These policies and standards have one main goal which is to provide 
proper protections to insurance policyholders whether the insurance contract is Islamic or 
conventional. Such standards and policies are based on the market conduct and corporate 
governance literatures of the insurance industry.     
 
    8.4.1 - Participants’ Perceptions of TOs’ Disclosure Variables 
As has been explained in chapter 5, customer satisfaction has a strong relationship with their 
perceptions. Thus, the main goal of this section is to explore participants’ perceptions about TO 
disclosure determinants variables, as the disclosure variable embodies two important dimensions 
of proper service quality i.e. empathy and reliability. Accordingly, a statistical description is 
given to all seven disclosure variables, some of which are illustrated by more than one 
question
67
.     
 
1. Disclosure Mechanism (DM)  
The disclosure mechanism (DM) of the TO is considered an important interfacing technique to 
convey participants’ benefits in an acceptable timeframe. Hence, this important variable is 
divided into four important sub-variables:  
 
I. Disclosure Mechanism Availability   
Table 8.10: Disclosure Mechanism Availability 
 
Q1- The company discloses ways to let me review my benefits at the participants’ fund  
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 276 92.0 
211.680 0.000 Yes 24 8.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q2- The company discloses the used approach to distribute investment return among participants   
Valid 
No 191 63.7 
22.413 0.000 Yes 109 36.3 
Total 300 100.0 
                                               
67 Based on the researcher’s readings of the literature review, some factors can be explained by more than one 
question which reflects the importance of those factors for participants.    
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Q3-The company often notifies me on different Fatwas issued regarding PF, specifically "Investment & 
surplus distribution" 
Valid 
Strongly Disagree 5 1.7 
189.967 0.000 
Disagree 122 40.7 
Neutral 58 19.3 
Agree 105 35.0 
Strongly Agree 10 3.3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.10, reflects participants’ replies to clarify whether the company has disclosed fund 
benefits, such as investment return and underwriting surplus. Participants would be eager to 
monitor their fund’s financial performance because their expected profit will be directly or 
indirectly influenced by the company’s investment activities which rely on company effort 
towards managing their assets. Surprisingly, 276 (92%) participants answered ‘No’ which means 
that takaful operators are not making them aware of a framework which would enable them to 
monitor their fund performance. Furthermore, 191 (63.7 %) participants, answered with ‘No’ 
when they were asked to clarify whether takaful operators disclose an approach to distribute 
investment returns among them. One of the vital duties of the SSB is to demonstrate truthful 
assessments and disclosure regarding the Shari'ah compliance of all required information by 
stakeholders including fatwas, Shari`ah-compliance channels, etc. Accordingly, participants 
were asked to clarify whether the company updates them on different fatwas that have been 
made by the SSB. The participants responses were quite similar, such that 35.0 % and 10 %, 
respectively of the total participants stated that they ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ with the notion, 
while 40.7 % and 1.7 % stated that they ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ respectively with it. 
The Chi-square test revealed that the variations of responses in three questions are statistically 
significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
II. Disclosure Mechanism Tools    
Table 8.11 Disclosure Mechanism Tools 
Q4-Which approach does the company use to communicate with me: 
4-1) The Internet 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-
square 
Sig. 
No 287 95.7 
250.253 0.000 Yes 13 4.3 
Total 300 100.0 
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4-2) Letters 
Valid 
No 94 31.3 
41.813 0.000 Yes 206 68.7 
Total 300 100.0 
4-3) Meeting 
Valid 
No 294 98.0 
276.480 0.000 Yes 6 2.0 
Total 300 100.0 
4-4) Seminars 
Valid 
No 299 99.7 
296.013 0.000 Yes 1 .3 
Total 300 100.0 
4-5) SMS 
Valid 
No 274 91.3 
205.013 0.000 Yes 26 8.7 
Total 300 100.0 
4-6) Phone 
Valid 
No 217 72.3 
59.853 0.000 Yes 83 27.7 
Total 300 100.0 
4-7) Brochures 
Valid 
No 300 100.0 
298.003 0.000 Yes 0 0 
Total 300 100.0 
4-8) The company often communicates with me 
Valid 
No 287 95.7 
250.253 0.000 Yes 13 4.3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
 
Table 8.11 shows the communication channels that TOs use to contact participants, as TOs are 
supposed to properly disseminate information to participants in accordance with international 
standards. Such information should be designed in light of adequate methods and assumptions to 
bring the relevant information to the attention of participants. Surprisingly, 287 (95.7%) of 
participants answered ‘No’ to the use of the internet as a communication channel between them 
and the company. Letters are the most used communication channel between them and the 
company as 206 (68.7%) participants answered ‘Yes’. On the other hand, the Chi-square test 
revealed the variations of responses in all sub-questions to be statistically significant (Asymp. 
Sig. < 0.05). 
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III. Disclosure Mechanism via Intermediaries  
Table 8.12: Disclosure Mechanism via Intermediaries 
Q5-Did you buy your policy from intermediaries? If yes, go to question 6, otherwise go to question 8.  
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 171 57.0 
5.88 0.015 Yes 129 43.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q6- Does the intermediary have sufficient knowledge of Sharia’h? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 96 74.0 
69.120 0.000 Yes 33 26.0 
Total 129 100.0 
Q7-Does the intermediary have sufficient knowledge of takaful business? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 96 74 
65.333 0.000 Yes 33 26 
Total 129 100.0 
 
Table 8.12 reflects the importance of insurance intermediaries to convey the right information to 
participants, which requires that intermediaries have sufficient knowledge of different takaful 
issues. This is in addition to being aware of Shari’ah issues and their implications for takaful.  
The role of intermediaries/brokers in the Saudi insurance market seems to compete fairly with 
the role of the salesperson for the takaful companies; 129 (43%) participants bought their takaful 
policies from brokers. Surprisingly, when participants were asked to clarify whether these 
intermediates have sufficient knowledge of different takaful and Shari’ah issues relating to 
takaful,  96 (74%) out of 129 participants replied with ‘No’, indicating that the intermediary that 
sold them the takaful policy had insufficient knowledge of these issues. This finding strongly 
requires the attention of Saudi insurance regulations to take the qualifications of those 
intermediaries/brokers more seriously and try to improve their takaful principles and Shari’ah 
knowledge. On the other hand, the Chi-square test revealed that the variations of responses in all 
three questions are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
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IV. Communications, Social Involvements and Expectations  
Table 8.13: Communications, Social Involvements and Expectations. 
 
Q8-The company discusses the Underwriting Surplus I deserved in the participants fund with me 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Disagree 2 .7 
190.100 0.000 
Disagree 89 29.7 
Neutral 81 27.0 
Agree 122 40.7 
Strongly Agree 6 2.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q9-The company discusses the investment return on PF with me 
 Strongly Disagree 3 1.0 
192.867 0.000 
Disagree 89 29.7 
Neutral 79 26.3 
Agree 124 41.3 
Strongly Agree 5 1.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q10-The company discusses my targeted expectations with me 
 Strongly Disagree 0 0 
122.987 0.000 
Disagree 111 37.0 
Neutral 57 19.0 
Agree 127 42.3 
Strongly Agree 5 1.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q11-The company communicate the issues relevant to my takaful policy with me 
 Strongly Disagree 0 0 
126.267 0.000 
Disagree 111 37.0 
Neutral 57 19.0 
Agree 128 42.7 
Strongly Agree 4 1.3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.13, reflects participants’ clarifications as to whether the company communicates with 
them to discuss their rights in receiving an underwriting surplus and investment return. Their 
answers were broadly optimistic, 40.7 % and 2.0 % of participants, respectively stated that they 
‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ with the notion that TOs discussed their rights to receive 
underwriting surplus with them. Also 41.3% and 1.7% respectively stated that they ‘agree’ and 
‘strongly agree’ with the notion that TOs discussed their rights in receiving investment return 
with them. Such a result complements participants’ answers in Table 8.30 that 256 (85.3 %) 
participants are buying their takaful policy for the expected financial benefit. Therefore, it is 
obvious that participants are more interested in the financial benefits of buying the takaful policy 
210 
 
rather than for any other reasons. Also, TOs were successful at reflecting the benefits behind 
buying a takaful policy. Furthermore, participants were asked to clarify, whether the takaful 
company had communicated with them regarding their targeted expectations. Hence, their 
answers were similar:  42.3 % and 1.7 %, respectively of total participants stated that they 
‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ with the notion, while 37.0 % stated that they ‘disagree’. 
Furthermore, when participants were asked to clarify whether the takaful company 
communicates with them regarding their policy in the takaful fund, regarding such issues as their 
expected benefits in the fund, duration of the contract, etc., their answers were quite similar. 
42.7% and 1.3 %, of the total participants, respectively stated that they ‘agree’ and ‘strongly 
agree’ with the notion, while 37.0 % stated that they ‘disagree’ with it. On the other hand, the 
Chi-square test revealed that the variation of responses to all four questions to be statistically 
significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
2. Disclosure of Investment Returns (DIR)  
Table 8.14: Disclosure of Investment Returns 
Q12 - The company disclosed their policy and procedures for handling participants’ investment returns. 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 213 71.0 
52.92 0.015 Yes 87 29.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q13 - The company disclosed a statement of profit and loss in the participants’ fund 
Valid 
No 252 84.0 
138.72 0.000 Yes 48 16.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q14 - The company disclosed a performance statement for participants’ investment fund 
Valid 
No 291 97.0 
265.08 0.000 Yes 9 3.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q15 - The company disclosed the expected period for distribution of investment returns 
Valid 
No 37 12.3 
170.253 0.000 Yes 263 87.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q16 - The company disclosed the previous investment returns 
Valid 
No 69 23.0 
87.48 0.000 Yes 231 77.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q17 - The company disclosed the composition of participants’ fund assets 
Valid 
No 205 68.3 
40.333 0.000 Yes 95 31.7 
Total 300 100.0 
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Table 8.14 reflects the importance of TO disclosure regarding investment returns, because in 
order for participants to have information regarding certain TO, participants need to rely on past 
and current financial positions of the company, so they can predict future financial performance 
(IAIS, 2002).Surprisingly, participants’ responses to the six main questions dealing with their 
rights to receive information about the investment returns from their fund were as the following: 
- 213 (71 %) of participants answered   ‘no’ to whether the company discloses their policy 
and procedures for handling participants’ investment returns. 
- 252 (84 %) of participants answered ‘no’ to whether the company discloses a statement 
of profit and loss. 
- 291 (97 %) of participants answered ‘no’ to whether the company discloses investment 
performance. 
- 205 (68.3 %) of participants answered ’no’ to whether the company discloses the 
composition of participants’ fund assets. 
 
 
However, participants were quite happy with the disclosure regarding the timing of investment 
returns distribution as 263 (87.7 %) of participants answered ’yes’; they were also happy with the 
disclosure of previous investment returns in that 231 (77 %) of participants answered ’yes’ to 
this statement. The Chi-square test revealed the variation of responses to all six questions to be 
statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
3. Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus (DUS) 
Table 8.15:  Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus 
Q18-The company disclosed their policy and procedures for handling participants’ surplus from 
underwriting activities. 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 204 68.0 
38.880 0.000 Yes 96 32.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q19-The company disclosed the methods used to calculate Underwriting Surplus  
Valid 
No 269 89.7 
188.813 0.000 Yes 31 10.3 
Total 300 100.0 
Q20-The company disclosed the conditions that allow them to receive Underwriting Surplus 
Valid 
No 290 96.7 
261.333 0.000 Yes 10 3.3 
Total 300 100.0 
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Q21-The company disclosed the uncollected Underwriting Surplus to me. 
Valid 
No 290 96.7 
261.333 0.000 Yes 10 3.3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.15 clarifies participants’ responses to the four questions which require them to clarify 
whether the company disclosed different information regarding underwriting surplus. The first 
question participants were asked was whether the company disclosed their policy and procedures 
for handling participants’ surplus from underwriting activities. Surprisingly, 204 (68 %) 
participants answered ‘no’ to the question. The second question participants were asked was 
whether the company discloses the methods used to calculate underwriting surplus; accordingly 
269 (89.7 %) participants answered ’no’. The third question participants were asked was whether  
the company discloses the conditions that allow them to receive underwriting surplus to which 
290 (96.7 %) of participants responded ‘no’. Finally, the participants were asked whether the 
company disclosed the uncollected underwriting surplus and again 290 (96.7 %) of participants 
answered with ‘no’. The Chi-square test revealed the variation of responses in all four questions 
to be statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
4. Disclosure of Shari’ah Compliance (DSC) 
Table 8.16: Disclosure of Shari’ah Compliance 
Q22-The company disclosed  policy and procedures to reflect the obligations of complying with Shari’ah 
laws in the participants’ fund 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 43 14.3 
152.653 0.000 Yes 257 85.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q23-The company disclosed the Shari’ah compliance annual report to participants 
Valid 
No 246 82.0 
122.880 0.000 Yes 54 18.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q24-The company disclosed the method and basis of Shari’ah methods used to allocate Underwriting 
Surplus to participants 
Valid 
No 290 96.7 
261.333 0.000 Yes 10 3.3 
Total 300 100.0 
Q25-The company disclosed the criteria used to scrutinize investment portfolio to participants 
Valid 
No 278 92.7 
218.453 0.000 Yes 22 7.3 
Total 300 100.0 
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Q26-The company disclosed the purifications technique used on the participants fund investment assets  
Valid 
No 239 79.7 
105.613 0.000 Yes 61 20.3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.16 clarifies TO adherence to Shari’ah laws to satisfy participants’ desires to invest their 
money according to Islamic laws. Therefore, participants were asked to clarify whether TOs had 
fulfilled their desires for Shari’ah compliance in all transactions.  In the first question 
participants were asked whether the company had presented an annual Shari’ah compliance 
report to them and 246 (82 %) of participants answered ’no’. Secondly, participants were asked 
if the company disclosed the method and basis of the Shari’ah method used to allocate 
underwriting surplus to which 290 (96.7 %) of participants answered ‘no’. The third question 
participants were asked was whether the company disclosed the criteria used to scrutinize 
investment portfolio and 278 (92.7 %) of participants answered ‘no’. Finally, participants were 
asked if the company disclosed the purifications technique used on the participants fund 
investment assets and 239 (79.7 %) of participants answered in negative. However, participants 
answered this question differently to the others. When asked to clarify if the company had 
disclosed their commitment to Shari’ah compliance when dealing with the participants fund, 257 
(85.7 %) of participants answered ‘yes’ which is not considered surprising given that every 
financial institution that offers Islamic financial products is supposed to clearly announce their 
Shari’ah compliance commitments to the public. Subsequently, the Chi-square test revealed the 
variation of responses to all five questions to be statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
5. Disclosure of Claims and Indemnities (DCI) 
Table 8.17: Disclosure of Claims and Indemnities  
Q27-The company discloses their policy and procedures for handling participants’ claims and indemnities.  
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent  
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 234 78.0 
94.08 0.015 Yes 66 22.0 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.17 reflects TOs’ claims and indemnities procedures, because indemnifying participants’ 
claims in takaful business might cause future problems. This is particularly the case when a TO 
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treats participants’ indemnity as an issue of ex gratia payments, ignoring the fact that the PRF 
from which the payments would be made belongs to policyholders not the shareholders. 
Accordingly, participants were asked to clarify if the TO had disclosed their policy and 
procedures for handling participants claims and indemnities and 234 (78 %) of the participants 
answered ‘no’. The Chi-square test revealed the variation of responses to be statistically 
significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
6. Disclosure of Fees, Deficits and Qard Hasan  (DFDQ) 
Table 8.18: Disclosure of Expenses, Fees, Deficits and Qard Hasan 
Q28 - The company disclosed the incentives percentage taken by the company for good performance 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 278 92.7 
161.333 0.000 Yes 22 7.3 
Total 300 100.0 
Q29 - The company disclosed the direct and indirect expenses against the participants’ fund 
Valid 
No 284 94.7 
221.880 0.000 Yes 16 5.3 
Total 300 100.0 
Q30-The company disclosed the eligibility of  participants’ fund to receive Qard Hasan 
Valid 
No 260 86.7 
161.333 0.000 Yes 40 13.3 
Total 300 100.0 
Q31-The company disclosed whether PIF covers the deficit of PRF 
Valid 
No 279 93.0 
221.880 0.000 Yes 21 7.0 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.18 reflects TOs’ disclosures regarding encountered expenses, charged fees and 
availability of qard (loan), because there is a strong relationship between charged expenses, fees 
and encountered deficits. As Shari’ah standards of AAOIFI (2010) state that insurance accounts 
shall bear all the expenses
68
 and fees
69
 that relate to insurance activities. Therefore, the higher the 
expenses paid out from the takaful fund, the lower the surplus will be (Archer et al, 2009). This 
will cause close deficits in the future. As a result of deficits
70
 encountered in the participants’ 
fund, the takaful operator will be required as a manager of the risk pool to provide qard hasan 
                                               
68 Such as direct claims expenses, re-takaful arrangement and indirect (salaries, rents) expenses.   
69 Such as (Wakalah Fee, Investment Management Fee, incentive fees etc). 
70 i.e., claims and expenses exceed takaful contributions. 
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(interest-free loan) in most jurisdictions and countries (Ali et al, 2008). Accordingly, participants 
were asked to clarify whether TOs disclosed the incentives structure and different expenses 
excluded from the fund. The first question asked about disclosure of incentive structure, to which 
278 (92.7 %) of participants answered ‘no’. The second question asked participants to clarify, 
whether TOs had disclosed direct and indirect expenses against the participants’ fund and 284 
(94.7 %) of participants answered ‘no’ to the question. Subsequently, participants were asked to 
clarify whether TOs had disclosed enough information that guaranteed their rights to receiving 
qard hasan. The first question asked whether the company disclosed their eligibility to provide 
qard hasan to the participants’ fund to which 260 (86.7 %) of participants replied ‘no’. The 
second question asked whether the company disclosed if the family takaful savings policy (PIF) 
covered the deficit of the risk protection from death (PRF). Accordingly, 279 (93 %) of 
participants answered ‘no’. On the other hand, the Chi-square test revealed the variation of 
responses to all four questions to be statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
7. Disclosure of Key Personnel (DKP) 
Table 8.19: Disclosure of Key Personnel 
Q32-Disclosure of investing participant fund into shareholders’ equities 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 178 59.3 
10.453 0.001 Yes 122 40.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q33-Disclosure of shareholders activities on participant underwriting surplus 
Valid 
No 289 96.3 
257.613 0.000 Yes 11 3.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q34-Disclosure of BoDs decisions regarding PF 
Valid 
No 266 88.7 
179.413 0.000 Yes 34 11.3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
 
In Table 8.19 participants were asked to clarify if the company had disclosed the percentage 
amount of investing some of the participants fund into the shareholders equities; accordingly, 
178 (59.3 %) of participants, responded in negative. Participants were also asked to identify 
whether the takaful company had disclosed shareholders’ activities on participants’ underwriting 
surplus and a large number of 289 (96.3 %) participants responded ‘no’. Participants were also 
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required to clarify if the TOs had disclosed the BoDs decisions regarding the participants’ fund 
and 266 (88.7 %) participants replied ‘no’. On the other hand, the Chi-square test revealed that 
the variations of responses in all three questions to be statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 
0.05).  
 
8.4.2 Participant’s Knowledge of Participants’ Fund 
As one of the main challenges facing TOs is participants’ awareness and knowledge of the 
takaful concepts (Malaikah, 2006) as participants’ lack of knowledge can cause confusion on 
customer motivations and preferences.
71
 Accordingly, this section explores participants’ 
knowledge and awareness regarding the service provided by the TOs. The knowledge 
questionnaires were structured according to the polices and standards on market conduct that 
have been imposed on corporate governance to determine whether the Saudi TOs adopted the 
required polices to provide the protection and satisfy the takaful participants. A statistical 
description of the seven knowledge variables are given with some variables exemplified by more 
than one question.  
 
1. Knowledge of the Takaful  Model Principles (KPM)  
Table 8.20: Knowledge and Awareness of the Takaful Model Principles Used 
Q1-Does the company brief you on the principles of takaful models 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 19 6.3 
228.813 0.000 Yes 281 93.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q2- What are the takaful models you are participating in 
Valid 
Wakalah 11 3.7 
345.167 0.000 
Mudarabah 130 43.3 
Waqf 4 1.3 
Don't Know 147 49.0 
Other 8 2.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q3-Is there a minimum duration period to cancel the contract   
Valid 
No 297 99.0 
228.813 0.000 Yes 3 1.0 
Total 300 100.0 
                                               
71 Refer to chapter 5, Section 5.4.2.  
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Table 8.20 clarifies whether participants have enough knowledge of the used model principles. 
The results show that 281 (93.7 %) of participants replied ‘yes’, which indicates that takaful 
company were conveying the necessary information to participants in regards to their products, 
policies and principles. In this section, participant’s knowledge with regards to the principles and 
models of the takaful fund has been explored by forwarding two main questions which reflect 
their knowledge about the fund they are participating in. The first question aims at exploring 
participants’ awareness of the model72 they are participating in and only 11(3.7 %) participants 
knew that wakalah is the used operating model, while the majority of 147 (49 %) participants 
chose to pick ‘don’t know’ to answer the question. Participants were also challenged to identify 
if they are aware of any minimum durations or initial stages, required by the TOs to cancel the 
contract and surprisingly 297 (99 %) participants answered ‘no’, i.e. there is no minimum 
duration to cancel the contract. However, takaful companies will usually indicate a minimum 
cancellation or surrender period before the maturity of the contract, disobeying this period will 
expose participants to bear a charge.
73
 The chi-square tests reveal that the variations of responses 
in all three questions are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
2. Knowledge of Investment Return (KIR) 
Table 8.21: Knowledge and Awareness of Investment Return 
Q4- Do you know  the difference between PIF & PRF 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 136 45.3 
2.613 0.106 Yes 164 54.7 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.21 reflects participants’ replies to distinguish between the available types of fund in the 
family takaful policy. As explained previously a family takaful policy can have two types of 
fund, either PRF and/or PIF. Surprisingly, only 164 (54.7 %) of participants are aware of the 
difference between risks and saving accounts, however the percentage of the knowledgeable 
participants is supposed to be much more, because participants’ choice of policy either PIF or 
                                               
72
 Wakalah is the used practised model in Saudi Arabia; please refer to Chapter 3, Section 3.7.  
73
  http://www.sabbtakaful.com/FAQs/Family%20FAQ/family_faq_en.shtml 
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PRF will depend on their needs and wants behind buying the takaful policy. The chi-square test 
reveals that this question is not statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. = 0.106) with a small 
discrepancy between participants’ replies.   
 
3. Knowledge of Underwriting Surplus (KUS) 
Table 8.22: Knowledge and Awareness of Underwriting Surplus 
Q5 - Do you know the difference between net underwriting surplus and gross underwriting surplus ? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 226 75.3 
77.013 0.000 Yes 74 24.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q6 - What options of underwriting surplus distribution were given by the TOs in association with participants claim 
situation?    
Valid 
Without 
Differentiation  
16 5.3 
748.880 0.000 
To Non-claimable 
Participants 
3 1.0 
Amount of claims 
< contributions 
1 .3 
I don't know 280 93.3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.22 shows participants’ responsesto distinction between different types of surplus from 
the underwriting activities as some companies distribute surplus to participants in the form of net 
underwriting surplus, while others distribute it as gross underwriting surplus.
74
 The used method 
to distribute underwriting surplus should be disclosed to participants. However, 226 (75.3%) 
participants replied with ‘no’ when asked if they can distinguish between types of underwriting 
surplus which reflects participants’ low level of awareness of the technicality of the distribution 
benefits. Participants’ awareness in this matter can make a great difference on their purchasing 
decisions. If the TOs distribute the net underwriting surplus then participants’ expected benefits 
can be reduced as they will be charged extra percentage as incentive for the good performance of 
the takaful operators. Furthermore, participants were challenged to reveal the conditions that 
allowed them to share with other participants in the underwriting surplus. Some companies will 
not allow participants who claimed to share the underwriting surplus, while allowing others. 
                                               
74Refer to Chapter 2, for further discussion.  
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Thus the company should reflect these policies to the participants. The results indicate that 280 
(93.3 %) of participants are unaware of the company surplus distribution policies for those who 
made claims. The Chi -square tests reveal that the variations of responses in both questions are 
statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. = 0.000). This was more clearly shown in question 6 as the 
Chi -square value was relatively large. 
 
4. Knowledge of Shari’ah Compliance (KSC)  
Table 8.23: Knowledge and Awareness of Shari’ah Compliance 
Q7-Do you the know difference between Re-Insurance and Re-Takaful? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 262 87.3 
167.253 0.000 Yes 38 12.7 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.23 reflects participants’ knowledge of Shari’ah compliance, as one of the main reasons 
for participants buying Islamic insurance is to comply with the Shari’ah. As a result, TOs should 
explain the type of risk mitigation they are using (either re-takaful or re-insurance) so 
participants can be fully aware of whether the company follows Shari’ah in all transactions. 
However, 262 (87.3 %) of participants replied ‘no’ reflecting their weak awareness of the 
difference between re-takaful and re-insurance, which indicates a gap between the takaful 
company and participants in transmitting an important fact that deals with Shari’ah compliance. 
The Chi square test reveals that the variation of responses to this question is statistically 
significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
5. Knowledge of Expenses, Fees, Deficits and Qard Hasan (KFDQ) 
Table 8.24: Knowledge and Awareness of Expenses, Fees, Deficits and Qard Hasan 
Q8- Which of the following fees does the company charge the participants’ fund account. 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Wakalah Fee 1 .3 
588.06 0.000 
Investment Management Fee 1 .3 
I don't Know 298 99.3 
Total 300 100.0 
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Q9- Under which of the following conditions would you be required by the takaful company to pay 
additional contributions: 
 Recovering Underwriting Deficits 3 1.0 
755.600 0.000 
Building-up Reserves 14 4.7 
Paying back Shareholders' Qard 2 .7 
I don't know 281 93.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q10-Does the Operator call before to recover participant’s fund deficits 
Valid 
No 272 90.7 
198.453 0.000 Yes 28 9.3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.24 reflects participants’ knowledge of expenses, fees, and qard hasan since TOs should 
advise participants on the types of fees that they are going to charge the participant’s fund, such 
as wakalah upfront fees, investment management fees, etc. However, the survey indicates that 
298 (99.3 %) of participants are not aware of the charged fees. While, 281 (93.7 %) of 
participants have no idea in what circumstances they will be legally required by the company to 
pay additional contributions to the participants’ fund, which indicates an information gap 
between participants and TOs.  Furthermore, participants were also asked to clarify if the TOs 
had called them before recovering a deficit encountered in the participants’ fund and 272 (90.7 
%) of participants replied ‘no’. This can imply three possible scenarios: (i) The financial position 
of the Saudi TOs are strong enough that they do not encounter a deficit in the fund. (ii) The TOs 
do not put the burden on participants in case of shortage encountered in the fund and they might 
compensate this shortage from shareholders’ funds by providing qard loan. However, they will 
forward any future underwriting surplus and/or future investment return from the participants’ 
fund to the shareholders’ accounts. (iii) TOs might gradually increase participants’ regular 
contributions, to recover the fund deficit. This fact might not be mentioned to the participants to 
keep the good reputation of the company among participants. On the other hand, the Chi -square 
tests reveal that the variations of responses in all three questions to be statistically significant 
(Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). 
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6. Knowledge of the Company’s Key Personnel Power and Activities (KKP)  
Table 8.25: Knowledge and Awareness of the Company’s Key Personnel and Activities 
11- Are you aware of the following key governance personnel of the takaful company you participate in: 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
BoDs 0 0 
N/A N/A 
Shareholders 0 0 
Sen. Manag. 0 0 
SSB 0 0 
Appt. Act. 0 0 
Inv. Team 0 0 
OutSourc Inv. Team 0 0 
Don’t Know  300 100.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q12-Do Shareholders Share the following things with participants: 
 Underwriting Surplus 0 0 
N/A N/A 
Investment Return 0 0 
Don’t Know 300 100.0 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.25 reflects participants’ knowledge of TOs key personnel, such as BoDs, shareholders, 
and others. Surprisingly, all 300 participants were unable to identify any organs of the company, 
which indicated two possible scenarios: (i) participants are not interested to know the company 
organs or (ii) takaful operators did not disclose the company organs to the public. Furthermore, 
participants were asked to reflect as to whether they understand the kind of financial discretion 
activities shareholders can exert on the participants’ fund. Surprisingly, all 300 participants 
responded ‘don’t know’ to this question. On the other hand, as participants’ replies for both 
questions were the same (i.e. all 300 participants picked ‘don’t know’ to both questions)  the Chi 
-square test became inapplicable.   
 
7. Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels  (KDC) 
Table 8.26:  Knowledge and Awareness of Dissatisfaction & Quitting Options 
Q13 - What options were given by the company in case you are dissatisfied with the company services: 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Complaints to the Company 35 11.7 
44.507 0.000 
Quit the Company 90 30.0 
I don't know 112 37.3 
The company didn’t inform me 
of any quitting options 
63 21.0 
Total 300 100.0 
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Q14 - Which of the following can you refer to in case of dispute between you and the company: 
Valid 
Arbitration 8 2.7 
374.053 0.000 
Court 64 21.3 
Ombudsman 13 4.3 
I don't know 215 71.7 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.26 reflects participants’ knowledge on the proper way to quit the company in case of 
dissatisfaction. This is important for the participants as it would save them losing the paid 
contributions. However, 112 (37.3 %) participants replied ‘don’t know’ where to go when they 
are dissatisfied with the TOs, while 90 (30%) participants replied ‘quit the company’, without 
knowing that quitting the company before contract maturity could incur a penalty charge for 
them. Furthermore, 63 (21%) participants replied the company didn’t inform me of any quitting 
options’. They were also asked to clarify which party they were supposed to refer to in case of 
dissatisfaction and 215 (71.7 %) participants’ replied that they didn’t know. Thus, the 
participants’ responses to the two questions indicate a lack of disclosure of participants’ rights to 
quit the company when they are dissatisfied. The Chi -square tests reveal that the variations of 
responses in both questions are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05), which was clear by 
a large discrepancy in the questions. 
 
8.4.3 Participants’ Preferences  
Blythe (1997) described need as a perceived lack, that individuals must realize their preferences 
in order for it to be described as need. This recognition (perception) of lack (unfulfilled need) has 
been linked to a series of resultant activities in the mind of the consumer. Kotler et al (2001) also 
define human needs as “states of felt deprivation”. Accordingly, this section will describe 
participant’s preferences as these mirrors their needs and wants. Accordingly, the highest the rate 
of participants’ preferences implies high lacking rate of perceiving the required services. The 
exploration of participants’ preferences will be with regards to the service provided by the TOs. 
Participants’ preferences will add an important factor to participants’ satisfaction. Some of these 
preferences have been recognized by the international insurance organizations, by complying 
with the corporate governance and market conduct standards. For meaningful understanding, the 
statistical descriptions of all five participants’ preference variables are given below. 
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1. Participants’ Preferences for Shari’ah compliance (PSC)  
Table 8.27: Participants’ Preferences for Shari’ah compliance 
Q1 - Participants’ Fund will be affected because SSB gives less time to judge assets validity. 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Disagree 5 1.7 
290.333 0.000 
Disagree 31 10.3 
Neutral 144 48.0 
Agree 117 39.0 
Strongly Agree 3 1.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q2 - I would like to have an opportunity to select the SSB 
 Strongly Disagree 1 .3 
286.567 0.000 
Disagree 26 8.7 
Neutral 94 31.3 
Agree 159 53.0 
Strongly Agree 20 6.7 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.27 clarifies participants’ preferences of TOs’ Shari’ah compliance. Accordingly, 
participants were asked if the validity of participants’ fund will be affected if SSB was given less 
time to judge the assets portfolio and 120 (40 %) participants replied with ‘agree’ and ‘strongly 
agree’, respectively. A follow-up question was asked to participants as to their preferences on 
whether they would like to be given the chance to select the SSB members to which 179 (59.7 
%) participants answered with ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’, respectively. This indicates that 
participants might require more disclosure on the Shari’ah pronouncements/resolutions for the 
participants’ fund. On the other hand, the Chi -square tests reveal that the variations of responses 
in both questions are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
2. Participants’ Preferences for a Representative on the TOs’ BoD’s (PRB) 
Table 8.28: Participants’ Preferences on having Representatives 
Q3 - I would like to have a representatives who represents all participants on the  BoDs 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Disagree 5 1.7 
317.233 0.000 
Disagree 144 48.0 
Neutral 19 6.3 
Agree 126 42.0 
Strongly Agree 6 2.0 
Total 300 100.0 
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Table 8.28 reflects participants’ preferences to have a representative who can represent their 
requirements to the TOs. The participants’ replies were quite similar in that 49.7 % of the 
participants’ replied with ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’, respectively, while 44 % of the 
participants replied with ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’, respectively. on the responses of 
participants might be due to the level of low premiums paid i.e. 182 (60.7 %) participants paid 
premiums between SAR 01- 1000, which might give them a feeling that it is not worthwhile for 
the participants representatives to spend much time managing other participants’ fund for less 
expected profit as they prefer to concentrate on their daily life and careers. The Chi-square test 
reveals that the variations of responses in this question are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 
0.05). 
 
3. Participants’ Preferences on TOs’ Key Personnel Power and Activities (PKP) 
Table 8.29: Participants’ Preferences on TOs’ Key Personnel Power and Activities 
Q4 - Participants should have the right to refuse shareholders activities on the participants’ fund 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
294.267 0.000 
Disagree 11 3.7 
Neutral 84 28.0 
Agree 193 64.3 
Strongly Agree 12 4.0 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.29 reflects participants’ preferences of TOs’ key personnel, and if they should have the 
rights to refuse shareholders intrusions on participants’ funds. Their answer was quite reasonable 
in that 205 (68.3 %) participants replied with ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’, respectively which 
indicate that participants are not in favour of letting shareholders control their funds. On the 
other hand, the Chi -square test reveals that the variations of responses in this question are 
statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
 
4. Participants’ Preferences on the Reason to Use the Takaful Policy (PRU) 
Table 8.30: Participants’ Preferences on the Reason to Use the Takaful Policy 
Q5 - Why do you use takaful insurance: 
5-1) To protect myself against financial loss 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 233 77.7 
91.853 0.000 Yes 67 22.3 
Total 300 100.0 
5-2)  To make a future plan that can benefit me and my family 
Valid 
No 44 14.7 
149.813 0.000 Yes 256 85.3 
Total 300 100.0 
5-3) To help other participants in their needs 
Valid 
No 296 98.7 
284.213 0.000 Yes 4 1.3 
Total 300 100.0 
5-4) To obey the government mandatory order to carry an insurance policy 
Valid 
No 299 99.7 
296.013 0.000 Yes 1 .3 
Total 300 100.0 
5–5) Because of Shari’ah compliance 
Valid 
No 193 64.3 
24.653 0.000 Yes 107 35.7 
Total 300 100.0 
Q6 - Which of the following do you prefer 
Valid 
Shari’ah-Loose & high 
return 
1 0.3 
296.013 0.000 Shar’iah-Strict & low 
return 
299 99.7  
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.30 reflects the reasons for participants’ to buy a takaful policy. As has been discussed 
previously, brotherhood and helping other Muslims is one of the main reasons that should 
motivates participants to buy a takaful policy as being stated in the Malaysian Takaful Act 1984. 
However, 256 (85.3 %) participants replied ‘to make a future plan that can benefit me and my 
family’, while only 4 (1.3 %) participants replied ‘to help other participants in their needs’, and 
193 (64.3 %) participants clarified that Shari’ah compliance was not the reason that leads them 
to buy a takaful policy. Participants’ preferences on the reason to buy a takaful policy were also 
challenged by linking Shari’ah with financial return. When participants are faced with only two 
choices, either loose Shari’ah compliance and high returns or strict Shari’ah compliance and low 
returns, 299 (99.7%) participants were in favour of the latter choice. Participants’ responses to 
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question 6 are not in contradiction to question 5. In question 5 the question was asked of the 
reason to buy a takaful policy and the main reason given by participants was the expected 
financial returns. In question 6 participants were given the choice to pick their type of Shari’ah 
preference. That participants’ prefered Shari’ah-strict & low return is not considered unusual 
since the religiousity is expected to be high for all Muslims. The Chi -square tests reveal that the 
variations of responses in all sub-questions are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). 
 
5. Participants’ Preferences for Claims and Underwriting Surplus (PCU) 
Table 8.31: Participants’ Preferences for Claims and Underwriting Surplus  
Q7 - When I make claim I still want to share Underwriting Surplus with other participants 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 81 27.0 
63.480 0.000 Yes 219 73.0 
Total 300 100.0 
Q8 - When other participants make a claim, do you think they deserve to share Underwriting Surplus with 
other participants? 
Valid 
No 76 25.3 
73.013 0.000 Yes 224 74.7 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.31 reflects participants’ preferences on claims and underwriting surplus. Participants 
were asked to clarify whether they wanted to share the underwriting surplus with other 
participants who did not make a claim and 291 (73 %) participants’ replied ‘yes’. The question 
was rephrased with a similar meaning and the participants were asked to clarify if they would 
allow other participants who made claims to share the underwriting surplus with them to which 
224 (74.7 %) participants replied in affirmative. In short, participants’ replies to these two 
questions supported their preferences on the main reason of buying a takaful policy i.e., 
participants are buying the takaful policies for the expected financial return, and they are very 
eager to get the expected financial return regardless if they made claims or not. On the other 
hand, the Chi-square tests reveal that the variations of responses for both questions are 
statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). 
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8.4.4 Participants’ Satisfaction Levels 
This section will explore participants’ satisfaction levels with the products and services presented 
by the TOs in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, participants were asked to clarify if they are satisfied 
with the services and products offered by the TOs. In other words, participants’ satisfaction level 
can be considered a reflection to the services that were presented by the TOs. The participants’ 
satisfaction variables have been categorized into seven types which are described next.  
 
1. Satisfaction with the TOs’ Disclosure Mechanisms (SDM) 
Table 8.32: Satisfaction with the TOs’ Disclosure Mechanisms 
1-Are you satisfied with the company disclosure in regards to any changes on the contracts terms? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Not Satisfied 2 .7 
202.267 0.000 
Not Satisfied 104 34.7 
Neutral 70 23.3 
Satisfied 120 40.0 
Strongly Satisfied 4 1.3 
Total 300 100.0 
2-Are you satisfied with the disclosure mechanisms of informing participants of their rights related to 
“investment return/underwriting surplus”? 
Valid 
Strongly Not Satisfied 4 1.3 
210.167 0.000 
Not Satisfied 106 35.3 
Neutral 65 21.7 
Satisfied 123 41.0 
Strongly Satisfied 2 .7 
Total 300 100.0 
3 -Are you satisfied with the disclosure mechanisms that make participants eligible to receive qard loan in 
cases when their account encounters a financial loss? 
Valid 
Strongly Not Satisfied 3 1.0 
209.500 0.000 
Not Satisfied 100 33.3 
Neutral 72 24.0 
Satisfied 124 41.3 
Strongly Satisfied 1 .3 
Total 300 100.0 
4 -Are you satisfied with the takaful company in conveying your rights and obligations of receiving 
benefits? 
Valid 
Strongly Not Satisfied 3 1.0 
241.233 0.000 
Not Satisfied 96 32.0 
Neutral 58 19.3 
Satisfied 141 47.0 
Strongly Satisfied 2 .7 
Total 300 100.0 
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Table 8.32 represents participants’ satisfaction with different issues relating to TOs’ disclosure 
mechanisms and 124 (41.3 %) participants replied  ‘satisfied’ and ‘strongly satisfied’ for the  
disclosures of contract terms changes, while 106 (35.4 %) participants replied with ‘strongly not 
satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied’, respectively. Similarly, 125 (41.7 %) participants replied with 
‘satisfied’ and ‘strongly satisfied’ regarding disclosure of informing participants of their rights 
related to investment return and underwriting surplus, while 110 (36.6 %) participants replied 
with ‘strongly not satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied’, respectively. 125 (41.6 %) participants’ replied 
‘satisfied’ and ‘strongly satisfied’, respectively, for the  disclosure of making participants eligible 
to  receiving qard loan in case of deficits, while 103 (34.3 %) participants’ replied with ‘strongly 
not satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied’, respectively.  Furthermore, participants were asked to clarify if 
they are satisfied with the company effort in conveying their rights and obligations of receiving 
their benefits; accordingly, 143 (47.7 %) participants replied with ‘satisfied’ and ‘strongly 
satisfied’, respectively, while 99 (33 %) participants replied with ‘strongly not satisfied’ and ‘not 
satisfied’, respectively. The Chi-square tests revealed that the variations of responses for all four 
questions are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). 
 
2. Satisfaction with the Investment Return (SIR) 
 
Table 8.33: Satisfaction with the Investment Return 
5-Are you satisfied with the income and profits generated from participant’s investment accounts? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Not Satisfied 13 4.3 
266.067 0.000 
Not Satisfied 161 53.7 
Neutral 57 19.0 
Satisfied 68 22.7 
Strongly Satisfied 1 .3 
Total 300 100.0 
6-Are you satisfied with the ways and methods used to distribute investment returns among participants? 
Valid 
Strongly Not Satisfied 6 2.0 
205.767 0.000 
Not Satisfied 128 42.7 
Neutral 70 23.3 
Satisfied 95 31.7 
Strongly Satisfied 1 .3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.33 represents participants’ satisfaction with the TOs financial position and performance 
considered an important factor in enhancing and developing insurance business as well as 
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reflecting the company ability to satisfy its promises and strength to meet participants’ 
obligations. Accordingly, 174 (58 %) participants replied with ‘strongly not satisfied’ and ‘not 
satisfied’, respectively with the profits and income generated from participants investment 
accounts, while 134 (45 %) participants replied  ‘strongly not satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied’,  
respectively with the ways and methods used to distribute investment returns among them. On 
the other hand, the Chi-square tests reveal that the variations of responses for both questions are 
statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). 
 
3. Satisfaction with the Underwriting Surplus (SUS) 
 
Table 8.34: Satisfaction with the Underwriting Surplus 
7-Are you satisfied with the amount of underwriting surplus distributed by the company? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Not Satisfied 3 1.0 
192.467 0.000 
Not Satisfied 95 31.7 
Neutral 88 29.3 
Satisfied 113 37.7 
Strongly Satisfied 1 .3 
Total 300 100.0 
8-Are you satisfied with the way and methods used in disclosing and allocating underwriting surplus? 
Valid 
Strongly Not Satisfied 2 .7 
224.267 0.000 
Not Satisfied 99 33.0 
Neutral 67 22.3 
Satisfied 131 43.7 
Strongly Satisfied 1 .3 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.34 represents participants’ satisfaction about underwriting surplus. As has been explored 
previously, participants are eager to get an underwriting surplus even when they made a claim. 
As a result, participants were asked to clarify if they are satisfied with the amount of distributed 
surplus. The participants were divided almost equally in their opinion, with 98 (33 %) 
participants answering with (strongly not satisfied and not satisfied) respectively, while 114 (38 
%) participants replied with ‘satisfied’’ and ‘strongly satisfied’ with the notion. Participants also 
have shown their satisfaction with the methods used in disclosing and allocating underwriting 
surplus, that 132 (44 %) participants answered with ‘strongly satisfied’ and ‘satisfied’ 
respectively, while 101 (34 %) participants replied with  ‘strongly not satisfied’ and ‘not 
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satisfied’, respectively. The Chi-square tests indicate that the variations of responses for both 
questions are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). 
 
4. Satisfaction with Shari’ah Compliance (SSC) 
 
Table 8.35: Satisfaction with Shari’ah compliance 
9-Are you satisfied with the company Shari’ah compliance mechanisms? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Not Satisfied 3 1.0 
333.000 0.000 
Not Satisfied 33 11.0 
Neutral 93 31.0 
Satisfied 168 56.0 
Strongly Satisfied 3 1.0 
Total 300 100.0 
10-Are you satisfied with the way and method used by the Shari’ah scholars to allocate underwriting 
surplus? 
Valid 
Strongly Not Satisfied 9 3.0 
219.767 0.000 
Not Satisfied 50 16.7 
Neutral 115 38.3 
Satisfied 124 41.3 
Strongly Satisfied 2 .7 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.35 represents participants’ satisfaction with TOs’ Shari’ah compliance, since Shari’ah 
compliance is considered the main pillar that differentiates takaful from the conventional 
insurance. Participants were asked if they were satisfied with the TOs’ Shari’ah compliancesand 
171 (57 %) of participants replied with ‘strongly satisfied’ and ‘satisfied’, respectively, while 36 
(12 %) of participants’ replied with ‘strongly not satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied’, respectively. 
Participants also have shown their satisfaction with the way and method used by the Shari’ah 
scholars to allocate underwriting surplus in that 126 (42 %) of participants’ replied with ‘strongly 
satisfied’ and ‘satisfied’, respectively. On the other hand, the Chi-square tests reveal that the 
variations of responses for both questions are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). 
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5. Satisfaction with Claims & Indemnities (SCI)  
 
Table 8.36: Satisfaction with Claims and Indemnities 
11-Are you satisfied with the terms and conditions of the required claim notice? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Not Satisfied 2 .7 
319.033 0.000 
Not Satisfied 84 28.0 
Neutral 43 14.3 
Satisfied 168 56.0 
Strongly Satisfied 3 1.0 
Total 300 100.0 
12-Are you satisfied with the prompt and permanent indemnity payments terms and conditions? 
 Strongly Not Satisfied 4 1.3 
394.233 0.000 
Not Satisfied 56 18.7 
Neutral 49 16.3 
Satisfied 190 63.3 
Strongly Satisfied 1 .3 
Total 300 100.0 
13-Are you satisfied with the claim settlements procedures indicated in the policy contract? 
 Strongly Not Satisfied 3 1.0 
297.400 0.000 
Not Satisfied 81 27.0 
Neutral 52 17.3 
Satisfied 163 54.3 
Strongly Satisfied 1 .3 
Total 300 100.0 
14-Are you satisfied with the time giving to participants to indemnify and recover the encountered loss? 
 Strongly Not Satisfied 2 .7 
127.547 0.000 
Not Satisfied 102 34.0 
Neutral 63 21.0 
Satisfied 133 44.3 
Strongly Satisfied 0 0 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.36 represents participants’ satisfaction with TOs’ claims and indemnities procedures, 
since it is the main principle that distinguishes insurance business from other financial 
institutions. Accordingly, participants were asked a couple of questions to clarify their 
satisfaction levels with the TOs’ claims and indemnities services and their answers are as 
follows: 
 
(i) 171 (57 %) of participants replied with ‘satisfied’ and ‘strongly satisfied’ for the terms and 
conditions of the required claim notice. (ii) 191 (63.6 %) of participants replied with ‘satisfied’ 
and ‘strongly satisfied’ for the prompt and permanent indemnity payments terms and conditions. 
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(iii) 164 (54.6 %) of participants replied with ‘satisfied’ and ‘strongly satisfied’ for the claim 
settlements procedures indicated on the contract. (iv) 133 (44.3 %) of participants replied with 
‘satisfied’ and ‘strongly satisfied’ against 104 (34.7 %) participants who reply with  ‘strongly not 
satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied’, for the time given to participants to indemnify and recover the 
encountered loss.  The Chi-square tests reveal that the variations of responses for all four 
questions are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). 
 
6. Satisfaction with Charged Fees, Deficits and Qard Hasan (SFDQ) 
 
Table 8.37:  Satisfaction with Charged Fees, Deficits and Qard Hasan 
15-Are you satisfied if the operator called on you for additional contribution to recover a deficit on 
the participant’s fund? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Not Satisfied 18 6.0 
216.240 0.000 
Not Satisfied 183 61.0 
Neutral 48 16.0 
Satisfied 51 17.0 
Strongly Satisfied 0 0 
Total 300 100.0 
16-Are you satisfied with the amount of incentives that the company is deducting from participants’ 
fund for good performance in generating underwriting surplus and investment return? 
Valid 
Strongly Not Satisfied 18 6.0 
68.667 0.000 
Not Satisfied 117 39.0 
Neutral 79 26.3 
Satisfied 86 28.7 
Strongly Satisfied 0 0 
Total 300 100.0 
 
Table 8.37 represents participants’ satisfaction with fees, deficits and qard hasan. As explained 
previously, there is a strong relationship which links company charged fees and expenses, with 
the encountered deficits and the availability of qard. Accordingly, participants were asked to 
clarify whether will be satisfied if the Operator calls on them to pay an additional contribution to 
recover a deficit on the participant’s fund. 201 (67 %) of participants replied with ‘strongly not 
satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied’, while only 51 (17 %) of participants replied with ‘satisfied’ and 
zero score for strongly satisfied with the notion. Participants have also shown their 
dissatisfaction with the incentives deduction from participants fund for good performance in 
generating underwriting surplus and investment return. 135 (45 %) of participants replied  
‘strongly not satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied’, while 86 (28.7 %) of participants answered  ‘satisfied’ 
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and again none indicated ‘strongly satisfied’. On the other hand, the Chi-square tests revealed 
that the variations of responses for both questions are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 
0.05). 
 
7. Satisfaction with the Company’s Key Personnel Power and Activities (SKP)  
 
Table 8.38: Satisfaction with the Company’s Key Personnel and Activities 
17-Are you satisfied to let the operator share underwriting surplus and investment return with you? 
Valid 
Options Frequency Percent 
Chi-square test 
Chi-square Sig. 
Strongly Not Satisfied 11 3.7 
263.567 0.000 
Not Satisfied 67 22.3 
Neutral 60 20.0 
Satisfied 160 53.3 
Strongly Satisfied 2 .7 
Total 300 100.0 
18-Are you satisfied with the shareholders ownership share in company? 
Valid 
Strongly Not Satisfied 6 2.0 
377.433 0.000 
Not Satisfied 39 13.0 
Neutral 186 62.0 
Satisfied 67 22.3 
Strongly Satisfied 2 .7 
Total 300 100.0 
 
 
Table 8.38 represents participants’ satisfaction with TOs’ key personnel. Participants were asked 
to clarify whether they are satisfied to let shareholders share underwriting surplus and investment 
return with them. The results indicate that 162 (54 %) of participants replied  ‘satisfied’ and 
‘strongly satisfied’ respectively, while 78 (26 %) of participants replied  ‘strongly not satisfied’ 
and ‘not satisfied’, respectively. Participants were also asked to clarify whether they are satisfied 
with the shareholders ownership share in the company and 62 % of the participants’ replied with 
neutral 23 % of the participants replied with ‘satisfied’ and ‘strongly satisfied’ against 15 % of 
the participants who replied with ‘strongly not satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied’. The Chi-square tests 
revealed that the variations of responses for both questions are statistically significance (Asymp. 
Sig. < 0.05). 
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8.5 PARTICIPANTS’ OVERALL PERCEPTIONS  
To reflect a useful interpretation and close insight into participants’ responses, all questions that 
represent an individual variable were combined together, then recoded and divided into three 
levels to give a clear meaning of that variable, with the following scaling approach (0 - 0.33 = 
Weak Perceptions , 0.34 - 0.66 = Moderate Perceptions, 0.67 - 1 = High Perceptions).   
 
8.5.1 - Participants’ Overall Perceptions of TOs’ Disclosure Variables 
Table 8.39 below reflects participants’ overall perceptions of the seven disclosure variables (DM, 
DIR, DUS, DSC, DCI, DFDQ, and DKP).     
 
Table 8.39 Participants’ Overall Disclosures 
Variables 
Low 
disclosure 
Moderate 
disclosure 
High 
disclosure 
Chi-square & Sig. 
DM 124 (41.3%) 152 (50.7 %) 24 (8 %) 90.56 (0 %)  
DIR 66 (22 %) 208 (69.3 %) 26 (8.7 %) 182.96 (0 %) 
DUS 277 (92.3 %) 12 (4 %) 11 (3.7 %) 469.940 (0 %) 
DSC 207 (69 %)  79 (26.3 %) 14 (4.7 %) 192.860 (0 %) 
DCI 234 (78 %) 0 (0 %) 66 (22 %) 94.08 (0 %) 
DFDQ 276 (92 %) 11 (3.7 %) 13 (4.3 %) 464.66 (0 %) 
DKP 165 (55 %) 128 (42.7 %) 7 (2.3 % ) 136.58 (0 %) 
 
Participants’ Overall Perceptions of TOs’ Disclosure Mechanisms (DM) 
Participants’ overall perceptions of the TOs’ disclosure mechanisms revealed that 152 (50.7 %) 
participants perceived moderate disclosure, followed by 124 (41.3 %) of participants with a low 
perceived disclosure, and only 24 (8 %) of participants with a high perceived disclosure from the 
TOs. On the other hand, the Chi-square test revealed that participants overall responses on the 
TOs’s disclosure mechanism are statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). 
 
Participants’ Overall Perceptions of TO Disclosure of Investment Returns (DIR) 
Participants’ overall perceptions on investment returns disclosure revealed that 208 (69.3 %) of 
participants perceived moderate information, followed by 66 (22 %) of participants with a low 
perceived disclosure, and only 26 (8.7 %) participants with a high perceived disclosure. 
Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that participants overall perceptions’ of TOs disclosure 
for participants’ fund investment returns is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
235 
 
Participants’ Overall Perceptions of TO Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus (DUS) 
Participants’ overall perceptions of underwriting surplus disclosure revealed that 277 (92.3 %) 
participants perceived low information, followed by 12 (4.0 %) participants with a moderate 
perceived disclosure, and only 11(3.7 %) participants with a high perceived disclosure. 
Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that participants overall perceptions’ of TOs’ 
disclosure for the underwriting surplus is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. . < 0.05).  
   
Participants’ Overall Perceptions of TO Disclosure of Shari’ah Compliance System (DSC) 
Participants’ overall perceptions of TO disclosure of Shari’ah compliance revealed that 207 
(69.0 %) participants perceived low information, followed by 79 (26.3 %) participants with a 
moderate perceived disclosure, and only 14 (4.7 %) participants with a high perceived disclosure. 
Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that participants overall perceptions’ of TOs’ 
disclosure for Shari’ah compliance is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
 
Participants’ Overall Perceptions of TO Disclosure of Claims and Indemnities (DCI) 
Participants’ overall perceptions on the TOs’ disclosure for the claims and indemnities 
procedures used the TOs revealed that 234 (78.0 %) participants’ perceived low information, 
followed by 66 (22 %) participants with a high perceived disclosure. Furthermore, the Chi-
square test revealed that participants overall perceptions’ of TOs’ disclosure for claims and 
indemnities is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
Participants’ Overall Perceptions of TO Disclosure of Fees, Deficits and Qard (DFDQ) 
Participants’ overall perceptions on the TOs’ disclosure for the charged fees, encountered 
deficits and the availability of qard revealed that 276 (92.0 %) participants perceived low 
information, followed by 13 (4.3 %) participants with a high perceived disclosure, then 11 (3.7 
%) participants with a moderate disclosure. Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that 
participants overall perceptions’ of TOs’ disclosure for fees, deficits and qard is statistically 
significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
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Participants’ Overall Perceptions of TO Disclosure of Key Personnel (DKP) 
Participants’ overall perceptions of  TO disclosure of the company’s key personnel revealed that 
165 (55.0 %) participants’ perceived low information, followed by 128 (42.7 %) of participants 
with a moderate perceived disclosure, then 7 (2.3 %) of participants with a high disclosure. The 
Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall perceptions’ of TOs’ disclosure for the 
company key personnel is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
8.5.2 - Participants’ Overall Knowledge  
Table 8.40, below reflects participants’ overall perceptions of the seven knowledge variables 
(KPM, KIR, KUS, KSC, KFDQ, KKP and KDC).     
 
Table 8.40:  Participants’ Overall Knowledge 
Variables 
Weak or no 
knowledge 
Moderate 
knowledge 
Good 
knowledge 
Chi-square & 
Sig. 
KPM  17 (5.7 %) 279 (93 %) 4 (1.3 %) 481.46 (0 %) 
KIR 136 (45.3 %) 0 (0 %) 164 (54.7 %) 2.613 (0.106 %) 
KUS 226 (75.3 %) 74 (24.7 %)  0 (0 %) 77.013 ( 0 %) 
KSC 262 (87.3%) 0 (0 %) 38 (12.7 %) 167.253 (0 %) 
KFDQ 272 (90.7 % ) 28 (9.3 %) 0 (0 %) 198.453 (0 %) 
KKP 300 (300 %) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) N/A 
KDC 237 (79 %) 63 ( 21 %) 0 (0 %) 100.920 (0 %) 
 
Participants’ Overall Knowledge of the principles of TOs Model (KPM)      
Participants’ overall knowledge of the used model principles revealed that 279 (93.0 %) of 
participants reported a moderate knowledge, followed by 17 (5.7 %) of participants with a weak 
knowledge, then only 4 (1.3 %) of participants with a good knowledge. Furthermore, the Chi-
square test revealed that participants’ overall knowledge of the used model principles is 
statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
Participants’ Overall Knowledge of Participants’ Fund Investment Returns (KIR) 
Participants’ overall knowledge of the distribute investment returns revealed that 164 (54.7 %) of 
participants reported a good knowledge, followed by 136 (45.3 %) of participants with a weak 
knowledge. Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall knowledge of the 
investment returns is statistically not significant (Asymp. Sig. > 0.05).  
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Participants’ Overall Knowledge of Participants’ Fund Underwriting Surplus (KUS) 
Participants’ overall knowledge of the distributed underwriting surplus revealed that 226 (75.3 
%) participants reported a weak knowledge, followed by 74 (24.7 %) participants with a 
moderate knowledge. Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that participants overall 
knowledge of the underwriting surplus is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
Participants’ Overall Knowledge of TOs’ Shari’ah Compliance System (KSC) 
Participants’ overall knowledge of the Shari’ah compliance system used by the TOs revealed 
that 262 (87.3 %) participants reported a weak knowledge, followed by 38 (12.7 %) participants 
with a good knowledge. Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that participants overall 
knowledge of Shari’ah compliance is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
Participants’ Overall Knowledge of Fees, Deficits and Qard (KFDQ) 
Participants’ overall knowledge of the charged fees, encountered deficits, and qard availability 
revealed that 272 (90.7 %) of participants reported a weak knowledge, followed by only 28 (9.3 
%) of participants with a moderate knowledge. Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that 
participants overall knowledge of fees, deficits and qard is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. 
< 0.05).  
 
Participants’ Overall Knowledge of TOs’ Key Personnel (KKP) 
Participants’ overall knowledge of the company’s key personnel revealed that all 300 
participants have no knowledge. Furthermore; the Chi-square test revealed that this variable is 
constant; hence the chi-square test cannot be performed. 
 
Participants’ Overall Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels (KDC) 
Participants’ overall knowledge of the proper channels to quit the company when they are 
dissatisfied, revealed that 237 (79.0 %) of participants reported a weak knowledge, followed by 
63 (21.0 %) of participants with a moderate knowledge. Furthermore, the Chi-square test 
revealed that participants’ overall knowledge for a proper dissatisfaction channels is statistically 
significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
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8.5.3- Participants’ Overall Preferences   
Table 8.41 below reflects participants’ overall preferences for the five preferences independent 
variables (PSC, PRB, PKP, PRU, and PSU).     
 
Table 8.41:  Participants’ Overall Preferences 
Variables 
Weak or no 
preference 
Moderate 
preference 
High 
preference 
Chi-square & 
Sig. 
PSC 22 (7.3 %) 98 (32.7 %) 180 (60 %) 124.88 (0 %) 
PRB 149 (49.7 %) 19 (6.3 %) 132 (44 %) 99.86 (0 %) 
PKP 11 (3.7 %) 84 (28 %) 205 (68.3 %) 192.02 (0 %) 
PRU 0 (0 %) 175 (58.3 %) 125 (41.7 %) 8.333 (0.004 %) 
PCU 57 (19 %) 43 (14.3 %) 200 (66.7 %) 150.980 (0 %) 
 
Participants’ Overall Preferences Regarding Shari’ah compliance (PSC) 
Participants’ overall preferences for company Shari’ah compliance, revealed that 180 (60.0 %) 
of participants reported a high preference, followed by 98 (32.7 %) of participants with a 
moderate preference. Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall 
preferences for the Shariah compliance is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
 
Participants’ Overall Preferences for a Representative on TO BoDs (PRB) 
Participants’ overall preferences to have a representative on the BoDs are almost equal, in that 
149 (49.7 %) of participants reported weak preference, followed by 132 (44 %) of participants 
with high preference. The Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall preference to have a 
representative on the BoDs is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. <  0.05).  
 
Participants’ Overall Preferences of TOs’ Key Personnel (PKP) 
Participants’ overall preferences for shareholders’ activities revealed that 205 (68.3 %) of 
participants reported high preferences, followed by 84 (28 %) of participants with moderate 
preferences. Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall preference to 
refuse shareholders activities is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05).  
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Participants’ Overall Preferences Regarding Reasons for the Use of Takaful policy (PRU) 
Participants’ overall preferences regarding reasons for buying a takaful policy revealed that 175 
(58.3%) of participants reported a moderate preference, followed by 125 (41.7 %) of participants 
with high preferences. The Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall preference of the 
reason to buy a takaful policy is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig < 0.05). 
  
Participants’ Overall Preferences for Claims and Underwriting Surplus (PCU) 
Participants’ overall preferences for TO claims and indemnities procedures revealed that 200 
(66.7 %) of participants reported high preference, followed by 57 (19.0 %) of participants with 
weak preference, then 43 (14.3 %) of participants with moderate preferences,   Furthermore, the 
Chi-square test revealed that participants overall preferences on the claims and indemnities is 
statistically significant (Asymp. Sig < 0.05). 
 
8.5.4 - Participants’ Overall Satisfaction       
Table 8.42 below reflects participants’ overall satisfaction with the seven satisfaction dependent 
variables (SDM, SIR, SUS, SSC, SCI, SFDQ, and SKP).     
 
 
Table 8.42:  Participants’ Overall Satisfaction 
Variables 
Weak or no 
satisfaction 
Moderate 
satisfaction 
High 
satisfaction 
Chi-square & 
Sig. 
SDM 91 (30.3 %) 81 (27 %) 128 (42.7 %) 34.978 (0 %)  
SIR 152 (50.7 %) 76 (25.3 %) 72 (24 %) 40.64 (0 %) 
SUS 105 (35 %) 66 (22 %) 129 (43 %) 20.22 (0 %) 
SSC 46 (15.3 %)  83 (27.7 %) 171 (57 %) 82.46 (0 %) 
SCI 79 (26.3 %) 52 (17.3 %) 169 (56.3 %) 75.06 (0 %) 
SFDQ 167 (55.7%) 82 (27.3%) 51 (17.0%) 72.14 ( %) 
SKP 76 (25.3%) 69 (23.0%) 155 (51.7%) 45.62 (0 %) 
 
Participants’ Overall Satisfaction with TOs’ Disclosure Mechanisms (SDM) 
Participants’ overall satisfaction with TOs disclosure mechanisms revealed that 128 (42.7 %) of 
participants reported high satisfaction, followed by 91 (30.3 %) of participants with weak 
satisfaction, then 81 (27 %) of participants with moderate satisfaction. Furthermore, the Chi-
square test revealed that participants’ overall satisfaction on the TOs disclosure mechanisms is 
statistically significant (Asymp. Sig < 0.05).  
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Participants’ Overall Satisfaction with TOs’ Investment Returns (SIR) 
Participants’ overall satisfaction on the distributed investment returns revealed that 152 (50.7 %) 
of participants reported weak satisfaction, followed by 76 (25.3 %) of participants with moderate 
satisfaction, then 72 (24.0 %) of participants with high satisfaction. The Chi-square test reveals 
that participants’ overall satisfaction with the TOs investment returns are statistically significant 
(Asymp. Sig < 0.05).  
 
Participants’ Overall Satisfaction with TOs’ Underwriting Surplus (SUS) 
Participants’ overall satisfaction with the distributed underwriting surplus revealed that 129 
(43%) of participants reported high satisfaction, followed by 105 (35%) of participants with 
weak satisfaction, then 29 (9.7 %) of participants with moderate satisfaction. Furthermore, the 
Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall satisfaction on the TOs underwriting surplus is 
statistically significant (Asymp. Sig < 0.05).  
 
Participants’ Overall Satisfaction with TOs’ Shari’ah Compliance Systems (SSC) 
Participants’ overall satisfaction with the Shari’ah compliance system used by the TOs revealed 
that 171 (57.0 %) of participants reported high satisfaction, followed by 83 (27.7 %) participants 
with moderate satisfaction, then 46 (15.3 %) participants with weak satisfaction. Furthermore, 
the Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall satisfaction on the Shari’ah compliance 
system is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig < 0.05).  
 
Participant Overall Satisfaction with TOs’ Claims and Indemnities (SCI) 
Participants’ overall satisfaction with TOs’ claims and indemnities procedures revealed that 169 
(56.3 %) participants reported high satisfaction, followed by 79 (26.3 %) of participants with 
weak satisfaction, then 52 (17.3 %) of participants with moderate satisfaction. Furthermore, the 
Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall satisfaction with the Shari’ah compliance 
system is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig < 0.05). 
  
Participants’ Overall Satisfaction with Fund Fees, Deficits and Qard (SFDQ) 
Participants’ overall satisfaction on the charged fees, encountered deficits and the availability of 
qard revealed that 167 (55.7 %) of participants reported weak satisfaction, followed by 82 (27.3 
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%) of participants with moderate satisfaction, then 51 (17%) of participants with high 
satisfaction. The Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall satisfaction with the charged 
fees, encountered deficits and the availability of qard is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig < 
0.05).  
 
Participants’ Overall Satisfaction with TOs’ Key Personnel (SKP) 
Participants’ overall satisfaction with the key personnel power and activities on the participants’ 
fund revealed that 155 (51.7 %) of participants reported a high satisfaction, followed by 76 (25.3 
%) of participants with a weak satisfaction, then 69 (23%) of participants with a moderate 
satisfaction. Furthermore, the Chi-square test revealed that participants’ overall satisfaction with 
the key personnel power and activities on the participants fund is statistically significant (Asymp. 
Sig < 0.05).  
 
8.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided information on the characteristics of the participants and also discussed 
the preliminary findings based on the overall results of the survey. The chapter provided detailed 
answers to research question 3 and the survey gives a clear picture of participants’ demographic 
characteristics in terms of gender, age, and education level, number of members included in the 
contract, premium paid, occupation, and contract duration. The survey also highlighted that TO 
A has 82 % of the total participants who answered the research survey, while 76.6 % of 
participants buy takaful savings policies rather than risks policies. 
  
Furthermore, the results analysis of the survey indicated that participants are not exposed to a 
proper disclosure mechanism to reflect their rights in receiving updated information about their 
benefits in the fund. For example, (92 %) participants indicated that TOs did not expose them to 
an effective disclosure mechanism to reflect their benefits rights in the fund. The survey also 
indicated an overall weak knowledge of participants of the services and products of the TOs. For 
example, (93%) showed no knowledge of the underwriting surplus distribution conditions, and 
(75%) showed no knowledge of the different kinds of underwriting surplus.  
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In terms of preferences, the majority of participants are in favour of being involved in controlling 
their funds. 60 % of participants prefer to be given an opportunity to select the SSB members and 
68.4% participants prefer to refuse shareholders’ activities in their fund. Surprisingly, 
participants have shown some moderate satisfaction in almost all satisfaction variables, with an 
exception for investment returns, charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard, 
which shows a weak satisfaction. 
 
Finally, as this chapter provides basic univariate descriptive analysis, it is vital to continue the 
analysis with a complex technique that yields better results to reflect the statistically significant 
impacts of the three variables (participants’ perceived disclosure, participants’ knowledge, and 
participants’ preferences) on participants’ satisfaction levels, which will be presented in the 
following two chapters. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES AFFECTING 
PARTICIPANT SATISFACTION : BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter explores the participants’ satisfaction, by exploring the relationships strength 
between participants’ perceptions about Takaful operators’ (TOs’) disclosure systems, 
participants’ knowledge and participants’ preferences with participants’ satisfaction levels. To do 
this, the bivariate analysis approach will be used which is considered to be one of the simplest 
forms of quantitative (statistical) analysis (Babbie, 2007). It involves analysing  two variables x 
and y, for the purpose of determining the empirical relationship between them, to find out 
whether the variables are related to one another and to measure how those two variables 
simultaneously change together (Babbie, 2007).  The empirical analyses in this chapter responds 
to the following research questions:  
 
Research Question 4: How do the participants’ demographics characteristics affect their 
satisfaction levels?   
Research Question 5: What are the strengths of relationship between participants’ perceptions, 
knowledge and preferences, with their satisfaction about the TOs services and products? 
 
Several inferential statistical tools are considered suitable approaches to analyzing non-
parametric
75
 data were used such as the Mann-Whitney U-Test (U-test), Kruskal-Wallis test (K-
W test) (Pallant, 2010), while the Spearman’s correlations approach has been adopted to tackle 
question 5. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 9.2 exploring and analyzing the 
relationship between participants’ demographics characteristics, as identified previously, with 
participants’ satisfaction with the service and products offered by the TOs by implementing the 
U-test and the K-W test. Section 9.3 identifies the relationship between the 3 TOs (A, B and C) 
with participants’ satisfaction levels by using the K-W test. Section 9.4 describes the significant 
association between participants’ perceptions, participants’ knowledge, and participants’ 
preferences with participants’ satisfaction by using Spearman’s correlations. Section 9.5 explores 
                                               
75 Refer to chapter 7 for justifying the use of non-parametric data analysis approach.   
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the significant association between participants’ perceptions and participants’ knowledge and 
between participants’ knowledge and participants’ preferences. Section 9.6 draws conclusion.  
 
9.2 MANN-WHITNEY U-TEST & KRUSKAL-WALLIS TEST FOR PARTICIPANTS’ 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS   
This section answers research question four and investigates the impact of participants’ 
personnel and demographic characteristics on their satisfaction level.  However, another variable, 
total participants’ satisfaction (TPS) is added to the seven satisfaction variables (SDM, SIR, 
SUS, SSC, SCI, SFDQ, and SKP)
76, to give a clearer insight as to participants’ demographic 
subgroups that are satisfied with all services and products presented by the TOs. Accordingly, 
the U-test was employed to examine participants’ gender and the K-W test to examine age, 
education level, premiums paid, number of members in the contract, contract duration, and 
occupation. The main statistic  considered to draw conclusion about statistically significant 
differences across variables in the output is the Asymp. Sig. which indicates if the significance 
level is less than 0.05 (Pallant, 2010).  Therefore, if there is a statistically significant difference 
found then the level of the difference has to be described by identifying which group variables 
scored the highest rank, by referring to the Mean Rank table (Pallant, 2010). Pallant also 
indicated that the (Z) value for U-test, and the Chi-Square (X2) test for K-W tests, are useful 
pieces of information, which can add more elaboration if the resultant variables were statistically 
significant (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05). Full details of the significance relations between participants’ 
demographic characteristics in relation with their satisfaction level can be found in Appendix D 
(Tables D.1 to D.8).    
                                               
76
 SDM Satisfaction with TOs’ Disclosure Mechanisms, SIR Satisfaction with TOs Investment Returns, SUS 
Satisfaction with TOs underwriting Surplus, SSC Satisfaction with Shari’ah Compliance System, SCI Satisfaction 
with Claims and Indemnities, SFDQ Satisfaction with Fees, Deficits and Qard, SKP Satisfaction with Key 
Personnel Power. 
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9.2.1. Participants’ Satisfaction based on Resultant Significant Value  
 As previously mentioned, this section highlights the variables that score a statistically significant 
value (Asymp. Sig. < 0.05) between participants’ satisfaction and their demographic 
characteristics. Accordingly, appendix D indicates a non-statistically significant difference (Sig. 
p > 0.05) between some of the participants’ demographics characteristics (participants’ education 
levels, participants’ premium paid, and participants’ contract durations) with all satisfaction 
variables. Participants’ satisfaction with TOs’ Shari’ah compliance (SSC) has also shown no 
statistically significant relations with all participants’ demographic characteristics, which 
complements the fact that 256 (85.3 %) participants buy takaful policy for future planning.
77
 
Only 107 (35.7 %) buy the takaful policy on account of its Shari’ah compliance. On the other 
hand, the K-W test shows a repeated statistically significant difference between participants’ job 
categories and some of the satisfaction variables (total participants’ satisfaction (TPS), 
satisfaction with TOs’ disclosure mechanism (SDM), satisfaction with underwriting surplus 
(SUS), satisfaction with claims and indemnities (SCI) with. Table 9.1 shows that students have 
the highest mean rank, while managers have the lowest for different satisfaction levels. While, 
participants’ satisfaction with the charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard 
(SFDQ) has reported a significant relationships with professionals (highest mean rank = 169.00) 
and managers (lowest mean rank = 128.02).  
 
Table 9.1 Relationships between Satisfaction Determinant Variables and Job Categories. 
Satisfaction Determinant Variables 
Students 
mean rank 
Managers 
mean rank 
P - Value 
Total participants’ satisfaction (TPS) 254.13 129.05 0.035 
Satisfaction with disclosure mechanism (SDM) 224.50 130.70 0.013 
Satisfaction with underwriting surplus (SUS) 199.00 114.50 0.013 
Satisfaction with claims and indemnities (SCI) 204.38 132.42 0.044 
 
 
The K-W test showed that participants’ satisfaction with participants’ funds charged fees, 
encountered deficits and availability of qard (SFDQ) has reported a statistically significant 
difference with participants job categories as Asymp Sig. P (0.036 < 0.05). Furthermore, Table 
9.2 shows that among  age grouping, participants aged above 51 years yields the highest (mean 
rank = 156.91), while participants aged 31 to 40 years reported the lowest (mean rank = 126.03). 
                                               
77 Refer to Chapter 8, Table 8.30.  
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Table 9.2 Relationships between Satisfaction with Charged Fees, Encountered Deficits and 
Availability of Qard and Participants’ Age Group 
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Participants’ Age in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfaction (Yrs) N Mean Rank Chi- Squ. - x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SFDQ 
Age (21-30) Yrs 24 152.67 
x^2 = 8.567 0.036 
Age (31-40) Yrs 119 126.03 
Age (41-50) Yrs 101 147.58 
Age > 51 Yrs 35 156.91 
Total 279   
 
In terms of participants’ satisfaction with TOs’ key personnel power and activities (SKP), the K-
W test reflected a statistically significant difference across variables as per Asymp Sig. P (0.04 < 
0.05), with the number of members included in the takaful policy. Table 9.3 indicates that 
participants with three members in the policy have reported the highest (mean rank =148.17), 
while participants with six members have reported the lowest (mean rank =111.00). 
 
Table 9.3 Relationships between Satisfaction with TOs’ Key Personnel Power and 
Activities and Number of Members in the Takaful Policy. 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Number of Members included in the takaful policy. 
Satisfaction Members N Mean Rank Chi-Squ. - x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SKP 
1 68 111.63 
x^2 = 13.194 0.04 
2 29 120.24 
3 39 148.17 
4 47 142.60 
5 31 133.03 
6 25 111.00 
Members ≥7 15 128.53 
Total 254   
 
While, the U-test shows that participants’ satisfaction with fund investment returns (SIR) 
reported a statistically significant difference across the variables as Asymp Sig. P (0.035 < 0.05), 
Table 9.4 shows that among gender categories females are ranked the highest (mean rank = 
181.85) and males have ranked the lowest (mean rank = 134.24). 
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Table 9.4 Relationships between Satisfaction from Investment Returns and Participants’ 
Gender 
Mann-Whitney Test for Participants’ Gender. 
Satisfaction  Gender N Mean Rank z Asymp Sig. (p) 
SIR 
Male 261 134.24 
z = 846.5 0.035 Female 10 181.85 
Total 271   
 
In short, participants’ job category appears to relate with almost all satisfaction variables with a 
statistically significant difference between variables of less than 0.05. The implication is that 
TOs must concentrate on participants’ job categories to enhance participants’ satisfaction.   
     
9.3 PARTICIPANTS’ SATISFACTION WITH THE TAKAFUL OPERATORS   
The K-W test explores the relationship between the three TOs (A, B, and C)
78
 offering services 
and products with participants’ satisfaction levels. Accordingly, as reported in Appendix D 
(Tables D.1 to D.8), the K-W test indicates that there is no statistical significance across all 
participants’ satisfaction variables with the three TOs, because all results reported Asymp Sig. P 
> 0.05.  
 
9.4 SPEARMAN'S CORRELATIONS  
To answer research question 6 the correlation technique is used to describe the strength and 
direction of the relationship between two variables (Pallant, 2010). Specifically, the Spearman's 
rank correlation coefficient or Spearman's rhois used as it has long been among the standard 
tools for nonparametric measurement of statistical dependence between two variables. 
Spearman's correlation is designed for use with ordinal level or ranked data and is particular 
useful when the data does not meet the criteria for Pearson’s correlations interval or continued 
data (Siegel, 1957; Pallant, 2010). Spearman’s correlations will give an indication of both 
directions (positive or negative) and the strength of the relationship. A positive correlation 
indicates that as one variable increases, so does the other, while a negative correlation indicates 
that as one variable increases, the other decreases (Pallant, 2010). Accordingly, Spearman’s 
correlation is carried out between participants’ perceptions about TOs’ disclosure systems, 
                                               
78 These codes represent the three TOs, as has been explained in chapter 7.  
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participants’ knowledge and preferences with participants’ satisfaction levels to discover 
significant association and strength between these variables, which will be gauged at 95% and 99 
% confidence level. 
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Table 9.5: Spearman’s Correlation between Participants’ Perceived Disclosure1 and Participants’ Satisfaction2   
 
  TPS SDM SIR SUS SSC SCI SFDQ SKP DM DIR DUS DSC DCI DFDQ DKP 
TPS 1.000 
              
SDM .838
**
 1.000 
             
SIR .755
**
 .594
**
 1.000 
            
SUS .771
**
 .622
**
 .540
**
 1.000 
           
SSC .485
**
 .274
**
 .302
**
 .263
**
 1.000 
          
SCI .794
**
 .633
**
 .496
**
 .607
**
 .344
**
 1.000 
         
SFDQ .603
**
 .423
**
 .396
**
 .491
**
 .145
*
 .368
**
 1.000 
        
SKP .593
**
 .416
**
 .426
**
 .359
**
 .406
**
 .372
**
 .262
**
 1.000 
       
DM .126
*
 .166
**
 .131
*
 .009 .086 .124
*
 .079 -.017 1.000 
      
DIR .011 .006 -.027 -.019 .074 .050 .036 -.028 .302
**
 1.000 
     
DUS .009 -.008 .039 -.066 -.037 .013 .123
*
 .026 .247
**
 .619
**
 1.000 
    
DSC -.015 -.035 .040 -.051 -.012 .002 .066 .050 .202
**
 .551
**
 .550
**
 1.000 
   
DCI .086 .100 .069 .016 .030 .078 .145
*
 .072 .206
**
 .541
**
 .636
**
 .430
**
 1.000 
  
DFDQ .029 .095 .020 -.006 -.106 .034 .111 -.060 .237
**
 .485
**
 .595
**
 .460
**
 .527
**
 1.000 
 
DKP -.024 -.027 .010 -.022 -.083 .007 -.015 -.057 .309
**
 .562
**
 .514
**
 .504
**
 .392
**
 .472
**
 1.000 
 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) = significance association at 99 % 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) = significance association at 95 % 
 
1. DM Disclosure Mechanisms, DIR Disclosure of Investment Returns, DUS Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus, DSC Disclosure of Shari’ah 
Compliance, DCI Disclosure of Claims and Indemnities, DFDQ Disclosure of Fees, Deficits and Qard, DKP Disclosure of Key Personnel. 
2. TPS Total Participants’ Satisfaction, SDM Satisfaction with TOs’ Disclosure Mechanisms, SIR Satisfaction with TOs’ Investment Returns, SUS 
Satisfaction with TOs’ underwriting Surplus, SSC Satisfaction with Shari’ah Compliance System, SCI Satisfaction with Claims and Indemnities, 
SFDQ Satisfaction with Fees, Deficits and Qard, SKP Satisfaction with Key Personnel.   
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9.4.1 Spearman's Correlations: TO Disclosure vs Participants’ Satisfaction.  
The Spearman’s correlation results in Table 9.5 show a 95% positive significant association 
between participants’ satisfaction on investment returns (SIR), participants’ satisfaction on 
claims and indemnities (SCI), and total participants’ satisfaction (TPS) with the company 
disclosure mechanisms (DM). The correlation results also indicated a 99% positive significant 
association between participants’ satisfaction on the company disclosure mechanisms (SDM) 
with the TO disclosure mechanisms (DM).   
 
The results also indicates a 95% significant association that relates participants’ satisfactions on 
participants’ fund charged fees, encountered deficits and the availability of qard loan (SFDQ) 
facilities, with two of the disclosure determinant variables underwriting surplus (DUS), claims 
and indemnities procedures (DCI). While, association between participants’ satisfactions with 
underwriting surplus (SUS) with all disclosure determinant variables appear to be insignificant. 
Another insignificant association has also been reported between participants’ satisfactions with 
Shari’ah compliance (SSC) with all disclosure determinant variables.  
 
Furthermore, TOs’ disclosure of investment returns (DIR), TOs’ disclosure of  Shari’ah 
compliance (DSC), TOs’ disclosure of fees, deficits and qard (DFDQ), and TOs’ disclosure of 
company key personnel power and activities (DKP) show insignificant association with all 
participants’ satisfaction variables.   
 
In short, based on the above findings, a straight positive significant association has been reported 
that varies from 95% to 99% confidence level between most of participants’ satisfaction 
determinant variables with TOs’ disclosure mechanisms (DM). An insignificant relationship 
association has been reported between participants’ total satisfaction (TPS) with the whole 
disclosure determinant variables, except with the disclosure mechanisms. Thus, an important 
conclusion can be made that TOs’ disclosure mechanisms could be effective in increasing 
participants’ satisfaction levels. In other words, as TOs have effective disclosure mechanisms 
(DM) so participants’ most determinant satisfaction variables enhances, since TOs’ disclosure 
mechanisms (DM) should reflect all services and products available from the company.    
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Table 9.6: Spearman’s Correlation between Participants’ Knowledge1 and Participants’ Satisfaction2   
 
  TPS SDM SIR SUS SSC SCI SFDQ SKP KPM KIR KUS KSC KFDQ KDC 
TPS 1.000 
             
SDM .838
**
 1.000 
            
SIR .755
**
 .594
**
 1.000 
           
SUS .771
**
 .622
**
 .540
**
 1.000 
          
SSC .485
**
 .274
**
 .302
**
 .263
**
 1.000 
         
SCI .794
**
 .633
**
 .496
**
 .607
**
 .344
**
 1.000 
        
SFDQ .603
**
 .423
**
 .396
**
 .491
**
 .145
*
 .368
**
 1.000 
       
SKP .593
**
 .416
**
 .426
**
 .359
**
 .406
**
 .372
**
 .262
**
 1.000 
      
KPM -.042 -.068 -.093 -.183
**
 .100 .046 -.144
*
 .053 1.000 
     
KIR -.031 -.044 -.017 -.143
*
 -.021 -.031 .111 .008 .186
**
 1.000 
    
KUS -.117
*
 -.109 -.087 -.182
**
 -.051 -.073 .049 -.070 .088 .469
**
 1.000 
   
KSC -.023 .001 .016 -.143
*
 -.001 -.054 .107 .045 .040 .347
**
 .605
**
 1.000 
  
KFDQ -.186
**
 -.164
**
 -.051 -.176
**
 -.086 -.193
**
 -.054 -.047 -.072 .130
*
 .176
**
 .139
*
 1.000 
 
KDC -.094 -.077 -.066 -.077 -.161
*
 -.075 .001 -.078 .138
*
 .178
**
 .274
**
 .147
*
 .144
*
 1.000 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) = significance association at 99 % 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) = significance association at 95 % 
 
1. KPM Knowledge of the principle of the TO’s Model, KIR Knowledge of Investment Returns, KUS Knowledge of Underwriting Surplus, KSC 
Knowledge of Shari’ah Compliance, KFDQ Knowledge of Charged Fees, Encountered Deficits and availability of Qard, KKP Knowledge of Key 
Personnel Power and Activities, KDC Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels.   
2. TPS Total Participants’ Satisfaction, SDM Satisfaction with TO’s Disclosure Mechanism, SIR Satisfaction with TO’s Investment Returns, SUS 
Satisfaction with TO’s underwriting Surplus, SSC Satisfaction with Shari’ah Compliance System, SCI Satisfaction with Claims and Indemnities, 
SFDQ Satisfaction with Fees, Deficits and Qard, SKP Satisfaction with Key Personnel. 
3.  The KKP variable has been omitted by SPSS system since all parameters of this variable are constant with 0 values. 
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9.4.2 Spearman's Correlation: Participants’ Perceived Knowledge vs Participants’ 
Satisfaction.  
Spearman’s correlations in Table 9.6, show a negative significant association at 95% between 
participants’ total satisfaction (TPS) with their knowledge of the underwriting surplus (KUS) 
activities conducted by TOs, and another negative significance association at 99% between 
participants’ total satisfaction (TPS) with their knowledge of fees charged for participants’ fund, 
encountered deficits and availability of qard loan (KFDQ) facilities. The result also shows a 99% 
negative significant association between participants’ satisfaction on TOs disclosure mechanisms 
(SDM) with their knowledge of participants’ fund charged fees, encountered deficits and the 
availability of qard loan (KFDQ) facilities. Also a number of significant negative associations 
have been noticed at 95% between participants’ satisfaction on the surplus from the underwriting 
activities (SUS) with a number of participants’ knowledge determinant variables which includes 
knowledge of the deserved investment returns (KIR) and knowledge of the used Shari’ah 
compliance system (KSC). Participants’ satisfaction with the surplus from the underwriting 
activities (SUS) have significant negative associations at 99% with a number of participants’ 
knowledge determinant variables: knowledge of the principle of the used takaful model (KPM), 
and knowledge of participants’ fund charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard 
loan (KFDQ) facilities. On the other hand, participants’ satisfaction with the company Shari’ah 
compliance system (SSC), have a negative significant association at 95% with their knowledge 
of the dissatisfaction channels (KDC).  
 
The participants’ satisfaction on the company claims and indemnities procedures (SCI) have a 
significant negative association at 99% with their knowledge of participants’ fund fees, deficits 
and qard loan (KFDQ) facilities. Furthermore, participants’ satisfaction with the participants’ 
fund charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard loan (SFDQ) facilities, have a 
negative significant association at 95% with their knowledge of the used model and principles 
(KPM) by the TOs.  Insignificant association has been reported between participants’ satisfaction 
on investment returns (SIR), with all participants’ knowledge determinant variables.  In short, 
based on the above findings participants have a straight negative significance association that 
varies from 95% to 99 % confidence levels between most of their satisfaction determinant 
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variables with most of their perceived knowledge determinant variables. This means that as 
participants’ knowledge increases, their satisfaction level decreases and vice versa. 
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Table 9.7: Spearman’s Correlation between Participants’ Preferences1 and Participants’ Satisfaction2   
 
  TPS SDM SIR SUS SSC SCI SFDQ SKP PSC PRB PKP PRU PCU 
TPS 1.000 
            
SDM .838
**
 1.000 
           
SIR .755
**
 .594
**
 1.000 
          
SUS .771
**
 .622
**
 .540
**
 1.000 
         
SSC .485
**
 .274
**
 .302
**
 .263
**
 1.000 
        
SCI .794
**
 .633
**
 .496
**
 .607
**
 .344
**
 1.000 
       
SFDQ .603
**
 .423
**
 .396
**
 .491
**
 .145
*
 .368
**
 1.000 
      
SKP .593
**
 .416
**
 .426
**
 .359
**
 .406
**
 .372
**
 .262
**
 1.000 
     
PSC .009 -.006 -.135
*
 -.068 .089 .051 -.017 .052 1.000 
    
PRB .153
*
 .227
**
 .144
*
 .096 .024 .102 .054 .073 -.018 1.000 
   
PKP -.074 -.042 -.088 -.140 -.015 -.058 .026 -.055 -.009 .192
**
 1.000 
  
PRU -.042 -.021 -.116 -.034 -.112 -.040 -.022 .048 -.074 -.027 .067 1.000 
 
PCU -.018 -.009 -.012 -.071 .043 .007 -.049 .015 .072 -.135-
*
 -.024 .000 1.000 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) = significance association at 99 % 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) = significance association at 95 % 
 
1. PSC Preference on Shari’ah Compliance, PRB Preference to have a representative on BoDs, PKP Preference on TOs’ Key Personnel, PRU Preference on 
the reason to use takaful policy, PCU Preference on claims and underwriting surplus. 
2. TPS Total Participants’ Satisfaction, SDM Satisfaction with TOs’ Disclosure Mechanisms, SIR Satisfaction with TOs’ Investment Returns, SUS 
Satisfaction with TOs’ underwriting Surplus, SSC Satisfaction with Shari’ah Compliance System, SCI Satisfaction with Claims and Indemnities, SFDQ 
Satisfaction with Fees, Deficits and Qard, SKP Satisfaction with Key Personnel. 
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9.4.3 Spearman's Correlation: Participants’ Preferences vs Participants’ Satisfaction.  
Spearman’s correlations in Table 9.7, shows a strong significant positive association at 95% 
between participants’ preferences to have a representative who sits on TOs’ BoDs79 (PRB) with 
their total satisfaction (TPS), as well as participants’ satisfaction in terms of the investment 
returns (SIR). Participants’ preferences to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB) have another 
significance association at 99 % with their satisfaction with the TOs’ disclosure mechanisms 
(DM), while participants’ preferences of TOs Shari’ah compliance (PSC) shows a negative 
significant association at 95% with their satisfaction with the investment returns (SIR) from the 
participants’ fund. On the other hand, a number of participants’ preferences determinant 
variables: preferences of TOs’ key personnel power and activities (PKP), preferences of the 
reason for buying the takaful policy (PRU), and preferences of TOs’ claims and underwriting 
surplus (PCU) conditions, has shown an insignificant association with all participants’ 
satisfaction determinant variables. Participants’ satisfaction with TOs’ underwriting surplus 
(SUS), TOs’ Shari’ah compliance (SSC) system, TOs’ claims and indemnities (SCI) procedures, 
charged fees encountered deficits and the availability of qard (SFDQ), and TOs’ key personnel 
power and activities (SKP) has shown an insignificant association with three of participants’ 
preferences determinant variables: preferences of TOs’ key personnel power and activities 
(PKP), preferences of the reason for buying the takaful policy (PRU), and preferences of TOs’ 
claims and underwriting surplus (PCU) conditions.      
 
9.4.4 Conclusions Resulting From Three Spearman’s Correlations  
The results of the three correlations models above reflect that there are straight positive 
relationships between the TOs’ disclosure mechanisms (DM) with most of the participants’ 
satisfaction determinant variables. However, a negative significant association has been reported 
between different participants’ knowledge determinant variables with almost all participants’ 
satisfaction determinant variables, with the exception of participants’ satisfaction with 
participants’ fund investment returns (SIR). Furthermore, there is a focused positive relationship 
between participants’ preferences to have representatives on the BoDs (PRB) with several 
satisfaction variables. Accordingly, another correlations approach should be conducted to find an 
effective layout between these variables to achieve increased participant satisfaction.   
                                               
79 Board of Directors.  
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  9.5 SUGGESTED CORRELATIONS APPROACH  
The three Spearman’s correlations above imply that firstly, TOs’ disclosure mechanisms can be 
effective in raising participants’ satisfaction. Secondly, participants’ current weak knowledge is 
causing higher levels of participants’ satisfaction. Thirdly, participants’ main preference is 
focused on having a representative on the BoDs to discuss their financial requirements in the 
participants’ fund. These conclusions are considered logical because participants lack different 
knowledge that affects their participants’ fund as a result of ineffective TO disclosure 
mechanisms. Participants are looking to have a representative that can represent their needs and 
wants on the BoDs. Accordingly, participants will feel satisfied with the financial conditions of 
their fund.     
 
However, because participants’ inadequate knowledge might be the result of a weak disclosure 
mechanism adopted by the TO, an active disclosure mechanism should exist to enhance 
participants’ knowledge while increasing their satisfaction level as well. Therefore, a Spearman’s 
correlation is carried out between participants’ perceived disclosure and participants’ knowledge, 
the main purpose of which is to find out if participants’ perceived disclosure hasany association 
with their knowledge. If so, then a conclusion can be drawn that participants’ weak knowledge 
was a result of a loose disclosure mechanism adopted by the TOs. Another Spearman’s 
correlation will also be run between participants’ knowledge and participants’ preferences, to 
discover whether participants’ knowledge will have an association with their preferences.  
Accordingly, a proper layout mechanism can be made to reflect an effective relationship between 
the participants’ perceptions, participants’ knowledge and participants’ preferences of the service 
provided by TOs to enhance participants’ satisfaction. 
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Table 9.8: Spearman’s Correlation between Participants’ Perceived Disclosure1 and Participants’ Knowledge2   
 
  TPK KPM KIR KUS KSC KFDQ KDC DM DIR DUS DSC DCI DFDQ DKP 
TPK 1.000 
             
KPM .161
**
 1.000 
            
KIR .465
**
 .186
**
 1.000 
           
KUS .779
**
 .088 .469
**
 1.000 
          
KSC .746
**
 .040 .347
**
 .605
**
 1.000 
         
KFDQ .243
**
 -.072 .130
*
 .176
**
 .139
*
 1.000 
        
KDC .334
**
 .138
*
 .178
**
 .274
**
 .147
*
 .144
*
 1.000 
       
DM .154
**
 .073 .151
**
 .229
**
 .089 .004 .021 1.000 
      
DIR .421
**
 .168
**
 .354
**
 .451
**
 .352
**
 .025 .238
**
 .302
**
 1.000 
     
DUS .520
**
 .069 .412
**
 .537
**
 .442
**
 .126
*
 .258
**
 .247
**
 .619
**
 1.000 
    
DSC .456
**
 .017 .287
**
 .439
**
 .459
**
 .136
*
 .181
**
 .202
**
 .551
**
 .550
**
 1.000 
   
DCI .464
**
 .070 .387
**
 .473
**
 .427
**
 .056 .166
**
 .206
**
 .541
**
 .636
**
 .430
**
 1.000 
  
DFDQ .458
**
 .001 .257
**
 .433
**
 .427
**
 .149
**
 .193
**
 .237
**
 .485
**
 .595
**
 .460
**
 .527
**
 1.000 
 
DKP .443
**
 .044 .341
**
 .441
**
 .393
**
 .043 .149
**
 .309
**
 .562
**
 .514
**
 .504
**
 .392
**
 .472
**
 1.000 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) = significant association at 99 % 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) = significant association at 95 % 
 
1. DM Disclosure Mechanisms, DIR Disclosure of Investment Returns, DUS Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus, DSC Disclosure of Shari’ah 
Compliance, DCI Disclosure of Claims and Indemnities, DFDQ Disclosure of Fees, Deficits and Qard, DKP Disclosure of Key Personnel. 
2. TPK Total Participants’ Knowledge , KPM Knowledge of the principle of the TO’s Model, KIR Knowledge of Investment Returns, KUS Knowledge 
of Underwriting Surplus, KSC Knowledge of Shari’ah Compliance, KFDQ Knowledge of Charged Fees, Encountered Deficits and availability of 
Qard, KKP Knowledge of Key Personnel Power and Activities, KDC Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels.   
3. TPK has been added to the knowledge determinant variables, for better reflection of how disclosure determinant variables can affect participants’ total 
knowledge.     
4. The KKP variable has been omitted by SPSS system since all parameters of this variable are constant with 0 values. 
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9.5.1. Spearman's Correlation: Participants’ Perceived Disclosures vs Participants’ 
Knowledge. 
Spearman’s correlation in Table 9.8, shows a significant association at 99% between 
participants’ total knowledge (TPK) with several TO disclosure determinant variables: 
disclosure mechanisms (DM), investment returns (DIR), underwriting surplus (DUS), 
Shar’iah compliance (DSC), claims and indemnities (DCI), charged fees encountered 
deficits and availability of qard (DFDQ), and key personnel power and activities (DKP).   
 
A significant association at 99 % was also reported between TOs’ disclosure mechanisms 
(DM) with participants’ knowledge of the deserved investment returns (KIR) and 
underwriting surplus (KUS). TOs’ disclosure on investment returns (DIR) has a positive 
99 % significant association with participants’ determinant knowledge variables: 
knowledge on the principles of the takaful model used (KPM), knowledge of 
participants’ fund investment returns (KIR),knowledge of participants’ fund underwriting 
surplus (KUS), knowledge of the TOs’ Shari’ah compliance system (KSC), and 
knowledge of the dissatisfaction channels (KDC) set by the TOs. 
 
Disclosure of participants’ fund underwriting surplus (DUS) reported a 99 % significant 
association with the following participants’ knowledge determinant variables: knowledge 
of participants’ fund investment returns (KIR), knowledge of participants’ fund 
underwriting surplus (KUS), knowledge of TOs’ Shari’ah compliance systems (KSC) 
and knowledge of proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC) set by the TOs. Disclosure of 
participants’ fund underwriting surplus (DUS) also reported a significant association at  
95% with participants’ knowledge of participants’ fund charged fees encountered deficits 
and qard loan availability (DFDQ). While disclosure of TOs’ Shari’ah compliance 
system (DSC) reported the same impact on participants’ determinant knowledge variables 
as disclosure of TOs participants’ fund underwriting surplus (DUS). Furthermore, 
disclosure of TOs’ claims and indemnities procedures (DCI) reported a 99 % significant 
association with the following participants’ knowledge determinant variables: knowledge 
of participants’ fund investment returns (KIR), knowledge of participants’ fund 
underwriting surplus (KUS), knowledge of the TOs’ Shari’ah compliance system (DSC), 
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knowledge of participants’ fund charged fees encountered deficits and the availability of 
qard loan (KFDQ), and knowledge of TOs dissatisfaction channels (KDC). While 
disclosure of TOs’ key personnel power and activities (DKP) reported the same impact 
on participants’ knowledge determinant variables as disclosure of TOs’ claims and 
indemnities (DCI) procedures. 
 
Finally, TOs disclosure of participants’ fund charged fees encountered deficits and qard 
loan availability (DFKP) has a positive 99 % significant association with following 
participants’ knowledge determinant variables: knowledge of participants’ fund 
investment returns (KIR), knowledge of participants’ fund underwriting surplus (KUS), 
knowledge of TOs’ Shari’ah compliance system (KSC), knowledge of participants’ fund 
charged fees encountered deficits and the availability of qard loan (KFDQ), and 
knowledge of proper dissatisfaction channels set by the TOs (KDC).  
 
In short, a strong significant association has been reported between almost all TOs 
disclosure determinant variables with most of the participants’ knowledge determinant 
variables, which indicates strong relationships between disclosure and knowledge, i.e. as 
TOs have an affective disclosure to reflect participants’ benefits from the participants’ 
fund so participants’ knowledge enhances.  
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Table 9.9: Spearman’s Correlation between Participants’ Knowledge1 and Participants’ Preferences2   
  PTP PSC PRB PKP PRU PCU KPM KIR KUS KSC KFDQ KDC 
PTP 1.000 
           
PSC .436
**
 1.000 
          
PRB .499
**
 -.018 1.000 
         
PKP .354
**
 -.009 .192
**
 1.000 
        
PRU .103 -.074 -.027 .067 1.000 
       
PCU .402
**
 .072 -.135
*
 -.024 .000 1.000 
      
KPM .058 .110 -.106 .031 .103 .137
*
 1.000 
     
KIR .058 -.010 -.112 .043 .048 .230
**
 .186
**
 1.000 
    
KUS .024 .030 -.097 .093 .042 .118
*
 .088 .469
**
 1.000 
   
KSC .040 .030 -.041 .088 .000 .118
*
 .040 .347
**
 .605
**
 1.000 
  
KFDQ -.006 -.125 -.040 .094 .096 .055 -.072 .130
*
 .176
**
 .139
*
 1.000 
 
KDC .009 -.013 -.235
**
 .045 .059 .142
*
 .138
*
 .178
**
 .274
**
 .147
*
 .144
*
 1.000 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) = significant association at 99 % 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) = significant association at 95 % 
 
1. KPM Knowledge of the principle of the TOs Model, KIR Knowledge of Investment Returns, KUS Knowledge of Underwriting Surplus, KSC 
Knowledge of Shar’iah Compliance, KFDQ Knowledge of Charged Fees, Encountered Deficits and availability of Qard, KKP Knowledge of Key 
Personnel Power and Activities, KDC Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels.   
2. PTP Participants’ Total Preferences,  PSC Preference on Shari’ah Compliance, PRB Preference to have a representative on BoDs, PKP Preference on 
TOs ‘Key Personnel, PRU Preference on the reason to use takaful policy, PCU Preference on claims and underwriting surplus. 
3. PTP has been added to the participants’ preferences determinant variables, for better reflection of how participants’ knowledge determinant variables 
can affect participants’ total preferences. 
The KKP variable has been omitted by SPSS system since all parameters of this variable are constant with 0 values. 
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9.5.2 Spearman's Correlation: Participants’ Knowledge vs Participants’ 
Preferences.  
Spearman’s correlations in Table 9.9 show insignificant association between several 
participants’ preferences determinant variables: total preferences (PTP), preference on 
Shari’ah compliance (PSC), preference on key personnel power and activities (PKP) and 
preference on the reason to buy takaful policy (PRU) with all participants’ knowledge 
determinant variables. While participants’ knowledge of participants’ fund charged fees 
encountered deficits and availability of qard reported an insignificant association with all 
participants’ preferences variables. However, the Spearman correlations between 
participants’ knowledge and participants’ preferences,  reported that participants’ have 
become more focused on their preference on claims and underwriting surplus (PCU) 
which reported a positive 95 % significant association with the following knowledge 
determinant variables: knowledge of takaful model principles (KPM), knowledge of 
participants’ fund underwriting surplus (KUS), knowledge of TOs’ Shari’ah compliance 
systems (PSC), and knowledge of proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC), and 99 % 
significant association with the participants’ knowledge on investment returns (KIR).  
 
On the other hand, a negative significant association has been reported at 99 % between 
participants’ preferences to have representatives on the BoDs (PRB) with participants’ 
knowledge of the proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC). This relationship indicates that 
whenever participants’ knowledge of the proper dissatisfaction channels, i.e. proper 
procedures to quit the TOs whenever participants are dissatisfied with the TOs services 
increases/decrease, then their preferences to have a representatives on the BoDs 
decreases/increase, since participants will not be in a need to present their needs and 
wants at BoDs level. Participants can quit the policy whenever they feel dissatisfied with 
the TOs service because they will have enough knowledge to legally quit the TOs 
whenever needed. In short, when participants’ knowledge increases, then they will be not 
in a need to intrude with the company strategic management by having a representative 
on the BoDs and they will be more focused on the variable that can directly impact their 
financial positions (claims and underwriting surplus).   
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9.5.3 Conclusions of Spearman’s Correlations Suggested Approach  
Spearman’s correlations on disclosure vs knowledge reveal a significant association 
among all variables from both sides, which indicates as participants’ perceived disclosure 
increases so their knowledge increases as well. While participants’ preferences to have a 
representative on the BoDs has been shifted to focus on their preferences on claims and 
underwriting surplus conditions, after Spearman’s correlations have been conducted on 
knowledge vs preference.  
 
9.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter is the first stage to analyze the significance of participants’ satisfaction, by 
exploring the relationship strength between different variables that are expected to have 
an impact on participants’ satisfaction. Accordingly, the analysis in this chapter has been 
conducted to address two main research questions 4 and 5. Research question 4 was 
addressed by implementing a statistical non-parametric data analysis technique U-Test 
and K-W test, to figure out the significant relationship between participants’ 
demographics characteristics with the satisfaction variables. Accordingly, the analysis 
results indicated that participants’ job categories have reported the most significant 
categorical variables that relate with almost all satisfaction variables.  
 
Research question 5, on the other hand, was addressed by implementing the Spearman’s 
correlations technique between participants’ perceptions about TOs disclosure systems, 
participants’ knowledge, and participants’ preferences with participants’ satisfaction 
levels. Accordingly, the obtained correlations model reflects a straight positive significant 
association between company disclosures determinant variables with participants’ 
satisfaction determinant variables, which indicates that as TOs disclose more information 
so participants’ satisfaction increases and vice-versa.  
 
On the other hand, a straight negative significant association was reported between most 
of the participants’ knowledge determinant variables with most of the participants’ 
satisfaction determinant variables. This indicates that as participants’ knowledge of TOs’ 
products and services increases/decreases, so their satisfaction level decreases/increases. 
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Furthermore, participants’ preference to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB) 
reported a positive correlation with most of participants’ satisfaction determinant 
variables. However, participants will be dissatisfied with participants’ fund investment 
returns (SIR) if their preferences on Shari’ah compliance (PSC) haven’t been achieved.      
 
The above discussions concluded that TOs disclosure mechanisms can do a great job in 
raising participants’ satisfaction, while participants’ weak knowledge and awareness 
might be a result of weak disclosure mechanisms adopted by TOs. Hence, an active 
disclosure mechanism should exist to enhance participants’ knowledge while increasing 
their satisfaction level as well. Therefore, a correlation has been run between participants’ 
perceived disclosure and participants’ knowledge of the services presented by the TOs. 
The main purpose of running this correlation is to find out if participants’ lack of 
knowledge is linked directly to participants’ weak perceived disclosure. Accordingly, the 
correlation results indicated a straight positive significant association between 
participants’ perceived disclosure and participants’ knowledge, i.e. whenever the TOs 
implement a proper disclosure mechanism, then participants’ knowledge is going to 
increase in the right direction, which will enhance their satisfaction level.  
 
Another correlation has been run between participants’ knowledge and participants’ 
preferences, to figure out how participants obtained knowledge impact their preferences. 
Accordingly, the new correlation revealed a straight positive association between 
participants’ knowledge and participants’ preferences. Participants’ preferences have 
been shifted from their preference to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB) to 
becoming more focused on their preference on claims and underwriting surplus (PCU). 
Almost all participants’ knowledge determinant variables with the exception of their 
knowledge of charged fees, encountered deficits, and availability of qard (KFDQ) 
reported a significant association with participants’ preferences on claims and 
underwriting surplus (PCU). The correlation results also revealed a negative significant 
association between participants’ preference to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB), 
and their knowledge of the proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC), i.e. when they have 
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proper knowledge of how to quit the TOs whenever they are dissatisfied, then their 
preference to have a representative on the BoDs is not valid any more.    
 
Therefore, a proper layout can be suggested for the TOs and to establish effective 
disclosure mechanisms, which will enhance participants’ satisfaction by increasing their 
knowledge in the right directions. The disclosure mechanisms should reflect all 
participants’ rights in the fund, investment returns and underwriting surplus. Shari’ah 
compliance, claims and indemnities procedures, fund encountered fees, deficits and qard 
facility, and shareholders activities in the fund. By reflecting such facts participants’ 
preferences will improve as their satisfaction level increases. 
 
Finally, as the current chapter reflects the significant strength of relationships between 
the variables that are expected to have an impact on participants’ satisfaction by 
implanting some of the bivariate analysis technique, then it will be quite beneficial to 
explore the significant form of relationships, by viewing the predicted categorical 
outcomes which can be achieved by using some of the Multivariate analysis approach. 
This is done in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIABLES AFFECTING 
PARTICIPANT SATISFACTION : MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter continues with the theme of the previous chapter of exploring the factors 
that impact on participant satisfaction, by reviewing the significant relationships between 
participants’ satisfaction levels as a dependant variable and three independents variables: 
participants’ perceptions about TOs disclosure systems, participants’ knowledge and 
participants’ preferences. Accordingly, a multivariate analysis approach is used for 
further analysis. Multivariate statistics involve observation and analysis of more than one 
statistical variable at a time to perform studies across multiple dimensions and take into 
account the effects of all variables on the responses of interest (Babbie, 2007).  
 
This chapter will address research question 6: What are the forms of relationship between 
participants’ perceptions, knowledge and preferences, with their satisfaction about the 
TOs services and products? 
 
Accordingly, this chapter uses multinomial logistic regression analysis as a tool to 
discover the factors that can impact on participants’ satisfaction. This chapter is 
organized as follows: Section 10.2 clarification of the validity of implementing 
multinomial logistic regression analysis; Section 10.3 presenting the form of relationships 
between dependent and independent variables; Section 10.4 presents a conclusion of the 
findings obtained from the previous three multinomial logistic regression analyses; 
Section 10.5 suggesting an approach to enhance participant satisfaction by running two 
multinomial logistic regression models between participants’ perceived disclosure and 
participants’ knowledge and between participants’ knowledge and participants’ 
preferences. Section 10.6 draws a conclusion of the suggested regression findings. 
Section 10.7 draws an overall conclusion.  
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10.2 THE VALIDITY OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION    
As outlined in the research methodology chapter, the multinomial logistic regression 
method was used as it most appropriate for dealing with the types of dependent variables. 
This study is concerned with non-parametric categorical data, i.e. the respondents had to 
indicate ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to some of the questions (Field, 2005; Tabachnick et al, 2007; 
Pallant, 2010). This is the opposite of multiple regression analysis, as the dependent 
variable in the latter technique needs to be a continuous variable, with scores reasonably 
normally distributed (Pallant, 2010).  
 
Accordingly, logistic regression allows researchers to test models to predict categorical 
outcomes with two or more categories. The predictor independent variables can be either 
categorical or continuous or a mix of both in one model. There is a family of logistic 
regression techniques available in SPSS which will allows researchers to explore the 
predictive ability of sets or blocks of variables and to specify the entry of variables (Field, 
2005; Tabachnick et al, 2007; Pallant, 2010).  The multinomial logistic regression 
approach is used here instead of binary logistics, as the dependent variables of interest in 
this study have an unordered categorical data with more than two categories
80
 (Wright, 
1995; Hosmer et al, 2000; Peat, 2001; Tabachnick et al, 2007; Pallant, 2010).    
 
The presence of a relationship between the dependent variable and a combination of 
independent variables is based on the statistical significance of the final model Chi-
square (Likelihood Ratio Tests) in the SPSS table titled ‘Model Fitting Information’. 
Therefore, to predict a significant form of relationship between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable the significant p-value should be less than 0.05 (Moutinho et 
al, 2007). However, a statistic that is important for the logistic regression analysis is that 
the overall regression model is fit for the test (Field, 2005; Pallant, 2010). For that 
purpose, the (goodness of fit) test needs to be carried out and the multinomial output 
should indicate the overall fitness of the model presented by the Likelihood Ratio Tests, 
(and the significant p-value (sig) of the final results should be less than 0.05) (Field, 
2005; Pallant, 2010).  
                                               
80 Examples are (0, 0.33, 0.66, 1), or (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1). 
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The multinomial logistic regression provides another unique feature for model (goodness 
of fit), the deviance chi-square test. In this test, the output is interpreted differently from 
the results the Likelihood Ratio Tests, that if the significant value is less than 0.05, this 
means the overall model is poor. Hence, for the model to be considered a good fit, then 
the significant value of the test must be higher than 0.05 (Agresti, 1996).  
 
The model’s ‘goodness of fit’ can also be indicated by the value R-Square. The value of 
R-Square indicates the amount of variation between dependent variables explained by the 
model (Pallant, 2010). The R-square in logistic regression is known as pseudo R-square 
statistics, another version of R-square provided in multiple regressions (Tabachnick et al, 
2007). Hence, it is highly desirable to have a larger R-square for the model. However, the 
interpretation of pseudo R-square here should not be treated the same way as true R-
square available in multiple regressions; hence it is highly recommended that the 
interpretation of the statistics is carried out with a high degree of caution (Pallant, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, the intercept has been omitted from all models, since all reported 
intercept coefficients are not significant; also the reported goodness of fit for the models 
without intercept has reported better results than with the intercept model. The researcher 
has followed the work of Hahn who suggests running the regression model with and 
without an intercept, and compares the models for superior fit (Hahn, 1997). Indeed, 
Theil contends “from an economic point of view, a constant term usually has little or no 
explanatory virtues” (Theil, 1971:176). Accordingly there are certainly cases in which 
economic theory posits the absence of the intercept because of unrealistic results, such as 
Douglas (1976), Casella (1983), Chambers et al (1986) and Adelman et al (1994). 
 
Finally, the results of each multinomial logistic regression model, has been summarized 
to reflect the three (goodness of fit) gauges and to reflect the prediction relationships 
between dependent and independent variables. All detailed tables have been reported in 
the appendix E (Tabales E1 to E31) on account of space constraints.   
 
 
268 
 
10.3 DEPENDENT, INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND FORMS OF RELATIONSHIPS    
As demonstrated in the table below, a multinomial logistic regression was carried out to 
find out prediction relationships between the three independent variables (participants’ 
perceived disclosure, participants knowledge, and participants’ preference) with the only 
dependent variable participants’ satisfaction level: 
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Table 10.1:  Multinomial Logistic Regression for Participants’ Perceived Disclosure vs Participants’ Satisfaction   
 
Dep2.Var. 
Independent1 Variables Overall Model Goodness-of-Fit 
  DM DIR DUS DSC DCI DFDQ DKP 
Chi - Square 
(Sig.) 
R2 
Chi - Square 
Deviance 
TPS 
Coff. 534.99 427.07 420.84 417.94 403.33 407.25 407.72 213.498 
(0.02) 
0.57 
365.562 
(0.12) Sig. 0.32 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.06* 0.236 0.339 0.12 
SDM 
Coff. 842.96 1825.44 585.17 526.25 3784.07 546.71 584.18 579.442 
(0.06) 
0.88 
471.699 
(1.00) Sig. 0.97 0.001*** 0.9 0.99 0.001*** 0.01*** 0.276 
SIR 
Coff. 439.74 315.34 291.3 294.88 288.9 289.05 298.42 274.700 
(0.0) 
0.717 
258.338 
(0.953) Sig. 0.044** 0.002*** 0.881 0.696 0.517 0.961 0.028 
SUS 
Coff. 438.2 307.7  9 302.46 312.92 300.86 299.9 301.17 260.852 
(0.0) 
0.7 
277.156 
(0.725) Sig. 0.102 0.298 0.372 0.076* 0.087* 0.688 0.269 
SSC 
Coff. 343.37 240.83 234.04 243.92 214.96 224.22 232.59 326.145 
(0.0) 
0.81 
199.358 
(1.00) Sig. 0.157 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.236 0.059* 0.0*** 
SCI 
Coff. 747.32 495.11 453.1 479.91 455.81 456.42 467.5 658.969 
(0.0) 
0.91 
397.790 
(1.00) Sig. 0.998 0.002*** 0.591 0.061* 0.005*** 0.371 0.0*** 
SFDQ 
Coff. 407.19 285.82 262.78 259.5 250.55 252.84 260.54 331.273 
(0.0) 
0.78 
212.071 
(1.00) Sig. 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.02** 0.16 0.07* 0.268 0.004*** 
SKP 
Coff. 382.7 270.23 257.91 266.63 265.26 266.58 268.36 284.490 
(0.0) 
0.75 
228.772 
(0.991) Sig. 0.316 0.155 0.911 0.372 0.009*** 0.096 0.014*** 
 
1. DM Disclosure Mechanisms, DIR Disclosure of Investment Returns, DUS Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus, DSC Disclosure of Shari’ah 
Compliance, DCI Disclosure of Claims and Indemnities, DFDQ Disclosure of Fees, Deficits and Qard, DKP Disclosure of Key Personnel. 
2. TPS Total Participants’ Satisfaction, SDM Satisfaction with TOs Disclosure Mechanism, SIR Satisfaction with TOs Investment Returns, SUS 
Satisfaction with TOs underwriting Surplus, SSC Satisfaction with Shari’ah Compliance System, SCI Satisfaction with Claims and Indemnities, SFDQ 
Satisfaction with Fees, Deficits and Qard, SKP Satisfaction with Key Power.  
3. *** Significant at 1% level of significance (p≤0.01), ** significant at 5% level of significance (0.01<p≤ 0.05), and * significant at 10% level of 
significance (0.05<p≤ 0.10). 
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10.3.1 Form of Relationships between Participants’ Perceived Disclosure vs 
Participants’ Satisfaction.   
Table 10.1 reflects the multinomial logistic regression model between each satisfaction 
variable as the dependent variable with the combination of participants’ perceived 
disclosure as independent variables.  
 
All (disclosures vs satisfaction) models reported an overall statistical significance 
goodness of fit, as the overall chi-square p-value of all models reported less than 0.05, 
with the exception of participants’ satisfaction on disclosure mechanisms (SDM) model, 
as it has a p-value of (0.06 > 0.05). Another important model fitness test is the deviance 
significance test, which indicates additional evidence of model fitness to adequately fit 
the data. Accordingly all (disclosures vs satisfaction) models reported an overall 
statistically significant goodness of fit, as the overall chi-square p-value of all models 
reported a p-value greater than 0.05. The last overall goodness fit test, is the R
2
 value, 
that the greater the R
2
 the better goodness of fit for the model. This means that the greater 
the R
2 
the greater chance of the satisfaction dependent variable can be explained by the 
combination of the disclosure independent variables. Accordingly all (disclosures vs 
satisfaction) models reported a high R
2 
that ranges from 57 % to 91 %.  
 
The likelihood ratio test was used to figure out the categorical prediction outcomes, 
between independent and dependent variables. Accordingly, participants’ satisfaction of 
TOs’ Shari’ah compliance (SSC) model and participants’ satisfaction regarding fund 
charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard (SFDQ) has been the most 
significant model to be explained by the disclosure determinant variables, as both 
satisfaction models were explained by five of the disclosure determinant variables. This 
is followed by participants’ satisfaction of the TOs claims and indemnities procedures 
(DCI) model, which was explained by four disclosure determinant variables.   
 
The likelihood ratio test for the SSC vs disclosure determinant variable model, revealed 
significance (p≤ 0.01) for TOs’ disclosures of participants’ funds (investment returns 
DIR, underwriting surplus DUS, Shari’ah compliance system SSC). It also showed 
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significance for the same p-value with the TOs’ key personnel power and activities SKP 
and significance (p≤ 0.1) with the TOs disclosure regarding participants’ fund charged 
fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard (SFDQ).  
 
The SFDQ vs disclosure determinant variable model revealed significance (p≤ 0.01) with 
TOs disclosure of participants’ fund investment returns (DIR), TOs’ disclosure of 
company key personnel power and activities (DKP), and TOs disclosure of the 
availability of proper disclosure mechanisms (DM). Participants’ satisfaction with the 
notion has significance (p≤ 0.05) with TOs disclosure of participants’ fund underwriting 
surplus (DUS), and significance (p≤ 0.10) with TOs disclosure of company claims and 
indemnities procedures (DCI).  
 
Participants’ satisfaction with TOs claims and indemnities on the other hand, has 
revealed significance (p≤ 0.01) with TOs disclosures regarding participants’ fund 
investment return (DIR), TOs’ claims and indemnities procedures (DCI), and TOs’ key 
personnel power and activities (DKP). Participants’ satisfaction with the notion has 
significance (p≤ 0.1) with the TOs’ disclosure of the company Shari’ah compliance 
system (DSC).  
 
Furthermore, participants’ total satisfaction (TPS) model and participants’ satisfaction 
regarding TOs’ disclosure mechanisms (SDM) model is explained by three of the 
disclosure determinant variables, that the (TPS) model has a significant (p≤ 0.01) with 
the TOs’ disclosures of participants fund (investment return DIR and underwriting 
surplus DUS), participants total satisfaction (TPS) is also significant at (p≤ 0.10) with the 
TOs’ disclosure of the company Shariah compliance system (DSC). While (SDM) model 
has a significant (p≤ 0.01) with the TOs’ disclosures of participants fund investment 
return (DIR), participants fund charged fees, encountered deficits and the availability of 
qard (DFDQ), and TOs’ claims and indemnities procedures (DCI). 
 
The participants’ satisfaction with fund investment returns (SIR) model and the 
participants’ satisfaction with fund underwriting surplus (SUS) model have reported the 
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least satisfaction models explained by the disclosure determinant variables, which were 
explained by two disclosure variables only. The satisfaction on investment return (SIR) 
model is significant (p≤ 0.01) with TOs’ disclosure of participants’ fund investment 
returns (DIR) and significance (p≤ 0.05) with TOs’ disclosure mechanism (DM). The 
satisfaction on underwriting surplus (SUS) model has significance (p≤ 0.10) with the 
TOs’ disclosures of the company Shari’ah compliance system (SSC) and TOs disclosure 
of the company claims and indemnities procedures (DCI).  
 
In conclusion, TOs’ disclosure of participants’ fund investment returns (DIR) has been 
the disclosure variable that formed the most significant relationship with six satisfaction 
determinant variables. This is followed by disclosure of claims and indemnities (DCI) 
and disclosure of the TOs’ key personnel power and activities (DKP), since it has a 
significance relationship with four satisfaction determinant variables. Meanwhile 
disclosure of participants’ fund underwriting surplus (DUS) has formed a significant 
relationship with three satisfaction determinant variables. Lastly, disclosure of the TOs’ 
Shari’ah compliance system (DSC) and TOs’ disclosure mechanisms (DM) has reported 
the least significant relationship with the satisfaction variables, with only two reported 
significance relationships. Such findings conclude that the most suitable way to disclose 
information of participants’ desires information would be conducted by an effective 
disclosure mechanism which can be adopted by TOs.    
         
 
   
 
  
 
 
273 
 
Table 10.2  Multinomial Logistic Regression for Participants’ Knowledge vs Participants’ Satisfaction   
 
Dep2.Var. 
Independent1 Variables Overall Model Goodness-of-Fit 
  KPM KIR KUS KSC KFDQ KDC 
Chi - Square 
(Sig.) 
R^2 
Chi - Square 
Deviance 
TPS 
Coff. 293.29 257.42 269.3 257.59 269.83 268.12 77.504 
(0.01) 
0.25 
163.056 
(0.089) Sig. 0.001*** 0.88 0.059* 0.806 0.243 0.09* 
SDM 
Coff. 465.13 435.27 453.74 434.66 3510.09 456.15 243.489 
(0.0) 
0.57 
259.957 
(1.00) Sig. 0.81 0.67 0.55 0.75 0.00*** 0.12 
SIR 
Coff. 229.42 209.43 223.49 210.05 213.9 212.918 114.610 
(0.0) 
0.38 
121.871 
(0.72) Sig. 0.11 0.71 0.06* 0.52 0.74 0.65 
SUS 
Coff. 219.32 186.28 197.49 189.09 195.59 192.62 147.221 
(0.0) 
0.48 
106.482 
(0.8) Sig. 0.00*** 0.8 0.16 0.19 0.28 0.34 
SSC 
Coff. 224.374 205.046 219.261 202.283 206.796 209.548 193.337 
(0.0) 
0.6 
136.270 
(0.17) Sig. 0.06* 0.18 0.02** 0.74 0.88 0.24 
SCI 
Coff. 454.2 402.87 425.82 396.13 422.8 409.52 359.811 
(0.0) 
0.72 
254.268 
(1.00) Sig. 0.03** 0.2 0.14 0.93 0.54 0.65 
SFDQ 
Coff. 225.821 206.451 210.282 203.147 213.958 200.949 142.386 
(0.0) 
0.45 
120.783 
(0.7) Sig. 0.02** 0.02** 0.2 0.14 0.06* 0.94 
SKP 
Coff. 213.877 184.509 209.249 184.132 199.147 189.851 171.562 
(0.0) 
0.54 
116.361 
(0.42) Sig. 0.00*** 0.59 0.00*** 0.72 0.1 0.38 
 
1. KPM Knowledge of the principle of the TOs Model, KIR Knowledge of Investment Return, KUS Knowledge of Underwriting Surplus, KSC 
Knowledge of Shari’ah Compliance, KFDQ Knowledge of Charged Fees, Encountered Deficits and availability of Qard, KKP Knowledge of Key 
Personnel Power and Activities, KDC Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels.   
2. TPS Total Participants’ Satisfaction, SDM Satisfaction with TOs’ Disclosure Mechanism, SIR Satisfaction with TOs’ Investment Returns, SUS 
Satisfaction with TOs’ underwriting Surplus, SSC Satisfaction with Shari’ah Compliance System, SCI Satisfaction with Claims and Indemnities, 
SFDQ Satisfaction with Fees, Deficits and Qard, SKP Satisfaction with Key Power.   
3. The KKP independent variable has been omitted by SPSS system as all parameters of this variable are constant with 0 values 
4. *** Significant at 1% level of significance (p≤0.01), ** significant at 5% level of significance (0.01<p≤ 0.05), and * significant at 10% level of 
significance (0.05<p≤ 0.10). 
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10.3.2 Forms of Relationships between Participants’ Knowledge vs Participants’ 
Satisfaction 
Table 10.2 reflects the multinomial logistic regression model between each determinant 
of the satisfaction dependent variable with a combination of participants’ knowledge as 
independent variables.  
 
All (knowledge vs satisfaction) models reported an overall statistical significance 
goodness of fit, as the overall chi-square p- value of all models reported less than 0.05. 
Also, the overall deviance goodness of fit values for all models showed statistically 
significant values, which reflects that the model adequately fits the data, as the overall 
chi-square (p-value) of all models reported a p-value greater than 0.05. The R
2
 values on 
the other hand, ranged from 25 % to 72 %. The reported R
2 
reflects by what percentage 
the satisfaction dependent variable can be explained by the combinations of participants’ 
knowledge independent variables.   
 
Furthermore, the likelihood ratio test indicates participant knowledge of the principles 
used by the TOs’ model (KPM) has reported the most independent variable to form a 
relationship with participant satisfaction determinant variables. It has a total of six 
significant forms of relationship, where the KPM has formed a statistical significance (p≤ 
0.01) with three satisfaction determinant values (total participants’ satisfaction (TPS), 
satisfaction with participant fund underwriting surplus (SUS) and satisfaction with TOs’ 
key personnel power and activities (SKP)).  Participants’ knowledge of principles used 
by TOs’ models (KPM), has formed another statistically significant relationship (p≤ 0.05) 
with two satisfaction determinant variables: satisfaction with TOs’ claims and 
indemnities procedures (SCI) and satisfaction with participants’ fund charged fees, 
encountered deficits and availability of qard (SFDQ). (KPM) has also reported statistical 
significance (p≤ 0.1) for satisfaction with TOs’ Shari’ah compliance system (SSC). Such 
findings for participants’ knowledge of the principles of TOs’ models (KPM), indicates 
the importance of this variable to enhance participants’ satisfaction, as participants will 
be aware of all conditions that allow them to get the ultimate benefit from their 
contribution to the participants’ fund.    
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Knowledge of participants’ fund underwriting surplus (KUS) has reported the second 
largest knowledge variable to form a significant relationship with participants’ 
satisfaction determinant variables, with four statistically significant relationships: (KUS) 
has statistical significance at (p≤ 0.01) with TOs’ key personnel power and activities 
(SKP) and another statistically significant relationship at (p≤ 0.05) with TOs’ Shari’ah 
compliance system (SSC). Lastly the (KPM) reported a statistically significant 
relationship at (p≤ 0.1) with the total participants’ satisfaction (TPS), and satisfaction 
with participants’ fund investment returns (SIR).  
 
The third knowledge variable with a statistically significant association with satisfaction 
determinant variables is participants’ knowledge of fund charged fees, encountered 
deficits and the availability of qard (KFDQ), since it formed two statistically significant 
relationships. These are that the (KFDQ) has a statistically significant relationship (p≤ 
0.01) with the satisfaction with TOs’ disclosure mechanisms (DM) and another 
relationship at (p≤ 0.1) with satisfaction with participants’ fund charged fees, 
encountered deficits and the availability of qard (SFDQ).   
 
While, knowledge of participant fund investment return (KIR) and knowledge of proper 
dissatisfaction channels (KDC), has reported the least knowledge variables that have a 
significant relationship with the satisfactions determinant variables in that the (KIR) has 
reported one statistical significance relationship at (p≤ 0.05) with the satisfactions of 
participants fund charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard (SFDQ). The 
(KDC) on the other hand, has reported another unique statistical significance relationship 
at (p≤ 0.01) with total participants’ satisfaction (TPS).  
 
Participants knowledge of Shari’ah compliance, has not reported a significant 
relationship with all satisfaction determinant variables, which complement the fact that 
256 (85.3 %)
81
 participants bought their takaful policy for future financial planning and  
193 (64.3 %) participants replied with ‘no’ to Shar’iah compliance as a reason that made 
them buy their takaful policy.  
                                               
81 Refer to Chapter 8, Table 8.30.  
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The multinomial regression results indicate that participants’ total satisfaction (TPS) and 
participants’ satisfaction with participants’ fund charged fees, encountered deficits and 
the availability of qard (SFDQ) has been the variable with the most satisfaction to be 
explained by three knowledge determinant variables. The (TPS) formed a significance 
relationship at (p≤ 0.01) with participants’ knowledge of the principles used by TOs’ 
models (KPM), and another two significant relationships at (p≤ 0.1) with participants’ 
knowledge of fund underwriting surplus (KUS) and participants’ knowledge of the 
proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC). The SFDQ has reported two significant 
relationships at (p≤ 0.05) with knowledge of the principles used by TOs’ models (KPM), 
and knowledge of fund investment returns (KIR). The other significant relationship at (p≤ 
0.1) with the knowledge of participants fund charged fees, encountered deficits and the 
availability of qard (SFDQ).  
 
In conclusion, participants’ knowledge of the principles used by TOs’ models (KPM) has 
reported six significant relationships with participant satisfaction determinant variables, 
followed by participants’ knowledge of the underwriting surplus (KUS) which reported 
four significant relationships with participants’ satisfaction determinant variables.  These 
results indicate participants need to be informed about the operational principles of the 
takaful model that runs their fund; they are also in need of enhancing their knowledge 
about several issues that concern their rights to receiving underwriting surplus. Thus by 
improving participants’ KPM and KUS, their satisfaction level would also increase. 
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Table 10.3  Multinomial Logistic Regression for Participants’ Preferences vs Participants’ Satisfaction  
 
Dep.2 
Var. 
Independent1 Variables Overall Model Goodness-of-Fit 
  PSC PRB PKP PRU PCU 
Chi - Square 
(Sig.) 
R^2 
Chi - Square 
Deviance 
TPS 
Coff. 140.83 144.54 141.01 151.54 141.12 30.150 
(0.067) 
0.17 
71.485 
(0.056) Sig. 0.789 0.06* 0.389 0.053* 0.736 
SDM 
Coff. 232.86 2063.75 230.86 240.78 239.79 157.772 
(0.0) 
0.6 
114.344 
(0.99) Sig. 0.557 0.00*** 0.19 0.41 0.12 
SIR 
Coff. 128.06 126.88 123.38 131.64 126.06 52.558 
(0.0) 
0.31 
65.955 
(0.12) Sig. 0.18 0.08* 0.45 0.13 0.37 
SUS 
Coff. 110.72 115.56 115.78 113.43 110.95 57.614 
(0.0) 
0.35 
55.204 
(0.28) Sig. 0.84 0.04** 0.03** 0.38 0.8 
SSC 
Coff. 135.37 132.8 132.7 141.42 134.38 76.191 
(0.0) 
0.43 
85.276 
(0.002) Sig. 0.57 0.85 0.89 0.17 0.75 
SCI 
Coff. 226.89 225.69 221.4 227.12 226.15 177.820  
(0.0) 
0.65 
109.478 
(0.99) Sig. 0.53 0.13 0.48 0.88 0.59 
SFDQ 
Coff. 123.33 122.53 125.95 127.59 123.32 50.513 
(0.0) 
0.29 
58.896 
(0.23) Sig. 0.82 0.71 0.12 0.45 0.83 
SKP 
Coff. 100.28 99.82 97.46 105.15 100.52 66.050  
(0.0) 
0.38 
35.300 
(0.91) Sig. 0.39 0.16 0.52 0.17 0.36 
 
1. PSC Preference on Shari’ah Compliance, PRB Preference to have a representative on BoDs, PKP Preference on TOs’ Key Personnel, PRU Preference 
on the reason to use takaful policy, PCU Preference on claims and underwriting surplus.   
2. TPS Total Participants’ Satisfaction, SDM Satisfaction with TOs’ Disclosure Mechanisms, SIR Satisfaction with TOs’ Investment Returns, SUS 
Satisfaction with TOs Underwriting Surplus, SSC Satisfaction with Shari’ah Compliance System, SCI Satisfaction with Claims and Indemnities, SFDQ 
Satisfaction with Fees, Deficits and Qard, SKP Satisfaction with Key Power.   
3. *** Significant at 1% level of significance (p≤0.01), ** significant at 5% level of significance (0.01<p≤ 0.05), and * significant at 10% level of 
significance (0.05<p≤ 0.10). 
                                               
 
 
 
278 
 
10.3.3 Forms of Relationships between Participant Preferences and Participant 
Satisfaction 
Table 10.3 reflects the multinomial logistic regression model between each determinant 
of the satisfaction dependent variables with a combination of participants’ preferences as 
independent variables.  
 
All (preferences vs satisfactions) models reported an overall statistically significant 
goodness of fit, as the overall chi-square p-value of all models was reported  at less than 
0.05, with the exception of the participants’ total satisfaction (TPS) model, as it has a p-
value of (0.067 > 0.05). Also, the overall deviance goodness of fit values for all models 
showed statistically significant values, reflecting that the model adequately fits the data. 
This is because the overall chi-square (p-value) of all models reported a p-value greater 
than 0.05, with the exception of participant satisfaction with TOs’ Shari’ah compliance 
system (SSC), as it has a p-value of (0.002 < 0.05). The R
2
 values on the other hand, 
ranged from 17% to 75%. The reported R
2 
reflects the percentage to which the 
satisfaction dependent variable can be explained by the combination of participants’ 
preferences as independent variables.   
 
Participants’ preferences to have a representative on the Board of Directors (BoDs) 
(PRB), has reported the preferences variable most likely to form a significant statistical 
relationship with satisfaction determinant variables, with four significant relationships. 
The (PRB) formed a significance relationship (p≤ 0.01) with participants’ satisfaction 
with the TOs disclosure mechanisms (SDM). The next significant relationship was at (p≤ 
0.05) with participants’ satisfaction with fund underwriting surplus (SUS). The two other 
significance relationships were at (p≤ 0.1) regarding fund investment returns (SIR) and 
another significance relationship with the participants’ total satisfaction (TPS).      
 
Participants’ preferences regarding TOs’ key personnel power and activities (PKP), 
reported a statistically significant relationship at (p≤ 0.05) with participant satisfaction 
with participants underwriting surplus (SUS). Also participants’ preferences regarding 
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the reason for buying a takaful policy (PRU), reports a statistically significant 
relationship at (p≤ 0.1) with total participant satisfaction (TPS).  
      
Furthermore, participants’ preferences for TOs’ Shari’ah compliance system (PSC) and 
participants’ preferences regarding TOs’ claims and underwriting surplus (PCU) reported 
insignificant relationships with all satisfaction determinant variables.  Participants’ total 
satisfaction (TPS) was explained by two participants’ preference determinant variables: 
(TPS) has a statistically significant relationship at (p≤ 0.1) with participants’ preference 
to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB) and with participants’ preferences for using 
the takaful policy (PRU). 
    
Participants’ satisfaction with participants fund underwriting surplus (SUS) has also been 
explained by two preferences determinant variables, that the (SUS) has a significant 
relationship at (p≤ 0.05) with participants’ preferences to have a representative on the 
BoDs (PRB), and with participants preferences regarding TOs’ key personnel power and 
activities (PKP).  Both satisfaction determinant variables, participants’ satisfaction about 
TOs’ disclosure mechanisms (SDM) and participants’ satisfaction regarding participant 
fund investment returns (SIR), have been explained by participants’ preferences for a 
representative on the BoDs (PRB), with a statistical significance (p≤ 0.01) for the (SDM) 
and a statistical significance (p≤ 0.1) for the (SIR). 
 
In conclusion, participants’ preference to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB), 
showed the most preference determinant variables that can bring satisfaction to 
participants, since it formed four significant relationships with participant satisfaction 
variables (TPS, SDM, SIR and SUS). Accordingly, to achieve participants’ satisfaction, 
TOs must adhere to participants’ preferences for assigning a representative on their 
behalf to discuss their rights and desires on participants’ underwriting surplus, investment 
return, and to have an effective disclosure mechanism with the BoDs, which will 
eventually increase their total satisfaction level.        
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10.4 CONCLUSIONS FROM THREE MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS  
The likelihood ratio test of the three multinomial logistic regression analyses indicated a 
number of significant forms of relationships between the three determinant independent 
variables (participants’ perceived disclosure, participants’ knowledge, and participants’ 
preferences) with the satisfaction determinant variables. It was noticed that TOs’ 
disclosure of investment returns (DIR) has been the disclosure variable that formed the 
most significant relationship with six satisfaction models, followed by disclosure 
regarding claims and indemnities (DCI) and disclosure of TOs’ key personnel power and 
activities (DKP). 
 
Participants’ knowledge determinant variables also indicated a number of significant 
relationships with the satisfaction determinant variables, that participant knowledge of 
the principles used by the TOs’ models (KPM) reported six significant relationships with 
participants’ satisfaction determinant variables. This was followed by participants’ 
knowledge of underwriting surplus (KUS) with four significant relationships with 
participants’ satisfaction determinant variable. In terms of participants’ preferences, 
participants showed a concentrated preference to have a representative on the BoDs 
(PRB) and such a preference has formed four significant relationships with participants’ 
satisfaction variables.   
 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that participants are in favour of 
obtaining more information about their financial benefits in the participants’ fund, which 
was obvious by their preference to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB). Such a fact 
was supported by a significant relationship between participants’ satisfaction and their 
knowledge of the principles of the takaful model used (KPM). Participants’ knowledge of 
the principles of the takaful model used could be a substitute for their preference to have 
a representative on the BoDs (PRB). If they have enough knowledge of how their fund is 
running then they will not need to have somebody representing their wishes to the TOs’ 
upper management. However, transferring the knowledge to participants would not be as 
efficient without having a suitable disclosure mechanism that conveys the desired 
financial benefits information to participants. Accordingly, it is believed that TOs’ proper 
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disclosure mechanisms do a great job in enhancing participants’ knowledge; it is is also 
believed that once participants have enough knowledge, their preferences can be 
improved, as they already possess the required information. Therefore, two multinomial 
logistic regression analyses are carried out between participants’ perceptions about TOs’ 
disclosure systems as an independent variable with participant knowledge as a dependent 
variable, to discover any impact from participants’ perceived disclosure on their 
knowledge. The second multinomial logistic regression analyses is run between 
participants knowledge as an independent variable with participants’ preferences as a 
dependent variables to figure out how participants knowledge might substitute 
participants’ desires preferences. By obtaining information on such a relationship could 
suggest ways to enhance participant satisfaction.  
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Table 10.4.  Multinomial Logistic Regression for Participants’ Perceived Disclosure vs Participants’ Knowledge 
 
Dep.2 Var. 
Independent1 Variables Overall Model Goodness-of-Fit 
 
DM DIR DUS DSC DCI DFDQ DKP 
Chi - Square 
(Sig.) 
R^2 
Chi - Square 
Deviance 
TPK 
Coff. 171.21 110.69 112.57 113.33 108.78 111.21 117.16 305.219 
(0.0) 
0.85 
102.351 
(1.00) Sig. 0.45 0.52 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.19 0.00*** 
KPM 
Coff. 5.09E+02 3.42E+02 3.03E+02 2.99E+02 2.82E+02 2.91E+02 2.81E+02 932.766 
(0.0) 
0.97 
241.765 
(1.00) Sig. 1 0.00*** 0.59 0.95 0.68 0.87 0.99 
KIR 
Coff. 289.55 221.41 213.85 216.56 216.01 212.91 219.08 173.969 
(0.0) 
0.58 
183.695 
(0.19) Sig. 0.11 0.09* 0.76 0.47 0.04** 0.82 0.02** 
KUS 
Coff. 2.66E+02 1.72E+02 1.46E+02 1.43E+02 1.30E+02 1.38E+02 1.51E+02 688.127 
(0.0) 
0.95 
115.924 
(1.00) Sig. 0.99 0.00*** 0.16 0.52 0.7 0.46 0.00*** 
KSC 
Coff. 109.571 55.511 51.093 59.077 47.187 54.23 52.617 367.032 
(0.0) 
0.94 
42.265 
(1.00) Sig. 0.46 0.06* 0.21 0.01*** 0.16 0.03** 0.02** 
KFDQ 
Coff. 6.10E+02 3.77E+02 2.74E+02 2.98E+02 2.34E+02 2.95E+02 2.29E+02 958.815 
(0.0) 
0.98 
91.288 
(1.00) Sig. 0.09* 0.00*** 0.54 0.01*** 0.89 0.00*** 1 
KDC 
Coff. 5.76E+02 3.91E+02 385.854 405.159 378.167 383.19 402.456 418.956 
(0.0) 
0.8 
342.459 
(1.00) Sig. 0.32 0.41 0.6 0.01*** 0.48 0.58 0.00*** 
 
1. DM Disclosure Mechanisms, DIR Disclosure of Investment Return, DUS Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus, DSC Disclosure of Shari’ah 
Compliance, DCI Disclosure of Claims and Indemnities, DFDQ Disclosure of Fees, Deficits and Qard, DKP Disclosure of Key Personnel. 
2. TPK Total Participants’ Knowledge, KPM Knowledge of the principle of the TOs’Models, KIR Knowledge of Investment Return, KUS Knowledge of 
Underwriting Surplus, KSC Knowledge of Shari’ah Compliance, KFDQ Knowledge of Charged Fees, Encountered Deficits and availability of Qard, 
KKP Knowledge of Key Personnel Power and Activities, KDC Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels. 
3. The KKP independent variable has been omitted by SPSS system since all parameters of this variable are constant with 0 values. 
4. TPK has been added to the knowledge determinant variables, for better reflections of how disclosure determinant variables can affect participants’ total 
knowledge.     
5. *** Significant at 1% level of significance (p≤0.01), ** significant at 5% level of significance (0.01<p≤ 0.05), and * significant at 10% level of 
significance (0.05<p≤ 0.10). 
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10.5 MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION SUGGESTED APPROACH   
The following section reflects on suggested multinomial regression analysis models, 
which will be between the participants’ perceptions about TOs’ disclosure system’ and 
participants knowledge and between participants’ knowledge and participants’ 
preferences. 
 
10.5.1. Forms of Relationships between Participants’ Perceived Disclosure and 
Participants’ Knowledge82   
Table 10.4 reflects the multinomial logistic regression model which illustrates the 
significance relationship between each knowledge determinant dependent variable with 
the combinations of participants’ perceived disclosure as an independent variable.  
 
All (disclosure vs knowledge) models reported an overall statistically significant 
goodness of fit, as the overall chi-square p - value of all models reported less than 0.05. 
Also, the overall deviance goodness of fit values for all models showed statistical 
significance values, which shows that the model adequately fits the data, as the overall 
chi-square (p-value) of all models reported a p-value of greater than 0.05. The R
2
 values 
on the other hand, ranged from 58 % to 97 %. Likelihood ratio test on the other hand, 
showed that two of the knowledge determinant variables, can be explained by four of the 
disclosure combined variables. Participants’ knowledge of the TOs’ Shari’ah compliance 
systems (KSC) reported a significant relationship at (p≤ 0.01) with TOs’ disclosure of the 
Shari’ah compliance system (DSC), and another significant relationship at (p≤ 0.05) with 
two of the disclosure variables. These were disclosure regarding fund charged fees, 
encountered deficits and availability of qard (DFDQ) and disclosure of TOs’ key 
personnel power and activities (DKP). There is a fourth significance relationship at (p≤ 
0.1) with participants’ fund investment returns.    
 
Participants’ knowledge of fund charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of 
qard (KFDQ) can be explained by four of the disclosure combined variables. (KFDC) 
reports a significant relationship at (p≤ 0.01) with disclosure of participants’ fund 
                                               
82 The used findings were taken from Tables 10.1 and 10.2. 
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investment return (DIR), disclosure of TOs’ Shari’ah compliance system (DSC) and 
disclosure of participants’ fund charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard 
(DFDQ), and another significance relationship at (p≤ 0.1) with TOs’ disclosure 
mechanisms (DM).    
 
The third knowledge group to report a significant relationship is participants’ knowledge 
of fund investment returns (KIR) explained by three of the disclosure combined 
variables. (KIR) reported a significant relationship at (p≤ 0.05) with TOs’ disclosure of 
claims and indemnities (DCI) and TOs’ disclosure of the company key personnel power 
and activities (DKP). There is another significant relationship at (p≤ 0.1) with disclosure 
participants’ fund investment returns (DIR).      
 
Disclosure of participants’ fund investment returns (DIR) and disclosure regarding TOs’ 
key personnel power and activities (DKP), have reported the disclosure variables that 
formed the most significant relationship with knowledge determinant variables. Each one 
of them formed five significant relationships with the knowledge determinant variables, 
followed by disclosure of TOs’ Shari’ah compliance systems (DSC) which formed three 
significant relationships with the knowledge determinant variables.    
 
Three of the five significant relationships conducted by (DIR) were reported at (p≤ 0.01) 
with knowledge of the principles of the takaful model used (KPM), knowledge of 
participants’ fund underwriting surplus (KUS), and knowledge of participants’ fund 
charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard (KFDQ). (DIR) formed 
another two significant relationships at (p≤ 0.1) with knowledge of the Shari’ah 
compliance system (KSC), and knowledge of participants’ fund investment returns 
(KIR).  
 
Disclosure regarding TOs’ key personnel power and activities (DKP) has formed three 
significant relationships at (p≤ 0.01) with the total participants’ knowledge (TPK) 
knowledge of participants’ fund underwriting surplus (KUS), and knowledge about 
proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC). (DKP) also formed another two significant 
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relationships at (p≤ 0.05) with the knowledge of participants; fund investment returns 
(KIR), and knowledge of Shari’ah compliance systems (KSC). Disclosure of TOs’ 
Shari’ah compliance systems (DSC) reported three significant relationships at (p≤ 0.01) 
with the knowledge of the Shari’ah compliance system (KSC), knowledge of 
participants’ fund charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard (KFDQ), 
and knowledge of proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC).  
 
To conclude, the multinomial logistic regression analysis findings indicate that   
disclosure of participants’ fund investment returns (DIR) and disclosure of TOs’ key 
personnel power and activities (DKP) have the greatest impact on participants’ 
knowledge which reflects such a logical approach. This is because participants are more 
eager to gain financial return from their contributions to the fund. They are also more 
willing to recognize the role, power and activities of the TOs’ key personnel. 
Furthermore, it should be highlighted that both disclosure variables (DIR and DKP) have 
similar significance relationships with three of the knowledge determinant variables, 
knowledge of participants’ fund investment returns (KIR), knowledge of the Shari’ah 
compliance systems (KSC), and knowledge about participants’ fund underwriting surplus 
(KUS). This means that as TOs enhance their (DIR and DKP), participants’ (KSC, KUS 
and KIR) will increase, which will bring satisfaction to participants, as the (KUS) 
reported a statistical significance with four satisfaction determinant variables.  
 
It should also be noted that disclosure of fund investment returns (DIR) which was the 
disclosure variable that brings the most satisfaction to participants, has reported a 
statistical significance relationship with the knowledge of the principles of the TOs’ 
takaful models used.  (KPM) which was the knowledge variable that brings the most 
satisfaction to participants, gives a clear picture that TOs’ disclosure of fund investment 
returns (DIR) will positively impact participants’ knowledge, not only of the principles of 
the TOs’ model of takaful (KPM), but also of other four knowledge determinant 
variables, which will increase participants’ satisfaction level. 
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Table 10.5  Multinomial Logistic Regression for Participants’ Knowledge vs Participants’ Preferences   
 
Dep2.Var. 
Independent1 Variables Overall Model Goodness-of-Fit 
  
KPM KIR KUS KSC KFDQ KDC 
Chi - Square 
(Sig.) 
R^2 
Chi - Square 
Deviance 
PTP 
Coff. 201.91 178.69 178.52 176.18 181.29 177.89 240.710 
(0.0) 
0.62 
110.181 
(0.97) Sig. 0.02** 0.26 0.86 0.92 0.87 0.93 
PSC 
Coff. 168 154.84 158.68 151.61 166.03 158.82 227.837 
(0.0) 
0.69 
97.834 
(0.93) Sig. 0.28 0.19 0.3 0.96 0.15 0.29 
PRB 
Coff. 145.08 139.96 144.41 139.92 144.85 162.1 43.372 
(0.0) 
0.19 
81.080 
(0.11) Sig. 0.63 0.75 0.2 0.81 0.41 0.00*** 
PKP 
Coff. 38.4 34.94 35.91 35.77 36.61 37.16 225.485 
(0.0) 
0.86 
21.033 
(1.00) Sig. 0.82 0.68 0.77 0.31 0.87 0.49 
PRU 
Coff. 2.14E+02 1.93E+02 1.96E+02 1.93E+02 2.07E+02 2.02E+02 520.249 
(0.0) 
0.85 
114.251 
(1.00) Sig. 0.78 0.86 0.97 0.93 0.78 0.62 
PCU 
Coff. 218.03 197.88 199.08 188.47 199.54 198.7 221.788 
(0.0) 
0.58 
117.298 
(0.91) Sig. 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.07** 0.63 0.28 0.08** 
 
1. KPM Knowledge of the principle of the TOs’ Models, KIR Knowledge of Investment Returns, KUS Knowledge of Underwriting Surplus, KSC 
Knowledge of Shari’ah Compliance, KFDQ Knowledge of Charged Fees, Encountered Deficits and availability of Qard, KKP Knowledge of Key 
Personnel Power and Activities, KDC Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels. 
2. PTP Participants’ Total Preferences, PSC Preference on Shari’ah Compliance, PRB Preference to have a representative on BoDs, PKP Preference on 
TOs’ Key Personnel, PRU Preference on the reason to use takaful policy, PCU Preference on claims and underwriting surplus.   
3. The KKP independent variable has been omitted by SPSS system since all parameters of this variable are constant with 0 values. 
4. PTP has been added to the participants’ preferences determinant variables, for better reflections of how participants’ knowledge determinant variables 
can affect participants’ total preferences. 
5. *** Significant at 1% level of significance (p≤0.01), ** significant at 5% level of significance (0.01<p≤ 0.05), and * significant at 10% level of 
significance (0.05<p≤ 0.10). 
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10.5.2. Forms of Relationships between Participants’ Knowledge and Participants’ 
Preferences
83
   
Table 10.5 reflects the multinomial logistic regression model which best illustrates the 
significant relationship between each preference as dependent variable with the combinations of 
participants’ knowledge as independent variables. All (knowledge vs preference) models 
reported an overall statistical significance goodness of fit, as the overall chi-square p-value of all 
models reported less than 0.05. Also, the overall deviance goodness of fit values for all models 
showed statistically significant values, which reflects an adequate model fit for the data. This is 
because the overall chi-square (p-value) of all models reported a p-value of greater than 0.05. 
The R
2
 values on the other hand, ranged from 19 % to 86 % indicating the percentage the 
preference dependent variable can be explained by a combination of participants’ knowledge 
independent variables.   
 
Among the preference variables, participants’ preferences of participants’ fund claims and 
underwriting surplus conditions (PCU) is mostly explained by knowledge determinant variables, 
with four significance relationships. This is because the PCU reported statistically significant 
relationships at (p≤ 0.01) with knowledge of the principles of the takaful model used (KPM) and 
knowledge of participants’ fund investment returns (KIR). There is another statistically 
significant relationship at (p≤ 0.05) with participants’ knowledge of underwriting surplus 
conditions (KUS) and knowledge of the proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC). Participants’ 
total preferences (PTP) and participants’ preferences to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB) 
reported the preference variables to have a least significant relationship with the knowledge 
determinant’ variables with a unique significance relationship. Accordingly, the PTP reported a 
significant relationship at (p≤ 0.05) with the knowledge of the principles of takaful model used 
(KPM).The (PRB) reported a significance relationship at (p≤ 0.01) with the knowledge of the 
proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC). 
 
On the other hand, participants’ preferences of Shari’ah compliance systems (PSC), preferences 
of the TOs’ key personnel power and activities and preferences of the motivation for buying a 
takaful policy reported an insignificant relationship with all knowledge determinant variables. 
                                               
83 83 The used findings were taken from Tables 10.2, and 10.3. 
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In conclusion, the multinomial logistic regression analysis indicated that participant’ preferences 
for claims and underwriting conditions (PCU) reported the most preference variable to have the 
least significant relationship with the knowledge determinant variable. Among these 
determinant’ variables is participants’ knowledge of the principles of the takaful model used 
(KPM) which was the knowledge variable that is most likely to bring satisfaction to participants. 
It should also be highlighted that there is a complete shift between participants’ intensive 
preferences to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB) (Preferences vs Satisfaction) to 
participants’ intensive preferences on claims and underwriting surplus conditions (Knowledge vs 
Preferences). Such a shift in participants’ preferences indicates that once participants have 
enough knowledge of their contributions benefits from the participants’ fund, they would no 
longer require a representative to convey their wishes to the TOs’ upper management.                  
 
10.6 CONCLUSIONS OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION: SUGGESTED APPROACH
84
  
The likelihood ratio test of the suggested multinomial logistic regression analysis for both 
models indicated some significant findings. Particularly that TOs’ disclosure of participants’ 
fund investment returns (DIR) and disclosure of TOs’ key personnel power and activities (DKP) 
will have a significant impact on participants’ knowledge. It is also clear that there is a 
significant relationship between the DIR which was the disclosure variable that brings most 
satisfaction to participants, with the knowledge of the principles of the TOs’ takaful model used 
(KPM) which was the knowledge variable that brings most satisfaction to participants. 
Participants’ intensive preferences to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB) (Preferences vs 
Satisfaction) have been shifted to an intensive preference for TOs’ claims and underwriting 
surplus conditions (PCU) (Knowledge vs Preferences). The (PCU) reported a significant 
relationship with the knowledge of the principles of the takaful model used (KPM) which was 
the knowledge variable that brings most satisfaction to participants. 
 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that as TOs disclose more information of participants’ fund 
investment returns (DIR) and other disclosure variables, participants gain more knowledge, not 
only of the principles of the TOs’ models of takaful (KPM), but also of other knowledge 
determinant variables, and once participants possess enough knowledge of their benefits from the 
                                               
84 The used findings were taken from Tables 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.5    
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participants’ fund, then their preferences will be concentrated on issues that directly affect their 
benefits. These include claims and underwriting surplus (PCU) without intruding into company 
management decisions by having a representative on the BoDs (PRB). Hence, such a cycle 
between participants’ perceived disclosure, knowledge and preferences will increase 
participants’ satisfaction levels.       
 
10.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
85
 
This chapter complements the previous empirical chapters by discovering the most suitable way 
to achieve participants’ satisfaction by reviewing the forms of relationship between the three 
independent variables (participants’ perceptions about TOs’ disclosure systems, participants’ 
knowledge and participants’ preferences) with participants’ satisfaction levels as a dependent 
variable. This chapter also provides an answer to research question 6, as stated in the 
introduction section of this chapter. Thus, three multinomial logistic regressions were conducted 
to determine the significant relationships between the three independent determinant variables 
with the dependent satisfaction determinant variables: the forms of relationships were varied 
according to 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level. Accordingly, the results of the three 
regression analysis models indicated an overall statistically significant goodness of fit, as the 
overall chi-square p- value of all models reported less than 0.05, reflecting the suitability of all 
models to fit the data, with the exception of two models (Disclosure determinant variables vs 
participants’ satisfaction of TOs’ disclosure mechanisms SDM) and (preferences determinant 
variables vs total participants’ satisfaction (TPS)).   
 
Furthermore, the deviance result of all reported models indicated that all deviance results are 
statistically significant (p-value > 0.05), which reflects the suitability of all models to adequately 
fit the data. The R-Square figures on the other hand, indicated that most of the R-Square values 
range from 60 % to 100 %, with very little scattered R-Square values from 16 % to 45 %. As has 
been explained previously, the greater the value of the R-Square, the better fit for the model, 
which means the greater the chance that the satisfaction dependent variable can be explained by 
combinations of the disclosure independent variables. 
 
                                               
85 The used findings were taken from Tables 8.9, 8.39, 8.40, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3  
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On the other hand, the likelihood ratio test indicated a number of significant forms of 
relationships between the three determinant independent variables with the satisfaction as 
dependant variables. It can be noted that TOs’ disclosure of participants’ fund investment returns 
(DIR) is the disclosure variable that formed the most significant relationship with six satisfaction 
models, followed by disclosure of claims and indemnities (DCI) and disclosure of TOs’ key 
personnel power and activities (DKP). This is because it has a significant relationship with four 
satisfaction determinant variables, while disclosure of participants’ fund underwriting surplus 
(DUS) has formed three relationships with the satisfaction determinant variables. Such 
significant relationship indicates the important of exposing participants to the expected 
investment returns from their contributions to the fund. Participants also show their desire to be 
made aware of the conditions that allow them to be indemnified whenever a claim has been 
made. Participants also wish to recognize the role, power and activities of the company key 
personnel. Participants’ knowledge determinant variable also indicated a number of significant 
relationships with the satisfaction determinant variables. Participants’ knowledge of the 
principles of the TOs’ models used (KPM), reported six significant relationships with 
participants’ satisfaction determinant variables. This is followed by participants’ knowledge of 
the underwriting surplus (KUS) with four significant relationships with participants’ satisfaction 
determinant variable. While the participants’ preferences determinant variable has shown a 
concentrated preference to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB), such preference has formed 
four significant relationships with participants’ satisfaction variable.   
 
From the three regression analyses, it can be concluded that, in order to bring satisfaction to 
participants, TOs should adhere to three main desires of participants. They should: 
I. Provide a representative, who can present and discuss participants’ rights and benefits to 
the TOs’ higher management. 
II. Educate participants about the principles of the takaful model used, i.e. Wakalah, 
Modarabah, Waqf, etc. 
III. Make participants aware of the expected financial benefits, especially participants’ fund 
investment returns, as 230 (76.7 %) participants participate in the investment fund 
accounts, and to expose them on the conditions that made them indemnified to cover 
future claims.  
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 The three satisfaction conditions above indicate that because of participants’ weak knowledge, 
which might be a result of a weak perceived disclosure, participants’ main preference is to have a 
representative on the BoDs. Thus, proper disclosure mechanisms adopted by the TOs would be 
effective for enhancing participants’ knowledge. Once participants have enough knowledge then 
their preferences might change as they will possess the required knowledge to substitute their 
requested preferences. Accordingly, another two multinomial logistic regressions were run 
between participants’ perceived disclosure as an independent variable with participants’ 
knowledge as a dependent variables, and between participants’ knowledge as an independent 
variable with participants’ preferences as a dependent variable. 
 
The regression analysis findings of disclosure vs knowledge complements participants’ three 
satisfaction conditions, that disclosure of participants’ fund investment returns (DIR) and 
disclosure of TOs’ key personnel power and activities (DKP), have the greatest significant 
relationships with the participants’ knowledge determinant variables, as it reported five 
significant relationships. Interestingly, the DIR which was the disclosure variable that brings 
most satisfaction to participants reported a statistically significant relationship with KPM which 
was the knowledge variable that brings most satisfaction to participants. This paints a clear 
picture of the fact that TOs’ disclosure of fund investment returns (DIR) will positively impact 
participants’ knowledge of the principles of the takaful model (KPM) used. Another interesting 
finding is participants’ focus preferences on claims and underwriting conditions (PCU), which 
reported the preference variable to have most significance relationships with the knowledge 
determinant variables. These results complement the assumption that knowledge and preferences 
change; participants changed from their preference to have a representative on the TOs’ BoDs 
(PRB), to focus on claims and underwriting conditions (PCU). This result indicates that once 
participants have enough knowledge about their contributions benefits from the participants’ 
fund, then they will not need a representative who can convey their preferences to the TOs’ 
upper management.       
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CHAPTER ELEVEN   
CONTEXTUALIZATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SAMA 
 
11.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
As been explained previously the layout structure of this research follows Wells et al (1995) 
effort. They study the regulatory directives system for better service quality toward 
policyholders. The main objective of projecting the regulator assessment and directives is to see 
whether the local regulator in Saudi Arabia has provided the TOs with the required tools to 
achieve participants’ desires satisfactions. Accordingly, this chapter will link between the 
international insurance policies per the literature chapters, along with the obtained findings of the 
empirical chapters to come up with a set of recommendations to enhance SAMA regulations for 
better services for the takaful participants. By doing so, the current chapter will address research 
question 7:  
 
Question 7: What are the suggested solutions for the Saudi Arabian Insurance Regulator to 
overcome any shortfalls in providing the required protections for takaful participants? 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 11.2 compares the Saudi insurance regulatory laws 
and directives with the international insurance and takaful standards and policies and with 
participants’ perceptions. Section 11.3 draws a conclusion.  
11.2 SAMA REGULATIONS VS INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE STANDARDS   
This section provides an answer to research question 7, by comparing the Saudi insurance laws 
and regulations as assigned by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) with the 
international insurance regulatory standards as has been reflected in the literature chapters. Some 
of the results from participants’ perceptions, knowledge and preferences found in the empirical 
chapters will be used to consolidate the findings’ conclusions with one main objective i.e. 
protecting rights of participants who contributed to the takaful fund. This is to be used to 
encourage SAMA to establish special takaful directives devoted for takaful companies operating 
in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, this section will follow the sequence of the literature chapters by 
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tackling some of the important issues that have been addressed on the Corporate Governance and 
Market Conduct & Disclosure chapters.     
 
11.2.1  Corporate Governance  
An important issue to mention here is that SAMA has never addressed takaful insurance or 
addresses a Shari’ah Governance issue in any of its directives; they often refer to cooperative 
insurance companies. Accordingly, the following discussion will address some important points 
that were mentioned in the corporate governance chapter, which might affect participants’ rights 
in receiving financial and social benefits. 
 
I. Stakeholders’ Relationships as per SAMA directives  
SAMA has issued a number of corporate governance regulations to strengthen the Saudi 
insurance market, some of which were directed towards the stakeholders. SAMA has identified 
the role of BoDs, actuaries, auditors and intermediaries, to provide the required protections to the 
policyholders. However, SAMA has not put in place any obligatory rules to guide the insurance 
companies to structure a corporate governance framework that specifies the strategic, operational 
roles, responsibilities, functions of all organs of the firms including but not limited to the BoD’s 
and its committees.  
 
It is preferable if SAMA develops its own insurance corporate governance system in accordance 
with the economical and political situations surrounding the Saudi financial market. Each 
organization should develop its own corporate governance model that caters for its specific needs 
and objectives (OECD, 2004; IAIS, 2004; IFSB, 2008, 2009a).  The model should put in place a 
balance of governance mechanisms that satisfies all stakeholder parties i.e. shareholders and 
participants. Such a balanced environment will create a good and strong culture of governance 
that enhances homogeneity and effective information flow among all stakeholders (IFSB, 2008). 
A sound corporate governance system should establish a connection between directors, 
managers, employees, shareholders, customers, creditors, and suppliers (Kaplan et al, 2000). By 
establishing such healthy relationships between insurance company stakeholders, the problem of 
culture manipulation and information concealment will be minimized if not eliminated. 
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Accordingly, it is recommended that SAMA identify a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders. 
 
II. Shari’ah Corporate Governance System  
SAMA in its first article on the supervision of the cooperative of insurance company’s laws’ has 
stated that the insurance business shall be operated in accordance with the principles of Islamic 
Shari’ah (SAMA, 2005a: 1). 
 
SAMA is also a “full member”86 of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) organization, 
which entitled SAMA to receive several benefits including, (i) technical assistance, (ii) 
participate in the IFSB awareness programme, (iii) participate in the development of the IFSB 
prudential standards, (iv) receive complimentary first-hand copies of the IFSB exposure drafts 
and be invited to comment on them, (v) receive complimentary printed copies of the IFSB 
publications such as standards, guidelines, surveys etc.  
 
Despite the membership of SAMA in IFSB and the fact that SAMA insurance law is in faith 
adhering to the Islamic principles, there is no single directive devoted to Takaful insurance, nor 
restrictions on certain assets portfolio that go against Shari’ah principles, nor directive on the 
rules of the Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB) and/or the insurance internal Shari’ah 
departments. Accordingly, it is preferable if SAMA identifies for insurance and takaful 
companies the methods of conducting activities in accordance with Shari’ah principles. It is also 
recommended that SAMA identifies the formation of the in-house religious advisers (SSB) with 
their roles and responsibilities as well as the roles and responsibilities of the Internal Shari’ah 
Review Audit (ISRA) and the Internal Shari’ah compliance unit/department (ISCU) and their 
relationships with the SSB members. 
 
Another vital issue is the successful efforts exerted by SAMA in simulating the international 
advanced insurance market by formulating the actuaries work. However, SAMA has ignored 
vital rules of the actuaries work, that the actuary and the Shari’ah Board should be in charge of 
                                               
86
 http://www.ifsb.org/membership.php. 
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finding proper investments contracts to run participants’ funds (either by mudaraba, wakala), 
setting wakala fees for investments management or any other combination, and they should set 
and advise of the fee structure and the profit-sharing ratio on the investment management 
between participants and the operator.  
 
The actuary is also responsible for allocating and approving the takaful benefits to participants in 
the family takaful business such as distribution of underwriting and/or investment profit. The 
collaboration between non-executive directors, Shari’ah scholars, actuary and/or participant’s 
representative should provide adequate protection for takaful participants by monitoring the 
reserve and distribution of underwriting and/or investment profit (IFSB, 2009a). Accordingly, it  
is vital for SAMA to link the actuaries work with the principles of Islamic laws to satisfy takaful 
participants’ goal of contributing to the takaful fund. It is recommended that SAMA conduct a 
research study among participants to find out their preferences to have a representative on the 
TOs’ management as it has been suggested by IFSB.  
 
III. Underwriting Surplus Distributions 
SAMA, in its directive called the “Implemented regulations” Article 70, mentions that the 
surplus distribution should be conducted as 10% of the net surplus distributed to the 
policyholders, the remaining 90% of the net surplus should be transferred to the shareholders’ 
income statement. Furthermore, 20% of the net shareholders’ income shall be set aside as a 
statutory reserve until this reserve amounts to 100% of the paid capital (SAMA, 2005b). 
 
While AAOIFI Shari’ah standard No. 26 (5/5) of 2007 states clearly that takaful surplus belongs 
to participants only. Therefore, surplus can only be distributed to the participants based on the 
participants’ donation percentage share.  In Saudi Arabia, where the majority of the TOs are 
using the wakalah model to operate the takaful scheme (AlJazira, 2008; SAAB, 2009; AlAhli, 
2010), contradiction arises with SAMA instructions as the TO in the wakalah operational 
mechanisms is considered an agent to run the underwriting and investments activities. The TO 
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should not share underwriting surplus with participants and they have only four sources of 
income
87
 and surplus is not one of these sources.  
 
Furthermore, SAMA seems in favour of implementing the net underwriting surplus instead of the 
gross underwriting surplus (SAMA, 2005b) which implies that the investment income is 
ploughed back into the takaful fund and the takaful company shares with the participant the 
surplus from the takaful fund (Ali et al, 2008; Asaria, 2009). Following SAMA’s surplus 
distribution instructions, therefore, reduces both underwriting surplus and investment return for 
participants, while shareholders get the ultimate benefits as per SAMA instructions. Therefore, it 
is preferable that SAMA states the operational scheme of the wakalah model, in accordance with 
the standards set by international organizations such as IFSB or AAOIFI, since the above-
mentioned TOs are claiming that they are running their takaful scheme with the wakalah model. 
However, the TOs in their public reports or websites never highlight any specific percentage of 
surplus distribution. In other words, to be fair to participants TOs should distribute underwriting 
surpluses to participants as per AAOIFI.  
 
The contradiction of SAMA’s rule of limiting surplus distribution to 10% only with the 
international insurance bodies can create confusion among participants as 226 (75 %) 
participants
88
 do not know the difference between net and gross underwriting surplus. 
Accordingly, it will be recommended that SAMA identifies the best approach to allocate 
underwriting surplus among participants. The allocation can take place by of of the following 
three ways: pro-rata mode, selective mode, or offsetting mode.
89
 This will help the participants 
as 280 (93 %) of them
90
 do not know the conditions of sharing in the underwriting surplus.  
 
 
                                               
87 Refer to chapter 2 for further discussion on types of takaful models. Also more details on the four sources of 
income for TOs’ operating by the Wakalah Model in Saudi Arabia, can be found on AlJazira Takaful website at 
(http://www.takaful.com.sa/m1sub3.asp) 
88 Refer to chapter 8, Table 8.22, for further discussion, also as per AlJazira Takaful web-site at 
(http://www.takaful.com.sa/m1sub3.asp). 
89 Refer to chapter 4, for further discussion on this issue.  
90 Ibid. 
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IV. Shareholders’ Power and the Availability of Qard Hassan91 
In some jurisdictions, such as in Malaysia, TOs are obligated to give an undertaking to the 
regulator to provide a qard facility to be drawn upon in the event of a deficit of a takaful fund 
(Hussain, 2009). One way to cover a deficit is by deducting the reserve amount from the takaful 
fund namely, claims contingency reserve (CCR). However, in case the reserve is not enough to 
cover the deficit then TOs will ask shareholders to provide qard hasan facility to cover the 
deficit (Tobias, 2009).  
 
Participants may be asked to pay regularly more than what is needed for the anticipated 
compensations in a given period and use the extra amount to build up a reserve as back-up 
capital for extraordinary damages (Archer et al, 2009). Alternatively, deducting from the past 
underwriting surplus can be used to build up a reserve (AAOIFI, 2010). According, clear 
instruction should be given by SAMA on the proper procedure that the TOs should follow to 
recover the shareholders loan facilities used to overcome a deficit in the takaful fund. As 
mentioned in SAMA’s Implemented Regulations directive, 20% of the net shareholders’ income 
should be set aside as a statutory reserve until this reserve amounts to 100% of the paid capital. 
However, SAMA does not clarify the sequences associated with the shareholders’ obligations to 
cover any deficits in the fund. In other words, it is preferable that SAMA identifies possible 
scenarios to pay back the shareholders’ loan which can be done either by increasing participants’ 
future contributions to the fund or by preventing participants getting any future underwriting 
surplus or investment return. 
 
SAMA might assert in its regulations and laws that the TOs should identify different types of 
expenses and management fees that are going to be deducted from the participants’ fund, as these 
might cause future deficits in the participants’ fund and prevent participants receiving 
underwriting surplus. The results show that 298 (99%) participants have no idea about different 
fees that have been charged by the TOs and 281 (94%) participants have no idea about the 
situations that causes them to pay additional contributions to the company. It is recommended 
that SAMA follows AAOIFI standards No. 13, which require disclosure of the basis applied by 
                                               
91 Findings of this section have been taken from chapter 8, Tables 8.24, 8.25 and 8.29. 
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the company in calculating expenses affecting policyholders’ funds such as pre-operating 
expenditures, reserves, costs of assets used in operations, claims and compensations, etc. 
 
On the other hand, there are several acceptable practices that can be exerted by the shareholders 
to use the takaful fund underwriting surplus and the investment return. However, SAMA did not 
specify the extent of shareholders’ power and limitations on the participants’ fund. This can open 
the door for the TOs to exert more discretion on the participants’ fund which might cause 
dissatisfaction among participants. This is supported by the findings which show that 300 
(100%) participants do not know if the shareholders are sharing in participants’ underwriting 
surplus and investments returns and 205 (68%) participants agree to have the right to refuse 
shareholders activities on the participants’ fund. Accordingly, it’s recommended that SAMA 
follows AAOIFI standards No. 13 which requires disclosure of the bases governing the 
contractual relationship between policyholders and shareholders. 
 
V. Clear Segregation between Shareholders’ and Participants’ Funds  
SAMA has clearly stated in the laws on the cooperative insurance directives Article 2, the 
Implemented Regulations Article 70, and the investment regulations, that the investment policy 
shall segregate policyholders’ funds from shareholders’ funds. This is because each type of asset 
is classified by different objectives and targets, which will require different financial statements. 
The main objectives are protecting policyholders’ and shareholders’ interests in terms of ability 
to meet liabilities and to ensure the business meets the minimum level of capital requirement 
(SAMA, 2005a; 2005b; 2011a). Despite the fact that SAMA asserts the importance of a clear 
segregation between policyholders’ and shareholders’ fund’, SAMA did not announce any 
directives to guide TOs with the proper instructions to separate the two funds.    
 
As one of the main challenges encountered in the takaful business is the hybrid structural scheme 
with the combination of mutual and proprietary, simultaneously following the principles of 
Taawun, Tabarru and the prohibition of Riba can raise a conflict of interest. TOs are considered 
custodians of a takaful fund and they might exert a good amount of discretion to determine the 
range of products, pricing, terms and conditions of contracts. Additionally conflict can arise due 
to an agency problem; the separation between the TO and the participants’ funds will create 
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asymmetric information and insufficient power for the participants to monitor the TO as a result 
of lack of representation (Hussain, 2009). Accordingly, it is recommended that SAMA assigns a 
directive to address the separation instructions in takaful insurance; the directive should clearly 
give an instruction to separate the assets in the family takaful between Participant Risk Fund 
(PRF) and those of the Participant Investment Fund (PIF), as well as between the assets of the 
takaful fund and those of the shareholders’ funds.  
 
VI. Asset-liability matching framework 
 
Assets-liability matching management is an important process in protecting policyholders’ rights 
in receiving financial benefits out of their contributions in the takaful fund. As IAIS (2002) 
asserts that the insurance companies should structure a framework to explain the used type of 
assets instruments, as well as contingent or intangible assets to reflect the suitability of the assets 
to gain profit in the short-term and a long-term time horizon and to reflect the suitability of the 
assets to work as a strong capital. The framework should explain how quickly the insurance 
company will be able to liquidate its investments if necessary without substantial loss in value. It 
should also identify the sensitivities of these investments to fluctuations in key types of market 
variables such as exchange rate, and equity price indices and credit risks. 
 
SAMA (2008b; 2005b) addresses the importance of assets-liabilities matching management to 
avoid liquidity risk. However, SAMA did not specify the required assets-liabilities matching 
procedures, nor identify suitable assets that fit with the takaful principles and model structures 
which mainly rely on the principles of Islamic laws since investments portfolio assets classes’ 
percentage  includes types of assets that contradicts Islamic laws e.g. foreign bonds (SAMA, 
2005b). Accordingly, it is recommended that SAMA issues a directive which identifies and 
classifies the type and percentage weights of the assets that can support the TOs operations.  
 
11.2.2  Market Conduct & Disclosure 
This section discusses some of the market conduct and disclosure matters that, when not 
implemented, can cause a negative impact on participants’ financial and social benefits. 
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I. Intermediaries 
Although SAMA has stressed that the intermediaries should have proper knowledge, training and 
enough experience (SAMA, 2011a), it did not specify the required knowledge and skills needed 
for the intermediaries - knowledge related to the economic and political situation of the Saudi 
market. The intermediaries should possess the necessary knowledge about different aspects on 
Shari’ah to sell a takaful policy. Researchers have a common complaint regarding the lack of 
training of life insurance salesmen (Gower, 1984). 
 
One of the IAIS (2011) requirements is for the intermediaries to be licensed. Similarly, it is 
recommended that SAMA enforces the intermediaries to be licensed or at least to possess the 
Insurance Fundamentals Certificate Exam (IFCE), which has been assigned by SAMA to all 
insurance employees working in Saudi Arabia and to comply with the UK Financial Services Act 
1986, which made it mandatory for intermediaries to comply with the code of conduct. Indeed, 
96 (74 %) out of 129 participants state that the intermediaries who sold them the takaful policy 
have insufficient knowledge about different issues of takaful principles and insufficient 
knowledge about the associated Shari’ah knowledge.   
 
SAMA has identified the duties of intermediaries to provide sufficient information to customers 
in terms of price comparisons, premiums payments, payable fees and expenses, claims required 
documents. However, SAMA did not touch on the element of human action/intervention when 
delivering the service. This element is important as it was the first four elements of Parasuraman 
et al. (1988) five dimensions of service quality.  
 
Finally, researchers are critical about the conflicts of interest that can arise from the commission 
payments structure by which intermediaries remunerated and the cultural environment in which 
they work (Mercantile & General Reinsurance, 1993; Gower 1984). Accordingly, it is preferable 
that SAMA becomes involved in setting up fair amounts of commissions and remunerations for 
intermediaries by comparing the domestic commission rates with the international advanced 
insurance market. It is expected that by setting fair intermediaries commission, a good service 
quality will be delivered to the perspective policyholders.     
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II. Disputes Settlement Procedures  
 
SAMA has made a noticeable effort to instruct the insurance companies to fairly treat 
policyholders’ claims and disputes, by structuring a claims department within the company 
which should settle all policyholders’ claims situations by appointing a specialized adjuster. The 
claim departments should also support policyholders to fill out the dispute form for further 
compliant investigation by the claim committee. 
Despite SAMA’s efforts to settle policyholders’ claim situations, it has not addressed the 
importance of disclosing options that policyholders can undertake to resolve the dispute issue 
with the insurance company. For example, policyholders might have the option to resolve the 
dispute with the insurance companies with the support of the adjuster. However, if the 
policyholder is not satisfied with the adjuster’s opinions then arbitration might be another option. 
If still unhappy with the arbitrator decision then the case can be escalated to the Grievances 
Court for final dispute resolution. The disputes settlement procedures should be available and 
disclosed to policyholders at all times for fair treatment. The importance of disclosing such 
information was clearly obvious in the conclusions of the research conducted by Wells et al 
(1995). They have concluded that a consumer tends to rate service quality higher if they are 
aware of their right to complain to the regulator. The awareness that a consumer advocate exists 
may reduce feelings of helplessness, dissatisfaction, or resentment. 
Indeed, 215 (72 %) participants
92
 replied that they do not know which parties they should refer to 
when a dispute is encountered with the insurance companies. Therefore, it is recommended that 
SAMA asserts the importance of disclosing the dispute resolution procedures along with the 
legal bodies to whom participants should rely on to resolve their disputes with the company.   
SAMA, with the cooperation of the Saudi jurisdiction, should relieve the controlling power of 
the Board of Grievances on the arbitrations committee. In other words, the arbitration 
organization should be treated as a separate entity from the Board of Grievances for better 
judgment diversifications and for policyholders to get the ultimate benefits of using arbitration 
services as it has wide feature functions
93
. Since the arbitral tribunal cannot execute their 
judgment on a commercial matter until the Board of Grievances approves an arbitration 
                                               
92 Refer to chapter 8, Table 8.26 for further discussion.  
93 Refer to Chapter 4, section 4.3.2, for further discussion.  
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instrument, the Board of Grievances can at any time be involved in any commercial case is that 
within the custody of the arbitration board (Ghazzawi et al., 2011). This will eventually limit 
arbitrators to do their work as has been identified by some of the advanced insurance markets 
such as in the UK.  It is also recommended that SAMA introduce the Ombudsman Service as an 
important alternative option to resolve policyholders’ insurance disputes. The ombudsman 
service should possess professional expertise in the insurance field to provide a free service to 
resolve disputes in insurance or other financial services.  
III. Disclosure Mechanisms  
SAMA, in its Insurance Market Code of Conduct Regulation, 2008 directive, clarifies that 
companies should communicate all relevant information with the customer and ensures that such 
information is provided to customers in writing. SAMA also points out that the company, upon 
customer request, should provide the customer with the key terms and conditions of the product 
and service purchased icluding benefits, claims and complaint procedures, restriction conditions, 
fund past performance, etc. The above disclosure instructions seem devoted to current customers 
or customers who are about to buy an insurance policy which is quite beneficial. However, this 
information should be available for all the general public (and not only on request of 
current/potential customers) as per IAIS (2011) public disclosure directive which asserts that 
information should be properly disseminated according to the international standards and 
designed in adequate methods and assumptions to bring the attention of policyholders and the 
public to the relevant information; it also states that the best channels to disclose information to 
the public is by using the internet.   
 
New customers would like to view different information about the company such as, financial 
performance, profit and loss statement, fund expenses and fees, policyholders’ financial benefits, 
assets portfolio, assets-liabilities matching process, Shari’ah board and Shari’ah compliance 
mechanisms, claim and complaint procedures, stakeholders obligations, company market 
position, board, management and shareholders structure, corporate culture, etc. The current 
policyholders would also like to review their benefits at the fund, which requires the TOs to 
provide an effective IT system to serve their desires.   
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Gow (2000) asserts that some insurers are still stuck in paper documentation, hampering faster 
communications with clients. This will prevent insurers from making the most from existing 
customer relationships. Gow (2000) ascertains what was quite obvious in the current research 
which showed that 276 (92%)
94
 participants indicated that the company did not disclose ways to 
let them review their benefits; 287 (96 %) participants indicated that the company did not use the 
internet to communicate with them; 206 (69 %) participants indicated that the company is 
communicating with them by letter and 287 (96 %) participants indicated that the company did 
not communicate with them at all. Accordingly, it is recommended that SAMA encourages 
insurance companies to let go of the old fashioned  paper handling approaches and to establish an 
active disclosure mechanism that uses the best available IT system to properly disseminate 
information to the public and to the current customers. 
 
IV. Code of Ethics  
SAMA Market Code of Conduct Regulation, 2008 requires insurance key stakeholders to act 
with integrity, honesty and fair dealing. However, SAMA has not put in place an adequate 
observation system that can periodically be conducted to monitor the compliance with this code 
and to effectively address any dishonourable behaviour.  
 
As SAMA demanded (in its first Article on the supervision of cooperative insurance laws) that 
insurance companies operating in Saudi Arabia should adhere to the Islamic principles, it is 
recommended that SAMA imposes a social ethical framework for implementation by takaful and 
insurance companies operating in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The framework should encourage and monitor correct and positive ethical behaviour, such as 
ihsan (goodness), tawakkal (trust in God), amanah (honesty), infaq (spending to meet social 
obligation), sabr (patience) and istislah (public interest) (Lewis, 2005). The framework should 
also mandate that any decision involving more than one party should access and consult on the 
basis of principles of Shura (consultation). Thus directors and senior managers would be 
expected to listen to the opinions of other executives before making a decision and shura 
members would include, as far as possible, representatives of shareholders, employees, suppliers, 
                                               
94 Refer to chapter 8, Tables 8.10 and 8.11 for further discussion. 
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customers. Other stakeholders including the community should also play a role in providing 
mutual cooperation to protect interests as a whole and to stimulate the social wellbeing function 
for social welfare (Choudhury et al, 2004).   
 
It is recommended that SAMA ensure that the code of ethics is properly implemented by 
whoever promotes or advertises the insurance and takaful products, such as a conventional bank 
with a takaful window, brokers, agents, actuaries, representatives, etc. In terms of investment 
activities TOs should strictly adhere to Islamic ethical codes. The framework should ensure that, 
for the long-term takaful contracts especially family takaful plans where long-term relationships 
are established between takaful participants and the TO’s, an adequate code of ethics and 
conduct should be observed by the representatives of the TOs’ before and after the finalization of 
the contract; such contracts should contain clear illustrations for better understanding and 
appreciation by takaful participants who may not be familiar with takaful terminology (IFSB, 
2008).   
 
Another ethical practice that can be suggested by SAMA to be implemented by the takaful and 
insurance companies is to find a way that can improve participants’ financial return in long-term 
contract such as participants who contributed to the family takaful scheme. SAMA can impose 
the methods used by the Islamic banking to attract participants such as, (i) minimizing 
shareholders equity to mobilize more benefits to participants, (ii) Profit Equalization Reserve 
(PER), by matching participants’ financial return with other operators in the same industry by 
setting aside both participants’ and shareholders’ funds before allocation, (iii) displaced 
commercial risk, encouraging shareholders to give up part or their entire mudarib share to the 
participants to motivate them into continuing to place their funds with the bank, in other words 
TOs’ should not ask for a refund for the amount of qard provided to recover a deficit in the 
takaful fund (Archer et al, 2009). 
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V. Service Quality95  
Bad practice, callous treatment and poor service design and delivery, have contributed to 
widespread customer dissatisfaction in the insurance industry (Wells et al, 1995; Friedman, 
2001a, 2001b; Cooper et al, 2001). Customers are demanding a lot more than the industry has 
been willing to give, leaving clients frustrated with their services (Robert, 2000). Such 
malpractices have created a growing distrust of the insurance industry among almost all 
stakeholder level customers, employees, regulators, shareholders and the public (Darcy, 1996).  
 
Wells et al (1995) call for regulators to seek more sophisticated and accurate diagnostic models 
for assessing insurer service quality in the insurance industry. Accordingly, it is important for 
SAMA to adopt a suitable service quality model to measure customer satisfaction levels, by 
assessing how well customers’ needs, expectations and perceptions are being met or exceeding 
the company’s offering. Indeed, the current research reflects that the majority of participants 
have a high level of preferences in that 179 (60 %) participants agrees to be given an opportunity 
to select the Shari’ah supervisory board, 205 (68 %) participants agree to be given an 
opportunity to refuse shareholders’ activities on the participants’ fund, and 224 (75 %) 
participants want to share with other participants the underwriting surplus whether they made 
claims or not.  It is also recommended that SAMA encourages insurance companies to adhere to 
customers’ expectations and perceptions by implementing a means of scoring satisfaction as a 
way of improving service quality in the Saudi insurance industry; it will be quite beneficial if 
SAMA has access to insurance companies’ policyholders’ satisfaction scoring card, for quick 
and adequate intrusions timing. The research findings report that 152 (51 %) participants have a 
weak satisfaction level with the participants fund investment return (SIR), and 167 (56 %) 
participants have a weak satisfaction level with the participants fund charged fees, encountered 
deficits and availability of qard (SFDQ). 
 
VI. Lesson from the Advanced International Insurance Industry  
 
The FSA in the United Kingdom has worked hard to develop and control their insurance market 
to provide the required protections to policyholders, especially (with-profits policyholders’)96, 
                                               
95 The findings of this section have been taken from chapter 8 (Tables 8.27, 8.29 and 8.31). 
96 Refer to chapter 3 for further discussion.    
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since they have the rights to share in the bonuses generated from the investment activities 
(similar to participants in the family takaful scheme). One of the FSA reform approach is to 
educate insurance customers of their rights and obligations, especially after the failure of 
Equitable Life insurance. Accordingly, the FSA has launched the Financial Capability Steering 
Group
97
 which will examine the approach to consumer education to achieve better public 
awareness and better policyholder protection (FSA, 2003).  Accordingly, regulators should have 
the burden and the responsibility to inform and educate consumers about the nature of the 
financial system (Dewing et al, 2001). It is recommended that SAMA simulates the FSA 
programme to educate and enhance policyholders’ awareness and knowledge about their rights 
and obligations in the fund, especially with those participants who possess a life family takaful 
policy as they have a long-term contractual agreement with the insurance company, which 
entitles them to receive periodic financial benefits. The importance of implementing an 
educational programme among takaful and insurance participants in the Saudi insurance market 
is supported by participants’ responses in the current questionnaire i.e. 226 (75 %) participants 
have an overall weak knowledge about the takaful fund underwriting surplus distributions 
(KUS), 262 (87 %) participants have an overall weak knowledge about the takaful fund Shari’ah 
compliance system (KSC), 272 (91 %) participants have an overall weak knowledge about the 
takaful fund charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard (KFDQ), and 237 (79%) 
participants have an overall weak knowledge about the proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC) 
when they are dissatisfied with the TOs’ services and products.   
 
Furthermore, it is preferable that SAMA simulate the FSA rules and guidance in relation to 
treating with-profits policyholders fairly according to the FSA’s Conduct of Business Handbook 
(COBS 20) and the associated Principle 6 (Customers’ interests), Principle 7 (Communications 
with clients), and Principle 8 (Conflicts of interest) (FSA, 2010). 
 
VII. Knowledge of Supervisory Authority  
Sound market conduct policies and procedures will not be carried out without having effective 
supervisors who can encourage insurers to make effective disclosure, by maintaining efficient, 
fair, safe, and stable insurance markets for the benefit and protection of policyholders (IAIS, 
                                               
97 The UK is considered the world pioneer to incorporate consumer education (Dewing and Russell, 2001). 
307 
 
2002). The supervisors will need to have sufficient knowledge about takaful to be able to 
understand the products with which they are dealing and the significant differences between 
takaful contracts and conventional ones. The takaful contracts should cover the contractual 
relationships between TOs and participants, including circumstances of any additional 
contributions that may be sought and the basis for the distribution of any surplus (Casey, 2009).    
 
It is very important that SAMA enhances their employees’ knowledge about the principles and 
products of takaful insurance according to the different used takaful models. SAMA employees 
should understand different implications between conventional and takaful insurance. It is 
preferable that SAMA relies on the already-established standards by organizations such as 
AAOIFI, IFSB and similar standards as per IAIS to regulate takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia 
and it will be quite beneficial if SAMA separates the takaful laws and regulations from the 
cooperative insurance ones as takaful consists of a hybrid structure, with the combination of 
mutual and proprietary scheme.  
 
11.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides an answer to research question 7, since this chapter linked SAMA 
regulations with the international insurance directives along the findings of the empirical 
chapters. A conclusion can be made that SAMA, does not have any directives and laws towards 
the takaful business, nor does it issue directives that address any Shari’ah concerns. Accordingly, 
it is highly recommended that SAMA assign separate directive laws that address the takaful 
insurance, and the principles of the Shari’ah laws. It is also recommended that SAMA enhances 
their employees’ knowledge about the principles and products of the takaful model. SAMA 
should also rely on the already-established standards as per AAOIFI, IFSB and similar standards 
as per IAIS to regulate the takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
308 
 
CHAPTER TWELVE   
CONTEXTUALIZATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TOS 
 
12.1 INTRODUCTION  
The current chapter discusses the findings of the empirical chapters. To do so, it follows the 
layout structure of Wells et al (1995). They study consumer perceptions of insurer’s service 
quality. The main objective of projecting participants’ perceptions is to see whether the Takaful 
Operators (TOs) are following the international insurance and takaful standards in providing the 
required service to participants. Accordingly, this chapter will provide the required discussions 
and recommendations to address research question8: 
      
Question 8: What are the suggested solutions to overcome any shortcoming of the current 
practises conducted by the TOs in Saudi Arabia to institute the required protections to the takaful 
participants? 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 12.2 compares participants’ perceptions about TOs’ 
disclosure systems, participants’ knowledge and participants’ preferences with the existing 
literatures of corporate governance and market conduct and disclosure as outlined in Chapters 3 
and 4. Section 12.3 discusses the significant findings that relate participants’ demographics 
characteristics with their satisfaction in accordance with the findings discussed in Chapter 8. 
Section 12.4 discusses the significant findings that link participants’ (perceptions, knowledge 
and preferences) with their satisfaction levels in accordance with the regression and Spearman 
correlation results presented in the last two chapters. Section 12.5 presents a suggested linkage 
between disclosure, knowledge and preferences. Section 12.6 Implications for participants. 
Section 12.7 draws a conclusion.  
 
12.2 PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND PREFERENCES   
This discussion section follows the layout structure of section 8.4 of chapter 8 by elaborating on 
participants’ most noticeable replies about participants’ perceptions about TOs disclosure 
systems, participants perceived knowledge and participants preferences. This section also 
discusses the implications for answer of research question number 3 which was provided in 
chapter 8. The elaboration will address participants’ overall perceptions, as well as participants’ 
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specific perceptions about each dimension. A comparison will also made between the available 
policies and standards of the international insurance and takaful bodies with the current 
operational situations of the Saudi TOs as per participants’ perceptions, to give a clearer picture 
on what are the ideal and preferable way to deal with participants for better treatments and 
protections. The results of this section are discussed and justified in order to respond to research 
question 3. This section will also partially provide an answer to research question 7.   
 
  12.2.1 Participants’ Overall Perceptions of TOs’ Disclosure Variables 
This section compares participant’s perceptions about the TOs’ disclosure systems according to 
the seven disclosure variables with the ideal corporate governance and market conduct polices 
and standards to figure out a proper way to protect participants. Participants’ perceptions about 
TOs’ disclosure systems will be judged based on the overall percentage of participants’ 
perceptions as per Table 8.39 in chapter 8. Hence, the larger the percentage rate of the “overall 
low disclosure perceptions” implies that participants have not been properly exposed to adequate 
disclosure from the TOs.  
 
An active and updated disclosure mechanism (DM) is considered the main driver for the success 
of any takaful company as the company disclosure mechanism is a hub where all company 
activities are generated from. However 276 (92 %) participants have scored the TOs’ (DM) with 
low to moderate perceptions. Such figures reflect a shortfall on TOs’ ability to adopt an active 
disclosure mechanism that can convey participants’ financial benefits. However, IFSB (2009a) 
asserts that the TOs should disclose a framework of the takaful models (either wakalah or 
mudarabah) which should address the rights and interests of stakeholders, and assign compliance 
mechanisms of underwriting and investment according to identified legal and regulatory 
frameworks.  
 
 
The majority of participants’ perceptions about TOs’ disclosure about participants’ fund 
investments return (DIR) scored low and moderate with 274 (91 %) participants. Participants’ 
low and moderate perceptions about TOs’ (DIR) indicates that TOs have not successfully 
disclosed important information that address participants’ financial deserves in the participants’ 
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fund, which comes in contrast to IAIS (2002) and AAOIFI standards No. 13. This points out to 
the importance of disclosing investment returns to participants and policyholders.    
 
In terms of participants’ perceptions about TOs’ disclosure about participants fund underwriting 
surplus (DUS), an overall of 277 (92.3 %) participants have reported low perceptions of DUS, 
which revealed that TOs have not accurately disclosed the required information about the surplus 
distributions to their participants. However, AAOIFI standard No. 13 stated that TOs should 
disclosed underwriting surplus distributions to participants. Participants’ perceptions about TOs’ 
Shari’ah compliance systems (DSC) were also low, with 207 (69%) participants in the category. 
The shortfall of TOs’ to convey their obligations to act within Shari’ah compliance is against the 
IFSB (2009b) rules, since TOs’ have a fiduciary responsibility towards their customers to 
comply and disclose the Islamic Shari’ah rules and principles at all times.  
 
Disclosure about TOs’ claims and indemnities (DCI) also scored low perceptions among 234 (78 
%) participants. This reflects that the TOs’ do not discloses enough information about their 
policies and procedures for handling participants’ claims and indemnities, which comes in 
contrast with AAOIFI standard No.13 which stresses on the importance of disclosure which must 
be in line with the bases applied by the company in calculating claims and compensations. 
 
Also, 276 (92%) participants have an overall low perception about TOs’ disclosures on 
participants fund charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard (DFDQ). The low 
disclosure about the DFDQ reflects TOs’ shortage to disclose the required information about this 
notion, which comes in contrast with AAOIFI standard No. 13, which stresses on the importance 
of disclosing information in line with the bases applied by the company in calculating 
management remuneration, charged fees and expenses affecting policyholders’ funds. In terms of 
TOs’ Key Personnel Power and Activities (DKP), participants have shown an overall low 
perception with 165 (55 %) participants. This low perception rate reflects TOs’ shortage in 
disclosing the required information about key personnel power and activities. However, IAIS 
(2002) asserts the importance of disclosing the financial relationship between shareholders and 
policyholders, and insurance management structures.  
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In conclusion, despite the fact that an updated and active disclosure mechanism leads to the 
success of any company, participants overall perceptions about TOs disclosure variables have 
scored low. Accordingly, TOs need to adhere to the regulations and standards that have been 
imposed on them for better participants’ education and to reflect TOs empathy and reliability in 
accommodating participants’ needs and wants.  
 
 12.2.2  Participants’ Knowledge  
This section compares participant’s perceived knowledge according to the seven knowledge 
variables with the ideal corporate governance and market conduct polices and standards to seek 
proper ways to protect participants. Participants’ perceived knowledge is judged based on the 
overall percentage of their knowledge as per Table 8.40, in chapter 8. Hence, the larger the 
percentage rate of “overall low knowledge” implies that participants have less education about 
takaful services and products.  
   
The results show that 279 (93 %) participants have shown a moderate knowledge about the 
principles of the used takaful model (KPM). Such figures contradict IFSB (2009a) recommended 
policy, that TOs should disclose fundamental information about their business activities and 
models.  Participants’ overall knowledge about investment return (KIR) has shown that 136 
(45.3 %) participants and 164 (54.7 %) participants have a weak and good knowledge, 
respectively. However, the near-equal percentages of a weak and good knowledge is considered 
normal, since participants should decide prior of signing the contract which fund to undertake 
which will suit their needs and wants i.e. either Participants Investments Fund (PIF) or 
Participants Risk Fund (PRF). Therefore, it is highly recommended that the TO’s design a 
disclosure mechanism which reflects the estimated returns and the complaints-handling and other 
contractual arrangements of PRF and PIF (IFSB, 2009a). 
 
  
Participants’ knowledge about participants’ fund underwriting surplus (KUS) has also shown as 
weak with 226 (75.3%) participants. However, TO’s must realize that it is important to spend a 
good effort to educate people about their rights in receiving underwriting surplus, as the 
underwriting surplus belongs to participants, as per AAOIFI Shari’ah standard No. 26 (5/5) of 
2007. Participant’s weak knowledge was also obvious about the Shari’ah system, as 262 (87.3 
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%) participants’ have shown an overall weak knowledge about TOs’ Shari’ah compliance 
systems (KSC), However, as an important step to ensure Shari’ah adherence, the Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board should present a Shari’ah annual report to the public (IFSB, 2009b). 
Participants have also scored an overall low knowledge about participants’ fund charged fees, 
encountered deficits and availability of qard (KFDQ) with 272 (90.7 %) participants. It is very 
important for TOs to educate people about the different types of expenses and fees charged to the 
participants’ funds, as their contribution can be used to cover different types of expenses, either 
direct or indirect, as per AAOIFI (2010) Shari’ah Standards and per AAOIFI standards No. 13.  
 
In regards to knowledge about TOs’ key personnel power and activities (KKP), all 300 
participants have shown no knowledge about a single member of the TOs’ key personnel nor 
whether if shareholders are sharing with them the underwriting surplus and investment return 
generated from the participants fund. TOs should adhere to the insurance international standards 
to educate people about the company’s governing personnel as per IAIS (2002) and IFSB (2009) 
which state that insurance and takaful companies should disclose information about the company 
board and senior management structure and their incentive structure. 
 
In terms of knowledge about dissatisfaction and quitting options (KDC), 237 (79 %) participants 
have shown weak knowledge. However, as per the international insurance regulatory bodies, 
proper negotiation procedures should be conducted between the insurer and the insured to 
resolve the issues; if disputes still stand then either litigation, arbitration or referral to the 
ombudsman should  be resorted to in order to resolve the issues (Vaughan, 1999). 
 
In conclusion, participants’ overall perceived knowledge was low, which implies that TOs have 
not conducted a proper education programme to enhance participants’ knowledge and awareness. 
Accordingly, TOs need to adopt an education programme or to structure an active disclosure 
mechanism to educate participants about the principles of the used takaful model. Furthermore, 
the findings of this research complements the findings of Metawa et al (1998); Bley et al (2004); 
Naser et al. (1999) and Gait et al (2009a; 2009b) who find that participants in Arabic and GCC 
countries have the basic knowledge of Islamic banking financing schemes such as savings 
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accounts, current accounts (participants in the current research are aware of the different 
investments returns from savings and risk accounts, underwriting surplus return rate). However, 
respondents are not aware of the complicated concepts used in the Islamic banks such as 
mudarabah, musharakah, and murabahah. The results of this research also indicate that 
participants have a limited knowledge on the differences between net and gross underwriting 
surplus, between re-takaful or re-insurance and between wakalah or murabahah takaful models, 
etc. 
 
12.2.3  Participants’ Preferences98 
A higher degree of participants preferences implies more lack of perceiving the required 
services, as preferences is a mirrors of need, that individual must realize (preference) their need 
in order for it to be described as need (Blythe, 1997). Hence, participants’ preferences are a 
reflection of their needs, where Kotler et al (2001) define human needs as states of felt 
deprivation. This section compares participants’ overall preferences as presented in Table 8.41, 
chapter 8 with the international insurance standards and policies to improve participants’ 
protections. The results show that 180 (60 %) participants score high overall preferences about 
the Shari’ah compliance systems (PSC) of the TOs, which implies shortfalls in the TOs’ 
Shari’ah services. Specifically, Table 8.27 shows that 179 (60 %) participants clarified that they 
want to select the Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB), since 120 (40 %) participants believe that 
participants’ funds will be affected because the SSB is given less time to judge assets validity. 
Thus, TOs should try to fulfil participants’ needs and wants in this regard. IFSB (2009b) asserts 
that the SSB should adopt and disclose a specified Shari’ah pronouncements/resolutions system 
and to identify fast and sound Shari’ah board response channels. 
 
Participants’ preferences to have a representative on the TOs’ Board of Directors (BoDs) (PRB), 
has scored almost equivalent score in that 132 (44 %) participants have an overall high 
preference, and 149 (49 %) have an overall low preference. However, it is recommended that fhe 
TOs adhere to IFSB (2009a) by assigning a governance committee which consists of non-
executive directors, Shari’ah scholars, and actuary and/or participants’ representative.  
                                               
98 Findings of this section has been taken from chapter  8 (Tables 8.30, 8.22)  
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Participants’ preferences on TOs’ key personnel power and activities (PKP), revealed an overall 
high preference with 205 (68 %) participants, which indicates participants’ objections to TOs’ 
intrusions in participants’ fund. In other words 205 participants agree to refuse shareholders 
activities on participants’ fund as per Table 8.29. As a result, TOs need to follow IFSB (2009a) 
which requires TOs to disclose the allocation of surplus or deficit for proper relationship 
determination between participants and shareholders.  
 
Participants’ preferences on the reason for using a takaful policy (PRU) indicates that the 
majority of participants are buying the takaful policy for the expected financial benefits. 
Specifically, Table 8.32 show that 256 (85 %) participants bought their policy for future planning 
that can benefit them and their families. 233 (78 %) bough their policy as a reason of loss 
protection, while 193 (64 %) participants indicated that Shari’ah compliance was not the reason 
to buy a takaful policy and 296 (99%) participants indicated they had not bought their takaful 
policy to help other participants in their financial loss.  
 
These findings indicate that participants are highly motivated by the promised financial return. 
However, they have less concern about the morality of takaful operations complying with the 
Shari’ah system. Participants also show less concern about one of the main purposes of takaful 
insurance i.e. to help other participants in their financial loss. The findings of the current research 
effort support results from previous writings such as Ramlee (2000); Bacha 2004) Sukmana et al 
(2005) that indicate that customers in Islamic banks are willing to move to a conventional bank 
as a reason of low financial return. Participants have not been educated properly by the TOs 
about the main purpose of using takaful products and they might be financially motivated by the 
promises made by takaful salespersons/intermediaries of expected quick and short financial 
returns. Mercantile & General Reinsurance (1993) concluded that the quality of life assurance 
sale is dependent on the quality of the people selling, the training they receive, the commission 
structure by which they are remunerated and the cultural environment in which they work. 
Gower (1984) was critical of the lack of training of life insurance salesmen and the conflicts of 
interest that can arise from commission payments. Therefore, it will better if takaful products are 
sold by the operator itself, since intermediaries need to acquire a wide set of information about 
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customer preferences, such as customer perspectives and their view in regards to Shari’ah issues 
(Ali et al, 2008). 
 
Participants’ preferences for claims and underwriting surplus (PCU) scored overall high 
preferences with 200 (67 %) participants. Specifically, Table 8.31 indicates that 219 (73 %) 
participants want to share in the underwriting surplus even when they made a claim for 
indemnities. Also, 224 (74%) participants also do not object to other participants who made 
claims to share the expected underwriting surplus with them. Participants’ preferences on this 
notion concluded that participants are in favour of implementing the pro-rate mode of 
distributing underwriting surplus as per AAOIFI Shari’ah standards (2010). Despite the fact that 
the majority of participants want to share on the underwriting, 280 (93 %) participants did not 
know of the options that can be used to share underwriting surplus with other participants in 
association with the claim situation. Accordingly, TOs need to educate their participants about 
the options that can used to distribute underwriting surplus among participants as per AAOIFI 
Shari’ah standards (2010). In conclusion, participants have shown overall high preferences on all 
dimensions. However, there is a noticeable motivated preference for participants to have a decent 
financial return rather than Shari’ah compliance needs. These findings come in contrast of 
Metawa et al (1998) and Haron et al (1994) who conclude that Islamic banking customers in 
GCC are religiously motivated rather than profit-motivated. However, the current research 
complements the findings of Erol et al (1989) on the Jordanian Islamic banking sector.  
 
12.3 THE IMPACT OF PARTICIPANTS’ DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS ON THEIR 
SATISFACTIONS LEVELS
99
 
This section discusses the findings of participants’ demographics characteristics in relation to 
participants’ satisfaction levels. The goal of this analysis is to draw an important awareness 
message for the TOs to exert extra precaution with certain segmented participants’ 
characteristics. The results of this section are discussed and justified in order to consolidate the 
answer which was provided in chapter 9 to address research question 4. This section will also 
partially provide an answer to research question 8.   
                                               
99 All participants’ actual demographics data has been taken from chapter 8. All participants’ demographic vs 
satisfaction test has been taken from chapter 9, Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.4. 
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Accordingly, Job categories are recorded as the largest of the demographic categories to have a 
relationship with 4 satisfaction variables: total participants satisfaction (TPS), satisfaction with 
TOs’ disclosure mechanisms (SDM), satisfaction with underwriting surplus (SUS), satisfaction 
with claims and indemnities (SCI).  Students are found to be the most satisfied and managers the 
least, among job categories. On the other hand, professionals and managers have reported a 
significant relationship with satisfaction about charged fees, encountered deficits and availability 
of qard (SFDQ). Therefore, TOs must take extra precautions when dealing with participants with 
a managerial position, since these people are more familiar with the Saudi market’s financial 
situation. This is due to their experience as managers in different working sectors because, as 
they hold managerial positions, they are exposed to different financial terminologies and 
calculations. Furthermore, as managers might have more experience than other participants in 
other job categories, and as they are expected to have a decent financial income, they expect 
better financial rewards on their contributions in the participants’ fund, which negatively reflects 
on their satisfaction level with the TOs’ services and financial returns. 
 
In contrast, students are the most satisfied participants with TOs’ services and products. This fact 
may be because students are less experienced than managerial participants about the required 
financial returns from their contributions in the fund. This along with their lack of knowledge 
about the principles of the used takaful model can lead students to be satisfied with the current 
services and products presented by the TOs.         
 
The findings show that participants with an age above 51 years are the most satisfied with 
participants’ fund charged fees, encountered deficits, and availability of qard, as they might be in 
a good financial position with less financial responsibility as their offspring might be old enough 
to be financially independent. Accordingly, they are flexible to pay more fees and to pay back 
shareholders’ qard-loans that may be necessary due to the deficits encountered in the 
participant’s fund. The participants aged between 31-40 years are the most dissatisfied, if the 
TOs called them to increase their contributions to the fund to recover shareholders’ qard-loan, as 
people at this stage are at the saving stage and have more responsibilities involving different 
financial commitments, such as paying back a mortgage loan, or paying children’s school fees, 
etc. The current research findings of age-satisfaction relationships is similar to Okumkus’ (2005) 
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findings, who found existence of a significant relationship between customer satisfaction and 
different age variables. It is also wise to refer to Bhaty (2007) who called takaful industry players 
to design their products to satisfy customers’ needs and wants by following the life- cycles 
approach. 
 
 
The findings show that female participants are more satisfied than males with the participants’ 
fund investments return, as females in Saudi Arabia have less responsibility than males. The 
current research complemented the findings of AL-Nouri (1993, 1995) and Gait (2009) who find 
that males are repeatedly reminded of the responsibilities as husband and father, while girls are 
kept in anticipation of marriage, motherhood and housekeeping
100
.  
 
Participants’ satisfaction with TOs’ Shari’ah compliance (SSC) system has shown no 
statistically significant relations with any participants’ demographic characteristics. The findings 
complement the research effort of Erol, Kayank, et al (1990) that there was no effect at all for 
religious motivation in the use of Islamic bank’s services by Jordanian customers. The findings 
also complements the fact that 256 (85.3 %) participants buy takaful policies for future planning 
and profit return, and only 107 (35.7 %) buy the takaful policy on account of its Shari’ah 
compliance. 
 
Other demographic characteristics, such as participants’ education levels, participants’ premium 
paid, and participants’ contract durations, show no significant statistical relationships with all 
satisfaction determinant variables. The findings were strongly explained by the fact that 138 (46 
%) participants have takaful contract durations between 0 - 5 years, i.e. half of the participants 
have short family takaful contracts, which might be due to a distrust of the TOs’ services and 
products, or participants are in the period of acquaintance where they want to assess the TOs’ 
services before making long-term commitments. However, both reasons do not imply that 
participants are satisfied or dissatisfied with the TOs. 
 
                                               
100
 However, with the overseas scholarship programme sponsored by the Saudi Government 7 years ago, thousands 
of returning females are expected to search for jobs.  
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In terms of premiums paid, a majority of participants, 98 (32.7 %) pays a premium between SAR 
1-500 followed by 84 (28 %) participants paying between SAR 501-1000, both groups 
representing a total of 62.7 % participants who pay less than SAR 1000 a month which are 
considered as low premium values. Such a fact might be a vital reason for lack of significance 
relationships between premiums paid and satisfaction determinants variables, practically as 
premiums increase this implies more financial return is expected. Accordingly, participants are 
paying lower premiums because they might be not satisfied with the income generated from their 
contributions in the participants’ fund.      
 
12.4 THE IMPACT OF PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTIONS ON THEIR SATISFACTIONS LEVEL 
(MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND SPEARMAN CORRELATION RESULTS) 
The regressions and correlations models conducted previously to examine the impacts of three 
variables (participants’ perceptions about TOs’ disclosure systems, participants’ perceived 
knowledge and participants’ preferences) with participants’ satisfaction levels revealed some 
important relationships between the variables. The discussion of this section relies on the 
regression findings to identify the form of relationships, i.e. it will indicate which variable causes 
the other. The correlation findings are also presented to indicate the directions of the relationship, 
i.e. positive or negative. The results of this section are discussed and justified in order to 
consolidate the answer which was provided in chapters 9 and 10 to address research questions 5 
and 6 respectively. This section will also partially provide an answer to research question 8.   
 
12.4.1 Participants’ Perceived Disclosure vs Participants’ Satisfaction101   
Spearman’s correlation findings on Disclosures vs Satisfaction indicate a straight positive 
relationship between disclosure and satisfaction variables. Specifically, the findings showed a 
number of positive relationships between disclosure mechanisms (DM) and almost all 
satisfaction variables. This indicates that an active and updated disclosure mechanism will 
improve participants’ satisfactions levels in all dimensions; the disclosure mechanisms should 
address participants’ financial benefits, Shari’ah compliance system and claims and indemnities 
procedures.  
                                               
101 The findings of this section has been taken from Chapters 8, 9, and 10 (Tables 8.10,8.11, 8.42, 8.12, 9.5, 10.1 ) 
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The results from regressions analysis on the other hand, indicate that company disclosure about 
participants’ fund investment returns (DIR), disclosure of claims and indemnities (DCI) 
procedures, disclosure of the TOs’ key personnel power and activities (DKP), and disclosure of 
participants’ fund underwriting surplus (DUS) have a significant effect on the majority of the 
satisfactions variables. In other words, as TOs enhance their disclosure mechanisms (DM) so 
participants’ satisfaction levels are going to increase, in relation with the above-mentioned 
disclosure dimensions.  Despite the fact that disclosure mechanism (DM) improves satisfaction 
of participants, 92 % of participants scored the TOs’ (DM) with weak to moderate perceptions. 
This resulted in participants’ dissatisfaction, as 57 % of participants scored weak to moderate 
satisfaction about TOs’ disclosure mechanisms (SDM). Participants’ low perception about TOs 
disclosure mechanisms (DM) has led them to score other disclosure determinants variables with 
low perceptions as well. This is because in order for the TOs to disclose participants’ different 
benefits, they need to have an active disclosure mechanism.  
 
Thus, TOs should take extra attention to disclose more information about participants’ 
investment fund returns and claims and indemnities procedures as these are the highest impact 
satisfactions variables. TOs have failed to disclose this information properly to participants as 91 
% of participants have scored low to moderate perceptions about TOs disclosure on investment 
return (DIR) and 78 % of participants have scored low perceptions about TOs disclosure in 
claims and indemnities procedures (DCI). These low disclosures resulted in 51 % of participants 
having a weak satisfactions level with participants fund investments return (SIR), and 44 % of 
participants have weak to moderate satisfaction about claims and indemnities procedures (SCI). 
 
To have an active disclosure mechanism (DM) TOs must use proper tools such as an accessible 
and updated IT system, expert and educated intermediaries or sales personnel, and a well- 
established social communication scheme, etc. as these tools can potentially affect customer 
satisfaction levels. Such a fact was strongly supported by the inclusion measurement suggested 
by Parasuraman et al. (1988) who identified the first four elements of five dimensions relating to 
product and process (reliability, responsiveness, assurance, empathy and tangibility) as elements 
of human action/intervention in service delivery. This has been validated by numerous other 
320 
 
studies which highlight the importance of customer interface (Roth et al, 1995; Krishnan et al., 
1999).  
 
The findings of the research show that 276 (92 %) participants reveal that the TOs do not 
disclose how they can review their benefits in the fund; 287 (96 %) participants indicate that the 
TOs did not use the internet as a way to communicate with them, and 96 (74 %) out of 129 
participants who bought their takaful policy from the intermediaries indicate that the 
intermediaries do not have sufficient knowledge about takaful and different Shari’ah issues. 
In conclusion, in order for the TOs to satisfy their participants they must disclose as much 
information as possible about investment returns (DIR) followed by claims and indemnities 
(DCI) and key personnel power and activities (DKP). The best way to expose participants to 
these disclosure variables is to introduce an updated and effective disclosure mechanism (DM).    
12.4.2 Participants’ Knowledge vs Participants’ Satisfaction
102
   
The Spearman’s correlation findings on knowledge vs satisfaction
 
 indicate a straight negative 
relationship between knowledge and satisfaction determinant variables, with clear concentration 
between participants’ satisfactions about underwriting surplus (SUS) with almost all knowledge 
determinant variables. This implies that the participants’ satisfaction about participants’ fund 
underwriting surplus (SUS) decreases/increases whenever participants’ knowledge 
increases/decreases. Such findings complement the findings of Wells et al (1995) who found that 
consumers’ actual knowledge of insurance has had a negative relationship with satisfaction 
levels. 
The regression findings indicate strong relationships between participants’ knowledge on the 
principles of the used takaful model (KPM) with six satisfaction determinant variables. In other 
words whenever TOs implement an education programme to enhance participants’ knowledge 
about the principle of takaful model (KPM), participants’ satisfactions about TOs’ key personnel 
power and activities (SKP), charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard (SFDQ), 
                                               
102 The findings of this section have been taken from Chapters 8, 9, and 10 (Tables 8.40, 9.6, 10.2). 
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claims and indemnities (SCI), Shari’ah compliance (SSC), underwriting surplus (SUS), and 
participants total satisfactions (TPS) are impacted positively.  
 
Both correlation and regression findings provide a logical explanation, that negative knowledge 
about the principles of the takaful model will keep participants’ in the grey area. When 
participants have little knowledge about the takaful model, then they will be satisfied with any 
financial return from the participants’ fund, as they have no idea about their specific rights and 
obligations in the fund. This conclusion can be seen in that only 1.3 % of participants have a 
good knowledge about the takaful principles (KPM), which results in participants’ high 
satisfaction in almost all satisfaction determinant variables: 43 % of participants are highly 
satisfied with the underwriting surplus (SUS), 57 % of participants are highly satisfied with the 
Shari’ah compliance (SSC), 56.3 % of participants are highly satisfied with the claims and 
indemnities, and 51.7% of participants are highly satisfied with the key personnel power and 
activities (SKP). 
 
Another practical example which proves that participants weak knowledge can lead to 
participants’ satisfactions, is the significance relationships between participants’ knowledge 
about underwriting surplus (KUS) with participants’ satisfaction about Shari’ah compliance 
(SSC) and satisfaction with TOs’ key personnel (SKP) in that 75.3 % participants have scored a 
weak knowledge about underwriting surplus (KUS), which causes participants’ satisfaction 
about Shari’ah compliance (SSC) and satisfaction about TOs’ key personnel power and activities 
(SKP) to increase with 57 % and 51.7%, respectively.   
  
In conclusion, it will be quite fair if the TOs launch an education programme to enhance 
participants’ knowledge about the principles of the takaful model (KPM), and this in a way will 
let participants excuse any shortfall from the TOs, as they will have enough knowledge about the 
principles of the takaful model. Hence, they can line up their rights and obligations in the fund 
with the current situations of the domestic financial market in terms of politics and financial 
situations. The best way to enhance participants’ knowledge is by improving TOs’ disclosure 
mechanisms, which should include both parties’ rights and obligations. As Roy (2002) asserts, 
insurers must realize that customers do want 24/7 access to their information which means 
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availability of server access 24/7; it is all about improving insurers’ communications capabilities 
and there does not seem to be alternatives other than investing in more robust IT systems. 
 
12.4.3 Participants’ Preferences vs Participants’ Satisfaction103 
The Spearman’s correlation findings on preferences vs satisfactions indicate a positive 
relationship between preference and satisfaction determinant variables. Participants’ preferences 
to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB) reported a significant relationship with almost all 
satisfaction determinant variables. Interestingly, the regression analysis results indicated similar 
findings in that participants’ preferences to have a representative on the BoDs significantly 
influences 4 satisfaction determinant variables: satisfaction on disclosure mechanism (SDM), 
satisfaction about takaful fund investment return (SIR), satisfaction about takaful fund 
underwriting surplus (SUS), and participants’ total satisfaction (PTP). In other words, if 
participants have a representative on the BoDs to discuss their rights and benefits on the fund, 
their satisfaction levels are expected to increase. To be specific, 50 % of participants scored 
weak preferences to have a representative on the BoDs. In similar percentage rates, 57 % of 
participants scored a weak to moderate satisfaction level about TOs’ disclosure mechanisms 
(SDM) and 57 % of participants scored a “weak to moderate” satisfaction about takaful fund 
underwriting surplus (SUS).76 % of participants scored a “weak to moderate” satisfaction about 
fund investment return (SIR).  
 
As has been described by Blythe (1997), need is a perceived lack, that individuals must realize 
(preference) their need in order for it to be described as need. This recognition (perception) of 
lack (unfulfilled need) has been linked to a series of resultant activities in the mind of the 
consumer. In other words, participants’ high percentage of preferences implies high rate of 
needs. However, it does not explicitly mean that as the majority of participants scored weak 
preferences about PRB, they are not in favour of having a representative on the BoDs, since the 
correlation and regression findings show a concentrated relationship between PRB and almost all 
satisfaction determinant variables. The proper explanation for that is their inadequate knowledge 
causes weak confidence in the takaful services and products, which eventually leads to their 
                                               
103 The findings of this section have been taken from Chapters 9 and 10 (Tables 9.7, 10.3). 
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weak preferences to have a representative as they have less knowledge to discuss their benefits 
with the TOs.  Howcroft et al. (2003) assert the importance of the level of knowledge and 
understanding of the financial products the customer should have, as this will determine their 
level of confidence in using any of the products and services. 
 
In conclusion, IFSB (2009a) suggests that the BoDs assign a governance committee consisting of 
3 parties (non-executive directors, Shari’ah scholars, and actuary and/or participant’s 
representative) to achieve adequate protection for takaful participants by monitoring the reserve 
and distribution of underwriting and/or investment profit. Therefore, it will be quite beneficial 
for participants to have a representative who can discuss their rights and obligations on the 
takaful fund, and it will be more beneficial and encouraging if this representative was given a 
financial reward for the time spent in discussing other people desires.     
 
12.5 SUGGESTED LINKAGE BETWEEN DISCLOSURE, KNOWLEDGE AND PREFERENCES  
Following the approach that has been suggested in chapters 9 and 10 about the correlation and 
regression models, in order for participants to be satisfied they will require more disclosure about 
investment return (DIR), disclosure about claims and indemnities (DCI) and disclosure about key 
personnel power and activities (DKP). Participants will be also satisfied if they have enough 
knowledge about the principles of the takaful model (KPM). Participants’ preferences to have a 
representative on BoDs (PRB) have shown significant relationships with almost all satisfaction 
variables. 
 
Accordingly, a positive relationship seems to exist between disclosure and knowledge and 
effective disclosure mechanisms (DM) should be in place to convey participants’ investments 
return (DIR) and for better education on the principles on the used takaful model (KPM). 
Another positive relationship seems to exist between knowledge and preferences as participants 
scored an overall weak knowledge; they are in need to have a representative on the BoDs to 
convey their rights on the takaful fund. Hence, the following discussion will elaborate on the 
form of relationships between participants’ perceptions about TOs’ disclosure mechanisms vs 
participants’ knowledge and participants’ knowledge vs participants’ preferences’. By doing so, 
this section will complete the provision to answer research question 8.       
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 12.5.1  Participants’ Perceived Disclosure and Participants’ Knowledge   
The Spearman’s correlation104 findings on Disclosure vs Knowledge indicate a positive 
relationship between disclosure and knowledge determinant variables. Participants’ knowledge 
about takaful fund investment returns (KIR) and takaful fund underwriting surplus (KUS) scored 
7 significant relationships with disclosure variables, followed by knowledge about TOs’ Shari’ah 
compliance systems (KSC) and TOs’ available dissatisfaction channels (KDC). While disclosure 
of takaful fund investment returns (DIR), underwriting surplus (DUS), Shari’ah compliance 
(DSC), charged fees, deficit and qard (DFDQ) show 5 significance relationships with the 
knowledge variables. These findings, shows strong positive relationships between disclosure and 
knowledge variables - in other words the existence of an active disclosure system can cause an 
enhancement in participants’ knowledge and vice versa. 
 
The multinomial logistic regressions between the two variables also indicate a significant 
relationship between TOs’ disclosures about takaful fund investments return (DIR) with 5 
knowledge variables. Disclosure of fund investment return (DIR) enhances participants 
knowledge about the principles of the used takaful model (KPM), fund investment return (KIR), 
fund underwriting surplus (KUS), fund’s Shari’ah compliance system (KSC), and charged fees, 
deficits and availability of qard (KFDQ). The regression findings were supported by 
participants’ perceptions which show that 91 % of the participants reported a weak to moderate 
perception about the TOs disclosure on fund investments return (DIR), their weak perceptions 
are reflected on their knowledge: 99 % of the participants have a weak to moderate knowledge 
about the principles of the used model (KPM), 75 % of the participants have a weak knowledge 
about the fund underwriting surplus (KUS), 87 % of the participants have a weak knowledge 
about the fund’s Shariah compliance system (KSC), 91 % of the participants have a weak 
knowledge about the fund charged fees, encountered deficits and availability of qard (KFDQ).  
 
However, participants’ weak perceptions about TOs’ disclosure of fund investment return (DIR) 
did not cause their knowledge about investment return KIR) to be weak as well, as 55 % of the 
participants have a high knowledge about the fund investments return (KIR) against 45 % who 
have a weak knowledge. Participants’ high knowledge about investment return (KIR) comes in 
                                               
104 Refer to chapter 9, Table 9.8.   
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parallel with other researchers’ findings (Metawa et al, 1998; Bley et al, 2004; Naser et al., 
1999; Gait et al, 2009a; 2009b) that clarifies that respondents in GCC and other Arabic countries 
have a high level of awareness and knowledge of the basic of Islamic banking financing 
schemes. This is similar to the question asked on this research to find out if participants are 
aware of the difference between investment account and risk account.  
  
The multinomial logistic regression also reflected a significant relationship between TO 
disclosures on the company key personnel power and activities (DKP), with 5 knowledge 
determinant variables. Disclosure of information on company key personnel power and activities 
can enhance knowledge on fund investment return (KIR), fund underwriting surplus (KUS), fund 
Shari’ah compliance (KSC), dissatisfaction channels (KSC), and participants total knowledge 
(TPK).   
 
The regression findings were supported by participants’ perceptions, that 98 % of the participants 
have weak to moderate) perceptions about TOs’ disclosures on the company key personnel 
power and activities (DKP). Their weak perceptions are reflected in their knowledge: that 75 % 
of the participants have a weak knowledge about the fund underwriting surplus (KUS), 87 % of 
the participants have a weak knowledge about the fund’s Shari’ah compliance system (KSC), 79 
% of the participants have a weak knowledge about the company dissatisfaction channels (KDC).  
 
In conclusion, participants’ knowledge is considered one of the challenges facing the takaful 
industry. It is entirely dependent on industry players, who must take a more active role in 
educating their customers (Abdi, 2007). Accordingly, as participants’ satisfaction occurs when 
customers compare their perception of the performance of the products and services in relation to 
their desires and expectations (Spreng et al., 1996) TOs should have an effective disclosure 
mechanism to improve participants’ knowledge, which will enable them to make proper 
comparisons of their perceptions with the company performance of the products and services. 
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12.5.2  Participants’ Knowledge and Participants’ Preferences105  
The Spearman’s correlation findings on Knowledge vs Preference indicate a positive relationship 
between participants’ preferences on claims and underwriting surplus (PCU) with 5 knowledge 
determinant variables, principles on the used takaful model (KPM), takaful fund investment 
return (KIR), takaful fund underwriting surplus (KUS), takaful fund Shari’ah compliance system 
(KSC), and dissatisfaction channels (KDC). The correlation findings also indicate one negative 
relationship between participants’ preference to have a representative on the BoDs (PRB) and 
participants’ knowledge about TOs’ dissatisfaction channels (KDC).  
 
Similarly, the regression findings show similar results as the Spearman’s correlation. A 
significance relationship occurs between participants’ knowledge about (KPM, KIR, KUS, and 
KDC) and their preferences about claims and underwriting surplus (PCU). The participants 
scored 67 % as a high preference on claim and underwriting surplus, which indicates they are in 
a need to gain underwriting surplus regardless if they made a claim or not, as Blythe (1997) 
indicates preference is a reflection of a need. 
 
Participants’ high preferences on (PCU) is a result of their little knowledge about the scenarios 
that allowed them to participate with other participants on the expected financial benefits from 
the takaful fund, as 75 % have a weak knowledge about participants’ fund underwriting surplus 
(KUS). Participants’ requirements to be identified whether they made claim or not comes in 
parallel with AAOIFI
106
 Shari’ah standards (2010), which indicate three scenarios that TOs can 
follow to distribute underwriting surplus among participants’ whenever participants made a 
claim for indemnity through pro-rata mode, selective mode or offsetting mode. The pro-rata 
mode distributes underwriting surplus among all takaful participants in proportion to the 
contributions paid, without differentiating between claimable and non-claimable accounts. This 
is done on the grounds that all takaful participants initially contributed to the fund to provide 
mutual help and protection for all participants (Haytham, 2009). Accordingly, TOs need to 
educate their participants about the core principles of contributing in the takaful fund, to support 
                                               
105 Findings of this section have been taken from chapters 8 & 9 (Tables 8.30 and 9.9).  
106
 Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions. 
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other participants in their financial loss. However, 296 (99 %) participants state that they did not 
buy their takaful policy to help other participants in their needs.  
 
One of the main reasons for not helping other participants and preferring future benefits is 
participants’ weak knowledge as the regression analysis indicates a significance form of 
relationships between the (KPM, KIR, KUS, and KDC and PCU). Hence, participants’ overall 
understanding about these mentioned knowledge variables was weak as 99 % of the participants 
have a weak to moderate knowledge about the principles of the used takaful model (KPM), 75 % 
of the participants have a weak knowledge about fund underwriting surplus (KUS), and 79 % of 
the participants have a weak knowledge about the company dissatisfaction channels (KDC). 
Enhancing participants’ knowledge about the principles about the takaful model (KPM), will 
enable participants to understand the conditions that allow them to share with other participants 
in the underwriting surplus which is based on the concept of solidarity and helping other 
participants in their needs.    
 
Another important finding is the significant relationship between participants’ preferences to 
have a representative on the BoDs (PRB) with their knowledge about the proper way to leave the 
company when they are dissatisfied with the company services (KDC). As the correlation finding 
indicates a negative relationship between (PRB) and (KDC), which means the existence of one 
dimension cancels the need for the other one. If TOs decide not to assign participants 
representative in the BoDs then they have to enhance participants’ knowledge about the proper 
way to leave the company when they are dissatisfied with the company services as 79 % of the 
participants have a weak knowledge about the (KDC).  
 
In conclusion, an adequate education programme for participants is required in the takaful 
industry to give them the confidence to properly identify their needs and preferences. It can be 
seen from this section that participants’ weak knowledge has affected their preferences. 
Participants are in favour of sharing underwriting surplus with other participants’ whether they 
made a claim or not. This is in line with AAOIFI Shari’ah standards (2010) which reason that all 
takaful participants initially contributed to the fund to provide mutual help and protection. TOs 
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should also identify legal dissatisfaction channels that allow participants to the leave company 
when they feel unhappy with the company services without major financial loss.      
 
Finally, TOs should disclose a framework that includes the takaful model used with the 
investment management functions such as: investment profit-sharing distribution, product 
benefits, termination charges in the case of early termination of a takaful contract with the exit 
options and the consequences of losing benefit payments from both Participant Risk Fund (PRF) 
and/or Participant Investment Fund (PIF). The framework should also disclose the frequency of 
investment profit and/or underwriting surplus declaration and their estimated returns and the 
complaints-handling and other contractual arrangements (IFSB, 2009a). 
 
12.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS  
Takaful is based on the concepts of tabarru and mudarabah.  Participants are committed to 
donate in the takaful fund for the purpose of helping others in their financial loss as a mean of 
solidarity and brotherhood between participants. Mudarabah occurs because the TO invests 
participants accumulated donations or premiums in an islamically acceptable business. 
Accordingly, participants shall bear in mind these two concepts when contributing to the takaful 
fund. Participants must also bear in mind that the TOs is a wakil or an agent to manage the fund 
according to Shari’ah principles and to provide a reasonable financial security for those who 
genuinely deserve it against the loss or damage suffered by them resulting from a defined risk. 
Hence, the TO is eligible to receive a fee, or upon a full consent of the participants might share 
with them the investments profit as a reward for managing the takaful scheme.  
 
Accordingly, it’s very important for the participants to realise the principles of the takaful 
insurance and the main purpose behind their contributions in the fund. Participants’ shall also be 
aware of their duties, rights and obligations to the takaful fund. Despite the fact that 93.7 % of 
the participants indicated that the TOs have briefed them on the principles of the takaful models,  
however 75.3 % of the participants shows a weak knowledge about their rights in receiving 
underwriting surplus. 87.3 % of the participants indicated that they have a weak knowledge 
about the Shariah compliance process. Surprisingly, underwriting surplus and Shariah 
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compliance are the main distinguishing matter with the conventional insurance. As the 
conventional insurance are based on an exchange contract. 
 
Participants shall also realise that brotherhood and helping other participants in their financial 
distress are the main object of their contributions to the takaful fund. However, 98.7 % and 64.3 
% of the participants have indicated that helping other participants in their needs and Shariah 
compliance respectively, are not the main reasons for their contributions to the takaful fund.  
 
It’s the responsibility of the TOs to educate their participants about their rights and obligations in 
the fund. It’s also the responsibility of the participants to search for their rights and benefits in 
the fund. Participants shall recognize the real object of Islamic insurance. They shall understand 
that Shariah compliance is a great favour and benefit to them, as they will be avoided to enter 
into a contract that involves a prohibition element to Islam.      
 
12.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides an answer to research question 8, since this chapter has discussed the 
findings of the empirical chapters on participants’ perceptions about TOs disclosure mechanisms, 
participants’ knowledge and participants’ preferences. The chapter also discussed the significant 
relationship between participants’ satisfaction levels with participants’ demographics findings 
and between participants’ satisfactions levels with the participants’ perceptions, knowledge and 
preferences. Accordingly, participants’ overall perceptions about TOs disclosure systems are 
low, which reflects TOs shortfalls in disclosing the required information to participants. 
Participants’ low perceived disclosure has affected their knowledge as participants’ overall 
knowledge is scored weak as well. As a result of participants’ low perceived disclosure and weak 
knowledge, their preferences were concentrated on having a representative on the BoDs to 
discuss their rights and obligations in the takaful fund.  
 
The correlation and regression results between participants’ perceived disclosure and 
participants’ knowledge and between participants’ knowledge and participants’ preferences 
supported the fact that participants’ perceived disclosure has positively impacted on their 
knowledge, i.e. an effective TO disclosure system implies improved participants’ knowledge. 
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The results also indicated a significant relationship between participants’ knowledge and 
preferences, and that participants need to be educated about the conditions that allowed them to 
share with other participants in the underwriting surplus in association with their claims 
situations. Another vital result is that whenever participants have enough knowledge to leave the 
company when they are dissatisfied with the company services and products, then they will not 
be in a need to have a representative on the BoDs.  
 
In terms of significant relationship between participants’ demographic characteristics and 
satisfactions, the results indicate that TOs should take into consideration participants’ job 
categories as one of the main demographic characteristics that significantly related with almost 
all satisfaction variables. In short, the current research study has found participants are 
contributing to the takaful fund as a reason of the expected financial return (investment return 
and underwriting surplus) and there is no effect at all for religious motivation.   
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN   
CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
13.1 INTRODUCTION  
This study aimed to explore participants’ satisfaction levels by reviewing their perceptions 
knowledge and preferences about the current services and products presented by the Takaful 
Operators (TOs), with the ultimate goal of providing better protections for the participants by 
suggesting a set of recommendations for both the TOs and the insurance regulatory authority in 
Saudi Arabia. To meet this aim, survey questionnaires were distributed among participants of 
takaful funds to get their perceptions and opinions. The results of the survey were analyzed and 
compared with the theories, standards, policies and related literature. This chapter recapitulates 
the main and practical recommendations for both TOs and the Saudi Insurance Regulatory 
Authority, for enhancing better service to achieve ultimate protections for takaful participants in 
Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. This chapter also highlights the research limitations and 
recommendations for future research. 
 
13.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR TAKAFUL OPERATORS  
The present study was motivated by a belief that a gap existed between the operational schemes 
of the takaful companies in Saudi Arabia and policies set out by standard-setting bodies for the 
takaful insurance industry. This discrepancy leads to unfair treatment of participants who 
contribute to the takaful fund. The participants are entitled to have their claim paid if there are 
enough underwriting funds to finance payout and are also entitled to share in the distribution of 
any investment and underwriting surplus. The only right that participants can exert on the takaful 
scheme is to discontinue their contract with the company in case of dissatisfaction. This study 
provides positive recommendations for various stakeholders in pursuing the desired ultimate 
objectives of operating the takaful insurance.  
 
In addition, this research also contributes to the existing academic research in terms of opening 
up new areas of study. It also renders valuable input to industry practitioners for improving 
current regulations and practice related to the operational and practical aspects of the product. 
The findings of this research might provide useful business growth from the marketing 
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perspective strategy. Accordingly, this section provides recommendations for the TOs based on 
participants’ perceptions and satisfaction findings 
 
13.2.1 Participants’ Demographics Characteristic Recommendations: 
This study draws an important conclusion about participants’ demographic characteristics impact 
on satisfaction levesl. The study has discovered that participants’ job categories have the most 
significant categorical variables that relate with almost all satisfaction variables, followed by 
other characteristics such as age grouping, number of members included in the policy and gender 
that made a unique significant relationship with different satisfaction variables. 
 
Accordingly, TOs should take into consideration participants’ job categories as one of the main 
demographic characteristics to address the participants’ satisfaction levels. TOs should be in 
frequent communication with those participants with a managerial background to satisfy their 
desires as they usually possess the required experience on the financial field and they are 
expecting more rewards for their contributions in the fund. TOs should also address the needs of 
the student participants as they may require a special family long-term plan (such as establishing 
a new business, marriage expenses, etc.) that can benefit them when they graduate. 
 
TOs need to apply the life-cycle approach, as participants with different age groupings have 
shown different satisfaction levels. TOs need to develop their products in accordance with 
participants’ age grouping. For instance participants aged from 20 to 30 might need special 
products that can benefit them in future such as housing support, marriage support.     
 
Finally, female participants might have a different investment strategy than males as they are 
more satisfied with the company’s investment return. Hence, TOs should design a saving 
account product that serves the interest of female participants. These can include, providing a 
savings account to help females launch their own project, such as a beauty shop, ladies dress 
shop, in-house food delivery, etc. TOs can also design savings account products that can support 
males establishing their own project that can generate a financial return, such as car maintenance 
garage, restaurants, etc.        
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13.2.2 Participants Perceptions, Knowledge and Preferences Recommendations: 
This study has shown that participants have overall low perceived information, which reflected a 
shortfall on the TOs disclosure system. The disclosure and satisfactions relating analysis 
concluded that in order for participants to be satisfied, TOs should disclose more information 
about investment return (DIR), followed by information about claims and indemnities procedures 
(DCI), and information about TOs key personnel power and activities (DKP).  
 
Findings on participants’ overall knowledge have also shown similar results. The knowledge and 
satisfaction analysis has shown that in order for participants to be satisfied they should posses a 
good knowledge about the principles of the used takaful model (KPM), followed by knowledge 
about takaful fund underwriting surplus (KUS). 
 
Participants scored an overall high regarding their preferences, which is considered a reflection 
of their needs and wants. The preference and satisfaction analysis concludes that in order for 
participants to be satisfied they need to have a representative on the takaful company’s Board of 
Directors (PRB).  
 
From the above three-model analysis, a conclusion can be made that participants’ low perceived 
information has affected their knowledge; hence they are in a need for someone to convey their 
wants and needs on the company’s Board of Directors. Accordingly, TOs need to adhere to these 
recommendations to satisfy their participants:    
 
I. Provide a representative, who can present and discuss participants’ rights and benefits to 
the TOs higher management. 
II. Educate participants about the principles of the takaful model used by the TOs, i.e. 
(Wakalah , Mudarabah, Waqf, etc). 
III. Make participants aware of the expected financial benefits, by disclosing enough 
information about takaful fund investment returns, claims and indemnity, and company 
key personnel power and activities. 
 
From the above it seems that improving participants’ perceived information will enrich their 
knowledge, and when participants possess enough knowledge their preferences will change as 
they will not be in a need for someone to convey the message from/to them.  
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Accordingly, another two relationship models were conducted between disclosure and 
knowledge and knowledge and preferences. The analysis findings indicated that when TOs 
improve their disclosure about takaful fund investments return (DIR), followed by a disclosure 
about TOs’ key personnel power and activities (DKP), then participants’ knowledge will be 
enhanced in almost all knowledge variables. Participants’ knowledge and preferences 
relationship show participants’ desire to possess enough knowledge about the conditions that let 
them receive underwriting surplus when they made claim (PCU) which has relationships with 
almost all knowledge variables. The model also indicates that whenever participants have 
enough knowledge about the proper way to leave the company when they are dissatisfied with 
the company services i.e. proper dissatisfaction channels (KDC), then they will not need to have 
a representative on the Board of Directors (PRB) to convey their dissatisfaction.       
 
The above two models supports the previous conclusion that when participants have enough 
information then their knowledge will be improved, and when their knowledge improves they 
will not require a representative as they will have enough knowledge about the ways to leave the 
company when they are dissatisfied with the company services and products. Accordingly, TOs 
needs to adhere to these recommendations to satisfy their participants: 
 
I. Disclose enough information about takaful fund investment returns, and company key 
personnel power and activities. 
II. Educate participants about the conditions that let them share underwriting surplus with 
other participants in association for a claim that has been made.  
 
Finally, the above discussion indicates that in order for TOs to satisfy their participants, they 
need to disclose more information about takaful fund investment returns (DIR), more 
information about the company key personnel power and activities (DKP). However, TOs need 
to disclose more information about underwriting surplus and claim conditions (DUS), as this 
information was one type of knowledge that was required by participants. In case of TOs’ 
shortfalls in disclosing enough information for participant, then a representative (PRB) is needed, 
to represent participants’ rights and obligations. However, when participants possess enough 
information then they will not be in a need to have a representative, as they will have enough 
knowledge to leave the company when they are dissatisfied with the company services (KDC). 
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In short, in order for the TOs to satisfy their participants, they need to disclose more detailed 
information about different sorts of financial returns (investment return and underwriting 
surplus), as participants are financially motivated and there is no effect at all for religious 
motivation.   
 
As there is an existing positive relationship between TOs’ disclosure systems,  participants’ 
knowledge and participants’ preferences, then TOs should have an effective disclosure 
mechanism with proper tools (effective IT system, effective social communications, listening to 
participants expectations, and educated sales personnel and intermediaries) to  disseminate the 
required information to participants. Finally, as has been indicated in the research methodology 
chapter the inductive research approach will end up with a theory or general preposition that 
might be derived from the observations of human behavioural analysis. Therefore, it is highly 
recommended if TOs follow the obtained theory or model below as per Figure 12.1, to achieve 
the required participants’ protections and satisfactions, which will eventually lead to participants’ 
loyalty and better retention value for the takaful operators. 
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Figure 13.1: Proposed Participants’ Satisfaction Cycling Model for the Takaful Industry 
B - Knowledge & Awareness
“Participants'  are in need of the 
following Knowledge” 
• Knowledge of Takaful Principles & Models  
(KPM) 
- Takaful Principles & Models , types of 
Participants Fund 
-Claims, Charged Fees,  expenses, Incentives & 
Premiums, Qard & Deductions, Contract 
Duration & Cancellation.
• Knowledge of Underwriting Surplus (KUS)
Expected period to distribute Underwriting 
Surplus .
Difference between gross and net underwriting 
surplus.
Conditions to distribute underwriting surplus in 
association with claims situations.  
C- Preferences
“In Order for T.O.s’ to Satisfy Participants' , 
T.O.s’ shall assign a (PRB)”  
•Representative on Takaful Operator Board of 
Directors (PRB).
- Discuss participants needs and wants.
- Convey message from/to participants. 
When Participants have enough knowledge about the 
proper way to leave the T.O.s’ when they are 
dissatisfied (KDC) and  when participants have enough 
knowledge about underwriting surplus and claims 
situation (KUS), they  will not be in a need for (PRB)     
A- Independent 
B -Dependent 
A – Disclosure
“Takaful Operators (TOs) Need to disclose the 
following information” 
• Disclosure of Investment Return (DIR) 
Past , Presents and Future Expected investment Return. 
• Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus in Associations 
with Claim Conditions  (DUS)
Pro-rata mode , Selective mode , Offsetting mode.
• Disclosure of Key Personnel  (DKP) 
Powers , Roles & Activities of Key Personnel .
To Achieve Better disclosure of DIR, DUS and DKP, 
T.O.s’  shall have an effective (DM)  
• Disclosure Mechanisms  (DM)
Effective IT system, Effective social communications, 
listening to participants expectations, and educated sales 
personnel and intermediaries.
D- Satisfaction
- When the T.O.s’ satisfies participants disclosure 
requirements (DIR), (DUS), (DKP) and (DM)., and 
- When they satisfies participants knowledge 
requirements (KPM) and (KUS), and 
- When they satisfies participants preference 
requirements (PRB), 
then participants will be satisfies  with  the Takaful 
Company Services and Products. 
1
2
3
4B- Independent C –Dependent 
C- Independent
D –Dependent 
A- Independent D –Dependent 
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13.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SAUDI ARABIAN INSURANCE REGULATOR  
This section presents recommendations for the Saudi insurance regulatory authority or Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). The recommendations are derived by comparing SAMA’s 
implemented directives and the standards and directives of the international insurance and 
takaful bodies.       
 
As has been mentioned earlier, all SAMA directives address the cooperatives insurance 
companies only. SAMA has not issued a single directive that deals with takaful insurance. As 
TOs consist of a hybrid of mutual and proprietary, based on the principles of taawun, tabarru 
and the avoidance of riba, it is recommended that SAMA assign separate directive laws that 
address the takaful insurance, and the principles of the Shari’ah laws. However, upon issuing 
specialized takaful directives, it is very important for SAMA to enhance their employees’ 
knowledge about the principles and products of the takaful model. SAMA employees should 
understand different implications between conventional and takaful insurance. SAMA should 
rely on the already-established standards as per AAOIFI, IFSB and similar standards as per IAIS 
to regulate the takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Since TOs in Saudi Arabia are following SAMA directives there is a need to modify the existing 
directives to suit the TOs operational principles which will eventually serve the interests of 
takaful participants.  
 
13.3.1 Corporate Governance 
SAMA in its directives has not put in place an obligatory directive to structure a corporate 
governance framework. Accordingly, it is highly recommended that SAMA assign a directive to 
make it obligatory for the TOs to structure a corporate governance framework.  
 
The framework should be structured in accordance with the economic and political situations 
surrounding the Saudi financial market, and it should specify the strategic, operational roles, 
responsibilities, functions of all organs of the firms including but not limited to the Board of 
Directors and its committees, the management, Shari’ah governance function. The framework 
should identify TOs’ methods of conducting activities in accordance with the Shari’ah principles 
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by identifying the construction form of the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) with their roles 
and responsibilities as well as the roles and responsibilities of the Internal Shari’ah audit and 
compliance department and their relationships with the SSB members. The takaful model used 
should be identified in this framework (i.e., wakalah, mudaraba, or a hybrid of wakalah and 
mudaraba). The operational scheme of the model should follow the operational structures of the 
takaful international organizations such as IFSB or AAOIFI.  
 
The actuarial roles should be identified in this framework as well. The actuary and the SSB shall 
be in charge of finding proper investment contracts to run participants’ fund (either by 
mudaraba, wakala, appointing wakala fees for investments management or any other 
combination)  and they should set and advise the fee structure and the profit-sharing ratio on the 
investment management between participants and the operator.  
 
The percentage of the distributed underwriting surplus among participants should be identified as 
per AAOIFI Shari’ah standard, that the takaful surplus purely belongs to participants as the 
distribution of surplus will be based on the participant’s donation percentage share, and the 
surplus cannot be taken by the TOs. The framework should also identify the best approach to 
allocate underwriting surplus among participants as per an appropriate AAOIFI standard, i.e. 
pro-rata mode, selective mode, or offsetting mode.  
 
Contributing more than regular contributions to pay back shareholders’ loans can cause 
dissatisfaction among participants. Hence, the framework should identify possible scenarios to 
pay back the shareholders loans: is it by increasing participants’ future contributions to the fund, 
or by preventing participants to get any future underwriting surplus or investment return. 
Accordingly, TOs should disclose their investment objectives and assets allocation rationale with 
the content of the assets instruments and their weight in the investments portfolio, and whether 
they are suitable to match short-term or long-term liabilities. It also recommended if the TOs 
follows the Islamic banking sectors strategies by letting the shareholders to minimize their equity 
as much as they can to mobilize Investment Account Holders (IAH) funds to benefit from 
generated profits. 
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Fees and expenses can be one of the main reasons to encounter a deficit in the takaful fund. 
Therefore, the framework should identify different types of expenses and management fees that 
are going to be deducted from the participants’ fund, as these might cause future deficits which 
will prevent participants’ rights in receiving underwriting surplus. 
 
Another reason that can prevent participants to gain the required financial benefits is 
shareholders power and activities. The framework should specify the limitations and the power 
of the shareholders in participants’ funds as per AAOIFI and IFSB acceptable practices, which 
allow shareholders to use the takaful fund underwriting surplus and the investment return. 
Hence, to reduce shareholders power on the takaful fund, the framework should clearly indicate 
assets separation in the family takaful between Participant Risk Fund (PRF) and those of the 
Participant Investment Fund (PIF), as well as between the assets of the takaful fund and those of 
the shareholders’ funds.  
 
For assets validity, the framework should identify types and percentage weights of the assets 
which comply with Islamic laws. The framework should also adopt an assets-liabilities matching 
procedures that can withstand assets volatilities in the Saudi insurance market.  
 
13.3.2 Market Conduct and Disclosure 
As market conduct identifies the way insurers deal with policyholders either directly or through 
intermediaries, SAMA should put in place a proper market conduct framework that can suit the 
takaful industry with an adequate observation system that can be periodically conducted to 
monitor the compliance with this code and to effectively address any undesirable behaviour. 
 
SAMA’s suggested market conduct framework should encourage and monitor correct and 
positive ethical behaviour, to treat participants fairly by assigning certain obligatory principles 
for better achievement of customer interests, better communications with customers, and quick 
conflicts resolutions. The framework should also encourage directors and senior managers to 
listen to the opinions of other executives before making a decision and shura members would 
include, as far as possible, representative of shareholders, employees, suppliers, and participants. 
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Accordingly, SAMA should also conduct a research study among participants to find out their 
preferences to have a representative on the TOs management as has been suggested by IFSB.  
 
The framework should also ensure that a proper code of ethics is properly delivered by whoever 
promotes or advertises the takaful products, such as a conventional bank with a takaful window, 
intermediaries, agents, actuaries, representatives, etc. In terms of investment activities TOs 
should strictly adhere to Islamic ethical codes. 
 
The intermediaries should also be included in the market conduct framework and they should be 
licensed and qualified with the necessary knowledge on different aspects of takaful and Shari’ah 
principles. The intermediaries shall be trained to take into consideration the element of human 
action/intervention when delivering the service. SAMA should also set up fair amounts of 
commissions and remunerations for intermediaries by comparing the domestic commissions with 
the international advanced insurance market to provide good service quality to participants. 
 
Resolving a dispute between the TOs and the participants is another vital subject of market 
conduct. Hence, the framework should identify the dispute-resolving options such as litigation, 
arbitration and Grievances Court. SAMA should also introduce the role of ombudsman as 
another option to mitigate an insurance dispute and, for better disputes judgment; the arbitration 
service should work independently from the Grievances Court for judgment diversifications.  
 
SAMA’s suggested market conduct and corporate governance framework should be run by the 
best available IT system to properly disseminate information to the public and to the current 
participants. The IT system should support the adoption of a sophisticated service quality model 
and participants’ satisfactions scoring electronic card to measure customer satisfaction levels, by 
assessing how well customers’ needs, expectations and perceptions are being met or exceeded 
the company’s offering. As a way of ensuring participants’ satisfactions, SAMA should have 
access to the insurance company’s participant’s satisfaction scoring card, for quick and adequate 
intrusions timing. 
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Finally, customer orientation and education about their rights and obligations is an important 
issue in the market conduct subject. It is considered a responsibility of the regulators to examine 
consumer education to achieve better public awareness and better policyholder protection. 
Accordingly, SAMA should launch a participant’s education programme especially with those 
who possess a life family takaful policy as they have long-term contractual agreements with the 
insurance company, which entitles them to receive periodic financial benefits.  
 
13.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
There was some limitations and challenges that restricted a robust outcome. Most of the 
limitations are related to the sampling approach as this research involved a market survey. Some 
of these limitations are: 
 
1. This research faced the limitations of targeting the supply side of the takaful products, i.e. 
meeting with the TOs’ board of directors and senior management level, due to SAMA’s 
new implemented regulations, which caused TOs to stop taking new customers and 
retaining the existing ones that have been with them for more than 20 years. Some of 
these new regulations demand the segregation between the insurance company from its 
main mother company (bank affiliation) which requires a separate capital and separate 
BoDs. Accordingly, reviewing the Saudi insurance regulatory directives and laws was the 
alternative available option to cover the shortage in reaching the supply side. 
2. Due to time and funding constraints, this research is limited to the sample from the TOs 
located in Jeddah. The study results would be more rigorous if more time was allocated to 
increase the sample size to include other TOs located in other cities in Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, the study will be more representative if the sample had included participants 
from other TOs, as recently a number of new TOs came into existence.  
 
3. Due to sampling technique limitations, which has been mentioned before, this study is 
unable to use the parametric statistical tools which are more robust and powerful 
statistical tools in analyzing the data.     
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4. Due to limitations in word-count for the thesis, it was not possible to include Solvency 
and Capital Adequacy topics. However, including these topics is considered an important 
benchmark for better market conduct approach.  
 
 
13.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Besides the afore-mentioned limitations, a number of suggestions and recommendations based 
on this study for future research can be made. Some suggestions that can further be researched 
and can be basis for new and similar studies for other financial services or institutions are 
identified below:    
 
1. Future study may expand the scope of the sample by including the TOs’ views on the 
services they offer their participants. Hence, a proper semi-structured interview, or a 
survey questionnaire can organized to be conducted with the TOs’ senior management 
level. However, it is highly recommended that such a study can be conducted in relation 
with SAMA as it has the authority to advise the TOs to be cooperative enough with the 
researchers and to present the required information within the allowable and ethical 
information exposures. SAMA can also advise which TO satisfies the required conditions 
to be legally operated in the Kingdom.  
   
2. After SAMA’s new restricted and compulsory regulations on Corporate Governance and 
Market Conduct and Disclosure, it is highly expected that the TOs will disclose more 
information to public. More importantly, it is expected that the TOs will disclose separate 
information for shareholders and participants funds, which will make it much easier for 
future researchers to come up with quick conclusions of the current financial situations of 
the Saudi TOs. Accordingly, new researchers can use this information as secondary data, 
to support the collected primary data from the TOs senior management.  
 
3. In accordance with the second suggestion, future research may also be  undertaken 
concurrently with time-series data analysis in addition to the cross-setion survey 
questionnaire used in this study. Using panel data (cross-section and time series) can 
provide rich analysis of the actual behaviour of the participants towards certain financial 
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variables over time (such as rate of investment return, rate of underwriting surplus) as 
participants in the current research showed more motivations toward the financial return 
other than religious motivation factors.  
 
4. The study can also be extended to include other participants from other cities in Saudi 
Arabia, such as Riyadh and Dhahran, which is considered the biggest city after Jeddah in 
possessing takaful participants.  
 
5. As the TOs in Saudi uses the wakala model, it would be interesting to do comparative 
empirical work of the wakala model used in other countries and also with the mudarabah 
model. To find out the best model that can provide the required protection for 
participants. 
 
6. Studies can also include Solvency and Capital Adequacy, as one of the topic that TOs 
should adhere to for better market conduct approach. Accordingly, future researchers can 
generate important questionnaires to be forwarded to the TOs to figure out their backup 
procedures for ultimate protection of the participants. 
 
13.6 EPILOGUE  
This research set out to explore and analyze the perceptions, knowledge and preferences of the 
participants who contributed to the takaful funds located in Saudi Arabia. The efforts and 
dedications put into this research especially during the data collection and analysis have yielded 
significant and meaningful results related to critical factor in the takaful industry. As the 
theoretical and empirical chapters indicate, this study has fulfilled its research aims and 
objectives laid out in first chapter. It is hoped and expected that at least some, if not all, parts of 
the suggested recommendations will be used and applied by the Takaful Operators in Saudi 
Arabia and by others worldwide. It is also hoped that the recommendations related to regulatory 
standards will be used and applied by the insurance regulatory authority in Saudi Arabia.  
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APPENDISES 
Appendix A 
Table A.1: Differences between Takaful & Conventional Insurance 
Compared Items Takaful Conventional 
Contract Participants in principle own the insurance funds, 
managed by the company. Participants give up 
individual rights to gain collective rights over 
contributions and benefits. 
Insurance is a buy-sell contract. Policies are sold and 
buyers are the policyholders. 
Guarantees  No contractual guarantees are given by the 
company. Joint indemnity between participants is a 
prerequisite of participating in a takaful scheme. 
The company guarantees certain benefits, especially 
death benefits. 
Company Company acts as a trustee and entrepreneur. Relationship between the company and the 
policyholders on a one to one basis. 
Insurer Takaful operator acts as an agent, they expected to 
provide quard-hassan in case of deficit. 
Insurer is liable to pay the insurance benefits as 
promised from its assets. 
Fund Funds belong to the participants on a collective 
basis and are managed by the company for a fee. 
Fund belongs to the company, thought separation of 
assets is maintained between share-holders and 
policyholders.  
Contribution/Premiums Cover paid based on donation, the money called 
‘Contributions’. Contribution is belongs to the 
takaful fund. It can be donated either in full or 
partial installment to the takaful fund. There is no 
interest charge in delaying the payment of donation. 
Money paid to buy cover called ‘premiums’. 
Premiums are owned by the insurer. Interest will be 
charged in delaying the payment of the premiums. 
Underwriting loss The takaful fund is owned by participants who bear 
the underwriting risk. 
The shareholders bear the underwriting risks. 
Profits  Insurance surplus belongs to the participants. 
Shareholders returns come out of margins in 
management fees for the insurance and investment 
activities of the takaful fund. 
Legally, insurance surplus belongs to shareholders. 
Surplus & Reserves Underwriting surplus owned by participants 
collectively through takaful fund.  
Reserves and surplus owned by insurer. 
Sales distribution Sales normally through salaried staff are preferred. Sales on both commission and salaried basis. 
Regulation Statutory with Islamic principles through a 
Sharia’ah committee. 
Statutory only. 
Investment Invested in accordance to Shari’ah guidelines. 
Investment returns must not be driven by interest 
and by unethical commercial activities. 
Invested freely in interest-based assets and other 
activities prohibited under the Shari’ah. 
Accounting Cash accounting is mostly preferred. One balance 
sheet and two income statements. 
Cash, deferred, embedded values, etc. one balance 
sheet and one income statement.  
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Table A.2: Differences between Mutual & Conventional Insurance 
Compared Items Takaful Mutual 
Contract Participants in principle own the insurance 
funds, managed by the company. 
Participants give up individual rights to gain 
collective rights over contributions and 
benefits. 
A risk contract between individuals 
insured and the pool of insurance. 
Contibution / Premiums Premium owned by policyholders, but 
operating seeking profit from insurance 
business.  
Premium owned by policyholders, no 
other party demanding a share of the 
profit.  
Company Responsibility Pay claims with underwriting fund, interest 
free loans in case of shortfall. 
Pay claims with underwriting fund. 
Purpose of Establishing company The takaful operating company establishes 
to maximize profits for shareholders except 
the Sudanese Model. 
Establish to provide policyholders with 
low-cost insurance and not to making 
profit. 
Control of the company Board of directors is elected by shareholders 
who own the company. While participants 
own the fund, thus participants don’t have 
the right to change board of directors. 
Board of directors is elected by 
policyholders who own the company. 
Policyholders have the right to change the 
company board of directors.  
Participants Responsibility Pay contributions. Pay contributions. 
Capital Utilised Participants fund. Participant’s capital. 
Investment Consideration Sharia’h compliant. No restrictions except prudential. 
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Appendix B 
ALJazira Takaful Ta’awuni Development  
 
Bank ALJazira was the first banking institution in the Kingdom to introduce its own protection 
and savings insurance products in 2001 as a fully-fledged Shari’ah-compliant alternative to 
conventional life insurance products. The Bank ALJazira takful model is based on the Taawun 
concept and Wakalah contract (ALJazira, 2010). Since then, Takaful Ta’awuni has assumed  the 
leading position in the life insurance market, in terms of volumes of policies sold, and has 
undergone rapid growth in order to satisfy increasing demand for Shari’ah-compliant life 
insurance in the Kingdom, with 11 Takaful sales offices distributed among the Kingdom 
(ALJazira, 2010). Hence, ALJazira Takaful has accounted for around 28% of the Protection & 
Savings sector (life insurance) in the Kingdom (SAMA, 2009).  As required by the insurance 
laws of Saudi Arabia, progress has been made to segregate the operations of the takaful 
insurance divisions from banking. Hence the Bank has decided to spin off its insurance business 
in a separate entity, with key developments to enhance the existing products and services by 
focusing on the infrastructure readiness of the new company to support operational performance 
after issuance of the insurance license by SAMA. One of the major components of this 
infrastructure development was the significant upgrade to the core life application system which 
will improve operational efficiency manifold (ALJazira, 2009).  Takaful Ta’awuni has focused 
on reengineering several insurance issues such as improving the existing TTD
107
 strategy, and 
the improvement of several takaful products with the main intention of complying with SAMA 
regulatory requirements, of which the Individual retirement contract is further aligned to 
customers’ needs (ALJazira, 2009).  By March 2010 ALJazira takaful had received SAMA 
approval to be legally licensed to operate as an insurance company in Saudi Arabia, with an 
agreed capital of SAR 348.75 million (E & Y, 2011). Accordingly, as a part of divisional 
segregation to comply with SAMA regulations, the Takaful Ta’awuni, has become a key part of 
Aljazira Financial Group which includes Aljazira Capital and Takaful Ta’awuni, where the Bank 
and AlJazira Capital Company possess 35% of the shares of the new insurance company, with 
the remaining shares being held by the other founding shareholders and other shares being 
offered to the public by way of the Initial Public Offering. As a result of the new transactions 
process, the assets, liabilities and the operations of the insurance business has been transferred to 
the new insurance company (Aljazira, 2010).  However, it has been noticed during the transitions 
period, that the fee income from the Takaful business line was lower by SAR 9 million, mainly 
due to lower business activity during the year and due to Takaful’s conversion to an independent 
public listed entity that will result in a spin-off of its activities from the Bank and its formation as 
a separate corporate entity. The wakala fee has also shown a great decline in its value which goes 
from SAR 112,919 million in 2008, to SAR 52,875 million in 2009, to much deeper decline in 
2010 to reach SAR 38,883 million (Aljazira, 2010).   
 
 
                                               
107 This level of disability reflects an injury that has rendered the employee completely unable to perform any job 
functions on a temporary basis. The employee is expected to make a full recovery and return to work. In the interim, 
compensation paid is usually a percentage of weekly wages until the worker returns to the job (Rubin, 2000). 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C.1: Tests of Normality 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TPS .280 183 .000 .775 183 .000 
SDM .229 183 .000 .835 183 .000 
SIR .337 183 .000 .720 183 .000 
SUS .353 183 .000 .685 183 .000 
SSC .420 183 .000 .628 183 .000 
SCI .289 183 .000 .783 183 .000 
SFDQ .357 183 .000 .712 183 .000 
SSP .374 183 .000 .676 183 .000 
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Appendix D 
 
Table D.1: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis for Non-Parametric Data Analysis 
 
Total Participants Satisfactions  
Mann-Whitney Test for Participants’ Gender. 
Satisfactions  Gender N Mean Rank z Asymp Sig. (p) 
TPS 
Male 286 148.14 
z = -0.387 0.699 Female 10 158.80 
Total 296 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Participants’ Age in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions (Yrs) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
TPS 
Age (21-30) Yrs 27 156.20 
x^2 = 3.688 0.297 
Age (31-40) Yrs 127 145.76 
Age (41-50) Yrs 106 140.90 
Age > 51 Yrs 35 171.31 
Total 295  
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants’ Educational level.   
Satisfactions  Education N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
TPS 
Doctorate 5 148.90 
x^2 = 6.005 0.199 
Master 24 112.75 
Bachelor 175 151.42 
Diploma 33 137.95 
High school /  lower 59 160.25 
Total 296  
Kruskal-Wallis Test for monthly premiums paid in Saudi Riyals (S.R). 
Satisfaction Premium (S.R) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
TPS 
(100 – 1000) S.R 182 142.07 
x^2 = 3.403 0.334 
(1001 – 2000) S.R 61 130.62 
(2001 – 3000) S.R 31 160.47 
Prem. > 3000 S.R 7 117.29 
Total 281  
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Number of Members included in the takaful policy.(Including main Participants’) 
Satisfactions Members N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
TPS 
1 83 139.52 
x^2 = 7.038 0.317 
2 32 132.14 
3 43 166.10 
4 50 144.98 
5 35 122.34 
6 30 148.75 
Members ≥7 13 161.27 
Total 286  
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Kruskal-Wallis Test for takaful contract durations in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions Durations N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
TPS 
(0 – 5)Yrs 137 144.57 
x^2 = 0.660 0.956 
(6 -10) Yrs 85 141.16 
(11 – 15) Yrs 16 144.78 
(16 – 20) Yrs 17 129.44 
Duration > 20 
Yrs 30 147.75 
Total 285  
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants Jobs Categories. 
Satisfactions Job N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
TPS 
Managerial 112 129.05 
x^2 = 18.231 0.011 
Academicians 48 151.41 
Retirees 38 155.08 
Technical’s 35 145.11 
Merchants 26 165.67 
Professionals 22 172.41 
Security 11 195.05 
Students 4 254.13 
Total 296  
Kruskal-Wallis Test for names of the company.   
Satisfactions Company N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
TPS 
A 243 147.05 
x^2 = 0.395 0.821 
B 45 154.79 
C 8 157.19 
Total 296  
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Table D.2: Satisfactions with the TOs Disclosure Mechanisms. 
 
Mann-Whitney Test for Participants’ Gender. 
Satisfactions  Gender N 
Mean 
Rank 
z Asymp Sig. (p) 
SDM 
Male 283 145.53 
z = 1000 0.258 Female 9 176.89 
Total 292   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Participants’ Age in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions (Yrs) N 
Mean 
Rank 
x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SDM 
Age (21-30) Yrs 27 155.98 
x^2 = 2.960 0.398 
Age (31-40) Yrs 126 143.62 
Age (41-50) Yrs 104 140.01 
Age > 51 Yrs 34 165.21 
Total 291   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants’ Educational level.   
Satisfactions  Education N 
Mean 
Rank 
x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SDM 
Doctorate 5 164.50 
x^2 = 5.256 0.262 
Master 24 114.58 
Bachelor 172 146.43 
Diploma 32 145.14 
High school /  lower 59 158.90 
Total 292   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for monthly premiums paid in Saudi Riyals (S.R). 
Satisfaction Premium (S.R) N 
Mean 
Rank 
x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SDM 
(100 – 1000) S.R 177 137.95 
x^2 = 4.055 0.256 
(1001 – 2000) S.R 62 128.78 
(2001 – 3000) S.R 31 159.66 
Prem. > 3000 S.R 7 164.57 
Total 277   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Number of Members included in the takafulpolicy. 
Satisfactions Members N 
Mean 
Rank 
x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SDM 
1 81 135.61 
x^2 = 5.364 0.498 
2 32 136.17 
3 42 160.20 
4 50 156.71 
5 35 136.87 
6 29 149.86 
Members ≥7 18 126.97 
Total 287   
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Satisfactions with the TOs Disclosure Mechanisms Continue. 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test for takaful contract durations in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions Durations N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SDM 
(0 – 5)Yrs 132 146.25 
x^2 = 1.757 0.78 
(6 -10) Yrs 86 133.83 
(11 – 15) Yrs 16 132.53 
(16 – 20) Yrs 17 150.06 
Duration > 20 
Yrs 
30 137.82 
Total 281   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants Jobs Categories. 
Satisfactions Job N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SDM 
Managerial 110 130.70 
x^2 = 
17.740 
0.013 
Academicians 48 153.00 
Retirees 38 153.47 
Technical’s 34 132.69 
Merchants 26 149.56 
Professionals 21 173.48 
Security 11 207.64 
Students 4 224.50 
Total 292   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for names of the company.   
Satisfactions Company N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SDM 
A 240 145.53 
x^2 = 0.357 0.836 
B 45 149.13 
C 7 162.79 
Total 292   
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Table D.3: Satisfactions with the TOs Investments Return 
 
Mann-Whitney Test for Participants’ Gender. 
Satisfactions  Gender N Mean Rank z Asymp Sig. (p) 
SIR 
Male 261 134.24 
z = 846.5 0.035 Female 10 181.85 
Total 271   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Participants’ Age in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions (Yrs) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SIR 
Age (21-30) Yrs 25 138.60 
x^2 = 
4.790 
0.188 
Age (31-40) Yrs 116 141.75 
Age (41-50) Yrs 98 123.50 
Age > 51 Yrs 31 147.56 
Total 270   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants’ Educational level.   
Satisfactions  Education N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SIR 
Doctorate 4 180.88 
x^2 = 
1.671 
0.796 
Master 23 134.43 
Bachelor 158 135.26 
Diploma 29 135.47 
High school / 
lower 
57 135.80 
Total 271   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for monthly premiums paid in Saudi Riyals (S.R). 
Satisfaction Premium (S.R) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SIR 
(100 – 1000) S.R 166 132.09 
x^2 = 
2.686 
0.443 
(1001 – 2000) S.R 58 118.80 
(2001 – 3000) S.R 30 141.18 
Prem. > 3000 S.R 5 123.40 
Total 259   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Number of Members included in the takafulpolicy. 
Satisfactions Members N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SIR 
1 72 137.89 
x^2 = 
5.783 
0.448 
2 33 118.71 
3 38 152.55 
4 46 131.98 
5 34 122.03 
6 27 132.61 
Members ≥7 16 129.25 
Total 266   
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Satisfactions with the TOs Investments Return Continue. 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test for takaful contract durations in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions Durations N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SIR 
(0 – 5)Yrs 116 135.75 
x^2 = 4.061 0.398 
(6 -10) Yrs 82 121.91 
(11 – 15) Yrs 16 123.72 
(16 – 20) Yrs 17 118.44 
Duration > 20 Yrs 29 144.59 
Total 260   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants Jobs Categories. 
Satisfactions Job N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SIR 
Managerial 102 122.31 
x^2 = 10.313 0.172 
Academicians 44 137.95 
Retirees 35 145.81 
Technical’s 32 133.66 
Merchants 23 153.43 
Professionals 20 144.10 
Security 11 157.82 
Students 4 195.75 
Total 271   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for names of the company.   
Satisfactions Company N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SIR 
A 223 136.77 
x^2 = 1.922 0.382 
B 43 127.84 
C 5 171.90 
Total 271   
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Table D.4: Satisfactions with the TOs Underwriting Surplus 
 
Mann-Whitney Test for Participants’ Gender. 
Satisfactions  Gender N Mean Rank z Asymp Sig. (p) 
SUS 
Male 256 131.62 
z = 798 0.585 Female 7 146.00 
Total 263   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Participants’ Age in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions (Yrs) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SUS 
Age (21-30) Yrs 25 135.64 
x^2 = 2.3 0.512 
Age (31-40) Yrs 110 127.10 
Age (41-50) Yrs 94 130.07 
Age > 51 Yrs 33 147.11 
Total 262   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants’ Educational level.   
Satisfactions  Education N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SUS 
Doctorate 4 126.00 
x^2 = 4.658 0.324 
Master 22 101.95 
Bachelor 155 134.84 
Diploma 30 134.13 
High school / lower 52 135.48 
Total 263   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for monthly premiums paid in Saudi Riyals (S.R). 
Satisfaction Premium (S.R) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SUS 
(100 – 1000) S.R 152 121.51 
x^2 = 4.052 0.256 
(1001 – 2000) S.R 61 127.73 
(2001 – 3000) S.R 30 143.02 
Prem.> 3000 S.R 6 95.58 
Total 249   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Number of Members included in the takafulpolicy. 
Satisfactions Members N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SUS 
1 70 128.14 
x^2 = 3.090 0.797 
2 28 130.41 
3 40 132.29 
4 43 140.03 
5 32 114.06 
6 27 133.74 
Members ≥7 18 123.11 
Total 258   
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Satisfactions with the TOs Underwriting Surplus Continue 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test for takaful contract durations in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions Durations N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SUS 
(0 – 5)Yrs 120 122.93 
x^2 = 3.061 0.548 
(6 -10) Yrs 76 126.48 
(11 – 15) Yrs 15 150.07 
(16 – 20) Yrs 17 117.62 
Duration > 20 Yrs 24 136.00 
Total 252   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants Jobs Categories. 
Satisfactions Job N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SUS 
Managerial 102 114.50 
x^2 = 17.742 0.013 
Academicians 43 145.67 
Retirees 33 139.09 
Technical’s 30 122.57 
Merchants 22 152.00 
Professionals 20 157.95 
Security 9 134.11 
Students 4 199.00 
Total 263   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for names of the company.   
Satisfactions Company N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SUS 
A 214 131.78 
x^2 = 0.033 0.984 
B 42 132.38 
C 7 136.43 
Total 263   
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Table D.5: Satisfactions with the TOs Sharia’h complying system, 
 
Mann-Whitney Test for Participants’ Gender. 
Satisfactions  Gender N Mean Rank z Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSC 
Male 242 126.54 
z = 959 0.459 Female 9 111.56 
Total 251   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Participants’ Age in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions (Yrs) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSC 
Age (21-30) Yrs 25 121.14 
x^2 = 0.967 0.809 
Age (31-40) Yrs 103 128.01 
Age (41-50) Yrs 89 121.75 
Age > 51 Yrs 33 131.06 
Total 250   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants’ Educational level.   
Satisfactions  Education N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSC 
Doctorate 4 130.38 
x^2 = 0.788 0.94 
Master 20 115.00 
Bachelor 148 126.42 
Diploma 25 126.80 
High school /  lower 54 128.22 
Total 251   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for monthly premiums paid in Saudi Riyals (S.R). 
Satisfaction Premium (S.R) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSC 
(100 – 1000) S.R 152 125.17 
x^2 = 5.916 0.116 
(1001 – 2000) S.R 54 105.94 
(2001 – 3000) S.R 26 120.23 
Prem.> 3000 S.R 6 94.83 
Total 238   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Number of Members included in the takafulpolicy. 
Satisfactions Members N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSC 
1 74 131.57 
x^2 = 10.946 0.09 
2 25 127.92 
3 33 134.39 
4 45 120.42 
5 29 92.74 
6 25 125.40 
Members ≥7 16 125.97 
Total 247   
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Satisfactions with the TOs Sharia’h complying system Continue, 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test for takaful contract durations in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions Durations N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSC 
(0 – 5)Yrs 113 123.34 
x^2 = 1.253 0.869 
(6 -10) Yrs 75 122.91 
(11 – 15) Yrs 12 105.79 
(16 – 20) Yrs 16 121.59 
Duration > 20 Yrs 26 116.63 
Total 242   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants Jobs Categories. 
Satisfactions Job N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSC 
Managerial 94 122.17 
x^2 = 8.919 0.259 
Academicians 41 109.72 
Retirees 31 129.06 
Technical’s 30 136.75 
Merchants 22 135.43 
Professionals 20 125.25 
Security 9 154.61 
Students 4 166.00 
Total 251   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for names of the company.   
Satisfactions Company N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSC 
A 206 127.55 
x^2 = 0.889 0.641 
B 37 120.26 
C 8 112.56 
Total 251   
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Table D.6: Satisfactions with the TOs claims and indemnities procedures, 
 
Mann-Whitney Test for Participants’ Gender. 
Satisfactions  Gender N Mean Rank z Asymp Sig. (p) 
SCI 
Male 283 146.14 
z = 1171 0.327 Female 10 171.40 
Total 293   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Participants’ Age in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions (Yrs) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SCI 
Age (21-30) Yrs 27 154.52 
x^2 = 5.111 0.164 
Age (31-40) Yrs 125 143.26 
Age (41-50) Yrs 106 139.67 
Age > 51 Yrs 34 173.34 
Total 292   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants’ Educational level.   
Satisfactions  Education N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SCI 
Doctorate 5 161.70 
x^2 = 8.207 0.084 
Master 24 106.92 
Bachelor 174 151.74 
Diploma 33 134.58 
High school / lower 57 155.30 
Total 293   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for monthly premiums paid in Saudi Riyals (S.R). 
Satisfaction Premium (S.R) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SCI 
(100 – 1000) S.R 178 141.18 
x^2 = 5.041 0.169 
(1001 – 2000) S.R 62 131.03 
(2001 – 3000) S.R 31 157.11 
Prem. > 3000 S.R 7 93.86 
Total 278   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Number of Members included in the takafulpolicy. 
Satisfactions Members N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SCI 
1 82 140.30 
x^2 = 6.645 0.355 
2 32 146.86 
3 43 166.47 
4 50 129.39 
5 34 138.50 
6 30 157.88 
Members ≥7 17 137.59 
Total 288   
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Satisfactions with the TOs claims and indemnities continue, 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test for takaful contract durations in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions Durations N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SCI 
(0 – 5)Yrs  133 144.56 
x^2 = 2.003 0.735 
(6 -10) Yrs  86 141.49 
(11 – 15) Yrs  16 147.75 
(16 – 20) Yrs  17 117.56 
Duration > 20 Yrs 30 138.20 
Total 282   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants Jobs Categories. 
Satisfactions Job N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SCI 
Managerial 111 132.42 
x^2 = 14.426 0.044 
Academicians 48 156.22 
Retirees 38 141.92 
Technical’s 35 136.53 
Merchants 26 161.54 
Professionals 20 185.30 
Security 11 179.91 
Students 4 204.38 
Total 293   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for names of the company.   
Satisfactions Company N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SCI 
A 240 143.70 
x^2 = 3.375 0.185 
B 45 166.84 
C 8 134.31 
Total 293   
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Table D.7: Satisfactions with the TOs deficits and qard loan procedures, 
 
Mann-Whitney Test for Participants’ Gender. 
Satisfactions  Gender N Mean Rank z Asymp Sig. (p) 
SFDQ 
Male 270 140.60 
z = 1053 0.438 Female 9 122.00 
Total 279   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Participants’ Age in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions (Yrs) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SFDQ 
Age (21-30) Yrs 24 152.67 
x^2 = 8.567 0.036 
Age (31-40) Yrs 119 126.03 
Age (41-50) Yrs 101 147.58 
Age > 51 Yrs 35 156.91 
Total 279   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants’ Educational level.   
Satisfactions  Education N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SFDQ 
Doctorate 5 106.80 
x^2 = 3.967 0.41 
Master 22 127.91 
Bachelor 161 139.75 
Diploma 33 132.24 
High school / lower 58 152.55 
Total 279   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for monthly premiums paid in Saudi Riyals (S.R). 
Satisfaction Premium (S.R) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SFDQ 
(100 – 1000) S.R 171 132.63 
x^2 = 2.425 0.489 
(1001 – 2000) S.R 60 130.79 
(2001 – 3000) S.R 28 149.75 
Prem. > 3000 S.R 7 113.07 
Total 266   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Number of Members included in the takafulpolicy. 
Satisfactions Members N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SFDQ 
1 78 143.88 
x^2 = 3.817 0.701 
2 31 121.58 
3 40 133.95 
4 48 137.31 
5 32 132.81 
6 29 141.67 
Members ≥7 17 155.91 
Total 275   
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Satisfactions with the TOs deficits and qard loan procedures continue, 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test for takaful contract durations in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions Durations N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SFDQ 
(0 – 5)Yrs  128 136.71 
x^2 = 2.611 0.625 
(6 -10) Yrs  82 139.16 
(11 – 15) Yrs  16 133.66 
(16 – 20) Yrs  16 109.50 
Duration > 20 Yrs 28 135.16 
Total 270   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants Jobs Categories. 
Satisfactions Job N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SFDQ 
Managerial 102 128.02 
x^2 =13.702 0.057 
Academicians 46 129.74 
Retirees 36 148.72 
Technical’s 33 135.70 
Merchants 26 153.85 
Professionals 22 179.45 
Security 10 157.80 
Students 4 169.00 
Total 279   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for names of the company.   
Satisfactions Company N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SDQ 
A 228 137.83 
x^2 = 1.26 0.533 
B 44 148.50 
C 7 157.14 
Total 279   
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Table D.8: Satisfactions with the TOs shareholders power and activities, 
 
Mann-Whitney Test for Participants’ Gender. 
Satisfactions  Gender N Mean Rank z Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSP 
Male 249 130.22 
z = 1191 0.79 Female 10 124.60 
Total 259   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Participants’ Age in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions (Yrs) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSP 
Age (21-30) Yrs 25 116.72 
x^2 = 1.926 0.588 
Age (31-40) Yrs 110 133.86 
Age (41-50) Yrs 91 130.42 
Age > 51 Yrs 32 121.88 
Total 258   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants’ Educational level.   
Satisfactions  Education N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSP 
Doctorate 3 134.17 
x^2 = 4.919 0.296 
Master 21 118.62 
Bachelor 154 131.16 
Diploma 31 111.69 
High school / lower 50 142.32 
Total 259   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for monthly premiums paid in Saudi Riyals (S.R). 
Satisfaction Premium (S.R) N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSP 
(100 – 1000) S.R 157 123.17 
x^2 = 5.524 0.137 
(1001 – 2000) S.R 54 122.24 
(2001 – 3000) S.R 29 133.72 
Prem.> 3000 S.R 5 63.60 
Total 245   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for Number of Members included in the takafulpolicy. 
Satisfactions Members N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSP 
1 68 111.63 
x^2 = 13.194 0.04 
2 29 120.24 
3 39 148.17 
4 47 142.60 
5 31 133.03 
6 25 111.00 
Members ≥7 15 128.53 
Total 254   
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Satisfactions with the TOs shareholders power and activities continue, 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test for takaful contract durations in Years (Yrs). 
Satisfactions Durations N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSP 
(0 – 5)Yrs  114 117.60 
x^2 = 4.238 0.375 
(6 -10) Yrs 77 134.29 
(11 – 15) Yrs 13 136.58 
(16 – 20) Yrs 17 114.09 
Duration > 20 Yrs 27 126.46 
Total 248   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for participants Jobs Categories. 
Satisfactions Job N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSP 
Managerial 100 126.54 
x^2 = 5.696 0.576 
Academicians 43 129.81 
Retirees 33 139.27 
Technical’s 30 118.92 
Merchants 22 141.07 
Professionals 19 119.50 
Security 9 150.11 
Students 3 182.00 
Total 259   
Kruskal-Wallis Test for names of the company.   
Satisfactions Company N Mean Rank x^2 Asymp Sig. (p) 
SSP 
A 209 129.42 
x^2 = 0.125 0.939 
B 42 133.23 
C 8 128.19 
Total 259   
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Appendix E 
Multinomial Regression Analysis 
 
Table E.1: TPS vs Disclosure Independent Variables 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 613.953    
Final 400.455 213.498 174 .022 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 356.690 336 .210 
Deviance 365.562 336 .128 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .509 
Nagelkerke .574 
McFadden .327 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 534.995 134.541 128 .329 
DKP 407.724 7.270 4 .122 
DIR 427.077 26.623 10 .003 
DUS 420.849 20.394 8 .009 
DFDQ 407.259 6.804 6 .339 
DCI 403.338 2.884 2 .236 
DSCl 417.940 17.486 10 .064 
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Table E.2: SDM vs Disclosure Independent Variables 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 1091.579    
Final 512.137 579.442 528 .060 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 9902.196 978 .000 
Deviance 471.699 978 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .863 
Nagelkerke .881 
McFadden .510 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 842.967
a
 330.829 384 .977 
DIR 1825.440
a
 1313.302 30 .000 
DUS 585.178
b
 15.397 24 .909 
DSC 526.253
a
 14.116 30 .994 
DCI 3784.071
a
 3271.933 6 .000 
DFDQ 546.709
a
 34.571 18 .011 
DKP 584.185
b
 14.405 12 .276 
 
Table E.3: SIR vs Disclosure Independent Variables 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 562.281    
Final 287.581 274.700 172 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 263.766 298 .924 
Deviance 258.338 298 .953 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .637 
Nagelkerke .717 
McFadden .461 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 439.744 152.163 124 .044 
DIR 315.341 27.760 10 .002 
DUS 291.302 3.721 8 .881 
DSC 294.888 7.306 10 .696 
DCI 288.900 1.319 2 .517 
DFDQ 289.057 1.476 6 .961 
DKP 298.429 10.848 4 .028 
 
 
Table E.4: SUS vs Disclosure Independent Variables 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 556.840    
Final 295.988 260.852 170 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 283.568 292 .627 
Deviance 277.156 292 .725 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .629 
Nagelkerke .708 
McFadden .451 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 438.204 142.216 122 .102 
DIR 307.799 11.810 10 .298 
DUS 302.460 6.472 6 .372 
DSC 312.924 16.936 10 .076 
DCI 300.862 4.874 2 .087 
DFDQ 299.907 3.918 6 .688 
DKP 301.176 5.188 4 .269 
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Table E.5: SSC vs Disclosure Independent Variables 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 538.216    
Final 212.071 326.145 162 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 360.624 278 .001 
Deviance 199.358 278 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .727 
Nagelkerke .818 
McFadden .591 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 343.370 131.300 116 .157 
DIR 240.838 28.767 10 .001 
DUS 234.048 21.977 8 .005 
DSC 243.929 31.858 10 .000 
DCI 214.960 2.889 2 .236 
DFDQ 224.225 12.154 6 .059 
DKP 232.593 20.522 4 .000 
 
Table E.6: SCI vs Disclosure Independent Variables 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 1096.046    
Final 437.077 658.969 522 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 614.334 990 1.000 
Deviance 397.790 990 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .894 
Nagelkerke .913 
McFadden .578 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 747.328
a
 310.250 384 .998 
DIR 495.115
a
 58.037 30 .002 
DUS 453.106
a
 16.029 18 .591 
DSC 479.919
a
 42.841 30 .061 
DCI 455.810
a
 18.732 6 .005 
DFDQ 456.428
a
 19.351 18 .371 
DKP 467.509
a
 30.432 12 .002 
 
Table E.7: SFDQ vs Disclosure Independent Variables 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 576.511    
Final 245.238 331.273 172 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 388.709 308 .001 
Deviance 212.071 308 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .695 
Nagelkerke .782 
McFadden .540 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 407.194 161.956 126 .017 
DIR 285.827 40.589 10 .000 
DUS 262.781 17.543 8 .025 
DSC 259.503 14.265 10 .161 
DCI 250.550
a
 5.312 2 .070 
DFDQ 252.845 7.607 6 .268 
DKP 260.544 15.306 4 .004 
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Table E.8: SKP vs Disclosure Independent Variables 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 540.309    
Final 255.819 284.490 166 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 257.349 282 .851 
Deviance 228.772 282 .991 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .667 
Nagelkerke .750 
McFadden .500 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 382.706 126.888 120 .316 
DIR 270.234
a
 14.415 10 .155 
DUS 257.916 2.097 6 .911 
DSC 266.637 10.818 10 .372 
DCI 265.261
a
 9.442 2 .009 
DFDQ 266.588 10.769 6 .096 
DKP 268.361
a
 12.543 4 .014 
 
Table E.9: Total Participants Satisfaction – Knowledge 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 334.669    
Final 257.165 77.504 42 .001 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 158.435 140 .136 
Deviance 163.056 140 .089 
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Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .228 
Nagelkerke .256 
McFadden .118 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 293.292 36.127 14 .001 
KIR 257.420 .255 2 .880 
KUS 269.305 12.140 6 .059 
KSC 257.597 .431 2 .806 
KFDQ 269.833 12.668 10 .243 
KKP 2.572E2 .000 0 . 
KDC 268.126 10.961 6 .090 
 
Table E.10: SDM vs Knowledge Independent Variables 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 674.753    
Final 431.264 243.489 126 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 362.700 414 .967 
Deviance 259.957 414 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .566 
Nagelkerke .577 
McFadden .214 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests 
ffect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 465.136
a
 33.872 42 .810 
KIR 435.279
a
 4.015 6 .675 
KUS 453.744
a
 22.480 24 .551 
KSC 434.668
a
 3.404 6 .757 
KFDQ 3510.098
a
 3078.834 24 .000 
KKP 431.264
b
 .000 0 .990 
KDC 456.150
a
 24.885 18 .128 
 
 
Table E.11: SIR vs Knowledge Independent Variables 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 323.374    
Final 208.764 114.610 42 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 123.589 132 .687 
Deviance 121.871 132 .725 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .345 
Nagelkerke .388 
McFadden .192 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 229.429 20.665 14 .111 
KIR 209.435 .671 2 .715 
KUS 223.493 14.728 8 .065 
KSC 210.056 1.292 2 .524 
KFDQ 213.909 5.145 8 .742 
KKP 208.764
a
 .000 0 . 
KDC 212.918 4.154 6 .656 
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Table E.12: SUS vs Knowledge Independent Variables 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 333.065    
Final 185.845 147.221 42 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 100.435 120 .902 
Deviance 106.482 120 .806 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .429 
Nagelkerke .482 
McFadden .255 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 219.329 33.484 14 .002 
KIR 186.284 .439 2 .803 
KUS 197.499 11.655 8 .167 
KSC 189.095 3.250 2 .197 
KFDQ 195.596 9.751 8 .283 
KKP 185.845
a
 .000 0 . 
KDC 192.625 6.780 6 .342 
 
 
Table E.13: SSC vs Knowledge Independent Variables 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 395.022    
Final 201.685 193.337 44 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 145.409 122 .073 
Deviance 136.270 122 .178 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .537 
Nagelkerke .604 
McFadden .351 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 224.374 22.689 14 .066 
KIR 205.046 3.361 2 .186 
KUS 219.261 17.576 8 .025 
KSC 202.283 .598 2 .742 
KFDQ 206.796 5.111 10 .884 
KKP 201.685
a
 .000 0 . 
KDC 209.548 7.863 6 .248 
 
 
Table E.14: SCI vs Knowledge Independent Variables 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 754.156    
Final 394.345 359.811 132 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 279.374 408 1.000 
Deviance 254.268 408 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .707 
Nagelkerke .722 
McFadden .316 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 454.203
a
 59.858 42 .036 
KIR 402.873
a
 8.528 6 .202 
KUS 425.820
a
 31.474 24 .141 
KSC 396.132
a
 1.787 6 .938 
KFDQ 422.804
a
 28.458 30 .546 
KKP 394.345
b
 .000 0 . 
KDC 409.521
a
 15.176 18 .650 
 
 
Table E.15: SFDQ vs Knowledge Independent Variables 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 341.668    
Final 199.282 142.386 42 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
405 
 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 116.272 130 .800 
Deviance 120.783 130 .707 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .400 
Nagelkerke .450 
McFadden .232 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 225.821 26.539 14 .022 
KIR 206.451 7.169 2 .028 
KUS 210.282 11.000 8 .202 
KSC 203.147 3.866 2 .145 
KFDQ 213.958 14.676 8 .066 
KKP 199.282
a
 .000 0 . 
KDC 200.949 1.667 6 .948 
 
Table E.16: SDC vs Knowledge Independent Variables 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 355.038    
Final 183.476 171.562 44 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 111.302 114 .554 
Deviance 116.361 114 .421 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .484 
Nagelkerke .545 
McFadden .301 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 213.877 30.401 14 .007 
KIR 184.509 1.033 2 .597 
KUS 209.249 25.773 8 .001 
KSC 184.132 .656 2 .720 
KFDQ 199.147 15.670 10 .109 
KKP 183.476
a
 .000 0 . 
KDCl 189.851 6.375 6 .383 
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Table E.17: Total Satisfaction – Preferences 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 169.273    
Final 139.123 30.150 20 .067 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 62.838 54 .192 
Deviance 71.485 54 .056 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .157 
Nagelkerke .176 
McFadden .078 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
PSC 140.832 1.709 4 .789 
PRB 144.549 5.426 2 .066 
PSA 141.012 1.889 2 .389 
PRU 151.545 12.422 6 .053 
PCI 141.122 1.999 4 .736 
 
Knowledge – Disclosure 
Table E.18: Total Knowledge – Disclosure 
Model Fitting Information 
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Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 411.729    
Final 106.510 305.219 88 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 158.872 168 .681 
Deviance 102.351 168 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .638 
Nagelkerke .851 
McFadden .734 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 171.218 64.707 64 .452 
DIR 110.692 4.182 5 .524 
DUS 112.570 6.060 4 .195 
DSC 113.334 6.824 5 .234 
DCI 108.782 2.272 1 .132 
DFDQ 111.211 4.701 3 .195 
DKP 117.168 10.658 2 .005 
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Table E.19: KPM - Disclosure 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 1.210E3    
Final 277.233 932.766 616 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 240.635 1176 1.000 
Deviance 241.765 1176 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .955 
Nagelkerke .971 
McFadden .748 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 5.091E2 231.825 448 1.000 
DIR 3.418E2 64.560 35 .002 
DUS 3.028E2 25.558 28 .597 
DSC 2.994E2 22.148 35 .955 
DCI 2.821E2 4.831 7 .681 
DFDQ 2.910E2 13.768 21 .879 
DKP 2.809E2 3.623 14 .997 
 
Table E.207: KIR  – Disclosure 
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Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 216.606 168 .007 
Deviance 183.695 168 .193 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .440 
Nagelkerke .587 
McFadden .418 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 289.556 77.559 64 .119 
DIR 221.411 9.414 5 .094 
DUS 213.850 1.854 4 .763 
DSC 216.561 4.565 5 .471 
DCI 216.012 4.015 1 .045 
DFDQ 212.919 .923 3 .820 
DKP 219.088 7.091 2 .029 
 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 385.965    
Final 211.997 173.969 88 .000 
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Table E.21: KUS – Disclosure 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 817.103    
Final 128.976 688.127 264 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 136.067 504 1.000 
Deviance 115.924 504 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .899 
Nagelkerke .959 
McFadden .827 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 2.660E2 137.046 192 .999 
DIR 1.717E2 42.770 15 .000 
DUS 1.455E2 16.557 12 .167 
DSC 1.430E2 14.051 15 .522 
DCI 1.304E2 1.408 3 .704 
DFDQ 1.377E2 8.680 9 .467 
DKP 1.505E2 21.502 6 .001 
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Table E.229: KSC – Disclosure 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 412.305    
Final 45.273 367.032 88 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 55.422 168 1.000 
Deviance 42.265 168 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .706 
Nagelkerke .941 
McFadden .883 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 109.571 64.298 64 .466 
DIR 55.511
a
 10.238 5 .069 
DUS 51.093 5.819 4 .213 
DSC 59.077 13.804 5 .017 
DCI 47.187
a
 1.914 1 .167 
DFDQ 54.230 8.956 3 .030 
DKP 52.617 7.344 2 .025 
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Table E.23: KFDQ – Disclosure 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 1.062E3    
Final 102.953 958.815 440 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 120.233 840 1.000 
Deviance 91.288 840 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .959 
Nagelkerke .986 
McFadden .892 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 6.100E2 354.262 320 .091 
DIR 3.774E2 121.592 25 .000 
DUS 2.744E2 18.607 20 .547 
DSC 2.984E2 42.658 25 .015 
DCI 2.348E2 1.643 5 .896 
DFDQ 2.958E2 39.972 15 .000 
DKP 2.293E2 .280 10 1.000 
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Table E.24: KKP – Disclosure 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 415.888    
Final .000 415.888 88 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson .000 168 1.000 
Deviance .000 168 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .750 
Nagelkerke 1.000 
McFadden 1.000 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM .000
a
 . 64 . 
DIR .000
a
 .000 5 1.000 
DUS .000
a
 .000 4 1.000 
DSC .000
a
 .000 5 1.000 
DCI .000
a
 .000 1 1.000 
DFDQl .000
a
 .000 3 1.000 
DKP .000
a
 .000 2 1.000 
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Table E.25: KDC – Disclosure 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 794.686    
Final 375.730 418.956 264 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 415.313 504 .998 
Deviance 342.459 504 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .753 
Nagelkerke .803 
McFadden .504 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
DM 5.759E2 200.210 192 .327 
DIR 3.913E2 15.568 15 .411 
DUS 385.854 10.123 12 .605 
DSC 405.159 29.428 15 .014 
DCI 378.167 2.437 3 .487 
DFDQ 383.190 7.459 9 .589 
DKP 402.456 26.725 6 .000 
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Table E.26: Preference  – Knowledge 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 416.732    
Final 176.022 240.710 42 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 87.646 140 1.000 
Deviance 110.181 140 .970 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .552 
Nagelkerke .621 
McFadden .365 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 201.919 25.897 14 .027 
KIR 178.696 2.674 2 .263 
KUS 178.526 2.504 6 .868 
KSC 176.181 .159 2 .924 
KFDQ 181.292 5.270 10 .872 
KKP 1.760E2 .000 0 . 
KDC 177.897 1.875 6 .931 
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Table E.27: PSC – Knowledge  
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 379.391    
Final 151.553 227.837 42 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 102.258 120 .878 
Deviance 97.834 120 .931 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .615 
Nagelkerke .691 
McFadden .434 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 168.003 16.449 14 .287 
KIR 154.846 3.293 2 .193 
KUS 158.684 7.130 6 .309 
KSC 151.616 .063 2 .969 
KFDQ 166.039 14.486 10 .152 
KKP 1.516E2 .000 0 . 
KDC 158.829 7.275 6 .296 
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Table E.28: PRB – Knowledge 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 183.241    
Final 139.869 43.372 21 .003 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 69.221 67 .402 
Deviance 81.080 67 .116 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .143 
Nagelkerke .191 
McFadden .111 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 145.085 5.216 7 .634 
KIR 139.965 .096 1 .757 
KUS 144.410 4.541 3 .209 
KSC 139.924 .055 1 .814 
KFDQ 144.855 4.985 5 .418 
KKP 1.399E2 .000 0 . 
KDC 162.105 22.236 3 .000 
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Table E.29: PKP – Knowledge 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 260.268    
Final 34.783 225.485 21 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 20.825 56 1.000 
Deviance 21.033 56 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .648 
Nagelkerke .864 
McFadden .753 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 38.409 3.626 7 .822 
KIR 34.943 .160 1 .689 
KUS 35.914 1.130 3 .770 
KSC 35.775 .992 1 .319 
KFDQ 36.611 1.828 5 .872 
KKP 34.783
a
 .000 0 . 
KDC 37.162 2.379 3 .498 
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Table E.30: PRU – Knowledge 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 712.588    
Final 192.338 520.249 84 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 104.057 280 1.000 
Deviance 114.251 280 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .823 
Nagelkerke .858 
McFadden .539 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-
Square df Sig. 
KPM 2.142E2 21.879 28 .787 
KIR 1.936E2 1.275 4 .866 
KUS 1.966E2 4.270 12 .978 
KSC 1.932E2 .824 4 .935 
KFDQ 2.073E2 14.940 20 .780 
KKP 1.923E2 .000 0 . 
KDC 2.023E2 9.944 12 .621 
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Table E.31: PCI – Knowledge 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null 409.352    
Final 187.565 221.788 42 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 130.717 140 .701 
Deviance 117.298 140 .919 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .523 
Nagelkerke .588 
McFadden .336 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
KPM 218.033 30.468 14 .007 
KIR 197.882 10.318 2 .006 
KUS 199.082 11.517 6 .074 
KSC 188.479 .914 2 .633 
KFDQ 199.547 11.982 10 .286 
KKP 1.876E2 .000 0 . 
KDC 198.703 11.139 6 .084 
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Appendix F 
Takaful Participants’ Survey 
 
Dear takaful participant’s, below are a number of questions that aim to enhance the rights and 
obligations of the takaful participants’ (policyholders’), as well as bringing good services to the 
takaful participants’ .The survey is part of the requirements to fulfill the required conditions to 
pass my postgraduate study, thus it will be highly appreciated if you could please support my 
study by answering the survey questions, the estimate time to properly answering the questions 
goes from 10 – 15 minutes. Your answer will be treated in a high confidential manner, your 
identity will not be appear to any party, as you are not required to state your name, or policy 
number at the takaful company.         
Very important Noticed 
The following are a brief explanations on some of the terminologies that been used in the 
questioners, I thought such explanation might facilitate a better understanding of the 
questioners: 
 
Shareholders’: an individual, either a company or person who owes a certain percentage on the 
company shares, shareholders sometime own more than 10% of the whole shares of the 
company, accordingly shareholders shares in the company increases as more dominant and 
control can be exerted from shareholders on the company management decisions. 
 
The Company Actuary: an individual expert who uses statistics to calculate insurance 
premiums by dealing with the financial impact of risk and uncertainty. Thus, the actuaries 
suppose to be the point of communication between the takaful company and the participants’, the 
actuary also should advice participants of their rights and obligations.    
 
Participants: is an individual who bought a contract in the takaful company, while in 
conventional insurance such an individual called “policyholders”. 
  
Participants’ Fund: it’s the fund that been launch by the takaful company out of the participants 
collected premiums (contributions), the fund is then separated according to a certain percentage 
into two sections, 
 
The first section: this section is collected for the purpose of covering different underwriting 
activities by the takaufl company, such as participant claims, as well as different expenses 
“direct and indirect” encountered by the takaful company, the surplus of this account after 
deducting the mentioned expenses above will be distributed at the end of the contract year 
among all participants according to the premium paid, however takaful company might share on 
the underwriting surplus as an incentive for them for generating these surplus. 
 
The second section: this section is collected for the purpose of investments that the remaining 
fund will be invested on behalf of the participants into different investment portfolios in 
accordance to the sharia’h principles, the return of such investments will distributed among 
participants according to their premium rate, however takaful company might share on the 
investments return as an incentive for them for generating such profits. 
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Takaful Participants’ Survey 
The following questions will require an answer by either filling the blank spaces or by 
marking the appropriate boxes with (x).  
- Name of the Takaful Company: ___________________ Date: _________________  
- Respondent’s Number: _________   Educational Level: __________________ 
- Age: ________         Gender: ________  Hobbies: ________ 
- Employment: Government   ____   Private Sector ____ 
  Business  ____   Student  ____ 
  Unemployed  ____   Retired   ____ 
A- Participants Perceptions about TOs Disclosure System  
I. Disclosure Mechanism Availability   
Q Questions Y N 
1 
The company discloses ways to let me review my benefits at the 
participants’ fund 
  
2 
The company discloses the used approach to distribute investment 
return among participants   
  
3 
The company often notifies me on different Fatwas issued regarding PF, 
specifically "Investment & surplus distribution" 
  
 
II. Disclosure Mechanism Tools    
Q S-Q Questions Y N 
4  Which approach does the company use to communicate with me:   
 4-1 The Internet   
 4-2 Letters   
 4-3 Meeting   
 4-4 Seminars   
 4-5 SMS   
 4-6 Phone   
 4-7 Brochures   
 4-8 The company often communicates with me   
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III. Disclosure Mechanism via Intermediaries  
Q Questions Y N 
5 
Did you buy your policy from intermediaries? If yes, go to question 6, 
otherwise go to question 8. 
  
6 Does the intermediary have sufficient knowledge of Sharia’h?   
7 Does the intermediary have sufficient knowledge of takaful business?   
 
IV. Communications, Social Involvements and Expectations  
SD = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N= Neutral, A= Agree, SA= Strongly Agree 
Q Questions  S.D D N A S. A 
8 The company discusses the Underwriting Surplus I deserved 
in the participants fund with me 
     
9 The company discusses the investment return on PF with me      
10 The company discusses my targeted expectations with me      
11 The company communicate the issues relevant to my takaful 
policy with me 
     
 
2. Disclosure of Investment Returns (DIR)  
Q Questions Y N 
12 
The company disclosed their policy and procedures for handling 
participants’ investment returns. 
  
13 
The company disclosed a statement of profit and loss in the 
participants’ fund 
  
14 
The company disclosed a performance statement for participants’ 
investment fund 
  
15 
The company disclosed the expected period for distribution of 
investment returns 
  
16 The company disclosed the previous investment returns   
17 The company disclosed the composition of participants’ fund assets   
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3. Disclosure of Underwriting Surplus (DUS) 
Q Questions Y N 
18 
The company disclosed their policy and procedures for handling 
participants’ surplus from underwriting activities. 
  
19 
The company disclosed the methods used to calculate Underwriting 
Surplus 
  
20 
The company disclosed the conditions that allow them to receive 
Underwriting Surplus 
  
21 The company disclosed the uncollected Underwriting Surplus to me.   
 
4. Disclosure of Shari’ah Compliance (DSC) 
Q Questions Y N 
22 
The company disclosed  policy and procedures to reflect the 
obligations of complying with Shari’ah laws in the participants’ fund. 
  
23 
The company disclosed the Shari’ah compliance annual report to 
participants. 
  
24 
The company disclosed the method and basis of Shari’ah methods 
used to allocate Underwriting Surplus to participants. 
  
25 
The company disclosed the criteria used to scrutinize investment 
portfolio to participants. 
  
26 
The company disclosed the purifications technique used on the 
participants fund investment assets 
  
 
5. Disclosure of Claims and Indemnities (DCI) 
Q Questions Y N 
27 
The company discloses their policy and procedures for handling 
participants’ claims and indemnities. 
  
 
6. Disclosure of Fees, Deficits and Qard Hasan  (DFDQ) 
Q Questions Y N 
28 
The company disclosed the incentives percentage taken by the company for good 
performance 
  
29 
The company disclosed the direct and indirect expenses against the participants’ 
fund 
  
30 The company disclosed the eligibility of  participants’ fund to receive Qard Hasan   
31 The company disclosed whether PIF covers the deficit of PRF   
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7. Disclosure of Key Personnel (DKP) 
Q Questions Y N 
32 Disclosure of investing participant fund into shareholders’ equities   
33 Disclosure of shareholders activities on participant underwriting surplus   
34 Disclosure of BoDs decisions regarding PF   
 
B. Participants Knowledge and Awareness 
 
1. Knowledge of the Takaful  Model Principles (KPM)  
Q Questions Y N 
1 Does the company brief you on the principles of takaful models   
2 What are the takaful models you are participating in   
3 Is there a minimum duration period to cancel the contract     
 
2. Knowledge of Investment Return (KIR) 
Q Questions Y N 
4 Do you know  the difference between PIF & PRF   
 
3. Knowledge of Underwriting Surplus (KUS) 
Q Questions Y N 
5 
Do you know the difference between net underwriting surplus and gross 
underwriting surplus ? 
  
 
 
6- The company distribute underwriting surplus to: 
a) All participants without differentiating between claimable and non-claimable accounts □       
b) Those participants who have not made any claims for a given financial year       □          
c) Those participants where the amount of claims is less than the contribution paid □  
d) I Don’t know  
 
4. Knowledge of Shari’ah Compliance (KSC)  
Q Questions Y N 
7 Do you the know difference between Re-Insurance  and Re-Takaful?   
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5. Knowledge of Expenses, Fees, Deficits and Qard Hasan (KFDQ) 
8- services provided by the takaful company, which of the following fees does the company 
charge the participants fund account, 
a) Up front wakalah fee         □ 
b) Investments management fees       □ 
c) I don’t know           □ 
d) Other (please specify ): __________________________________________ 
 
 
9- Under which of the following conditions would you be required by the takaful company to 
pay additional contributions: 
a) Recovering Underwriting Deficits        □ 
b) Building-up Reserves         □ 
c) Paying back Shareholders' Qard       □ 
d) I don't know          □ 
 
Q Questions Y N 
10 Does the Operator call before to recover participant’s fund deficits   
 
6. Knowledge of the Company’s Key Personnel Power and Activities (KKP)  
11- Are you aware of the following key governance personnel of the takaful company you 
participating in:  
a) “BoDs”, Board of Directors      □  
b) Shareholders       □ 
c) Senior Management      □ 
d) “SSB”, Sharia’h Supervisory Board     □ 
e) Company Appointed Actuary     □ 
f) Investment Management Team    □  
g) Outsourced Investment Company    □ 
h) I don’t know       □ 
 
12- Do the shareholders of the company share with participants the,   
a) Underwriting Surplus        □ 
b) Investments Return        □ 
c) I don’t know         □  
 
 
7. Knowledge of Dissatisfaction Channels  (KDC) 
13- What options been given by the company in case you are dissatisfied with the company 
services:  
a) Complain to the company       □ 
b) Quit the company and move elsewhere    □ 
c) I don’t Know         □ 
d) Other, please specify:______________________________ 
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14- Which of the following you can refer to in case of dispute between you and the company: 
a) Arbitration         □ 
b) Court           □ 
c) Ombudsman         □   
d) I don’t Know         □  
e) Other, Please specify:  
 
 
C. Participants Preferences 
 
1. Participants’ Preferences for Shari’ah compliance (PSC)  
SD = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N= Neutral, A= Agree, SA= Strongly Agree 
Q Questions  S.D D N A S. A 
1 
Participants’ Fund will be affected because SSB gives less 
time to judge assets validity. 
     
2 I would like to have an opportunity to select the SSB      
 
2. Participants’ Preferences for a Representative on the TOs’ BoD’s (PRB) 
SD = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N= Neutral, A= Agree, SA= Strongly Agree 
Q Questions  S.D D N A S. A 
3 
I would like to have a representatives who represents all participants on 
the  BoDs 
     
 
3. Participants’ Preferences on TOs’ Key Personnel Power and Activities (PKP) 
SD = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N= Neutral, A= Agree, SA= Strongly Agree 
Q Questions  S.D D N A S. A 
4 
Participants should have the right to refuse shareholders activities on the 
participants’ fund 
     
 
 
4. Participants’ Preferences on the Reason to Use the Takaful Policy (PRU) 
Q S-Q Questions Y N 
5  Why do you use takaful insurance:   
 5-1 To protect myself against financial loss   
 5-2 To make a future plan that can benefit me and my family   
 5-3 To help other participants in their needs   
 5-4 To obey the government mandatory order to carry an insurance policy   
 5-5 Because of Shari’ah compliance   
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6- Which of the following you prefer, 
a) A strict Sharia’h compliance with lower investments return   □ 
b) Loose Sharia’h compliance with higher investments return   □ 
 
 
5. Participants’ Preferences for Claims and Underwriting Surplus (PCU) 
Q Questions Y N 
7 
When I make claim I still want to share Underwriting Surplus with other 
participants 
  
8 
When other participants make a claim, do you think they deserve to share 
Underwriting Surplus with other participants? 
  
 
 
D. Participants Satisfaction Level  
Please mark the appropriate boxes with (x), based on your satisfaction level on the company provided 
services, where (SnS = Strongly not Satisfied, nS = not Satisfied, N= Neutral, S= Satisfied, SS= strongly 
Satisfied) 
 
1. Satisfaction with the TOs’ Disclosure Mechanisms (SDM) 
Q Questions  SnS nS N S S.S 
1 
Are you satisfied with the company disclosure in regards to 
any changes on the contracts terms? 
     
2 
Are you satisfied with the disclosure mechanisms of 
informing participants of their rights related to “investment 
return/underwriting surplus”? 
     
3 
Are you satisfied with the disclosure mechanisms that make 
participants eligible to receive qard loan in cases when their 
account encounters a financial loss? 
     
4 
Are you satisfied with the takaful company in conveying 
your rights and obligations of receiving benefits? 
     
 
 
2. Satisfaction with the Investment Return (SIR) 
Q Questions  SnS nS N S S.S 
5 
Are you satisfied with the income and profits generated from 
participant’s investment accounts? 
     
6 
Are you satisfied with the ways and methods used to 
distribute investment returns among participants? 
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3. Satisfaction with the Underwriting Surplus (SUS) 
Q Questions  SnS nS N S S.S 
7 
Are you satisfied with the amount of underwriting surplus 
distributed by the company? 
     
8 
Are you satisfied with the way and methods used in 
disclosing and allocating underwriting surplus? 
     
 
 
4. Satisfaction with Shari’ah Compliance (SSC) 
Q Questions  SnS nS N S S.S 
9 
Are you satisfied with the company Shari’ah compliance 
mechanisms? 
     
10 
Are you satisfied with the way and method used by the 
Shari’ah scholars to allocate underwriting surplus? 
     
 
 
5. Satisfaction with Claims & Indemnities (SCI)  
Q Questions  SnS nS N S S.S 
11 
Are you satisfied with the terms and conditions of the 
required claim notice? 
     
12 
Are you satisfied with the prompt and permanent indemnity 
payments terms and conditions? 
     
13 
Are you satisfied with the claim settlements procedures 
indicated in the policy contract? 
     
14 
Are you satisfied with the time giving to participants to 
indemnify and recover the encountered loss? 
     
 
 
6. Satisfaction with Charged Fees, Deficits and Qard Hasan (SFDQ) 
Q Questions  SnS nS N S S.S 
15 
Are you satisfied if the operator called on you for additional 
contribution to recover a deficit on the participant’s fund? 
     
16 
Are you satisfied with the amount of incentives that the 
company is deducting from participants’ fund for good 
performance in generating underwriting surplus and 
investment return? 
     
 
7. Satisfaction with the Company’s Key Personnel Power and Activities (SKP)  
Q Questions  SnS nS N S S.S 
17 
Are you satisfied to let the operator share underwriting 
surplus and investment return with you? 
     
18 
Are you satisfied with the shareholders ownership share in 
company? 
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 إستبيان حملة وثائق التأميين التكافلي
 
 عزيزي حامل وثيقه التامين في شركه التامين التكافلي
 
 السلام عليكم ورحمه الله وبركاته
تجدون ادناه مجموعه من الاسئله التي اتمني ان احصل على إجابات لها من قبلكم حتي اتمكن من إنهاء متطلبات إنهاء 
علما بان وقت إجابه الاسئله قد يستغرق من , البحث الذي انا بصدده وهي إيجاد خدمه افضل لحمله وثائق التامين التكافلي
                                                                                                              .                       دقيقه 10إلى  10
                                                                                                                                   
فت إنتباهكم ان جميع الاجابات المحصله قد يتم التعامل معها بسريه تامه جدا ولن تكشف هويه المشاركين في اخيرا اؤد ان ال
  .                                                                                                                  الاسئله لشركه التامين التكافلي
 ملاحظه هامه جدا
 
  .  فيما يلي موجز لشرح بعض المصطلحات التي وردت من ضمن الاسئله والتي قد تسهل الاجابه على نموذج الاستبيان
من % 10هم الذين يملكون اسهم في شركه التامين التكافلي قد تصل حصه المساهم في اسهم الشركه إلي اكثر من : المساهمين
وبالتالي إمتلاك , م قد يكون بنك اورجل اعمال يمتلك نسبه في اسهم شركه التكافلالمساه, المجموع الاجمالي لاسهم الشركه
                                                                                                                                  .    شركه التكافل مجلس إدارهاسهم كثيره في الشركه قد يفرض على المساهم السيطره على إداره الشركه والتحكم في قرارات 
هو الشخص الخبير بدراسه وتقدير الاحصاءات للحصول على نسبه الخطر المتوقعه من كل مؤمن وبالتالي فهو : الاكتوارى
                                              .                            الشخص الذي توكل إليه مهمه تقدير مبالغ الاقساط الشهريه للتامين
                                                                                   
هو الفرد الذي يخشي ان يتعرض إلي خسائر ماديه في المستقبل لذلك فهو يحمي نفسه بشراء وثيقه : حامل وثيقه التامين 
  .                                                                                  ي يجد الدعم المادي عند وقوع الخسائرالتامين التكافلي لك
                                                                        
ومن ثم تقوم شركه , مين من قبل حمله وثائق التامينهو الصندوق الذي يتم فيه تجميع جميع اقساط التا: صندوق مال المؤمنين
  :                                                                                             قسمينالتامين التكافلي بتقسيم صندوق المال إلي 
                                                                                     
كما انه يتم خصم بعض مصاريف شركه , يجمع لسد إحتياجات حمله الوثائق عند تعرضهم لاي مخاطر ماليه  :القسم الاول 
عند نهايه العام وبعد إستقطاع جميع ماورد سابقا فائض هذا القسم اما . التامين التكافلي المباشره وغير المباشره من هذا القسم
ومع ذلك فإن شركه التامين التكافلي قد تشارك حمله , حمله وثائق التامين كل حسب نسبه القسط الذي يدفعه فانه يوزع على 
  .                                                               الوثائق بهذا الفائض كحافز لهم لجهدهم المبذول للحصول على هذا الفائض
                                                        
واما عوائد , يجمع لغرض الاستثمار في الاصول و المحافظ الاستثماريه التي تتوافق مع الشريعه الاسلاميه :القسم الثاني
ومع ذلك فإن شركه التامين التكافلي قد تشارك حمله , الارباح فيتم توزيعها على حمله الوثائق كل حسب نسبه القسط الذي يدفع 
  .                     الوثائق بالعوائد والارباح من هذه المحافظ الاستثماريه كحافز لهم لجهدهم المبذول للحصول على هذه الارباح
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 تعباء من قبل الباحث
  ______________:التاريخ________________                          :رقم المشاركه
 ____________________________________________________
 بدايه الاستبيان
  تعباء من قبل حامل وثيقه التامين التكافلي  
  :الرجاء الاجابه علي الاسئله الاتيه
  ______________:مستوى التعليم________________         :إسم شركه التاميين التكافلي المشترك فيها
  انثي ⁄ ذكر : الجنس_____________  :العمر
  ____________________________________________________________ :الوظيفه
  ___________:خطه التاميين العائليه___________, : عائليه__________ , : عام: نوع وثيقه التاميين
  ___________:عدد افراد الاسره المضموميين لوثيقه التاميين
  _______________:الفتره الزمنيه لوثيقه التاميين_____________ , :القسط الشهري لوثيقه التاميين
  ______________________________________:هل يوجد شرط جزائي عند إلغاء وثيقه التاميين
 
 metsyS erusolcsiD sOT tuoba snoitpecreP stnapicitraP -A
 
   ”MD“ msinahceM erusolcsiD .1
 
   ytilibaliavA msinahceM erusolcsiD .I
 س السؤال نعم لا
كالفائض المالي الناتج من عمليه تشغيل صندوق (الشركه قامت بإستعراض الفوائد المستحقه من الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين   
  .                                                      المؤمنين وعائد إستثمار المحفظه الاستثماريه للمؤمنين
 1
شركه التامين التكافلي اوضحت لي طريقه توزيع عوائد وارباح المحفظه الاستثماريه علي حمله وثائق التامين التكافلي   
  .                                                                   المشتركيين في نفس صندوق مال المؤمنين
 2
 
اوافق 
 بشده
 لااوافق لااوافق محايد اوافق
 بشده
 س السؤال
شركه التامين التكافلي دائما ما تتطلعني على الفتاوي الصادره من مجلس مستشاري      
طرق توزيع (اللجنه الشرعيه في كل امر يخص صندوق مال المؤمنين من  حيث 
الاصول في المحافظ , الفائض المتبقي من مختلف نشاطات صندوق مال المؤمنين 
, طريقه توزيع الارباح العائده من إستثمار المحفظه , بالمؤمنين الاستثماريه الخاصه 
طريقه الحصول على القرض الحسن , مشاركه المساهمين في صندوق مال المؤمنين
 ).وغيرها, لسد عجز صندوق مال المؤمنين
 3
 
    slooT msinahceM erusolcsiD .II
  اى من الوسائل التاليه تستخدم من قبل شركه التاميين التكافلي للتواصل معك 4
(   ) رسائل على الجوال  , (   )ندوات تثقيفيه بنظام التكافل , (   )خاصه إجتماعات , (   )رسائل بريديه , (   )الانترنت 
  (   )لقاءات إجتماعيه لزياده الترابط بين الشركه والمؤمن , (   )شركه التاميين التكافلي لاتتواصل معي , (   )إتصال هاتفي 
  __________):وضح ذلك لوسمحت(إجابه اخرى 
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  seiraidemretnI aiv msinahceM erusolcsiD .III
 س السؤال نعم لا
إذا , 6اذا كان الجواب نعم فانتقل لسؤال رقم , وسيط لشركه التامين الرئسيه⁄ هل اشتريت عقد التامين التكافلي عن طريق سمسار   
    .                                               من فضلك 8كان الجواب لا فانتقل لسؤال رقم 
 5
الوسيط لشركه التامين الرئسيه يمتلك كميه معقوله من المعلومات والخبره بخصوص الشريعه الاسلاميه ⁄  ان السمسار هل تعتقد   
  .وتطبيقاتها في التامين التكافلي
 6
ه الوسيط لشركه التامين الرئسيه يمتلك كميه معقوله من المعلومات العامه عن مختلف المواضيع الخاص⁄  هل تعتقد ان السمسار   
  . بالتامين التكافلي
 7
 
 
  snoitatcepxE & stnemevlovnI laicoS ,snoitacinummoC .VI
اوافق 
 بشده
لااوافق  لااوافق محايد اوافق
 بشده
 س السؤال
شركه التامين التكافلي تناقش معي وجهه نظري في النسبه المؤيه التي استحقها من      
.                 عوائد ارباح المحفظه الاستثماريه الخاصه بحمله وثائق التامين التكافلي
                                                              
 8
شركه التامين التكافلي تناقش معي وجهه نظري في النسبه المئويه التي استحقها من      
  .                       الفائض العام لصندوق مال المؤمنين
 9
شركه التامين التكافلي تناقش معي على الدوام كل مايختص باهدافي المتوقعه من      
  .                            مشاركتي بصندوق مال المؤمنين
 10
شركه التامين التكافلي دائما علي إتصال بي لمناقشه مختلف القضايا المستجده في عقد      
ووثيقه التامين الخاصه بي وايضا مناقشه كل المستجدات المتعلقه بصندوق مال 
  .                                             المؤمنين
 00
 
  )RID( snruteR tnemtsevnI fo erusolcsiD .2
 
 س السؤال نعم لا
شركه التاميين التكافلي اوضحت لك عن السياسات والاجراءات المتبعه بخصوص حقوقك المتعلقه في الصندوق المالي  هل  
  .من ناحيه العائد المالي من عمليات إستثمار المحافظ الاستثماريه للصندوق المالي للمؤمنين, للمؤمنين
 20
 30  .الشركه قامت بتوضيح الارباح والخسائر المتعلقه بالصندوق المالي للمؤمنين كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين  
 10  . كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح اداء المحفظه الاستثماريه  
 50  . لمحفظه الاستثماريهكمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح الوقت المتوقع لتوزيع عوائد الارباح من ا  
 60  . كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح الارباح  السابقه للمحفظه الاستثماريه  
 70  .  كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت محتوى وانواع الاصول في المحفظه الاستثماريه  
 
 )SUD( sulpruS gnitirwrednU fo erusolcsiD .3
 
 س السؤال نعم لا
شركه التاميين التكافلي اوضحت لك عن السياسات والاجراءات المتبعه بخصوص حقوقك المتعلقه في الصندوق المالي  هل  
  .من ناحيه الفايض المالي من عمليات تشغيل الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين, للمؤمنين
 80
كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح طريقه توزيع الفائض المالي من عمليات تشغيل الصندوق المالي   
  . للمؤمنين
 90
كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح طريقه التصرف بالفائض المالي الغير المستلم من عمليات تشغيل   
  .للمؤمنين من قبل حمله وثائق التامين التكافليالصندوق المالي 
 12
 334
 
كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح الطرق المختلفه لتوزيع الفائض المالي من عمليات تشغيل   
  .الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 02
 
 
 )CSD( ecnailpmoC h’airahS fo erusolcsiD .4
 س السؤال نعم لا
التاميين التكافلي اوضحت لك عن السياسات والاجراءات المتبعه بخصوص حقوقك المتعلقه في الصندوق المالي شركه  هل  
  .من ناحيه التوافق مع الشريعه الاسلاميه, للمؤمنين
 22
كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح التقرير السنوي الصادر عن الهيئه الشرعيه لشركه التامين   
  . التكافلي
 32
كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح الطريقة الشرعية المطبقة في توزيع فائض الارباح من تشغيل   
  .  صندوق مال المؤمنين
 12
كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح المعايير الشرعيه لتدقيق وفرز الاصول الموجوده في المحافظ   
  .الاستثمارية في صندوق مال المؤمنين
 52
المحافظ  كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح الطريقه الشرعيه المتبعه لتنقيه الاصول الموجوده في  
  .الاستثماريه الخاصه بصندوق مال المؤمنين
 62
 
 
 )ICD( seitinmednI dna smialC fo erusolcsiD .5
 
 )QDFD(  draQ dna sticifeD , seeF fo erusolcsiD .6
 
 )PKD( lennosreP yeK fo erusolcsiD .7
 س السؤال نعم لا
شركه التاميين التكافلي اوضحت لك عن السياسات والاجراءات المتبعه بخصوص حقوقك المتعلقه في الصندوق المالي  هل  
  .في حال وجود خساره ماديه من ناحيه إستحقاق التعويض, للمؤمنين
 72
 س السؤال نعم لا
كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح نسبة الحوافز التي تتقاضاها الشركة نتيجه الاداء الجيد في تشغيل   
وبالتالي الحصول فائض مالي في صندوق المؤمنين والحصول علي عائد مادي نتيجه إداره المحافظ , الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
  . الاستثماريه للمؤمنين
 82
كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح مصاريف شركه التامين التكافلي المباشره وغير المباشره والتي   
  . تستقطع من الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 92
كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح حقوق المؤمنين بالحصول علي قرض حسن لسد عجز مالي في   
  .الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 03
كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الشركه قامت بتوضيح ما إذا كان عائد المحافظ الاستثماريه الخاصه بصندوق المومنين    
  . يتستخدم لتغطية العجز من صندوق الحمايه من المخاطر وعند الموت
 13
 س السؤال نعم لا
قامت الشركه بتوضيح  إستثمار صندوق مال المؤمنين في الاسهم الخاصه بمالكي ,  كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين   
  .شركه التامين التكافلي
 23
الارباح من قامت الشركه بتوضيح مختلف الأنشطة التي يقوم بها المساهمين من فائض ,  كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين   
  .عمليه تشغيل الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 33
 434
 
 
 ssenerawA dna egdelwonK stnapicitraP -B
 
  )MPK( selpicnirP ledoM  lufakaT eht fo egdelwonK .1
 
 
  :ماهو نوع نموذج التكافل التعاوني الذي تشارك فيه .3
 
  ______________):وضح ذلك لوسمحت(إجابه اخري (    ) لا اعلم (    ) الوقف (    )  المضاربه (    ) الوكاله 
 
 
 )RIK( nruteR tnemtsevnI fo egdelwonK .2
 
 )SUK( sulpruS gnitirwrednU fo ssenerawA dna egdelwonK .3
 
 6.ق مال المومنين على حمله الوثائق  شركه التامين التكافلي توزع فائض صندو  : وفقا للاليه التاليه
 a( (   ).يوزع لجميع حمله وثائق التامين بدون تفرقه مابين من تقدم بطلب تعويض عن خساره ماليه او من لم يتقدم بطلب تعويض  
 b( (   ). يوزع فقط للمومنين الذين لم يطالبو باى تعويض خلال عقد التامين 
 c( يوزع للمومنين    (   ). ريه المدفوعه لشركه التامين لكن هذه التعويضات اقل من قيمه الاقساط الشه, الذين قامو بطلب تعويضات 
 d( (   ). لا اعلم  
 
  )CSK( ecnailpmoC h’airahS fo egdelwonK .4
 
 
قامت الشركه بتوضيح مختلف القرارات التي صدرت من قبل مجلس الإدارة في ما ,  كمشارك في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين   
  .يخص الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 43
 س السؤال نعم لا
.    هل شركه التاميين التكافلي اعطتك موجز عن اساسيات وطبيعه النموذج التشغيلي للصندوق المالي للمؤمنين الذي تشارك فيه  
                                                                                                        
 0
 2  .                                                                                التاميينهل يوجد فتره معينه لالغاء وثيقه   
 س السؤال نعم لا
 4 هل انت على درايه بالفرق مابين  صندوق التاميين والحمايه من المخاطر وعند الموت و صندوق التوفير الاستثماري العائلي  
 س السؤال نعم لا
درايه بالفرق مابين  الفائض الاجمالي من عمليات تشغيل الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين والفائض الصافي من عمليات هل انت على   
  .تشغيل الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 5
 س السؤال نعم لا
 7  .هل انت على درايه بالفرق بين إعاده التامين التجاري و إعاده التامين التكافلي  
 534
 
 )QDFK( draQ dna sticifeD ,seeF ,sesnepxE fo egdelwonK .5
 
اي الرسوم التاليه تستقطعه شركه التاميين من الصندوق المالي , من اجل الخدمه المقدمه من شركه التاميين التكافلي .8
  : للمؤمنين
 a(.  (   ).  رسوم تدفع لشركه التاميين التكافلي لاداره وتشغيل الصندوق المالي للمشاركيين باستخدام نظام الوكاله   
 b(. رسوم   (   ).    التاميين التكافلى لاستثمار المحافظ الاستثماريه المتواجده في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنينتدفع لشركه 
 c(.  (   ).  لا اعلم  
 d(. ______________):وضح ذلك لوسمحت(إجابه اخري  
 
 9. :فى اى الظروف التاليه سوف تكون ملزم امام شركه التاميين التكافلي لدفع مبلغ إضافي
 a(  (   ).    لسد عجز مالي في عمليات تشغيل الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 b(  (   ).    لرفع مستوى رأس المال المدخر للصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 c(  (   ).   لدفع دين القرض الحسن المقدم من قبل ملاك شركه التاميين التكافلي لسد عجز مالي في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 d(  ).    ( لا اعلم 
 e( __________):وضح ذلك لوسمحت(إجابه اخرى . 
 
 
  )PKK( seitivitcA dna rewoP lennosreP yeK s’ynapmoC eht fo egdelwonK .6
 
  هل انت علي درايه بالشخصيات القياديه التاليه في شركه التاميين التكافلي 00  :                                                         
 a(  (   ).  مجلس اعضاء مديري إداره شركه التاميين التكافلي  
 b( (   ). ملاك الاسهم الرئسيين لشركه التاميين التكافلي 
 c( (   ). لعليا في شركه التامين التكافلي الاداره ا
 d( (   ). مجلس إداره مستشاري اللجنه الشريعيه في شركه التامين التكافلي 
 e(  (   ).  الشركه " الخبير بشؤون التامين"إكتواري 
 f(  (   ).  الفريق الموكل بإستثمار الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين 
 g( إذا كانت المحافظ الاستثماريه للصندوق المالي للمؤمنين تستثمر عن طريق شركه  خارجيه  (شركه الاستثمار الخارجيه 
  ) (   ). وليس بواسطه شركه التاميين التكافلي         
 h(  (   ).  لا اعلم  
 
 20. : يهل ملاك الاسهم الرئيسسين في شركه التاميين التكافلي يشاركون المؤمنين ف  
 a(  (   ).   الفايض المالي العام من عمليات تشغيل الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 b(  (   ).  العائد المالي من عمليات إستثمار المحافظ الاستثماريه للصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 c(  (   ).  لااعلم 
 
 
 س السؤال نعم لا
 10  .هل طلبت منك شركه التامين التكافلي من قبل دفع رسوم إضافيه لسد العجز الحاصل في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين  
 634
 
 )CDK( snoitpO gnittiuQ & noitcafsitassiD fo egdelwonK .7
 31. : ما الخيارات الممنوحه من قبل شركه التاميين التكافلي في حال عدم رضاك عن الخدمه المقدمه منهم  
 a(  (   ).   التظلم والشكوى لجهه معنيه في شركه التاميين التكافلي  
 b(  (   ).  الغي إشتراكي في اى وقت والانتقال إلي شركه تاميين اخرى  
 c(  (   ).  خيارات في حال عدم رضائي عن الخدمه المقدمه منهم لم تقدم لي شركه التاميين اى 
 d(  (   ).  لااعلم  
 e( __________ ):وضح ذلك لوسمحت(إجابه اخرى 
 10. : اي من الجهات التاليه يمكن اللجو إليها في حال وجود إختلاف بيني وبين شركه التاميين
 a( (   ). شركات التاميين والمؤمينين جهه ثالثه مختصه بعمليه فض النزاعات الحاصله مابين 
 b( (   ). محكمه مختصه بفض النزاعات التجاريه والماليه 
 c( (   ). جهه محققه في الشكاوي ضد شركات التاميين 
 d(  (   ).  لااعلم  
 e( __________):وضح ذلك لوسمحت(إجابه اخرى  
 
  secnereferP stnapicitraP - C
 
  )CSP( ecnailpmoc h’airahS rof secnereferP ’stnapicitraP .1
اوافق 
 بشده
لااوافق  لااوافق محايد اوافق
 بشده
 س السؤال
مجلس مستشاري اللجنه الشرعيه لايعطون الوقت الكافي لإصدار احكام شرعيه تخص      
 .   مختلف القضايا التي تتعلق بصندوق مال المؤمنين
 1
لي الفرصة للتصويت لاختيار اعضاء مجلس إداره مستشاري اللجنه  أود أن تتاح     
 .الشريعيه في شركه التامين التكافلي
 2
 
 )BRP( sthgir gnitov & evitatneserpeR .2
 
اوافق 
 بشده
لااوافق  لااوافق محايد اوافق
 بشده
 س السؤال
المشاركين من حمله هل تفضل ان يكون لك مندوب او متحدث بالنيابه عنك وعن جميع      
وظيفه المندوب هو ان يحضر جلسات مجلس إداره شركه , وثائق التامين التكافلي
 .التامين التكافلي وان يناقش مختلف القضايا التي تختص بصندوق مال المؤمنين
 3
 
 )PKP( seitivitcA dna rewoP lennosreP yeK sO.T no secnereferP ’stnapicitraP .3
اوافق 
 بشده
لااوافق  لااوافق محايد اوافق
 بشده
 س السؤال
شركه التامين التكافلي يجب ان تعطيني جميع الخيارات والحقوق لرفض تدخل      
, كالمشاركه في الفائض التشغيلي للصندوق (المساهمين في صندوق مال المؤمنين 
 ). وغيره, إستثمار عوائد الارباح من المحفظه الاستثماره لصالحهم
 4
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 )URP( yciloP lufakaT a gniyuB rof nosaeR eht no secnereferP ’stnapicitraP .4
  لماذا إستخدمت نظام التاميين التكافلي  .1
 a( . لحمايه نفسي من عواقب خسائر ماليه  (    )  
 b( .  (    ) لعمل خطط مستقبليه تضمن مستقبل ورثتي من بعدى 
 c( .  (    ) امين التكافلي في حال تعرضهم لخسائر ماليه لمساعده شركاء اخرين في نفس صندوق الت
 d( .  (    ) لان الدوله فرضت التاميين الاجباري علي المواطنين والمقيمين 
 e( .  (    ) لتوافقه مع الشريعه الاسلاميه 
 f( . ______________ ):وضح ذلك لوسمحت(إجابه اخري 
 
  :ضلهما هو نوع التاميين الاستثمارى الذى تف .6
 a( .  (   ). ومع قسط شهرى عالي نسبيا , لكن مع عائد مالي قليل , تاميين إسلامي موافق للشريعه الاسلاميه
 b( .  (   ).  ومع قسط شهرى منخفض نسبيا , تاميين تجارى غير موافق للشريعه الاسلاميه لكن مع عائد مالي مرتفع 
 
 )UCP( sulpruS gnitirwrednU dna smialC rof secnereferP ’stnapicitraP .5
 س السؤال نعم لا
هل تعتقد انك مازلت تستحق المشاركه في , بالرغم انك تقدمت بطلب تعويض لشركه التاميين التكافلي عن خسائر ماليه حصلت لك  
الفائض المالي الناتج من عمليات تشغيل الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين كما انك تستحق المشاركه في الارباح الناتجه من إستثمار 
  .    لمؤمنينالمحافظ الاستثماريه الخاصه با
 7
 
 
هل تعتقد انه , عند مطالبه احد المشاركيين في صندوق مال المؤمنين بتعويض مالي من الصندوق نتيجه لخساره ماليه حصلت له  
 8  .                                                                           مازال يستحق المشاركه في الفائض العام من صندوق مال المؤمنين
 
  leveL noitcafsitaS stnapicitraP - D
 
 )MDS( smsinahceM erusolcsiD ’s.O.T eht htiw noitcafsitaS .1
 
راض 
 بشده
 محائد راض
غير 
 راض
غير راضي 
 بشده
 س السؤال
هل أنت راض عن الاليه المستخدمه من اكتوارى شركه التامين التكافلي في نقل      
متطلباتك إلي شركه التكافل وايضا توضيح حقوقك المستحقه من شركه التامين 
والمشاركه في عوائد , كالمشاركه في الفائض المتبقي من صندوق مال المؤمنين
 . الارباح من إستثمار المحفظه الاستثماره للمؤمنين
 1
هل انت راض عن الاليه المستخدمه في توضيح حقوق المؤمنين في الاشتراك في      
الفائض المتبقي من صندوق مال المؤمنين وفي الاشتراك في عوائد الارباح الناتجه من 
 .إستثمار المحافظ الاستثماريه لصندوق مال المؤمنين
 2
شركه التامين التكافلي لتوضيح احقيه هل انت راض عن الاليه المستخدمه من قبل      
صندوق مال المؤمنين بالحصول على قرض حسن لسد اى عجز مالي قد يطرا على 
 .الصندوق
 3
هل انت راض عن اليه شركه التامين التكافلي لتوضيح اي مستجدات قد تطراء على      
 . شروط وثيقه عقد التامين مابين الشركه والمؤمن
 4
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 )RIS( nruteR tnemtsevnI eht htiw noitcafsitaS .2
 
راض 
 بشده
 محائد راض
غير 
 راض
غير راضي 
 بشده
 س السؤال
هل انت راض عن نسبه العوائد والارباح من تشغيل المحفظه الاستثماريه الخاصه      
 .بالمؤمنين
 5
هل انت راض عن الطريقه المستخدمه لتوزيع وتقسيم عوائد الارباح الناتجه من      
 .إستثمار المحافظ الاستثماريه لصندوق مال المؤمنين
 6
 
 )SUS( sulpruS gnitirwrednU eht htiw noitcafsitaS .3
 
راض 
 بشده
 محائد راض
غير 
 راض
غير راضي 
 بشده
 س السؤال
هل انت راض علي النسبه او الكميه المعلنه والمقدمه من قبل شركه التامين التكافلي      
 .حال وجود فائض في صندوق مال المؤمنينلحمله الوثائق في 
 7
هل انت راض عن الطريقه المستخدمه في توضيح وتوزيع الفائض العام المتبقي من      
 .صندوق مال المؤمنين علي حمله الوثائق المستحقين للمشاركه
 8
 
 )CSS( ecnailpmoC h’airahS htiw noitcafsitaS .4
 
راض 
 بشده
غير  محايد راض 
 راض
راض غير 
 بشده
 س السؤال
هل أنت راض عن الاليه                                                                           
المستخدمه من قبل الهيئه الشرعيه في شركه التامين التكافلي للتوافق وتحكيم مختلف 
  .  القضايا التي تطرا على صندوق مال المؤمنين وفقا لاحكام الشريعه
 9
هل انت راض عن الطريقه المستخدمه من قبل مجلس مستشاري اللجنه الشرعيه في      
 .      تقسيم الفائض الناتج من النشاطات المختلفه لصندوق مال المؤمنين
 01
 
 )ICS( seitinmednI & smialC htiw noitcafsitaS .5
 
راض 
 بشده
غير  محايد راض 
 راض
غير راض 
 بشده
 س السؤال
هل أنت راض عن الشروط والقيود المنصوص عليها في عقد التامين التكافلي في حال      
 . التعويضات المؤقته او التعويضات النهائيه عند تعرض حامل الوثيقه لخسائر ماديه
 11
هل انت راض عن اليه وخطوات وشروط تعويض الخسائر لحمله الوثائق من قبل      
 .  شركه التامين التكافلي
 21
هل انت راض عن الفتره الزمنيه الموضحه في وثيقه عقد التامين لتعويض المؤمنين      
 .  في حال وجود خسائر بعد إستيفاء جميع شروط التعويض
 31
هل انت راض عن الشروط والمصطلحات الوارده في عقد وثيقه التامين لتعويض      
 .المؤمن في حال وجود خسائر ماديه
 41
 
 )QDFS( draQ dna sticifeD ,seeF degrahC htiw noitcafsitaS .6
 
راض 
 بشده
 محائد راض
غير 
 راض
غير راضي 
 بشده
 س السؤال
إذا طلبت منك شركه التامين التكافلي دفع رسوم إضافيه لسد العجز  هل انت راض       
 .الحاصل في الصندوق المالي للمؤمنين
 51
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هل انت راض عن مقدار الحوافز المستقطعه من صندوق مال المؤمنين لمكافاءه إداره      
شركه التامين التكافلي لجهدهم في الحصول على فائض مالي في صندوق مال 
 .  المؤمنين وايضا لجهدهم في إيجاد عوائد او ارباح من تشغيل المحافظ الاستثماريه
 61
 
 )PKS( seitivitcA dna rewoP lennosreP yeK s’ynapmoC eht htiw noitcafsitaS .7
 
راض 
 بشده
غير  محايد راض 
 راض
غير راض 
 بشده
 س السؤال
المؤمنين (هل انت راض ان تشارك شركه التامين التكافلي مع حمله الوثائق      
في الفائض الناتج من مختلف الانشطه في ) المشتركين في نفس صندوق مال المؤمنين
صندوق مال المؤمنين وايضا ان تشارك في عوائد الارباح الناتجه من إستثمار 
               .               المحفظه الاستثماريه للمؤمنين
 71
 81 .هل انت راض عن نسبه الاسهم المملوكه لبعض المساهمين في شركه التامين التكافلي     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
